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Abstract 
 
The U.S. government appears incapable of creating an adequate strategy to alter the 
behavior of the wide variety of malicious actors seeking to inflict harm or damage through 
cyberspace. This thesis provides a systematic analysis of contemporary deterrence 
strategies and offers the U.S. the strategic option of active cyber defense designed for 
continuous cybered conflict. It examines the methods and motivations of the wide array of 
malicious actors operating in the cyber domain. The thesis explores how the theories of 
strategy and deterrence underpin the creation of strategic deterrence options and what role 
deterrence plays with respect to strategies, as a subset, a backup, an element of one or another 
strategic choice.  It looks at what the government and industry are doing to convince 
malicious actors that their attacks will fail and that risk of consequences exists.  The thesis 
finds that contemporary deterrence strategies of retaliation, denial and entanglement lack 
the conditions of capability, credibility, and communications that are necessary to change 
the behavior of malicious actors in cyberspace.  This research offers a midrange theory of 
active cyber defense as a way to compensate for these failings through internal systemic 
resilience and tailored disruption capacities that both frustrate and punish the wide range of 
malicious actors regardless of origin or intentions. The thesis shows how active cyber defense 
is technically capable and legally viable as an alternative strategy in the U.S. to strengthen 
the deterrence of cyber attacks. 
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Abbreviations 
 
A2/AD Anti-access/Area denial 
ACD Active Cyber Defense 
AIS Automated Indicator Sharing   
APT Advanced Persistent Threat 
BPHS Bulletproof Hosting Services  
CBM  Confidence-Building Measure  
CFAA Computer Fraud and Abuse Act  
CIS Center for Internet Security  
CISP Cybersecurity Strategy and Implementation Plan 
CMF  Cyber Mission Force   
CSC  Critical Security Controls  
DCO Defensive Cyberspace Operations  
DDoS Distributed Denial of Service  
DHS Department of Homeland Security 
DIUx Defense Innovation Unit Experimental   
DNC Democratic National Committee  
DNS Domain Name System  
DOD Department of Defense 
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone 
EU European Union 
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 
FS Financial Services  
FTP File Transfer Protocol  
GDP Gross Domestic Product  
GLACY Global Action on Cybercrime 
GOP Guardians of Peace 
G-20 Group of Twenty 
GPS Global Positioning System 
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GSCI Global Socio-Cyber Infrastructure 
HM Her Majesty’s 
HTTP(S) Hypertext Transfer Protocol (Secure) 
IACD Integrated Adaptive Cyber Defense  
ICANN Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
ICMP Internet Control Message Protocol  
ICS-CERT Industrial Control System – Computer Emergency Response Team  
ICT Information and Communication Technology 
IDM Internal Defensive Measures 
IP  Intellectual Property 
IP Internet Protocol  
ISAC Information Sharing and Analysis Center 
ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 
NSA National Security Agency  
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NCCIC National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center  
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology 
NTP Network Time Protocol   
OPM Office of Personnel Management 
OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe  
PII Personally Identifiable Information  
PIN Personal Identification Number 
POS Point-of-Sale 
PPD  Presidential Policy Directive  
PLA People’s Liberation Army 
RA Response Actions  
RAM Remote Access Memory 
RAT Remote Access Trojan  
SIEM Security Information and Event Management  
SSL Secure Sockets Layer  
6 
 
STIX Structured Threat Information eXpression 
SQL Structured Query Language 
TAXII Trusted Automated eXchange of Indicator Information 
TTP Tactics, Techniques and Procedures 
UK United Kingdom 
UN United Nations 
UNCLOS UN Convention on Law of the Sea 
URL uniform resource locator 
XML Extensible Markup Language 
  
7 
 
Introduction 
 
Headlines in May 2017 were dominated by the massive WannaCry ransomware 
attack that hit 74 countries across Europe and Asia, affecting more than a dozen hospitals 
in England’s National Health System.1  Even worse than this criminal activity is the threat 
to critical infrastructure as seen by the malware infections at electrical distribution 
companies in Ukraine that caused outages to 225,000 customers in late 2015. 2  
Furthermore, recent reports on alleged Russian hacks into the U.S. Democratic National 
Committee and the staff of French candidate Emmanuel Macron, coupled with subsequent 
release of emails or content in coercive campaigns to apparently influence Presidential 
Elections have brought national attention to the inadequacy of cyber deterrence. 3  All 
sectors of the economy rely on the networks, systems, and services that form cyberspace.4  
 
 Information and Communication Technologies [ICTs] form the technical backbone of 
these networks and are equally essential to the defense sector, especially during the conduct of 
military operations.  Yet protecting cyberspace is challenging because it is currently borderless, 
subject to dynamic change, and open to all comers.  The cybered society is probed and 
penetrated by nation states, hacker groups, criminal organizations, and terrorist groups or lone 
wolves.  These entities called malicious or threat actors can be partially or wholly responsible for 
                                                          
1 Robert McMillian, Jenny Gross, and Denise Roland, “Major Cyberattack Sweeps Globe, 
Hitting FedEx, U.K. Hospitals, Spanish Companies,” The Wall Street Journal, May 12, 2017. 
2 Electrical Information Sharing and Analysis Center, “Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the 
Ukrainian Power Grid,” March 18, 2016: 1-25. 
3 Adam Nossiter, David E. Sanger and Nicole Perlroth, “Hackers Came, But the French Were 
Prepared,” New York Times, May 10, 2017. 
4 The basis of this introduction first appeared in Strategic Studies Quarterly Vol. 9, No. 1 
(Spring 2015). The thesis is drawn from recent publication of my book titled Strategic Cyber 
Deterrence: The Active Cyber Defense Option (New York, Rowman & Littlefield: July 2017). 
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a cyber incident that dramatically reduces an organization’s security.5  Many of these malicious 
actors seek state secrets, trade secrets, technology, and ideas, or they develop the ability to strike 
critical infrastructure and harm advanced economies.6  Hacker groups and criminal gangs often 
work in concert with state actors, under some form of control, direction, incitement or other more 
nebulous arrangement.  That intertwined relationship allows foreign governments to hide their 
malicious activity and claim innocence if confronted.7  In addition, malicious actors use common 
tools, techniques and talent, available for purchase at very low prices on illicit web sites on the 
worldwide underground market.8  This convergence of actor relationships, motivations, tactics, 
and capabilities complicates attribution of an attack9  and makes using a single option to change 
the behavior of an individual actor, such as the nation state, impossible and impractical to 
counter cyber attacks.  
 
Malicious actor attacks, via cyberspace, target “an enterprise’s use of cyberspace for the 
purpose of disrupting, disabling, destroying, or maliciously controlling a computing 
environment/ infrastructure; or destroying the integrity of the data or stealing controlled 
information.”10  Recent incidents show cyber attacks are employed and refined in a systematic, 
coordinated manner in an effort to achieve actor objectives.  Criminal exploitation, military or 
                                                          
5 Ivy Wigmore, “Threat Actor Definition,” Security Threats and Countermeasures Glossary, 
January 2016.  
6 Robert Anderson, Jr. “Cybersecurity, Terrorism, and Beyond: Addressing Evolving Threats to 
the Homeland,” testimony before the Committee on Homeland Security and Government 
Affairs, US Senate, September 10, 2014.    
7 Ian Duncan, “Cyber Command chief: Foreign governments use criminals to hack U.S. 
systems,” The Baltimore Sun, March 16, 2016. 
8 Dell Secure Works, “Underground Hacker Markets,” Annual Report, April 2016: 1-22.  
9 Mandiant, “M Trends 2015: A View From the Front Lines,” Alexandria, Virginia, June 2015; 
20-22. 
10 National Institute of Standards and Technology, “Glossary of Key Information Security 
Terms,” NISTIR 7298 Revision 2, May 2013: 57.    
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industrial espionage, nationalist hacker protests, and infrastructure infiltration or sabotage are 
prominent in actor operations and campaigns.  The motivations to conduct malicious activity 
vary, from criminals looking for financial gain, hacktivists promoting a cause, and state actors 
engaging in espionage (military or economic) or infiltrating critical infrastructure.11  In many 
cases the actors conducting crime, espionage or disruption are the same.  Even more so, all 
malicious actors in cyberspace have one thing in common: an increasing choice of attack 
methods. In deciding to attack, each actor will assess the effort against the expected benefit 
under their own criteria or rationality.  As a strategic response to the threat of cyber attacks, 
deterrence seeks to change adversary perceptions of costs, benefits and restraint.12  A daunting 
and critical question is whether contemporary deterrence strategies are sufficient to deter 
malicious actors in cyberspace in a multi-faceted approach or would an alternative strategy be 
more effective?   
 
 Governments have every reason to search for responses to challenges in cyberspace and 
deterrence is a key response.  Deterrence is “the prevention of an adversary’s undesired 
action.”13 Contemporary deterrence occurs when an adversary’s believes that a threat of 
retaliation exists, the intended action cannot succeed, or the costs outweigh the benefits of 
acting.14  Therefore deterrence centers on ways to impose costs, deny benefit, or encourage 
restraint.  The strategic debate during the Cold War over how best to deter the threat of nuclear 
attack was separated into first ‘deterrence by punishment’ (threat of retaliation that imposes 
                                                          
11 Adam Bromwich, Symantec, “Emerging Cyber Threats to the United States,” Testimony 
before House Committee on Homeland Security, February 25, 2016. 
12 U.S. Department of Defense, The DOD Cyber Strategy, April 2015: 11. 
13 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Operation Planning, Joint Publication 5-0 (Washington, 
DC: Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011): E-2. 
14 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-0, (Washington, DC: Office 
of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 17 January 2017): VI-4. 
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costs) and second into ‘deterrence by denial’ (limitation of damage by denial of success).15 Since 
U.S. policy would not condone today the punishment of another country, a more appropriate 
view of the first method would simply be ‘deterrence by retaliation.’ In contemplation of 
strategic interdependence spawn from contemporary globalization, one might also add a third 
method titled ‘deterrence by entanglement’ (presumably cooperation on mutual interests 
encourages restraint to avoid unintended consequences and antagonizing third parties).16 These 
three contemporary strategic deterrence options could conceivably apply in some fashion for 
cyberspace.  Although an argument can be made that especially in the Cold War, deterrence 
functions worked only amongst stable actors and in situations of overall stability.  Some actors 
(e.g. ISIS) cannot be deterred by traditional thinking.  
 
Cyberspace – A National Achilles Heel? 
 
Cyberspace is defined by the military as “a global domain within the information 
environment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures 
and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and 
embedded processors and controllers.”17 For social, technical, and economic purposes, 
cyberspace can be considered as more than a domain but a substrate. In this usage, a “substrate” 
is an underlying physical layer on which modern society is built.18 Cyberspace uniquely 
underpins every facet of social, technical and economic systems in developed societies. This 
                                                          
15 Schuyler Forester, “Theoretical Foundations: Deterrence in the Nuclear Age,” in American 
Defense Policy, Schuyler Foerster and Edward Wright, eds., 6th ed. (Baltimore, MD: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1990): 47-51. 
16 Roger Harrison et al., “Space Deterrence: The Delicate Balance of Risk,” Space and Defense 3 
(Summer 2009). 
17 See Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated 
Terms (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, As Amended Through 15 October 2016), 60. 
18 David J. Betz and Tim Stevens, Cyberspace and the State: Toward a Strategy for Cyber-
Power, (Routledge, 2011): 37. 
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substrate has a topology that is largely territorial, built by people unlike other traditional domains 
of warfare. The services relied upon in daily life, such as water distribution, healthcare, 
electricity generation, transportation, and financial transactions, depend on this underlying 
information technology infrastructure.19 Systems or assets supporting these services are 
designated as critical infrastructure, deemed so because their incapacity or destruction would 
have “a debilitating impact” on national or economic security, public health or safety.20 Because 
most critical infrastructure supports military operations, any significant disruption to the integrity 
of their networks could compromise the military’s abilities to protect the nation.21  In talking 
about the hypothetical dangers of what has been called a ‘Cyber Pearl Harbor,’ Representative 
Mike Rogers stated in 2014 that “the threat of a catastrophic and damaging cyberattack in the 
United States critical infrastructure like our power or financial networks is actually becoming 
less hypothetical every day.”22 
 
  Not only has the volume of malicious code, known as malware, that threatens the 
functioning of critical infrastructure, increased to over 390,000 new programs each day,23 but 
also the means of malware delivery have expanded to take advantage of human or technological 
weaknesses and modern day platforms.  A specific method used to access equipment, computers 
or systems to deliver malware or other hostile outcomes is called a ‘cyber attack vector’ by 
                                                          
19 Sean P. McGurk, National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center Director, 
“The DHS Cybersecurity Mission: Promoting Innovation and Securing Critical Infrastructure,” 
Testimony before the US House Committee on Homeland Security, April 15, 2011. 
20 Executive Office of the President, “Executive Order -- Improving Critical Infrastructure 
Cybersecurity,” (Washington: The White House, February 12, 2013). 
21 William J. Lynn III, Deputy Secretary of Defense, “Remarks on the Department of Defense 
Cyber Strategy,” Delivered at National Defense University, Washington, DC, July 14, 2011.  
22 Mike Rogers, “Cybersecurity Threats: The Way Forward,” Hearing of the House (Select) 
Intelligence Committee, Washington, DC, November 20, 2014.  
23 AV Test, The Independent IT-Security Institute, Malware Statistics, August 9, 2016: 
https://www.av-test.org/en/statistics/malware/.  
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security professionals.24  Vast arrays of vectors threaten industrial, commercial, governmental 
and military systems and devices.  These attack methods have grown in complexity and 
sophistication, ranging from emails specifically tailored by attackers, using information found in 
social sites (a technique call social engineering), to spark interest of individuals to click on links 
or open attachments loaded with malware in ‘spear phishing’ attacks, or the planting of 
malicious code on legitimate sites visited by targeted individuals in what is called a ‘watering 
hole’ attack.25  Auxiliary means for malware delivery include compromises of physical devices, 
like when an infected flash drive inserted into a U.S. military laptop spread code onto network 
systems,26 or compromises of third party vendors of services and supplies that have trusted 
access to corporate networks, which is becoming a common occurrence.27  The most sensational 
and publicized methods are intrusions by groups of attackers categorized as an “advanced 
persistent threat” (APT) and assaults using distributed denial of service (DDoS) methods. The 
APT group’s form of hacking is designed to covertly penetrate networks and systems to steal or 
alter information, manipulate data, or cause damage. DDoS assaults disrupt website availability 
by overwhelming network equipment with high volume requests by compromised computers or 
by consuming application processing resources.28 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
24 Kevin G. Coleman, “The Cyber Commander’s eHandbook: The Strategies and Tactics of 
Digital Conflict,” version 4, Technolytics, 2013, 52-80. 
25 Symantec, “Internet Security Threat Report,” Volume 19, April 2014: 26 and 34. 
26 William J. Lynn III, Deputy Secretary of Defense, “Defending a New Domain,” Foreign 
Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 5, September/October 2010. 
27 Chris Strohm, “U.S. Intelligence to help Companies avert Supply-Chain Hacking,” Bloomberg 
News, August 10, 2016. 
28 Securosis, “Defending Against Denial of Service Attacks,” White Paper, Version 1.3, October 
31, 2012: 1-24.  
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New Emergent Forms of Peacetime Conflict 
 
 As a result of ‘cyber attack vector’ proliferation, highly motivated threat actors at any 
level now have myriad methods to conduct malicious activity in cyberspace. Primary areas of 
malicious activity are the theft or exploitation of data; disruption or denial of access or service; 
and destructive action comprising corruption, manipulation, and damage or the alteration of data 
– at rest and in motion. The buying or renting of malicious code viruses, exploits of code 
vulnerabilities (software and computer configuration flaws – including zero days), botnets 
(collections of compromised computers), and command and control servers (used for 
instructions) provides these actors with a ready array of tools and services.  Some actors use 
these tools and services in “cyber warfare”, which is a widely used and contested term. U.S. 
military joint terminology defines cyber warfare as “an armed conflict conducted in whole or 
part by cyber means.”29 Here an attacker could launch a military confrontation during a period of 
tension by attacking civilian infrastructure, a cyber attack just prior to or simultaneously with a 
surprise military attack, or wait until war starts to activate implanted exploits.30  In addition to 
“military operations to deny an opposing force the effective use of cyberspace systems and 
weapons in a conflict,”31 state cyber campaign doctrine appears to include disruption of 
governmental services, financial enterprises, and media outlets.  For example in August 2008, 
when Russian troops engaged Georgian forces during their ground invasion, six command and 
control servers, managed by a cybercrime group, issued DDoS attack commands on select 
Georgian government, news and banking sites.32 This instance and many others since indicate 
                                                          
29 James E. Cartwright, “Joint Terminology for Cyberspace Operations” (Washington, DC: 
Office of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 2010), 8. 
30 Martin C. Libicki, Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar, (Santa Monica, California: RAND 
Corporation, 2009): 143-149. 
31 Joint Terminology for Cyberspace Operations, 8. 
32 Jeff Carr, “Russia/Georgia Cyber War – Findings and Analysis,” Project Grey Goose: Phase I 
Report, October 17, 2008. 
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that disruptive and destructive cyber attacks on critical infrastructure are becoming a part of 
modern conflict. 
 
  Although “cyber warfare” as defined above has entered into the common lexicon, the 
term “cybered conflict” or “cyber enabled conflict” characterizes more appropriately the 
essential nature of modern military operations.  Cybered conflict frames the complexity and 
ambiguity of struggle involving cyberspace, including hybrid warfare (multi modes) and 
insurgent campaigns that exploit the domain or use attack methods in the form discussed 
previously.33  Cybered conflict symbolizes “old and new forms of conflict born of, enabled 
through, or dramatically altered by cyberspace.”34 For instance, malicious activity occurred in 
cyberspace during Russian military operations in Crimea.  Operations started with the seizure of 
Ukrtelecom offices and the physical cutting of telephone and internet cables.35  Groups like 
OpRussia and Russian Cyber Command (Rucyborg)36 that opposed annexation conducted DDoS 
attacks against Russian sites,37 while pro-Russian CyberBerkut was active against NATO, in 
particular targeting their main public website before Crimea’s vote in March 2014 to secede from 
Ukraine and join Russia.38   Berkut is a reference to the feared riot squads of ousted pro-Russian 
President Victor Yanukovich.  CyberBerkut also compromised the Central Election Commission 
during Ukraine’s presidential election in May 2014, disabling real-time display updates in the 
                                                          
33 Chris Demchak, “Cybered Conflict, Cyber Power, and Security Resilience as Strategy,” 
Cyberspace and National Security, (Georgetown University Press, 2012): 121-136. 
34 Peter Dombrowski and Chris Demchak, “Cyber War, Cybered Conflict, and the Maritime 
Domain,” Naval War College Review, April 1, 2014: 3. 
35 John Leyden, “Battle apparently underway in Russia-Ukraine conflict, The Register, March 4, 
2014.  
36 Meto Ddihadzijanev, “Hacktivists of the Russian Cyber Command,” Scribd, April 10, 2014.  
37 Mark Clayton, “Massive cyberattacks slam official sites in Russia, Ukraine,” Christian 
Science Monitor, March 18, 2014.  
38 Adrian Croft and Peter Apps, “NATO Websites hit in cyber attack linked to Crimea tension,” 
Reuters, March 16, 2014. 
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vote count and posting false results.39  Political conflicts between nations have also spawned 
cyber attacks against Western news organizations.40 The Syrian Electronic Army, a group of pro-
regime hackers, has compromised external-facing websites and social media accounts of The 
New York Times, The Associated Press, CNN, The Huffington Post and Forbes, to promote the 
embattled Syrian regime.41 
 
Rising State-level Security Concerns  
 
  The former U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta warned that the attacks on energy 
companies in the Arabian Gulf and on banks in the United States mark a significant escalation of 
the cyber threat and renewed concerns over still more destructive scenarios.42  Shamoon 
malware, which is intended to destroy data, infected some 30,000 workstations at Saudi Aramco 
Oil Company in August 2012, rendering them unusable.43  A partial photo showing the burning 
of an American flag was used to overwrite the content of the files. Weeks later, Qatar’s RasGas 
suffered a major malware attack that shut down its website and email servers but not production 
systems.44 In September 2012, six major American banks were hit in a wave of DDoS attacks 
that caused Internet blackouts and delays in online banking.  Even though the attackers 
                                                          
39 Nikolay Koval, “Revolution Hacking,” Cyber War in Perspective: Russian aggression against 
Ukraine, Chapter 6, (Tallinn, Estonia, NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence 
Publications, 2015): 55-58. 
40 Mandiant, “M Trends: Beyond the Breach,” Alexandria, Virginia, April 2014: 1-7.    
41 Patrick Tucker, “Syrian Electronic Army Threatens to Hack CENTCOM,” Defense One, 
March 3, 2014.  
42 Leon E. Panetta, “Defending the Nation from Cyber Attack,” Business Executives for National 
Security, New York, October 11, 2012.  
43 Kelly Jackson Higgins, “Shamoon Code ‘Amateur’ But Effective,” Dark Reading, September 
11, 2012. 
44 Danielle Walker, “Natural gas giant RasGas targeted in cyber attack,” SC Magazine, August 
31, 2012.   
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announced the time and targets in advance, the financial institutions were unable to prevent their 
websites from being disrupted.45  In Ukraine in December 2015, three different regional 
electricity distribution companies were attacked by malware infections that caused outages to 
approximately 225,000 customers.  A third party entered into company computer and control 
systems to remote control distribution management systems and shut off substation breakers.46  
The delineations between the various phases of the operation suggest different levels of actors 
worked on different parts and possible collaboration between cyber criminals and state actors.47  
 
 While most attacks to date have not spilled far beyond the digital world, security experts 
seem to agree that the threat to critical infrastructure is real.  For example, Meredith Patterson, an 
information security expert says “It is remarkably easy to just mess with the temperature 
someplace in a natural gas plant and catch the entire plant on fire.”48  Just because attacks on 
critical infrastructure do not happen very often does not mean they are not possible.  
 
As of today, preparations for cybered conflict are already included in the Phase Zero or 
“Shape” Phase found in the notional six-phase model of joint and multinational operations 
described in US joint doctrine. This doctrine presents military operations leading to “war” as a 
natural progression of activities, from shaping, deterring, seizing initiative, dominating, 
stabilizing to enabling civil authority.49 Certainly two major adversaries are attempting to shape 
                                                          
45 Nicole Perlroth, “Attacks on 6 Banks Frustrate Customers,” The New York Times, September 
30, 2012.  
46 Electrical Information Sharing and Analysis Center, “Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the 
Ukrainian Power Grid,” March 18, 2016: 1-25.  
47 Kim Zetter, “Inside the Cunning, Unprecedented Hack of Ukraine’s Power Grid,” Wired, 
March 3, 2016.  
48 Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, “How Cyberattacks on Critical Infrastructure Could Cause 
Real-Life Disasters,” Motherboard, August 16, 2016.  
49 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Operation Planning, US Joint Publication 5-0, 
(Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, August, 11 2011), III-38 through III-44. 
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the world’s and each other’s perceptions of threat and response. The commander of U.S. Cyber 
Command stated in his 2012 Congressional testimony that China was responsible for the 
advanced persistent threat (APT) intrusion into the security firm RSA patented SecurID systems 
for multi-factor authentication.50 Duplicate 'SecurID' electronic keys made with extracted 
information, explicitly by China, were then used to penetrate the networks of Lockheed Martin 
and several other US defense contractors in May 2011.51 The Pentagon made further allegations 
against China in its 2013 annual report, alluding to the use of “computer network exploitation 
capability to support intelligence collection against the US diplomatic, economic, and defense 
industrial base sectors.”52 Exposure by an American company of a hacking campaign based in 
Shanghai focused on drone technology53 confirmed the Washington Post published list of two 
dozen military systems compromised by cyber espionage emanating from China.54   
 
At the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore in June of 2013, Defense Secretary Chuck 
Hagel voiced this concern about “the growing threat of cyber intrusions, some of which appear to 
be tied to the Chinese government and military.” 55 In May 2014 the Justice Department indicted 
five members of the Chinese Military on charges of computer fraud, damaging a computer, 
                                                          
50 Kelly Jackson Higgins, “China Hacked RSA, U.S. Official Says,” Dark Reading, March 29, 
2012.  
51 Jim Finkle and Andrea Shalal-Esa, “Hackers breached U.S. defense contractors,” Reuters, 
May 27, 2011.  
52 U.S. Secretary of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments 
Involving the People’s Republic of China,” May 2013: 36. 
53 Edward Wong, “China’s push for drones fueled by U.S. secrets,” International Herald 
Tribune,” September 23, 2013: 1. 
54 Oliver Knox, “Chinese hackers breach key US weapons designs,” Yahoo News, May 28, 2013, 
and later further confirmation by Agence France-Presse, “Report: Chinese Soldiers Linked to US 
Military Hacking Case,” Defense News, January 20, 2016.  
55 Reuben F. Johnson and James Hardy, “Hagel Reiterates Cyber Charges against China,” Jane’s 
Defense Weekly, June 12, 2013. 
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aggravated identify theft and economic espionage.56  Officials noted that the difference in U.S. 
cyber activity is that economic advantage is obtained if China or others provide state-owned 
enterprises with extracted information to improve their competitive edge and reduce cost.57 The 
cost to the United States in all kinds of intellectual property (product plans, research results, and 
customer lists) and confidential business information (trade secrets, exploration data, and 
negotiating strategies) theft amounts at least to “$200 to $250 billion annually.”58 While most of 
the intrusions seen to date originating from China appear to be for the purpose of collecting 
intelligence rather than launching attacks, each objective requires access and a compromise for 
espionage could become disruptive or destructive with little notice by the same actor.59 
 
China has in return made much of what it calls the U.S.’ “global” cyber activity, 
evidenced by the discovery in June 2010 of the Stuxnet virus infecting nuclear facilities in Iran.60  
More recent revelations prominently disparaged by Chinese statements include the United States 
penetrating of the servers of the telecommunications firm Huawei to learn how to conduct 
surveillance or offensive cyber operations against countries that buy the Chinese-made 
equipment.61 After Washington filed criminal charges against the Chinese military officers in 
2014, an editorial in the Global Times, a subsidiary of the People’s Daily, the official journal of 
China’s Communist Party said “Regarding the issue of network security, the US is such a 
                                                          
56 United States District Court, Indictment, Criminal No. 14-118, Filed May 1, 2014: 1-48.  
57 Scott Jasper, “Are US and Chinese Cyber Intrusions So Different?” The Diplomat, September 
9, 2013.  
58 McAfee, “Net Losses: Estimating the Global Cost of Cybercrime,” with Center for Strategic 
and International Studies, June 2014: 1-23. 
59 United States, Secretary of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security 
Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” April 2014: 34-35. 
60 David E. Sanger, “Obama Order Sped up Wave of Cyberattacks against Iran,” New York 
Times, June 1, 2012. 
61 David E. Sanger, “N.S.A Breached Chinese Servers Seen as Security Threat,” New York 
Times, March 22, 2014. 
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mincing rascal that we must stop developing any illusions about it.” The Global Times asserted 
that the United States “spies both home and abroad with the PRISM program of the National 
Security Agency (NSA)” and “still owes an apology to Beijing” over the NSA hacking of its 
network.62  
 
The challenge for national security is that, while the accusations are flying around, the 
deceiving, penetrating, exploiting and extracting continues to increase. The current responses are 
clearly insufficient and moving out of cybered conflict Phase Zero is highly undesirable.  In 
China, the state–criminal nexus is apparent as cyber intruders who commit crimes and espionage 
use similar methods, for instance by employing the same Remote Access Trojan tools (that 
capture and extract information) to include Poison Ivy, Ghost, and PlugX.63  Some state actors 
also ‘moonlight’ for financial gain, further complicating attribution.  China also uses professional 
hackers for hire, like the Hidden Lynx group, located in China.  Hidden Lynx hackers steal very 
specific information that could be used to gain competitive advantages at both the corporate and 
nation state level.64  They have been engaged in several high-profile campaigns, to include 
Operation Aurora, the intrusions on Google and more than 30 other companies disclosed in 2010 
that revealed the complexity and obscurity of advanced persistent threats (APTs).65  Part of 
China and Iran’s anti-access and area denial strategies to blunt outside interference is the 
condoning or out-sourcing of cyber power to proxy groups. An activist group known as the 
Cutting Sword of Justice took responsibility for the cyber destruction at Saudi Aramco. A hacker 
group called Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Cyber Fighters took credit in online posts for the previously 
                                                          
62 “High-level hooligan: Chinese media vents spleen over US cybercrime charges,” RT News, 
May 21, 2014. 
63 Kelly Jackson Higgins, “Chinese Cyberespionage Tool Updated For Traditional Cybercrime,” 
Dark Reading, November 27, 2012. 
64 Stephen Doherty,Jozsef Gegeny, Branko Spasojevic, and Jonell Baltazar, “Hidden Lynx – 
Professional Hackers for Hire,” Version 1.0, Symantec, September 17, 2013.  
65 William Jackson, “How Google Attacks Changed the Security Game,” Government Computer 
News, September 1, 2010. 
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mentioned U.S. Bank assault in September 2012, supposedly in retaliation for an anti-Islam 
video that mocks the Prophet Muhammad.  Investigators eventually traced attack signatures in 
both cases to Iranian hackers with government ties.66  This multiplicity of instances by a nexus of 
nation states, hacker groups, and criminal organizations that are now in the public domain is 
presumably matched by many more not publicly known.  
  
Deterrence – The Preferred Alternative to War  
 
  The number of actors to be deterred is the first of many challenges in applying the 
contemporary deterrence approach. For a deterrence strategy to be implemented well and to be 
effective, however, three elements are essential: capability (possessing the means to influence 
behavior), credibility (instilling believability that counter actions may actually be deployed), and 
communication (sending the right message to the desired audience).67 The achievement of these 
conditions for effective deterrence is extremely difficult in cybered conflict.  State capabilities to 
influence the behavior of malicious actors in cyberspace are constrained by their ability to 
operate with anonymity, impunity and deniability. Even if actors are convinced that counter 
actions may be deployed, their rationality cannot be assumed; and the audience of actors 
conducting cyber attacks is vast and varied in motivations and intentions.   
  
 The point of deterrence is to add another consideration to the attacker’s decision making 
calculus68 and (for the U.S. and others) this lends itself to extended deterrence to friends and 
allies and multiple actors such as NATO and the EU.  Yet affecting a wide array of actors in 
cyberspace is a problem since deterrence has to work in the mind of each attacker under different 
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circumstances.  Even if the attacker is rational, their motivations to achieve political objectives, 
national pride, personal satisfaction or monetary gain are not easily deterable. Rationality was a 
big part of Cold War nuclear deterrence thinking which has informed the cyber deterrence 
debate. Chris Demchak has offered an alternative “theory of action” in which a malicious actor 
or group’s decision is a function of legitimacy, need, and confidence related to the act itself, the 
latter primarily through transforming the ease of action, irrespective of actor culture,69 which 
means increased confidence by any party that the act will succeed. The more each of those 
elements is pushed below a threshold; the malicious act is ‘disrupted.’  But pushing the elements 
for a wide range of actors simultaneously is difficult, making retaliation and entanglement hard 
to implement.   
 
  Hence a new means of deterrence is required for a cybered world.  Recognizing the need 
to “integrate newer behavioral approaches outside a rational state based actor construct,” the 
Assistant Chief of Staff for U.S. Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration recommended 
moving beyond reliance solely on “imposition of costs to integrate denial of benefits and other 
methods for encouraging restraint.”70  Therefore to move beyond Cold War relics, the focus must 
be on closer linking deterrence to the desired effect of altering behavior, regardless of the actor 
being deterred.71  For rational state actors, the strategy of deterrence by entanglement can 
encourage responsible behavior (to not conduct, endorse or allow malicious cyber activity in 
their territory) through cooperation based on economic and political relationships between 
governments.  However for the wider array of malicious actors, a different paradigm or concept 
has to be considered to achieve the central premise of deterrence – altering behavior.72   
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An updated strategic option and the main concern of this work – is one designed for this 
new form of continuous cybered conflict, titled “active cyber defense”.  The strategy reinforces 
both deterrence by denial and deterrence by retaliation.  It combines internal systemic resilience 
to halt malicious cyber activity after an intrusion with tailored disruption capacities to thwart 
malicious actor objectives.73  Hence active cyber defense supports denial by making it harder to 
carry out a cyber attack and supports retaliation by providing more options to inflict punishment, 
to include a series of offensive cyber options. As a combined and new means to achieve 
deterrence, active cyber defense also enhances adversary propensity for restraint in peacetime 
cybered conflict by shaping the adversary’s perceptions of costs and benefits of a cyber attack 
irrespective of the character or number of actors to be deterred.74  Active cyber defense involves 
the synchronized detection, analysis and mitigation of network security breaches in cyber 
relevant time combined with the aggressive use of legal countermeasures deployed outside the 
victim’s network by authorized entities.75  Inside the defender’s network, active cyber defense 
stops or limits damage through detective controls and remediation actions, seamlessly automated 
in a common framework of integration – which is offered by many companies. The promise of 
active cyber defense is in internal countermeasures that act without regard to the identity or type 
of malicious actor or their motivations, only to detect, isolate or eradicate their malware. Outside 
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the victim’s network, active cyber defense offers a range of countermeasures for use by the state 
or private organization depending on technical feasibility and legal authorities. The selection of 
countermeasures will vary for the type of malicious actor based on circumstances and risk, which 
is not a small issue whether in the U.S. or in other liberal democracies to different degrees, and 
can take time, at the right level, and with the necessary expertise to correctly analyze it.  
 
  The main issue today was summed up well by Senator Inhope, during the 2014 Senate 
Hearing to consider the nomination of the new commander for U.S. Cyber Command, who said, 
“the lack of a cyber-deterrence policy... [has] left us more vulnerable to continued cyber 
aggression.” When the nominee was asked “how do we prevent that,” Vice Admiral Rogers 
responded “We’re generating capability, we’re generating capacity...But in the end I believe 
we’ve got to get some idea of deterrence within the cyber arena.”76  The concept of 
contemporary deterrence is still debatable because of its origin in traditional nuclear deterrence 
which relies on an adversary having knowledge of the destruction that will result from 
misbehaviors. That clarity, however, is not possible in cyber since the secrecy about cyber 
weapons is necessary to preserve their effectiveness.77  The strategy of active cyber defense, 
however, does not intrinsically require clear adversary knowledge of the mechanisms that defeat 
attacks. It also appears less likely to escalate conflict by requiring the deterring state to make 
demands or posture in a threatening manner either.  The promise of active cyber defense 
warrants examination of evidence to determine if it is more likely to alter behavior than current 
methods attempted for contemporary deterrence strategies in the emerging forum of peacetime 
conflict.  Nuclear deterrence theories are cannot be read across directly into cyber.  Among the 
reasons are the range of actors and the low barriers to entry. 
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Thesis Research Question  
 
To what extent, in a deeply cybered world, does active cyber defense for a largescale 
modern state mitigate the systemic security losses of transnational cyber attacks more 
comprehensively than the contemporary deterrence strategies of retaliation, denial, or 
entanglement? 
 
 Given the breadth, speed, and volume of cyberspace’s predators, active cyber defense 
technologies will be automated and have the ability to interdict, isolate or remove threats.  As a 
means to strengthen deterrence, the intent of active cyber defense is to deny benefits to 
adversaries by ensuring systemic resilience, by engaging, deceiving or stopping adversaries, and 
by imposing costs through disruption capacities, regardless of the source.  The concept of 
“systemic resilience” means a defender’s state or network has the capacity of combined social 
and technical systems to proactively recognize, adapt to, absorb, and innovate around 
disturbances or disruptions.78 Given how the nature of cyber attacks has changed, it would be 
ideal to develop comprehensive, overarching internal systemic resilience and tailored disruption 
capacities79 to meet the failings, or limits, of contemporary deterrence strategies.  However that 
level of comprehensive deterrence will take time.  The implementation of this form of robust 
cyber power will require unprecedented peacetime cooperation among all stakeholders in 
industry, government and defense spheres due to the inherent complexity in socio-economic-
technical systems. The necessary self-organizing order in interactions between these complex 
adaptive systems with so many interconnected parts will take a long time to establish. 
 
In the interim, the nation’s national security community needs to consider less all-
inclusive strategies for deterrence such as active cyber defense, those that center on collaborative 
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efforts with fewer actors to achieve some greater measure of deterrent ‘emergence’ in complex 
systems. The property of emergence is roughly described by the common phrase “the action of 
the whole is more than the sum of the actions of the parts.”80 As a first step, the 2009 U.S. 
Cyberspace Policy Review identified the need for a comprehensive framework to facilitate 
coordinated response by government, the private sector, and allies to a significant cyber threat or 
incident.  The report recognized that “addressing network security issues requires a public-
private partnership as well as international cooperation and norms.”81  Likewise, the 2014 U.S. 
Joint Staff Unity of Effort Framework Solution Guide recognized that the government and the 
private sector have to coordinate their activities to prepare for cyber threats.  The Joint Staff 
realized that achieving unity of effort to meet national security goals is problematic due to 
challenges in information sharing, competing priorities, and uncoordinated activities.82  PPD-41 
issued by the White House in 2016 codified that “significant cyber incidents demand unity of 
effort within the Federal Government and especially close coordination between the public and 
private sectors.”83 
 
NATO experiences offer an example of how to design a comprehensive approach for 
operations in a domain of interest (like cyber deterrence).  The former director of the National 
Security Agency (NSA) argued “government, industry and our allies have to work together” to 
prepare for catastrophic cyber attacks in our future.84  The North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
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(NATO) has for decades aligned parties in various operations through a comprehensive approach 
based on shared “principles and collaborative processes that enhance the likelihood of favorable 
and enduring outcomes within a particular situation.”85  NATO stated “the need to promote a 
comprehensive approach applies not only to operations, but more broadly to many of NATO’s 
efforts to deal with 21st century security challenges, such as…protecting against cyber attacks.”86  
To be effective in continuous cybered conflict, the NATO methodology has to be adapted for 
different operational conditions, structural characteristics, and prominent partners, to include 
private sector actors.  The White House has also embraced a comprehensive approach for cyber 
deterrence by endorsing public and private sector partnerships for cyber defense of critical 
infrastructure sectors.87  Within this context, a partnership would be defined as close cooperation 
between parties having common interests in achieving a shared vision. The 2010 Comprehensive 
National Cybersecurity Initiative sought to create such an approach to cyber defense strategy that 
deters “interference” and attack in cyberspace.  
   
The challenge is to align the efforts of all parties for a common purpose in all means of 
deterrence.  However, if one accepts that contemporary deterrence does not work well in a 
cybered conflict world, and this partnership lags in its unity of effort in a whole of nation 
approach, then active cyber defense offers a means to strengthen deterrence by combining 
systemic resilience and disruption capacities in the interim period, allowing time for all 
participants to adjust and align efforts for a longer term, comprehensive deterrence strategy. An 
analysis of the sufficiency of strategic cyber deterrence options (retaliation, denial, entanglement 
or active cyber defense) to alter malicious actor behavior in cyberspace requires answers to the 
following questions: 
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Sub-questions  
 
1. To what extent will the threat of the use of all necessary means, often in kind, in 
response to hostile acts in cyberspace achieve deterrence by retaliation?   
2. By what degree do protective measures improve the security of networks and systems 
to deny adversaries the benefit of attack? 
3. To what level will cooperative measures for entanglement based on mutual interests 
restrain behavior in conducting, endorsing or allowing malicious cyber activity?  
4. By what extent does evidence show that active cyber defense is technically capable 
and legally viable as a comprehensive means for dissuading and deterring malicious 
actors? 
 
Research Design  
 
Grounded theory research methods were used to examine deterrence strategy options 
based on empirical evidence.  This approach requires pursuing empirical research guided by the 
theories of strategy and deterrence while allowing the data to manifest elements emergent in a 
cybered world and not anticipated in the other approaches.  Strategy is described as the direction 
and use made of means by chosen ways in order to achieve the desired ends of national policy.88  
Deterrence is about decisively influencing decision making by threatening to impose costs, or 
denying benefits, while encouraging restraint.89  This process of research grounded in qualitative 
data,90 is intended to produce a proposed midrange theory of deterrence by active cyber defense.  
The discussion starts with the empirical phenomenon and abstracts from it to create general 
                                                          
88 Arthur F. Lykke, Jr. “Toward an Understanding of Military Strategy,” Guide to Strategy, 
(Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, 1983), February 2001: 179-185. 
89 Kevin Chilton and Greg Weaver, “Waging Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century,” Strategic 
Studies Quarterly, Vol. 3, Issue 1, (Spring 2009): 31-42. 
90 Kathy Charmaz, Constructing Grounded Theory, 2nd Edition, (London: SAGE Publications 
Ltd, 2014): 1-21.  
28 
 
concepts that can be verified by data.91  In particular, concepts of systemic resilience and 
disruption capacities,92 both essential to security from attacks, are the tests of comprehension, 
for all deterrence methods and data is analyzed to demonstrate the relative effectiveness of the 
contemporary and new deterrence methods.  
 
Source material is drawn from a combination of informative meetings and literature 
review.  The data is primarily qualitative.  Informative meetings were conducted with public 
agency and private sector decision makers, program experts, and security practitioners in the 
fields of national security and cyber strategy.  For instance, meetings were held at U.S. Cyber 
Command, the National Security Agency, Commander, U.S. Tenth Fleet, U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security (Office of Cybersecurity & Communications and Intelligence & Analysis), 
and the John’s Hopkins Applied Physics Lab.  In the United Kingdom, the thesis was discussed 
with the Foreign & Commonwealth Office, the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, 
Royal United Services Institute, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, Chatham House, and 
RAND Europe.  Consultations on security technologies were conducted with Palo Alto 
Networks, Hexis Corporation, Akamai, Carbon Black, Crowdstrike, Cylance, Dell, FireEye, 
Hewlett Packard, IBM, LightCyber, LogRhythm, Looking Glass, Sophos, Splunk, Watchguard 
and others in the range of solutions.  Primary literature consists of testimony, documents, 
concepts, publications, reports, papers, media outlets and blogs that form raw intelligence, and 
secondary literature was used in the form of published books, chapters, essays, articles, and 
studies.  The data was constructed and unearthed data observations, interactions and materials 
gathered on the topics in the Research Sub-questions and also study of related empirical events 
and experiences. Simultaneous data collection and analysis occurred through constant 
comparison, with pauses to capture instantaneous realizations of analytical connections.   
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The initial collection and consideration of data started an iterative process of 
interpretation of categories based on segments of data.  The rich and voluminous array of 
malicious actors, their methods in incidents, and their campaigns of malicious cyber activity 
provide considerable data for categorization to compare and contrast analyses. The analysis 
addresses the evidence of limits to or constraints on the effectiveness of the strategic deterrence 
options of retaliation, denial, entanglement and active cyber defense as formally stated in the 
research sub-questions. Specific measures of attacks, time, and costs are used where applicable 
to evaluate option utility and sufficiency.  For example, at the tactical level, the analysis 
considers the impact of the options on attacks (number of attempted or successful penetrations by 
the attacker), time (of threat detection, response and mitigation by the defender), and costs (for 
the attacker or defender).  Then at the strategic level, the analysis considers the impact of the 
options on attacks (volume of noise across social, technical and economic systems generated by 
the attacker), time (in mitigation of systemic security losses by the defender), and costs (in the 
order of magnitude of gross domestic products for the defender), although difficult to accurately 
judge.  The measures are used to determine whether these options are more or less 
comprehensive than the concepts of systemic resilience and disruption capacities.  The result is a 
midrange theory of active cyber defense.   
 
Key Options for Analysis  
 
A summary of the initiatives, issues and constraints identified and analyzed in the four 
strategic option sections is presented below: 
 
Deterrence by Retaliation is defined by the effort to directly impose costs for hostile acts 
in cyberspace. Retaliation is based on “the right to use all necessary means” in order “to defend 
our Nation, our allies, our partners and our interests.”93  Means for a proportional and justified 
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response include “diplomatic, informational, military, and economic, as appropriate and 
consistent with applicable international law.”94  Military response options may include the 
employment of cyber (or cyber physical) and/or kinetic capabilities.  Under some circumstances, 
hostile acts in cyberspace could constitute an armed attack within the meaning of Article 51 of 
the UN Charter.95  Established principles would apply in the context of an armed attack (Jus ad 
bellum).96  First, the right of self-defense applies against an imminent or actual armed attack 
whether the attacker is a State or non-State actor.97  Second, the use of force in self-defense must 
be limited to what is necessary and proportionate to address the nature of the threat.98  Third, 
States are required to take measures to ensure their territories are not used for purposes of armed 
activities against other States.  The use of cyber tools in the context of armed conflict (Jus in 
bello) is addressed by existing rules and principles of the international law of armed conflict.99  
 
Hostile acts include armed attack, and damage.  On whether or not a cyber operation 
constitutes an armed attack, according to the Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law 
Applicable to Cyber Operations (Rule 71), “depends on the scale and effects.”100 Cyber 
operations that result in death or injury of individuals or destruction or damage of objects could 
be defined as an armed attack.101 Although Stuxnet caused physical damage, the international 
                                                          
94 Ibid. 
95 Office of General Counsel, Department of Defense Law of War Manual, June 2015 (Updated 
May 2016). 1016-17. 
96 Ibid, 1015.  
97 Ibid, 1018.   
98 Ibid.   
99 Ibid, 1020-22.  
100 Michael Schmitt, Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber 
Operations, Second Edition (Cambridge University Press, 2017), 339. 
101 Michael N. Schmitt, “Attack as a Term of Art in International Law: The Cyber Operations 
Context,” Proceedings 4th International Conference on Cyber Conflict,” (Tallinn, Estonia: 
Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, 2012): 283-293. 
31 
 
group of experts who authored the Tallinn Manual was divided on whether the damage 
constituted an armed attack.  Future cyber attacks could be designed to transmit data or modify, 
degrade or corrupt data in a malicious but not immediately noticeable manner that could avoid 
the obvious damage threshold and yet be damaging.102  The NATO Enhanced Cyber Defense 
Policy affirms that cyber defense is part of NATO’s core task of collective defense. Any decision 
as to whether a cyber attack would invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty is subject to 
political decisions by the North Atlantic Council on a case-by-case basis.103  Although the 
manner in which the North Atlantic Council would assess each cyber attack remains ambiguous. 
No standards for assessment exist and countries hold various and differing internal criteria.104  
This ambiguity gives an adversary the option to use cyber as a method of attack against critical 
infrastructure.105  
 
The imposition of costs in deterrence by retaliation is intended to reduce any threat 
actor’s willingness or ability to initiate or continue an offensive operation.  While some argue the 
fundamental interconnectedness of networks means the effects of responsive cyber operations 
cannot be limited, others claim as a point of debate that contained operations are possible even 
within broadly connected systems.106 However, deliberate, inadvertent or accidental escalation 
could trigger a chain reaction that raises the level of conflict beyond any contemplated by any 
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party to the conflict.107 In the United States only the president can approve a cyber operation 
likely to result in significant consequences, a tough decision due to an inability to predict 
collateral damage and uncertainty over political effects.108  Equally, the threat of massive cyber 
retribution would probably encourage actors to seek low levels of cyber attacks that fall below 
the threshold that would trigger such retaliation in kind.109  In many cases, victim countries may 
be constrained to seek justice rather than retribution. In court, victim states can press for access 
to individuals or information and use refusal to cooperate as a justification for retaliation.  
However, until retaliation by any means does ensue, there is no punishment and hence, this 
deterrence option is extremely limited in a world of cybered conflict.110 
 
Deterrence by Denial is defined as the effort to withhold any benefit from malicious 
activity in cyberspace and thereby over time encourage perceptions of cyber attacks as pointless 
endeavors.  Denial of any malicious actor’s objectives occurs by increasing the security of 
networks and systems. In this context, security is “a condition that results from the establishment 
and maintenance of protective measures that enable an enterprise to perform its mission or 
critical functions despite risks posed by threats to its use of information systems.”111 In this 
context, protective measures limit damage by reducing the risk of an attack succeeding.  Specific 
actions for risk reduction can include the promulgation of security strategies or policies to avoid 
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or accept risk; the implementation of security controls to mitigate or diminish risk; and 
organizational arrangements to share or transfer risk.112 A variety of protective measures are 
contained and endorsed in best practice guidelines for businesses, organizations and consumers.  
An example of a best practice for security strategies is the employment of a defense-in-depth 
approach that emphasizes “multiple, overlapping, and mutually supportive defensive systems to 
guard against single-point failures in any specific technology or protection method.”113 Examples 
of best practices regarding security policies include the use of encryption to protect sensitive 
data, the restriction of removable media, and the enforcement of effective passwords.  
 
While best practice guidelines help reduce risk from cyber threats, more methodical 
approaches for the identification and application of other protective measures, like specific 
safeguards, are contained in a variety of frameworks.  Safeguards are prescribed to protect the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability (the CIA triad) of an information system. Safeguards 
may include security features, management constraints, personnel security, and security of 
physical structures, areas, and devices.  Safeguards are synonymous with security controls.114 
The Center for Internet Security (CIS) produced Critical Security Controls for Effective Cyber 
Defense offers a set of actions based on the combined knowledge of actual attacks and effective 
defenses.115  The controls deny benefit of attack by monitoring networks and systems, detecting 
attack attempts, identifying compromised machines, and interrupting infiltration.  The top three 
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drivers for adopting the controls are increasing visibility of attacks, improving response and 
reducing risk.116  When the U.S. Congress failed to pass necessary legislation, President Obama 
signed an Executive Order for the development of a Cybersecurity Framework that incorporates 
voluntary consensus standards and industry best practices.  The initial Cybersecurity Framework 
is built around the core functions of identify, protect, detect, respond, and recover.117 The Critical 
Security Controls are part of the Framework’s informative references that illustrate ways to 
accomplish core functions and thereby make attacks on systems either less possible or less costly 
even if they succeed initially.  
 
Cyber intelligence on threats and vulnerabilities leads to better risk-informed decision 
making on investments in relevant security controls.  Organizational arrangements for the 
sharing of cyber intelligence are another form of protective measures to reduce risk, although 
horizontal sharing may lead to leaks. As mandated in the 2013 Executive Order, the National 
Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) coordinates with the private 
sector, and also government and international partners as a mechanism in deterrence by denial.  
The NCCIC integrates analysis and data into a comprehensive series of actionable and shareable 
information products. In addition, the NCCIC cooperates with information sharing and analysis 
centers (ISACs) to protect portions of critical information technology that they interact with, 
operate, manage, or own.  For example, the NCCIC worked with the Financial Services ISAC 
during the 2012 series of DDoS assaults on U.S. major banks to provide technical data and 
assistance to financial institutions.  Data included DDoS related IP addresses and supporting 
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contextual information, which was also given to over 120 international partners.118  The NCCIC 
has been designated by PPD-41 as the lead coordinator for asset response.119  
 
The deterrence option, however, is limited in its comprehensive potential due to the need 
for real time, actionable data sharing among competitors for markets and with government 
agencies.  Critical actors in agencies and companies acknowledge the need to share more 
individual information about threats across enterprise boundaries but are worried about their 
organization’s liability and the ambiguities of cybered risk.  Commercial offerings to share data - 
such as the Internet Identity’s (IID) Active Trust platform – allow contributors to retain 
ownership of data and control dissemination.120  Yet in reality, only cybersecurity legislation can 
permit the private sector to share real-time cyber threat activity detected on its networks without 
fear of violating civil liberties and rights to privacy of citizens.121  In December 2015, President 
Obama signed the “Cybersecurity Act of 2015” as part of an emergency budget omnibus bill.   
The legislation gives liability protection to companies that share information with the 
government but requires them to strip away personal data first.122  Even with passage of this 
legislation, participation in sharing arrangements - and adoption of industry best practices - for 
securing cyberspace remains voluntary for the private sector that largely owns the Nation’s 
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critical infrastructure.123  This is the same private sector that routinely discovers 85% of cyber 
breeches from an external party usually many months after an intrusion.124  Today the average is 
around 150 days after the breach.125  This private sector laggardly participation remains despite 
the reality that it is not a matter of if a company will be breached, but when.126  Hence, this 
deterrence option is also limited in its effectiveness for the near term cybered conflict. 
 
Deterrence by entanglement is defined as an effort to encourage responsible state 
behavior (and thus restrain malicious behavior) by raising the perceived value of maintaining and 
not endangering the returns from government to government cooperation on mutual interests. To 
some extent, nations share political, economic, commercial, and strategic interdependence in 
cyberspace and so all too some degree share vulnerability. The United Nations Secretary General 
has stated “While all Nations appreciate the enormous benefits of ICTs [Information and 
Communication Technologies], there is also broad recognition that misuse of the cyberspace 
substrate poses risks to international peace and security.”127  The 2013 report by the Group of 
Governmental Experts (GGE) emphasized this shared vulnerability by observing that the 
“development and spread of sophisticated malicious tools and techniques” for cyber attack 
increases “the risk of mistaken attribution and unintended escalation.”128  The GGE report also 
noted that states have affirmed the need for cooperative action against threats resulting from 
misuse of ICTs.  While states have to lead these efforts, effective cooperation also rests on 
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participation by the private sector and civil society to achieve a comprehensive result as required.  
The 2013 report, and an updated version in 2015, specified an array of actions, to include norms, 
rules and principles of responsible State behavior in cyberspace, such as prohibiting harm to 
critical infrastructure and emergency response systems, and other confidence building measures 
intended to further deterrence through risk reduction.129   
 
One action to strengthen deterrence by entanglement is the formal implementation of 
binding agreements between states.  Arms control treaties aim to establish legal regimes that 
make conflict less likely by reducing the existence of, or restricting the use of certain weapons.  
However, imposing limitations on the development and proliferation of what has been called 
“cyber-weapons” is difficult.  Their properties - especially their ubiquitous ease of deception and 
opaqueness, speed of action, and complexity - are incompatible with the conditions of standing 
arms control treaties.130  The lack of universal consensus on what even constitutes a “cyber-
weapon” complicates verification of compliance.  Most of the technology relied on in an 
offensive capacity is inherently dual-use.  The means, control and distribution are created, held, 
and employed by a large array of non-state as well as state actors.  Vulnerability assessment tools 
that scan an organization’s systems and data for security gaps can relatively easily be reused in 
an attack to gain illegal access.131 Otherwise helpful software can be repurposed with minimal 
effort for a variety of malicious actions.132 Another hindrance for arms control enforcement is 
that the creator or source of the weapon is often not the user.  For example, in state sponsored 
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hacktivist campaigns, cyber tools with instructions are often provided by third parties to patriotic 
hackers supporting a cause or casual opportunists who happen to join in the attack.133   
 
Absent useful formal treaties, a broad assortment of other more cooperative measures has 
been promoted to restrain state activity, or state sponsored or endorsed activity, from malicious 
activity in cyberspace.  Internationally acceptable norms, rules and principles of responsible 
behavior by states could ensure order in cyber activity if fully implemented and enforced. They 
start with the premise that international law, and in particular the Charter of the United Nations is 
applicable to cyberspace and thereby enforceable with the same mechanisms.  The Seoul 
Conference on Cyberspace in 2013 resulted in a ‘Framework for and Commitment to Open and 
Secure Cyberspace’ that offers guidelines for governments and organizations on coping with 
cybercrime and cyberwar.134  These guidelines include verbatim norms of behavior proposed in 
2013 by the UN Group of Government Experts for States to meet their international obligations 
regarding wrongful acts attributed to them, refrain from using proxies to commit wrongful acts, 
and ensure their territories are not used by non-State actors for unlawful acts.135  The fourth 
Global Conference on Cyberspace in The Hague in 2015 is a particularly good exemplar of these 
entanglement – as – deterrence efforts. The meeting gathered representatives from governments, 
private sector and civil society “to promote practical cooperation in cyberspace, to enhance cyber 
capacity building, and to discuss norms for responsible behavior in cyberspace.”136   
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Regional or bilateral dialogue have been able to establish voluntary confidence-building 
measures to promote trust and assurance, such as those agreed upon by the United States and 
Russia in 2013 for sharing of cyber threat indicators.137  Other practical measures to increase 
predictability and reduce misperception include exchange of views on national policies, like an 
informative briefing by the Obama Administration in 2014 to Chinese officials on Pentagon 
doctrine for defending against and conducting cyber attacks.138  Finally, capacity-building 
assistance is recognized as a likely need for some States to fulfil their responsibilities in any form 
of agreement for securing cyberspace.  Efforts for assistance range from developing technical 
skill and sharing best practices, to strengthening national legal frameworks.139   
 
Overall, cooperative measures do have the potential to address cyber related threats, 
vulnerabilities and risks in some considerable measure, but they require extensive cooperation 
that is often thwarted by a clash of competing state interests in addition to the role of non-state 
actors.  For example China suspended a Sino – US working group on cyber issues after the 
indictment of the Unit 61398 members, citing “we should encourage organizations and 
individuals whose rights have been infringed to stand up and sue Washington.”140  Reasons for 
tension in cooperation with China on matters of international governance can be explained by 
standard international relations theory.  Realists argue that China “did not have a hand in 
creating” the existing architecture and, as China becomes more powerful, it would naturally seek 
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to alter international institutions.141  Others say the authoritarian regime is “uncomfortable with a 
multi-stakeholder system” guided by concerns for the rights of individuals and flexible attitudes 
toward state sovereignty.142  Chinese leaders state that “China has been a ‘rule-taker,’ but is 
becoming a ‘rule-maker’ who is promoting new norms and rules of the game that fit its national 
interests.”143  Likewise, the Russian mantra of “new rules or no rules”144 obstructs cooperation 
on international governance with civil society democracies in particular.145  
 
This discussion demonstrates how each of three contemporary deterrence strategies are 
not comprehensive enough to adapt to the needs of cyber conflict in the near or possibly longer 
term. The strategic option of active cyber defense, however, is a fourth choice potentially 
capable of reinforcing the other three in the near and long term.  In this work, active cyber 
defense is defined as the automated real-time detection, analysis and mitigation of network 
security breaches for systemic resilience combined with the aggressive use of legal 
countermeasures beyond network and state territorial boundaries for tailored disruption. It is 
designed to meet the gaps in comprehensiveness present in the other deterrence options but 
needed urgently for a robust national cybered defense.  Scholars have described active cyber 
defense as a range of actions that engage the adversary before and - especially - during a cyber 
incident. Their listings of the gamut of applicable activities include the use of honeypots, 
beaconing, sinkholing, and deception – all of which increase adversary costs through 
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interference, delay, obstruction, or trickery.146  Typical examples of these techniques, in order of 
the above intent, would be use of a honeypot to see which files the adversary wants to steal, 
remotely tracking stolen files by passive watermarks, redirecting the malware on an infected 
computer to communicate not with an attacker but with a safe server, or allowing the attacker to 
steal files that contain false or misleading information.147 More aggressive countermeasures 
outside of the victim’s network include “taking control of remote computers to stop attacks” or 
“launching denial of service attacks against attacking machines.”148   
 
 Today the cyber security industry is shifting to more reactive forms of active cyber 
defense, predicated on automated and integrated technologies that have the ability to identify, 
interdict, isolate or remove threats inside the network within defined action limits.149  Active 
cyber defense, as an announced strategy strengthens deterrence against attacks by combining 
systemic resilience and disruption capacities.  Part of the failure of the three contemporary 
options is that they do not easily operate to defeat the attack at the speed and scale needed for 
cyberspace and thereby add failure to perpetrators’ calculations about costs and benefits of such 
operations. An early pioneer in the field was Hexis Cyber Solutions, which created and fielded 
HawkEye G as an automated threat removal platform – an early prototype for active defense 
capabilities.150  This next generation cyber security platform, now acquired by Watchguard 
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Technologies,151 provides endpoint and network sensing, threat detection analytics, and 
automated countermeasures that “remove advanced threats at machine speed from within the 
network” before adversaries can “steal data, compromise intellectual property or cause process 
disruption.”152  Once HawkEye G detects and investigates a cyber threat, it deploys network-
based countermeasures (like blocking traffic or redirecting it to a Bot Trap) and host-based 
countermeasures (such as killing the malware process or quarantining malicious files) to 
remediate and remove the threat.153  In respect for corporate reluctance to adopt machine-enabled 
defensives for fear of algorithmic misfires with unexpected results, Hexis provided choices for 
HawkEye G settings, either to use corporate policies to control automatic countermeasure 
execution or to allow machine-guided execution to optimize human-in-the loop threat response 
and removal.  HawkEye G was selected due to its unique capabilities by the U.S. Intelligence 
Community as part of an integrated active cyber defense solution named SHORTSTOP for 
protecting federal agencies’ networks against advanced adversaries.154  
 
For active defense outside the network of specific organizations, Rule 20 of the Tallinn 
Manual 2.0 says “A State may be entitled to take countermeasures, whether cyber in nature or 
not, in response to a breach of an international legal obligation that it is owed by another 
State.”155  Furthermore the Manual states there is in existing international law “no prohibition 
against injured States turning to a private firm, including foreign companies, to conduct cyber 
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countermeasures on their behalf against responsible States.”156  This use of a proxy for defense is 
complicated, however, by the rules in westernized states or companies themselves.  On the 
contrary “hack-back” is when the victim acts on its own initiative with a counterstrike to stop an 
ongoing attack, or even hack into their network to delete or alter stolen information.157  Although 
it is alleged that “an increasing number of U.S. companies are taking retaliatory action,”158 for 
private sector actors to act on their own using hack-back, existing legal constraints would have to 
be adapted to allow use of these tactics.159 The primary law in the United States that applies to 
private sector use of hack-back techniques is the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), 
codified as Title 18, Section 1030. A company’s defenders can violate the CFAA by accessing a 
“protected computer” without authorization or by exceeding authorized access.160 Currently in 
the United States "it's illegal to chase bad guys up the wire, even if you have the capability to do 
so -- it's illegal to shoot back."161 However, one could argue that U.S. common law admits 
certain rights of self-defense and defense of property in preventing the commission of a crime 
against an individual or a corporation. Applying the latter for hostile cyber attacks, the range of 
permitted actions is roughly comparable to the range for non-lethal self-defense. While 
individuals are not permitted to engage in revenge or retaliation for a crime, they are— in some 
instances—entitled to take otherwise-prohibited actions for the purpose of preventing or averting 
an imminent crime or one that is in progress. Yet in most cases, challenges in quickly obtaining 
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definitive attribution preclude exercising this right.162 Therefore today a private sector actor may 
realistically and legally only use countermeasures within its own network, unless granted 
authority on behalf of the state to use countermeasures outside the network under international 
law constraints, which might not be the case in practice.   
 
The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has already embraced the use of active cyber 
defense as a means to defend military operations and thereby compensate for the failure of 
contemporary deterrence strategies in cybered conflict.  The Department defines the concept as 
the “synchronized, real-time capability to discover, detect, analyze, and mitigate threats and 
vulnerabilities” against its own operational networks.163  For the military, these tasks are very 
similar to defensive cyberspace operations described by the Director of Operations at U.S. Cyber 
Command as “passive and active cyberspace defense activities that allow us to outmaneuver an 
adversary.”164 Defensive cyberspace operations provide the ability to discover, detect, analyze, 
and mitigate threats with malicious capability and intent to affect key cyber terrain.  
Subcategories of these operations are internal defensive measures (IDM), actions taken inside 
networks, and response actions (RA), actions taken outside networks.  Tasks for IDM are 
“hunting” on units within DoD network space for threats and directing allowable responses, 
whereas RA is “about going after the shooter” outside DoD network space to stop the attack.165  
The Commander, Fleet Cyber Command has stated “we have people that hunt bad actors,” 
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indicating a propensity to actively defend the network vice waiting to respond to or deny the 
benefit of cyber attacks, or even waiting for cooperative measures to work. 166    
 
Illustrative Case of Insufficient Contemporary Strategies 
 
The U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has said “cyber attacks are incredibly 
disruptive and could disable his country’s critical infrastructure.”167 While tangible evidence 
readily supports that assertion, like the cyber attack on the Ukraine power grid, not all cyber 
attacks rise to that level of harm against key resources, but they can have a significant economic 
or political effect. Take for instance, the 2016 hack into the Democratic National Committee 
(DNC) network that created political fallout through what could be considered a coercive 
campaign. The breach offers an illustrative case for an initial look at the sufficiency of 
contemporary deterrence strategies or an alternative strategy.  The Washington Post reported in 
June that “Russian government hackers penetrated the computer network of the Democratic 
National Committee and gained access to the entire database of opposition research on GOP 
presidential candidate Donald Trump.”168  Committee officials said the intruders also were able 
to read all email and chat traffic.  After discovering the intrusion in late April, the Committee 
reached out immediately to the cyber firm CrowdStrike to investigate.  In May, CrowdStrike 
identified two separate Russian intelligence-affiliated hacker groups present in the network.  One 
group named Cozy Bear (APT29) had gained access the prior summer and the other named 
Fancy Bear (APT28) in April.169  A comparative analysis of malware samples for coding 
                                                          
166 Richard R. Burgass, “Fleet Cyber Commander: “We Have People That Hunt Bad Actors,” 
Seapower Magazine Online, December 2, 2014.  
167 Martin E. Dempsey, “Cyber attacks could disable critical US infrastructure,” Interview, Press 
TV, January 12, 2015. 
168 Ellen Nakashima, “Russian government hackers penetrated DNC, stole opposition research 
on Trump,” The Washington Post, June 14, 2016.  
169 Dmitri Alperovitch, “Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee,” 
CrowdStrike Blog, June 15, 2016.  
46 
 
structures and obfuscation techniques by Fidelis Cybersecurity supported the CrowdStrike 
findings.170 
 
Dmitry Peskov, a spokesman for President Vladimir Putin, immediately told foreign 
journalists in Moscow that “I absolutely rule out the possibility that the government or 
government agencies were involved in this.”171  Although Russia denied the DNC hack, both 
groups in question have been accused of hacking on their behalf.  FireEye has documented a 
series of cyber espionage campaigns by APT28 in Eastern Europe and European security 
organizations that would likely benefit the Russian government.172 Likewise, CrowdStrike claims 
that APT29 hacked the White House, State Department and U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff.173  The 
purpose of the DNC hacks appeared to be presidential candidate Donald Trump. In late July 
2016 WikiLeaks dumped nearly 20,000 emails from top DNC officials.  Several of the released 
emails revealed that officials floated ideas about ways to undermine the candidacy of former 
presidential candidate Bernie Sanders174 contrary to Democratic party leader’ statements meant 
to appear unified behind presumptive presidential nominee Hillary Clinton.175  The immediate 
fallout for the DNC was severe.  One day before the Democratic convention was ready to begin, 
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the DNC Chairwoman announced her resignation, and enraged Sanders supporters protested and 
disrupted the convention.176 Multiple Democrats alleged “the Russian government stole the 
emails and provided them to WikiLeaks in an effort to help Republican presidential nominee 
Donald Trump win the November election.”177 The leaks of damaging emails related to the 
Clinton campaign continued all the way up to the election and beyond.178  
 
Since no financial information was reported to be abused after any penetrations by the 
Russian hacker groups - only personal details of wealthy donors including celebrities,179 it 
appears their motivations or those of their state sponsor were not for profit but political in nature, 
apparently to understand and influence political decisions in the United States. After all, Russia 
had set precedent for this sort of coercive activity by interfering through proxy hacker groups in 
the presidential elections in Ukraine in 2014 and allegedly in the UK Brexit referendum of 
2016.180  On October 7, 2016, the U.S. Director of National Intelligence stated with confidence 
“that the Russian Government directed the recent compromises of e-mails from U.S. persons and 
institutions, including U.S. political organizations. ... We believe based on the scope and 
sensitivity of these efforts, that only Russia’s senior-most officials could have authorized these 
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activities.”181 Countering that statement, WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange adamantly claimed 
that the source for the hacked emails “is not the Russian government and it is not a state 
party.”182  Six months later, in late May 2017, President Putin still “denied the Russian State had 
directed any hacking operations designed to influence the U.S. election – though he did say 
Russian patriots could have been behind the plot on their own accord.”183 Although new details 
revealed by the Washington Post, finally in late June 2017, revealed that the “CIA had obtained 
intelligence from sources inside the Russian government by early August [2016] that captured 
the Russian leader’s specific instructions to subordinates on the operation’s objectives: disparage 
and seek to defeat the Democratic nominee Hilary Clinton while helping to deliver the White 
House to Trump.”184 
 
Interfering in the integrity of democratic society elections is part of cybered conflict, or 
hybrid warfare, and will be difficult to deter by either retaliation, denial, or entanglement. A 
proportional and justified response to the DNC incident would not include military means for 
deterrence by retaliation for according to Tallinn Manual general editor Michael Schmitt, “it’s 
not a situation that would allow the U.S. to respond in self-defense militarily.”185  The 
effectiveness of other means to impose costs such as diplomatic overtures and legal indictments 
would be doubtful.  The Kremlin called the U.S. allegations “nonsense” and its leaders would 
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likely not cooperate.”186  For deterrence by denial, any layered protective measures in place on 
the DNC network obviously failed.  Significant investment will be necessary to counter the 
advanced techniques of this type of sophisticated actor and credibility will be difficult to re-
establish save over time.  For deterrence by entanglement, the United States does have a 
cooperation pact but not a formal enforceable binding agreement with Russia for protection of 
the information resources of their states.  Although Russia has tacitly agreed to international 
norms in 2015 through participation in the UN Group of Government Experts findings, it can 
challenge attribution to the act or to employing the proxies and it would be difficult to hold them 
legally accountable.  National security expert James Lewis sums up the situation well in stating 
“If we couldn’t deter Moscow from going into the Ukraine, we’re not going to deter them from 
hacking us.”187  Clearly deterrence by retaliation or punishment, denial and entanglement failed 
because they are not comprehensive enough strategies for a cybered world.   
 
Active cyber defense is the only option that is likely to have been effective in advance; its 
implementation would have invoked an earlier response.  While the initial entry in the network 
by social engineering would not have been blocked, the breach could have been detected sooner 
by automated capabilities that discover and interpret subtle behaviors in enterprise activity and 
attributed quickly for action.  Given the importance of fair elections, subsequent verifiable alerts 
could have enabled state-level tailored disruptive countermeasure considerations, for which 
Schmitt said unlawful intervention gave the United States grounds to undertake.188  Only if active 
cyber defense had been in place would the results have been less likely because the strategy is 
more comprehensive as a strategic option to a cybered world. A detailed analysis of all four 
strategic options and the actual U.S. response will be presented in the final conclusion. 
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Expected Outcomes  
 
In the illustrative case of alleged state-sponsored espionage, and in other disruptive or 
destructive cyber attacks, each contemporary deterrence strategy has limits in effectiveness in 
preventing malicious activity.  Deterrence convinces adversaries not to take malicious actions by 
“means of decisive influence over their decision making.”189  Decisive influence is achieved by 
threatening to impose costs, or deny benefits, while encouraging restraint.190  There are ways to 
overcome the current shortcomings of contemporary deterrence strategies for a cybered world by 
a deterrence strategy that imposes real consequences (retaliation), employs proactive defenses 
(denial), and pursues diplomatic concessions (entanglement). Incidents like the DNC hack can be 
learning experiences because they force states to recognize the potential risks and threats, and 
perhaps pursue laws and norms they otherwise would not have endorsed.191  Deterrence options 
are not mutually exclusive. U.S. doctrine, for instance, uses a mixed approach, especially across 
diplomatic, legal, economic and military dimensions.  However whether these options can 
achieve decisive influence on their own or whether the strategy of active cyber defense is 
necessary to fill in the existing gaps is the key question of this work.  The data shows these 
contemporary methods do not work as planned or needed in cybered conflict. As offered here, a 
midrange theory of active cyber defense provides the framework to compensate for these 
contemporary deterrence failings through systemic resilience and disruption capacities that both 
frustrate and punish the wide range of malicious actors regardless of origin or intentions.  
 
This project will make an original contribution to knowledge by correlating actual threat 
incident details to public assertions of effectiveness in order to assess the effectiveness of 
                                                          
189 U.S. Department of Defense, Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept, Version 2.0, 
(Washington, DC: US Strategic Command, December 2006), 8. 
190 Ibid.  
191 Mark Pomerleau, “Hope for global cyber norms struggles following Russian hacking 
allegations,” C4ISRNET, January 5, 2017. 
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contemporary deterrent responses to the threat of cyber attack.  Although conceptual literature192 
and workshop proceedings193 exist on cyber deterrence theory, there is little empirical work of 
this nature attempting to compare contemporary strategies across complex social and technical 
issues equally.  For application of a more comprehensive approach, a variety of conferences194 
and speeches195 have addressed the subject but lack a unified framework. In response to the void, 
this project provides an empirically grounded midrange theory in active cyber defense is the key 
strategic deterrence option most likely to influence the behavior of malicious actors in 
cyberspace.  As stated earlier by Vice Admiral Michael Rogers, the proliferation of malicious 
actors and cyber attack vectors does not allow much time to “get some idea of deterrence within 
the cyber arena.”196  
 
Thesis Structure 
 
The thesis is divided into three sections, which examine in total the broad themes 
outlined above.  The sections are succinctly entitled: Thinking about Deterrence, Contemporary 
Deterrence Strategies, and A New Strategic Option.  These sections will contain chapters which 
                                                          
192 Will Goodman, “Cyber Deterrence: Tougher in Theory than in Practice?” Strategic Studies 
Quarterly, Vol. 4, Issue 3 (Fall 2010): 102-135.  
193 National Research Council, Proceedings of a Workshop on Deterring CyberAttacks, The 
National Academies Press, 2012. 
194 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (2011), “A Comprehensive Approach 
to Cyber Security: Exploring the future OSCE Role,” Conference, Hofburg, Vienna, 9-10 May. 
195 James Lewis, “Rethinking Cyber Security – A Comprehensive Approach,” Sasakawa Peace 
Foundation, Tokyo, September 12, 2011. 
196 “Hearing to consider the Nominations of ... VADM Michael S. Rogers, USN to be Admiral 
and Director, National Security Agency/ Chief, Central Security Services/ Commander, U.S. 
Cyber Command,” Statements Before the Senate Committee on Armed Services,” 11 March, 
2014. 
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analyze thematically a different sub-theme within the section followed by a conclusion and 
appendix.   
 
Section One: Thinking about Deterrence 
 
The first section explores the current literature and the nature of the cyber threat to 
ascertain what theoretical foundations can be applied to deter cyberattacks. 
 
Chapter I presents the literature review which reveals that adequate sources exist to 
express the underlying logic of the thesis. The constantly changing array of malicious actors, 
attack methods and motivations in cyberspace mandates use of the most current reference 
material for critical analysis of deterrence strategy options and to draw out conceptual theories.  
Therefore the evidence base is very young and can be at times problematic.  Primary sources that 
would directly document cyber attacks – who made them, when and how, and with what 
reasoning – do not often exist in unclassified documents.  As most attacks are illegal, the best 
evidence will be hidden from view by attackers, governments, and often victims themselves.  
The only sources we can draw upon are thus ones indicating that an attack occurred and 
sometimes giving results pointing at suspects.  This thesis therefore draws on testimony, 
documents, concepts, publications, reports, papers, media outlets and blogs as raw intelligence to 
construct compelling answers to propositions.  
 
While there are academic treatises of the topics pertaining to contemporary cyber 
deterrence strategies and the alternative of active cyber defense, an integrated examination does 
not exist.  Much secondary literature only describes cyber threats, doctrinal approaches, 
offensive tactics, and defensive procedures while other works consider individual aspects of 
technology, policy and warfare.  In order to form the most comprehensive arguments for the 
research questions, secondary literature in the form of published books, chapters, essays, articles, 
and studies will be used to examine applicable theories, occurrences, or initiatives.    
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Chapter II examines the most common types of attack methods available to all levels of 
malicious actors operating in global cybered conflict.  It starts with discussion on how malicious 
code is spread through exploitation of vulnerabilities by cyber attack vectors.  The chapter then 
provides technical detail on in particular, five vectors for compromise of information systems -   
spear phishing, watering hole, point-of-sale, web application, and distributed denial of service 
attacks - along with examples of their use in actual cyber incidents.  The discussion then outlines 
– key malicious and defending actors and presents their motivations in campaigns of malicious 
or pre-emptive cyber activity. Specifically, the chapter will describe and examine the doctrine 
and capabilities of nation states, to include North Korea, Iran, China, Russia, and even the United 
States, hacker groups, criminal organizations, and terrorist groups – using recent cyber incidents 
to better understand their position and intent on cyber operations. The chapter will finish further 
elevating the nationally significant consequences of these cyber attacks upon complex socio-
technical-economic systems of defending nations.   
 
Chapter III explains conceptually how theories of strategy and deterrence underpin the 
creation of contemporary strategic cyber deterrence options or would inform the adaptation of an 
alternative option that would most likely influence malicious actor behavior in cyberspace. It 
begins with a review of seminal scholars’ thinking on the role of deterrence to illustrate the 
relationship between deterrence strategies, as a subset, a backup, an element of one or another 
national strategic choice.  The discussion explores national strategic choices made in three 
historical periods.  Specifically, the chapter examines the use of coercive diplomacy and 
preemption before World War II, escalation dominance and countervailing strategy during the 
Cold War, and superiority in cyberspace and other domains or functional models in an era of 
Rising Cybered Conflict.  In each of the three historical periods, the chapter explores how 
theories of deterrence found in these periods apply or not in the formulation and implementation 
of strategic cyber deterrence options.  Finally in recognition of the intrinsic complexity and 
vulnerabilities found in various socio-economic-technical systems, the chapter concludes with an 
explanation of why a comprehensive approach enhances the multi-sector and largescale 
organizational interaction needed for the deterrence of malicious actors in cyberspace.   
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Section Two: Contemporary Deterrence Strategies  
 
The second section analyses the utility and sufficiency of the contemporary deterrence 
strategies of retaliation, denial and entanglement for influencing malicious actor behavior in 
cyberspace.  
 
Chapter IV assesses the effectiveness of deterrence by retaliation through use of a range 
of means to impose costs for hostile acts in cyberspace.  Specifically it reviews the utility of 
military cyber operations, diplomatic engagements, law enforcement measures, economic 
sanctions, and even the use of kinetic capabilities, to change an actor’s perceptions under varying 
conditions and circumstances. The chapter starts with an illustrative case that depicts an example 
of a justified and proportionate response by the United States government to a destructive and 
vindictive cyber attack by a foreign government on the private company Sony Pictures in 2014.  
The chapter next reviews the challenges in military response options, to include cyber weapon 
selection and usage constraints, both in the context of armed attack and of armed conflict. It then 
considers the virtues of other response options in a whole-of-government approach using the 
tools of global diplomacy, law enforcement expertise, and economic clout.   The chapter finishes 
with an assessment of whether retaliation meets the conditions of effective deterrence for 
cybered conflict, given a greater tolerance for risk in malicious actors generated from 
government hesitancy to use all necessary means to change their behavior.  
 
Chapter V evaluates the effectiveness of deterrence by denial of benefit to malicious 
cyber activity.  Specifically it ascertains whether protective measures - including the 
promulgation of security strategies, the implementation of security controls, and the sharing of 
cyber threat information or intelligence - can limit actor willingness to attack over time.  The 
chapter starts with an illustrative case that depicts the failure of deterrence by denial of benefit in 
a massive breach at the U.S. Office of Personnel Management in 2015.  The chapter then 
examines the utility of protective measures designed to reduce risk, beginning with a defense-in-
depth strategy that places preventive and detective security controls informed by cyber threat 
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intelligence across what the cyber security industry labels the “cyber kill chain.”197  The chapter 
next evaluates security control frameworks to institute industry best practices and security 
solutions.  The chapter then addresses whether threat intelligence sources and information 
sharing arrangements can stay ahead of the threat.  After an explanation of risk management 
efforts to limit damage, the chapter finishes with an assessment of whether denial meets the 
conditions of effective deterrence for cybered conflict, given the apparent ease by which 
malicious actors are able to quickly penetrate systems with low cost, readily available attack 
tools.  
 
Chapter VI appraises the effectiveness of deterrence by entanglement to ensure restraint 
in malicious cyber activity.  Specifically it ascertains whether cooperative measures, including 
international norms, confidence building measures, and capacity building assistance, can restrain 
state behavior in conducting, endorsing or allowing malicious cyber activity originating from 
territory under their jurisdiction.  The chapter starts with an illustrative case that depicts an 
example of the use of coercive diplomacy by the United States government to reach an 
unprecedented cyber arms agreement with China in 2015.  The chapter then examines premises 
and principles for responsible state behavior found in global interdependence and international 
law.  After discussion of the current inability to obtain formal binding obligations for cyberspace, 
the chapter presents initiatives and related setbacks in a broad assortment of cooperative 
measures under development by international bodies, organizations and corporations. The 
chapter finishes with an assessment of whether entanglement meets the conditions of effective 
deterrence for cybered conflict, given the divergence of state objectives, views, and values 
regarding the use of cyberspace.  
 
 
 
                                                          
197 Eric M. Hutchins, Michael J. Cloppert, and Rohan M. Amin, “Intelligence-Driven Computer 
Network Defense Informed by Analysis of Adversary Campaigns and Intrusion Kill Chains,” 
Lockheed Martin Corporation, March 2011 
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Section Three:  A New Strategic Option  
 
The third section assesses whether evidence supports the assertion that active cyber 
defense compensates for the shortcomings of the contemporary deterrence strategies and is 
technically capable and legally viable as an effective, alternative cyber deterrence strategy.  
 
Chapter VII describes and evaluates the range of actions for active cyber defense (ACD) 
in the context of the real time detection, analysis, and mitigation of network security breaches 
combined with the aggressive use of legal countermeasures beyond network and state territorial 
boundaries. The chapter starts with an illustrative case of actual cyber attacks in 2013 and 2014 
affecting two U.S. mega retailers, Target and Home Depot, that depict the virtues of active cyber 
defense capabilities applied across the cyber kill chain. It then examines how implementation of 
this concept creates internal systemic resilience to withstand a potential attack using typical 
proactive activities, such as honeypots or sinkholes, and more recently new cyber security 
industry driven reactive approaches, using automated and integrated capabilities in a single 
security platform. Next the chapter outlines how the concept employs tailored disruption 
capacities to punish the attacker under the permissive legal conditions contained in international 
law.  The chapter then explores employment options and restrictions for use of countermeasures 
by private companies, licensed privateers, and government agencies.  The chapter concludes with 
arguments for considering active cyber defense as an alternative or part of deterrence strategy.  
 
The Conclusion summarizes whether the data unearthed and considered is sufficient 
evidence to base a verdict on the proposed midrange theory of active cyber defense applicable to 
the world of cybered conflict emerging to challenge state security today.  The final chapter 
reviews malicious actor advantages in cyberspace, particularly in terms of scale, proximity and 
precision.198  It then examines the potential for systemic sector consequences in terms of 
                                                          
198 Peter Dombrowski and Chris Demchak, “Cyber War, Cybered Conflict, and the Maritime 
Domain,” Naval War College Review, April 1, 2014: 83.  Malicious actors can scale attacking 
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cascading effects from disruptive or destructive cyber attacks.   The chapter next presents an 
assessment at the strategic level of the impact of the contemporary deterrence strategies in terms 
of these three measures: on attacks (volume of noise across social, technical and economic 
systems), time (in mitigation of systemic security losses), and costs (in the order of magnitude of 
gross domestic products).  Given the shortfalls of existing deterrence options demonstrated over 
the previous chapters the conclusion then consolidates the evidence showing how the midrange 
theory of active cyber defense is technically capable and legally viable as a means for deterring 
malicious actors.  After review of multiple factors for application of active cyber defense 
activities inside and outside the network, the illustrative case of politically disruptive and 
coercive cyber attacks upon the Democratic National Committee network outlined in the 
introduction is examined in more detail to depict a recent example of why active cyber defense is 
the preferred and available means to strengthen deterrence and compensate for the shortcomings 
of other options. The chapter finishes with how active cyber defense meets the conditions of 
capability, credibility and communication to be considered an empirically grounded midrange 
theory for effective cyber deterrence.   
 
An Appendix presents a national strategy agenda for creating internal systemic resilience 
and tailored disruption capacities through implementation of active cyber defense.  The agenda’s 
intent is to induce in an actor the belief that a threat of retaliation credibly exists, the intended 
action cannot fully succeed, or the costs outweigh any benefits of acting.   The appendix will 
delineate how the strategic pillars of resilience and disruption play roles in the current cyber 
security strategies of international organizations and multiple nations when enabled through an 
effective comprehensive cyber deterrence approach.  The appendix then explores architectures 
and arrangements already in place in the United States to strengthen the two strategic pillars.  
The appendix finishes with priority suggestions and policy recommendations to guide tradeoffs 
and choices in a national strategy agenda aimed to provide comprehensive deterrence in a 
conflictual, complex, cybered world.     
  
                                                          
units, operate outside close physical proximity, and vary “the precision of their targeting from a 
single person to cities, regions, or entire nations.” 
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Section One: 
 
 
 
Thinking about Deterrence   
59 
 
CHAPTER I 
 
Literature Review  
 
Primary Sources  
 
The constantly evolving array of malicious actors, attack methods and motivations in 
cyberspace forces the use of the most current reference material to acquire data for critical 
analysis of deterrence strategy options.  Primary sources used here include testimony, 
documents, articles, speeches, concepts, publications, reports, papers, media outlets and blogs.  
The phenomena is too new to rely on published works by academics and too diverse and 
dynamic to rely on formal institutional documents.  The secrecy surrounding the subject area 
makes the finding of reliable sources of any form very difficult.  Only the nature of cyber threats 
and actual attacks can be gleaned from past testimony and documents.  
 
Government Testimony and Documents 
  
The subject area is so dynamic that only very current material plays a prominent role in 
analysis.  The testimony of government officials serves to establish published positions and 
policies on the risk and mitigation of cyber threats and vulnerabilities.  Sean McGurk, the 
Director of the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center, delineated in 
2011 how malicious actors in cyberspace, including nation states, terrorist networks, and 
criminal groups, “have varying levels of access and technical sophistication, but all have 
nefarious intent.”199  McGurk later spoke of how a cyber event impacting control systems in the 
electric, nuclear, water, transportation or communications sectors could have implications at all 
                                                          
199 Sean P. McGurk, National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center Director, 
Testimony before the House Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and 
Security Technologies, April 14, 2011: https://www.dhs.gov/news/2011/04/14/testimony-
national-cybersecurity-and-communications-integration-center-director-se%C3%A1n 
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levels of government and the private sector with potentially cascading effects upon all critical 
infrastructure sectors.200  In 2012, General Keith Alexander, the Commander of U.S. Cyber 
Command, remarked that “it is only a matter of time before someone employs capabilities that 
could cause significant disruption to civilian or government networks and to our critical 
infrastructure.”201  Alexander went on to state in the context of cyber espionage and attack 
“against the United States as well as our allies and partners”, that “our cyber capabilities 
represent key components of deterrence.”202  General Alexander adjusted his position the 
following year by saying we have “some confidence in our ability to deter major state-on-state 
attacks but we are not deterring the seemingly low-level harassment of private and public sites, 
property, and data.”203 
 
Jane Hall Lute, the Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, outlined in 
2013, malicious actor methods to Congress to include distributed denial of service attacks and 
social engineering to malware introduced through thumb drives, supply chain exploitation, and 
trusted insider access.  She contended the success of efforts “to reduce cybersecurity risk 
depends on effective identification of cyber threats and vulnerabilities, analysis, and enhanced 
information sharing...from all levels of government, the private sector, and international 
                                                          
200 Roberta Stempfley, Acting Assistant Secretary, Office of Cyber Security and 
Communications, and Sean P. McGurk, Testimony before the House Subcommittee on Oversight 
and Investigations, July 26, 2011: 
https://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2011/07/StempflyMcgurk-1.pdf. 
201 Keith B. Alexander, Commander, United States Cyber Command, Testimony before the 
House Committee on Armed Services, March 20, 2012: 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/postures/posture_cybercom_20mar2012.pdf. 
202 Ibid.  
203 Keith B. Alexander, Commander, United States Cyber Command, Statement before the 
Senate Committee on Armed Services, March 12, 2013: 
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB424/docs/Cyber-091.pdf. 
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entities.”204  In 2013 Roberta Stempfley, the Acting Assistant Secretary, U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security asserted that carefully crafted information sharing provisions, as part of 
cyber security legislation, are essential to improve the Nation’s cybersecurity posture.  
Accordingly, Stempfley argued that “Congress should enact legislation to incorporate privacy, 
confidentiality, and civil liberties safeguards into all aspects of cyber security” and promote “the 
establishment and adoption of standards for critical infrastructure.”205  
 
In 2013 Larry Wortzel, a senior member of the U.S.-China Economic and Security 
Review Commission, testified that Chinese cyber espionage poses a major threat to U.S. business 
interests and military readiness, by using intrusions to fill gaps in China’s research programs.  In 
case of conflict, he asserted military doctrine in China “calls for attacks on critical infrastructure 
of an opponent’s homeland.”206  Admiral Rogers, the Commander, U.S. Cyber Command, the 
successor to Alexander, verified China, along with one or two other countries, already has cyber 
capabilities that “could shut down the electric grid in parts of the United States.”207 Alexander 
                                                          
204 Jane Hall Lute, Deputy Secretary, US Department of Homeland Security, Statement before 
the House Committee on Homeland Security, March 13, 2013: 
http://docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/HM00/20130313/100390/HHRG-113-HM00-Wstate-LuteJ-
20130313.pdf. 
205 Roberta Stempfley and Lawrence Zelvin, National Cybersecurity and Communications 
Integration Center Director, Statement before the House Committee on Homeland Security,” 
May 16, 2013: https://www.dhs.gov/news/2013/05/16/written-testimony-nppd-house-homeland-
security-subcommittee-cybersecurity-hearing. 
206 Larry M. Wortzel, “Cyber Espionage and the Theft of US Intellectual Property and 
Technology,” Testimony before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, July 9, 2013: 
http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF02/20130709/101104/HHRG-113-IF02-Wstate-WortzelL-
20130709-U1.pdf. 
207 Catherine Herridge, “NSA Director: China can damage US power grid,” Fox News, 
November 20, 2014: http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/11/20/nsa-director-china-can-
damage-us-power-grid.html. 
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stated prior that the U.S. Cyber Command and Components, when directed, will defend the 
“nation against attacks in cyberspace.”208  Robert Anderson, an Executive Assistant Director, at 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), expanded the range of malicious actors in cyberspace 
in 2014 to include “state-sponsored hackers, hackers for hire, global cyber syndicates, and 
terrorists.”209  The same year, James Clapper, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), 
highlighted how “terrorist organizations have expressed interest in developing offensive 
capabilities,” in addition to using cyberspace for influence, propaganda, finance and recruitment.  
Clapper commented on how “cyber criminals play a major role in the international development, 
modification and proliferation of malicious software,” while nations like “Iran and North Korea 
are unpredictable actors” whose cyber capabilities might “provoke or destabilize the United 
States or its partners.”210  In 2015, Robert Work, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, recognized 
that for the United States “we are not where we need to be in our deterrent posture.”211  A year 
later in 2016, Lieutenant General McLaughlin, the Deputy Commander, U.S. Cyber Command, 
pronounced that “one of the [Defense] Department’s key policy goals in cyberspace is to deter 
                                                          
208 Keith B. Alexander, Commander, United States Cyber Command, Statement Before the 
House Committee on Armed Services, March 12, 2014: 
http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS26/20140312/101883/HHRG-113-AS26-Wstate-
AlexanderUSAK-20140312.pdf . 
209 Robert Anderson, Jr. “Cybersecurity, Terrorism, and Beyond: Addressing Evolving Threats to 
the Homeland,” Testimony before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government 
Affairs, September 10, 2014: https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/hearings/cybersecurity-terrorism-
and-beyond-addressing-evolving-threats-to-the-homeland. 
210 James R. Clapper, “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” 
Statement for the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,” February 4, 2014: 
https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/testimonies/203-congressional-testimonies-
2014/1011-statement-for-the-record-worldwide-threat-assessment-of-the-us-intelligence-
community-hpsci. 
211 Cheryl Pellerin, “Defense, Intel Leaders: Cybersecurity Priorities are Defense, Deterrence,” 
DoD News, Defense.gov, September 29, 2015.  
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cyberattacks” and therefore the Department is “supporting a comprehensive, whole-of-
government cyber deterrence strategy” in line with the approach of this thesis.212 
   
Government documents promulgate regional or national strategy, policy, plans or orders 
to secure or defend cyberspace from the threat of cyber attack.  In the United States in particular, 
a lineage of products has been issued over nearly fifteen years that attempt to keep pace with the 
evolving threat.  They start with the 2003 National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace which is 
obviously quite outdated, although it does properly highlight public-private engagement as a key 
component to secure cyberspace.  The Strategy priorities stress continuity plans for resilience, 
law enforcement capabilities, national training and awareness, secure technology programs, and 
international cooperation to deter malicious actors and the same would apply today.213 The 2009 
Cyberspace Policy Review: Assuring a Trusted and Resilient Information and Communication 
Infrastructure maintains emphasis on a public-private partnership for addressing network 
security issues, as well as international cooperation and norms.  The Review delineates need for 
“a comprehensive framework to ensure coordinated response and recovery by the government, 
the private sector, and our allies to a significant [cyber] incident or threat.”214  The 2010 
Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative consists of a number of mutually reinforcing 
                                                          
212 Mr. Thomas Atkin, Lieutenant General James K. McLaughlin, United States Cyber 
Command, and Brigadier General Charles L. Moore, Statement Before the House Armed 
Services Committee, June 22, 2016: 
http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20160622/105099/HHRG-114-AS00-Wstate-AtkinT-
20160622.pdf. 
213 Executive Office of the President, The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, (Washington, 
DC: The White House, February 2003): https://www.dhs.gov/national-strategy-secure-
cyberspace. 
214 Executive Office of the President, Cyberspace Policy Review: Assuring a Trusted and 
Resilient Information and Communication Infrastructure, (Washington, DC: The White House, 
May 2009): 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Cyberspace_Policy_Review_final_0.pdf. 
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initiatives designed as key elements of a broader national strategy.  Initiative number ten intends 
to define and develop enduring deterrence strategies and programs upon realization that 
contemporary measures have not achieved the needed level of security.215  When Congress failed 
to enact cyber security legislation, the President signed in 2013 an Executive Order -- Improving 
Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity to improve information sharing and develop a cyber 
security framework,216 and the Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity 
was released a year later.217  In parallel, the President issued PPD-21 in 2013 titled Presidential 
Policy Directive -- Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience,218 which was followed shortly 
by National Infrastructure Protection Plan 2013: Partnering for Critical Infrastructure Security 
and Resilience to better manage risks to critical infrastructure by identifying threats, reducing 
vulnerabilities and mitigating consequences of incidents through an integrated approach across a 
diverse community.219 
                                                          
215 Executive Office of the President, The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative, 
(Washington, DC: The White House, March 5, 2010): 
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB424/docs/Cyber-034.pdf. 
216 Executive Office of the President, Executive Order -- Improving Critical Infrastructure 
Cybersecurity, (Washington, DC: The White House, February 12, 2013): 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/executive-order-improving-
critical-infrastructure-cybersecurity. 
217 National Institute of Standards and Technology, Framework for Improving Critical 
Infrastructure Cybersecurity, Version 1.0, February 12, 2014: 
https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cyberframework/cybersecurity-framework-
021214.pdf. 
218 Executive Office of the President, Presidential Policy Directive -- Critical Infrastructure 
Security and Resilience, PPD-21, (Washington, DC: The White House, February 12, 2013): 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-directive-
critical-infrastructure-security-and-resil. 
219 Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan 2013: Partnering 
for Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, March 2013: 
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Three releases by the United States in 2011 clarified the nation’s positions on cyberspace. 
The first International Strategy for Cyberspace: Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a 
Networked World released in May 2011 illuminated the combination of diplomacy, defense, and 
development to enhance prosperity, security, and openness.220  The defense objective sets 
pertinent policy for this book in stating that the “United States will, along with other nations, 
encourage responsible behavior and oppose those who would seek to disrupt networks and 
systems, dissuading and deterring malicious actors, and reserving the right to defend these vital 
national assets as necessary and appropriate.”221  Next the U.S. Department of Defense Strategy 
for Operating in Cyberspace published in July 2011 designates cyberspace as an operational 
domain to organize, train and equip as armed forces do in air, land, maritime, and space. 
Department efforts in 2011 focus on mission assurance supported by the development of 
increasingly resilient networks and systems.222 The Department’s Cyberspace Policy Report 
issued in November 2011 provides indications of how the United States will respond to hostile 
acts in cyberspace.223  The same year the NATO promulgated their initial policies for collective 
defense response in a 2011 document titled Defending the Networks, The NATO Policy on Cyber 
                                                          
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/NIPP%202013_Partnering%20for%20Critic
al%20Infrastructure%20Security%20and%20Resilience_508_0.pdf. 
220 Executive Office of the President, International Strategy for Cyberspace, (Washington, DC: 
The White House, May 2011): 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/international_strategy_for_c
yberspace.pdf. 
221 Ibid, 12. 
222 U.S. Department of Defense, Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, July 2011: 
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/ispab/documents/DOD-Strategy-for-Operating-in-
Cyberspace.pdf. 
223 U.S. Department of Defense, Cyberspace Policy Report, November, 2011: 
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB424/docs/Cyber-059.pdf. 
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Defence.224  The European Union (EU) followed suit with their 2013 Cybersecurity Strategy of 
the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace Cybersecurity Strategy outlining 
principles, priorities, actions and roles to achieve an open, safe and secure cyberspace.225  This 
document is supplemented by national strategy objectives, such as in The UK Cyber Security 
Strategy: Protecting and promoting the UK in a digital world that emphasizes detecting and 
defeating threats while pursuing internationally-agreed upon rules of the road on the use of 
cyberspace.226  The UK strategy was updated in 2015 at the same time as establishment of a new 
National Cyber Security Centre.  In 2015 the United States updated their Department of Defense 
Cyber Strategy to strengthen both cyber defense and cyber deterrence postures, in particular 
adding the need to “strengthen the overall resilience of U.S. systems to withstand a potential 
attack if it penetrates the United States’ defenses,” which forms the basis for the concept of 
internal systemic resilience found in this book.227  The U.S. Defense Department is tasked to 
defend the nation against cyberattacks of significant consequence, which includes working with 
other agencies of the government.  
 
 
                                                          
224 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2011), Defending the Networks, The NATO Policy on 
Cyber Defence, approved by NATO defense ministers on June 8, 2011: 
http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_08/20110819_110819-policy-
cyberdefence.pdf. 
225 European Commission, Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and 
Secure Cyberspace, July 2, 2013: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-
market/en/news/communication-cybersecurity-strategy-european-union-%E2%80%93-open-
safe-and-secure-cyberspace. 
226 The UK Cyber Security Strategy: Protecting and promoting the UK in a digital world, 
November 2011: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/cyber-security-strategy. 
227 U.S. Department of Defense, The DoD Cyber Strategy, April 2015: 
https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/2015/0415_cyber-
strategy/Final_2015_DoD_CYBER_STRATEGY_for_web.pdf. 
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Official Articles and Speeches 
 
Articles or speeches by senior officials in the United States provide tangible reasons why 
cyber defense policy initiatives should include use of contemporary deterrence strategies.  In 
2008, Defense Deputy Secretary William Lynn revealed in Foreign Affairs a significant 
compromise of the U.S. Department of Defense military networks by an infected flash drive that 
was inserted into a U.S. military laptop at an operating base in the Middle East.  Lynn stated the 
operation to counter this previously classified attack “marked a turning point in U.S. cyber 
defense strategy.”228  One year after the Pentagon released their strategy, Lynn used the same 
academic forum to remark that “the danger of cyber warfare rivals that of traditional war.”229 
Citing a “strategic shift in the cyber threat” from exploitation to disruption (which can be both 
depending on purpose and actor), Lynn stated that “cyber technologies now exist that are capable 
of destroying critical networks, causing physical damage, or altering the performance of key 
systems.”230 In 2012, former U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta used examples of these sorts 
of attacks on energy companies in the Middle East as evidence for his contention of “a 
significant escalation of the cyber threat and renewed concerns over still more destructive 
scenarios that could unfold” as part of a cyber-Pearl Harbor scenario.231  
 
The former U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey 
amplified in a speech in 2013 that those “disruptive and destructive attacks are becoming a part 
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of conflict between states, within states, and among non state actors.”232 In this conflict, he 
remarked that “civilian infrastructure and business are often targeted first”, which makes sense 
since softer targets.233  He went on to say that the Department of Defense is therefore “taking on 
a new mission when asked, with interagency partners that is defending the nation from cyber 
attacks.”234  However the question lingers as to whether defense strategy is adequate to maintain 
superiority against this rapidly changing threat landscape, when certainly under challenge.235  
General Keith Alexander, the Commander of U.S. Cyber Command, and his colleagues 
contended in The National Interest that even as the United States confronts mounting threats, an 
historical opportunity exists to deter them, through “an evolving set of capabilities and activities 
that have not yet reached their collective potential.”236  Alexander said progress has been made, 
but more can be done to provide: “authority to respond to threats,” “legislation that facilitates 
information sharing with the private sector, established security standards for critical 
infrastructure,” and doctrine for “the conduct of military operations in cyberspace.” – which 
arguably conflate issues and are very difficult to tackle.237 
 
Military Concepts and Publications 
 
 In the United States, military concepts are critical to identify problems and propose 
solutions for innovative ways to conduct operations.  Ideally they will produce capabilities that 
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render previous ways of warfighting obsolete while changing measures of success in operations. 
The Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept, December 2006, Version 2.0, states that 
deterrence strategy must “be tailored to the perceptions, values and interests of specific 
adversaries.” It also states that deterrence operations “convince adversaries not to take actions 
that threaten interests” by “means of decisive influence over their decision-making.”  Decisive 
influence is “achieved by credibly threatening to deny benefits and/or impose costs while 
encouraging restraint by convincing the actor that restraint will result in an acceptable 
outcome.”238  U.S. Joint Staff doctrine states that success in preparation and response to cyber 
threats “is dependent upon unity of effort enabled by collaboration and coordination” among 
partners. Their Unity of Effort Framework Solution Guide, August 2013, provides procedures, 
templates, and definitions to aid planners in improving unity of effort for complex problems.239   
 
Joint and service publications provide the doctrinal foundations, fundamental principles 
and specific considerations that guide the armed forces in operations. The DOD Dictionary of 
Military and Associated Terms, as of March 2017, sets forth standard US military terminology 
but is limited in expressions of cyberspace and deterrence.240   Joint Publication 3-0 for Joint 
Operations, January 2017, views deterrence as a phase (Deter) in a flexible model to arrange 
combat and stability operations,241 where more detail on individual phases is found in Joint 
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Publication 5-0 for Joint Operation Planning, August 2011.242  Joint Publication 3-24 for 
Counterinsurgency, November 2013, provides a glimpse of how the comprehensive approach 
can frame unified action by key actors for unity of effort in operations.243 Joint Publication 3-12 
(R) for Cyberspace Operations, February 2013, provides military guidance and joint doctrine for 
“the planning, preparation, execution and assessment of joint cyberspace operations.”244 Joint 
Publication 1-04 for Legal Support to Military Operations, August 2016, describes the law of 
war principles of military necessity, humanity, distinction, and proportionality to be used in all 
joint military operations.245 The Department of Defense Law of War Manual, updated May 2016, 
devotes an entire chapter on how law of war principles and rules apply to cyber capabilities and 
the cyber domain, in particular for cyber operations in both jus ad bellum and jus in bello.246  
Joint Publication 3-01 for Countering Air and Missile Threats, March 2012, illuminates how 
passive and active measures for Ballistic Missile Defense are very similar in context to 
Defensive Cyberspace Operations.247 Air Force Doctrine Document 3-12 for Cyberspace 
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Operations, November 2011, Change 1, addresses unique challenges, such as mission assurance, 
compressed decision cycles, and anonymity from inherent attribution.248  Other Department of 
Homeland Security and Commerce publications provide information security terms,249 
practices,250 standards,251 and guidelines.252  
 
Industry Reports and Papers 
 
Commercial cyber security vendors conduct research and produce various synopses on 
multiple aspects of the cyber threat.  Their annual or special reports and papers are the most 
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current and detailed source of evidence on the magnitude and mitigation of the cyber threat.  
Scholars of cyber security or strategy related topics cannot rely on traditional academic sources 
that are dated and limited in explanation and understanding of the pervasive and evolving threat.  
For example, the annual Internet Security Threat Report by Symantec reviews the ever changing 
types and number of breaches and attacks plus delivery tactics while recommending appropriate 
best practices and security controls.253  Whereas Verizon’s annual Data Breach Investigations 
Report centers on developing data breech statistics and attack methods categorized in basic 
patterns with recommended and suitable controls.254 The annual Global Threat Report by 
CrowdStrike reveals the latest malicious activity and techniques used by state and non-state 
actors.255  Other primary sources of current threat summaries or expert predictions include 
FireEye M-Trends,256 Kaspersky Security Bulletins257 and McAfee Threat Predictions.258 More 
detailed and foundational analysis on specific threat delivery mechanisms call threat vectors and 
the cyber kill chain are found in special releases by companies such as RSA259 or Lockheed 
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Martin.260   Exacting reviews of actual “advanced persistent threat” groups and their 
organizations, locations, affiliations, activities, targets, and methods are produced according to 
nations, such as China by Mandiant for APT1261 and Russia by FireEye for APT28.262  Other 
cyber security companies, like Imperva, break down the motivations and tactics of different 
actors, like Anonymous (the hacker collective) use of Distributed Denial of Service type 
methods.263 Other actor campaigns identified in a host of illustrious names are captured and 
explained by security firms, such as Night Dragon and Operation Troy by McAfee,264 or Red 
October and NetTraveler by Kaspersky265 and Operation Blockbuster by Novetta.266  
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Commercial cyber security firms also produce unique technical analysis of attacks or 
occurrences leading to suggested security solutions that are unavailable for use elsewhere.  
Almost all government analysis is classified and thus not accessible to the general public.  A 
scholar that possesses an appropriate clearance and views classified information risks inadvertent 
disclosure in discussion and publication.  An example of useable material is a FireEye paper that 
explained how their product solutions would disrupt the 2010 Aurora attack upon U.S. 
companies at each stage of the infection lifecycle.267  Similarly Lumension identified how a 
defense-in-depth approach can protect against the weaponized malware used in the Flame virus 
attacks upon Iran.268  Other security companies identify cyber defense solution requirements to 
detect and defend across all attack process stages.269  These suggested defensive measures are 
similar to the Critical Security Controls endorsed by the SANS Institute.270  The Ponemon 
Institute assists organizations in creating a business case to adopt these security controls through 
publication of periodic studies depicting risks in endpoints271 and costs of breaches.272  A 
plethora of industry papers recommend products and practices to protect companies from 
advanced threats, like by Kaspersky on targeted cyber attacks.273 Though some security firms 
claim that prevention alone is not enough, and defenders need technologies that automate 
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responses to advanced cyber threats. For example, Hexis Solutions declared Hawkeye G can 
detect, investigate and remove threats at the speed of a machine, without human intervention, 
from within the network.274 
 
Media Outlets and Blogs 
 
Analysis of viable strategies to counter emerging and pressing cyber threats requires 
dynamic reporting of incidents and policies. Quite a number of electronic and print media 
resources provide credible cyber security industry expert evaluations and senior government 
official positions on cyber threats and vulnerabilities coupled with related reactions and 
initiatives.  In many cases the only news of significant cyber attacks comes from daily papers or 
their online sites, such as the New York Times, Reuters, Bloomberg, Washington Post and the 
Wall Street Journal.  Without access to and use of these sources, patterns of evidence cannot be 
developed and fused to reach conclusions on the usefulness of proposed strategies in this thesis.  
Furthermore exclusive reporting is only contained at specific locations such as the Dark Reading 
site which posts stories, news, commentary and conversations on attacks or beeches, 
vulnerabilities and threats, plus cloud, application, endpoint, mobile and perimeter security.275  
More essential and unique details can be found in blogs, like at the InfoSec Institute Resources 
Site or IANS Blogs at IANS Perspective, and in sites, like Ars Technica for Risk Assessment at 
Security & Hacktivism or Cyber Attack at the Hacker News site.  The applicability of cyber 
attacks in warfare is elaborately presented in magazines, such as Jane’s Defense Weekly, or in 
blogs, such as Digital Conflict Blog at the Defense Systems site.  Daily recaps of important 
federal cyber security and information technology initiatives can only be found in posts by the 
groups like FedCyber and FedScoop.  Finally, pertinent information on current cyber security 
solutions is available in print journals such as Government Computer News and SC Magazine. 
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Secondary Literature 
 
Academic treatises of the multiple topics pertaining to contemporary cyber deterrence 
strategies have not yet achieved an adequately inclusive or integrated examination.  Many 
sources are devoted only to various cyber threats, doctrinal approaches, offensive tactics, and 
defensive procedures while others consider only individual aspects of technology, policy or 
warfare.  In order to form expansive arguments for the research questions, this volume of 
disparate information will be fused with a variety of applicable theories, occurrences, or 
initiatives found in published books, chapters, essays, articles, and studies.    
 
Cyber Threats 
 
For this work, a clear understanding of technical aspects of cyber threats is critical to 
evaluate the utility of security controls, initiatives and regimes designed to counter cyber attacks.   
However only a limited set of technically oriented books and chapters exist that outline various 
cyber threats and state of the art attack methods.  Kevin Coleman, a reputable columnist for the 
magazine Defense Systems, defined a “cyber attack vector” as “a category of software or code 
vulnerability, along with the path and method used to exploit it.”276 In his electronic book, 
Coleman not only described nearly fifty types of vectors, but also graded each along a risk scale 
(1 to 5) for threat, use, maturity, and defenses. Robert Koch, on the Faculty of Computer Science 
at the Universitat der Bundeswehr Munchen, presented attack trends for the purpose of 
evaluating weaknesses in current security systems. He claimed the most important methods are 
application layer attacks (like a code injection into a Web forum input box for a specific action to 
be performed on a database), zero day exploits (a program exploiting a flaw in software, such as 
operating systems or web browsers, that is available before the vendor knows about the flaw), 
social engineering (an intrusion that relies on human interaction for installation), dissemination 
routes (for malware, e.g. through data storage media), and insider attacks (that result in data 
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leakage) or all of them and more.277  Christopher Elisan, a principal malware scientist at the 
security firm RSA Netwitness, classified means by which malware (software or firmware 
intended to perform an unauthorized process that will have adverse impact on the confidentiality, 
integrity, or availability of an information system)278 is able to infiltrate a targets system as 
‘infection vectors’.279  While Marcus Maybaum, a German Air Force Information Technology 
professional,280 and Ed Skoudis, a network security consultant for Intelguardians Network 
Intelligence,281 analyzed specific tools and techniques for intrusion along the phases of the cyber 
attack process defined as reconnaissance, weaponization, delivery, exploitation, installation, 
command and control, and action on objectives.  
 
A major form of cyber threat called the “advanced persistent threat” covertly obtains 
unauthorized access and uses stealthy techniques along the phases of the cyber attack process to 
steal valuable information usually in long-term surveillance operations against targets. Case 
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studies of APT group attacks reveal common tools, techniques, and indicators.282  Mauno 
Pihelgas, a security technology researcher at the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of 
Excellence (NATO CCD COE), described ways in which APTs and other malicious actors 
operate to avoid detection and association with their true identity in order to maintain anonymity.  
He prescribed the use of “back-tracing” as a way to identify the originating source of 
communication, using processes or tools such as “traceroute” to find the route of network 
packets, which could determine attribution for an appropriate response to an attack.283  Cyber 
threat intelligence strives to understand the type, motivation and capability of APTs and other 
malicious actors, as well as potential impacts.  In his short summary, Bob Gourley, a partner at 
Cognito Corporation, advocated that cyber threat intelligence drives decisions on defenses and 
provides sources of cyber threat intelligence from a range of providers.284    
 
 A broad examination of cyber actors and their intentions is offered by Mike McConnell, 
former Director of the NSA National Security Agency.  He observed that malicious actors posing 
the greatest threats to cyberspace have shifted in the last 20 years from those causing operational 
nuisances or financial impacts to “terrorist groups and nation-states whose strategic intent is to 
cause long-term harm” to U.S. economic well-being and national security.285 Several prominent 
books illuminate the type of operations conducted by these actors.  Eneken Tikk, a well-known 
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international lawyer, masterfully annotated the timelines, means, targets, origins and effects of 
suspected state-sponsored disruptive cyber conflicts in Estonia and Georgia in her treatise on 
legal considerations.286  Jason Healey, the Director of the Cyber Statecraft Initiative of the 
Atlantic Council, provided a chronological narrative of a quarter century of conflict in 
cyberspace, looking in particular at the militarization phase of cyber history containing 
espionage and disruptive attacks, to include the former by Chinese affiliated APT groups.  His 
analysis revealed that the “probability and consequences of disruptive conflict have often been 
hyped; while the real impacts of cyber intrusions have been consistently under-appreciated.”287   
 
A variety of seminal articles and essays help outline the objectives and methods of 
attacker campaigns, which are a series of extended and connected major operations aimed at 
achieving specific goals, in cyberspace.  In some cases, actors seek to merely influence others 
through, and by means of, cyberspace.  Christian Czosseck, a German Army Information 
Technology professional, outlined how state cyber power can be wielded by dedicated national 
capabilities and also by proxies of different types in ways not possible before cyberspace, 
especially leveraging the global outreach and anonymity of the internet.288  For example Iftach 
Amit, Managing Partner, Security & Innovation, linked Russian cyber warfare activities in 
Estonia and Georgia to cybercrime groups,289 mechanisms that states would not have used in 
previous eras.  For the Ukraine conflict, Mark Clayton examined whether similar attacks tied to 
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two large criminal botnets have any national allegiance.290  John Bumgarner, the Chief 
Technology Officer for the U.S. Cyber Consequences Unit, argued Russia did not run the same 
playbook used in Georgia since it did not blind the Ukrainian government with massive cyber 
attacks when its forces invaded Crimea.291  While Bryan Krekel, from Northrop Grumman, 
pointed out that in China organized cyber criminals and state-sponsored intelligence 
professionals often operate in the same environment and against similar targets.292   
 
Some senior sources link attacks to a “war” equivalent often.  Larry Wortzel a senior 
member of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, presented evidence that 
“the Chinese government is directing and executing a large scale cyber espionage campaign 
against the United States.”293  He claimed intrusions into government and defense industries pose 
a major threat to US military operations and readiness. Wortzel said the Chinese government 
provides state-owned enterprises information and data exfiltrated through espionage to out-
compete US companies.294 In their Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report, 
Lewis and Baker examine the impact of cyber espionage and also cybercrime in terms of cost but 
conclude “the cost of malicious cyber activity involves more than the loss of financial assets or 
intellectual property.  There are opportunity costs, damage to brand and reputation, consumer 
losses from fraud, the opportunity costs of service disruptions...and the cost of increased 
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spending on cybersecurity.”295  According to the works of cyber warfare specialists Richard 
Clarke and Robert Knake, recent cyber attacks constitute a form of “cyber war” due to the 
conditions and effects of these attacks.296  
 
Contrarian views on whether cyber attacks achieve a “war” equivalent are necessary in 
considerations in this work regarding legal thresholds for military responses.  By contrast, well 
recognized scholar Thomas Rid of King’s College argued that past and present cyber attacks are 
forms of political violence (sabotage, espionage and subversion) that just remove direct human 
action.297  Others agree that research indicates the actual magnitude and pace of attacks do not 
match popular perception of war.298  In looking at the strategic aspects of how cyber war affects 
the will of the adversary directly, Martin Libicki from the RAND Corporation differentiated how 
cyber warfare is about the conduct of war, carried out to improve the performance of combat in 
the physical domain.299  Chatham House scholar Paul Cornish’ and his co-authors agreed that 
cyber warfare “cannot be separated from conflict in the physical domain.”300  Finally Thomas 
Mahnken concluded cyber warfare uses “the cyber instrument as a dimension of a larger military 
conflict,” aiding lethal forms of warfare, whereas “the independent use of the cyber instrument” 
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is termed “cyber war.”301 Overall, the terms cyber war and warfare are poorly defined, contested, 
and misunderstood.  
 
Strategic Theory  
 
 Numerous books and chapters by distinguished authors depict dimensions of strategic 
theory for national defense, or simply the theory of strategy.  These works are necessary to 
understand the role, and use, or threat, of force in this work.  Beatrice Heuser referred to strategy 
as how people think about the link between political aims and the use of force, or its threat.  She 
presented how the term strategy as the “art of the general” in antiquity evolved into the “science 
of the supreme commander” in early 1800, in contrast to “the use of engagements for the object 
of war” according to Clausewitz.  She noted a return to the use of technical definitions by 
generals in the early twentieth century did not allow for the political directives under which 
strategy operated.  Eventually though it appears today’s military thinkers have formed consensus 
that strategy is about “the pursuit of political aims by the use or possession of military means.”302 
Edward Luttwak considered strategy to be “a body of reoccurring objective phenomena that arise 
from human conflict.”  He contended that the normative Clausewitz version continued to 
dominate American interpretations while preferring a succinct French definition along the lines 
of “the art of wills that use force to resolve conflict.”303  Likewise, French General Andre 
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Beaufre had a tendency to speak of strategy as “the art of the dialectic of force, or more 
precisely, the dialectic of opposing wills, which use force for the settlement of their disputes.”304 
 
 Colin Gray endeavored to show that strategy is an inclusive rather than exclusive realm 
of thought and behavior, where different perspectives are sources both of constraint and 
opportunity.  He reiterated that military strategy pertains to the use and threat of force for the 
purposes of policy as decided by policy, an important connotation for use of the threat of 
retaliation.305  Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart, an English military theorist, recognized strategy 
depends on a sound calculation and coordination of the ends (policy) and the means (ability).  He 
opined that strategy has to overcome resistance, manifested by human will.306 To that extent, 
Lawrence Freedman explored whether it is possible to manipulate and shape the environment or 
fall victim to forces beyond control. His treatment of rational actor theory is most revealing 
regarding tendencies of self-interest overcome by coalitions and cooperation in strategic 
situations.  However, the theory works well only if people are reasonable and sensible, and 
thoughtful about consequences, which bounds the notion of rational behavior.307  Arthur F. 
Lykke, Jr. added the third element of ways (methods) in characterizing the Strategy = Ends + 
Ways + Means paradigm, to illustrate the need to examination courses of action to achieve 
objectives by available resources, such as to prevent undesirable behavior.308  
 
 Keith Payne and Dale Walton state that Cold War nuclear deterrence strategies assumed 
that challengers would be rational and reasonable and thus predictable.  However they countered 
                                                          
304 Beatrice Heuser, The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present, 
(Cambridge University Press, 2010): 17. 
305 Colin S. Gray, Perspectives on Strategy, (Oxford University Press, 2013). 
306 B.H. Liddell Hart, “The Theory of Strategy,” Military Strategy: Theory and Application, 
(Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, 1983), 3-22 to 3-27. 
307 Lawrence Freedman, Strategy, (Oxford University Press, 2013). 
308 Arthur F. Lykke, Jr. “Toward an Understanding of Military Strategy,” Guide to Strategy, 
(Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, 1983), February 2001: 179-185. 
84 
 
that “even the most brilliantly conceived and presented deterrence threats may be discounted or 
misunderstood” by “desperate or confident leaders intent on their chosen course,” which could 
apply to the type of actors operating in cyberspace.309 Colin Gray pointed out that nuclear 
weapons in the Cold War were instruments of policy capable of functioning in the ends-means 
context of strategy in time of and deterrence of war.310  While Lawrence Freedman noted nuclear 
“forces were not being used to compel a change in the status quo but only to contain an 
enemy.”311  In his view Soviet expansionism “could only be held through the threat of force and 
if necessary, the realization of this threat at those points where it looked as if it might break out 
of limits.”  Therefore Freedman concluded that “containment as an objective lent itself to 
deterrence as a method.”312  Although Freedman did consider nuclear weapons as a problem in 
strategy in terms of military means to be related to political ends, and reached the conclusion that 
security problems can be eased only by stronger conventional forces, similar to their role in 
cyber deterrence as an alternative means to respond to a cyber attack.313   
 
In Marc Trachtenberg’s study of the influence of historical experience on strategy, he 
attempted to make sense of a world of thermonuclear weapons in citing Bernard Brodie’s 
conclusion that what was needed was a comprehensive and radically different framework for 
thinking about strategic issues.314  In thinking about the current security environment, Michael 
Carns stated the United States has little choice but to rethink security and deterrence as they 
apply to the various state, non-state, and trans-national threats that have heretofore been ignored 
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or wished away, which astutely applies to attempts to address today’s cyber threats in this work.  
Carns stated the first step would be to craft a holistic national security policy that deters, or at 
least manages, emergent threats, because the promise is great and the alternative unacceptable.315  
Colin Gray recapped that if one discusses strategic ideas, like deterrence, to remember that 
strategy inalienably is a practical subject pervaded with political meaning.  The challenge of 
deterrence is thus the challenge of strategy. Gray reminded the reader that the purpose of 
strategy, according to Clausewitz, is “to impose our will on the enemy’ and hence ‘an enemy 
who chooses to be deterred is an enemy who chooses to subordinate his will to ours”316 and the 
enemy examined in this work is the malicious actor in cyberspace.   
 
Cyber Strategy 
 
In 2010 U.S. President Barak Obama appeared to adhere to Michael Carns advice that the 
first step to deter or manage emerging threats is to craft a holistic national security policy by 
ordering, shortly after taking office, “the development of a comprehensive approach to securing 
America’s digital infrastructure.”317  A key element of the approach, labeled number 10, of the 
President’s subsequent 2010 Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative is to “Define and 
develop enduring deterrence strategies and programs.”318 The Initiative stated that “senior 
policymakers must think through the long-range strategic options available” which inspired the 
illumination of those offered in this work.  The Initiative provided some useful considerations for 
this work in articulating “an approach to cyber defense that deters interference and attack in 
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cyberspace by improving warning capabilities, articulating roles for private sector and 
international partners, and developing appropriate responses for both state and non-state actors,” 
although these responses have not been developed as evidenced in many attacks since.319  In 
regard to warning, security expert James Lewis identified a widening gap between offensive and 
defensive capabilities where most companies find out they have been hacked months later, 
usually by a third party.  Therefore Lewis contended that any cyber strategy should set 
expectations for the sharing of threat information between and among parties that can act on the 
data.  In regard to roles for international partners, he stated cyber strategy should also reflect the 
importance of international cooperation and governance that requires common norms to create an 
atmosphere that encourages responsible behavior.320 Both observations by Lewis, on threat 
information sharing and common international norms, highlight the need for mechanisms used in 
this work for deterrence by denial and by entanglement, respectively.   
 
National cyber security strategies suggest a myriad of actions and initiatives to secure 
cyberspace, including creative ways to deter malicious actors. In his seminal book on the subject, 
Kenneth Geers, a U.S. Representative to the NATO CCD COE, described cyber attack 
mitigation strategies that fall into the categories of technical solutions, military doctrine, attack 
deterrence, and arms control.  Geers highlighted useful opportunities or limitations on each 
category, specifically in the potential for new protocols that provide enhanced security features; 
objective calculations for offensive operations; credibility challenges in deterrence due to 
attribution and asymmetry; and cyber arms control model difficulties because of prohibition and 
inspection challenges.321  In a later release from Tallinn on a theoretical framework for facets of 
national cyber security according to different levels of public policy, Alexander Klimburg, a 
nonresident senior fellow with the think tank Atlantic Council, examined political aims, strategic 
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goals, organizational considerations, and international agreements and regulations.322  His 
mandate for governmental, societal and international stakeholders to work together in order to 
succeed in cyber security implores the application of a comprehensive approach as a means of 
cooperation as seen in this work.  
 
Any cyber strategy to deter or manage emerging threats should outline a vision and 
approach to understanding and managing risk while balancing civil rights and liberties, as 
espoused in this work under the chapter on deterrence by denial.  Christin Goodwin and Paul 
Nicholas, from the Microsoft Corporation contribute to this vision and approach by providing a 
clear set of principles that serve as the basis for a risk-based strategy, where risk is assessed by 
identifying threats, vulnerabilities and consequences; then managed through costs or controls.323  
A report by Herbert Lin, a renowned researcher at Stanford University, and his associates 
recognized that tensions exist between cybersecurity and other public policy concerns, especially 
the aforementioned civil rights and liberties due to their informational dimension. For example a 
policy to inspect Internet traffic for malware could be regarded as a violation of privacy. 
Likewise the sharing of technical information raises concerns about possible privacy or antitrust 
violations, which is accommodated by legislative proposals identified in this work.324 
 
 The formulation of strategic options for deterrence in this thesis is not limited to the 
consideration of only U.S. strategy and policy decisions and initiatives.  The thesis also draws 
upon academic pieces that frame official cyber defense policy established by the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). For example, Diana De Viva at the 
NATO Defence College summarized a range of useful NATO efforts and arrangements leading to 
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release of their Enhanced Cyber Defense Policy in 2014.325  While Hannes Krause, an Assistant 
Defence Counselor, Permanent Representation of Estonia to NATO looked at progress and 
challenges since adoption of the original NATO Policy in 2011, in areas such as use of the 
defense planning process in the cyber context and information sharing as a political goal.326 
Others authors have captured lessons after attacks from legal, operational and strategic 
perspectives, to include the feasibility of deterrence by denial or by punishment,327 and also the 
international perspective on cyber conflict, that leads to cooperation on areas of agreement.328 
Giles Merritt, the Chairman of the Security and Defence Agenda expressed EU leader views on 
proposals for private-public, in addition to international cooperation.329  Meanwhile, renowned 
U.S. expert Jason Healey portrayed NATO’s policies and capabilities in terms of defensive 
improvements, political governance and operational steps. Given difficulties in keeping attackers 
out of systems, Healey emphasized resilience as the way to secure strategic objectives.330 
 
Deterrence Theory 
 
 A variety of books provide historical and practical foundations for deterrence theory as 
the basis for foreign policy, which are necessary to understand the object and use of strategic 
options in this work.  Gordon Craig and Alexander George laid out a process to weigh the 
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interest of the country, convey a commitment to defend those interests, and back its commitment 
by threats to respond if the opponent acts.331  This process applies to a potential malicious act in 
cyberspace. The authors admit the general theory of deterrence they draw upon is found in a 
manuscript by Alexander George and Richard Smoke that presents an in-depth assessment of 
deterrence theory applied in American foreign policy since the end of World War II. That book 
focuses on efforts to deter limited conflicts and the authors conclude the “theory has been 
markedly less useful to policy-makers than it might have been” by relying too heavily on 
“deterrent threats in lieu of the more flexible instruments of inter-nation influence associated 
with classical diplomacy,” which relates directly to ongoing international engagements 
concerning cyberspace.332  In their new approach for “Perfect Deterrence,” Frank Zagare and 
Marc Kilgore focused on connections among capability, preferences, credibility and outcomes in 
both mutual direct and to extended deterrence relationships.333  Adam Lowther framed policy 
applications in terms of deterrence instruments, failure and consequences that are helpful for use 
of deterrence theory in this century.334 
 
General Kevin Chilton, commander, U.S. Strategic Command, and senior advisor Greg 
Weaver judged “deterrence should and will remain a core concept in our twenty-first century 
national security policy... because the concept itself is just as relevant today as it was during the 
                                                          
331 Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of 
our Time, (Oxford University Press, 1995).   
332 Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory 
and Practice, (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1974.) 
333 Frank C. Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour, Perfect Deterrence, (Cambridge University Press, 
2000).  
334 Adam Lowther, “Framing Deterrence in the Twenty-first Century,” Proceedings of Deterrence 
in the Twenty-first Century, (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, May 
2009).  
90 
 
Cold War.”335  With a seminal analysis of Cold War observations, Schuyler Forester’s primer is 
useful to this work because it lays out the basic elements of traditional deterrence (by denial and 
by punishment) and highlights inherent contradictions. Discussions of deterrence must be 
specific about whom and what to deter before solving the question of how.  Most poignant is 
Forester’s realization that “deterrence must be most effective in circumstances when rationality 
can least be assumed.”336 According to, Janice Stein, the rationality of adversaries is one of the 
principal threads of the debate about deterrence as theory and strategy. She addressed the 
meaning of rationality, the construction of the threat and the structure of the international system. 
Stein found the problem of rationality is compounded by the complex and uncertain global 
system, a useful finding considering the vast motivations of malicious actors in cyberspace that 
exploit globalization gains for malicious acts.337  Chris Demchak outlined a theory of action that 
involves addressing the malicious actor's or group's sense of legitimacy, need, and confidence 
related to the act itself.338  She claimed “humans in general are motivated by perceptions of 
legitimacy (often called beliefs), needs (usually monetized), and confidence (historically tied to 
the ability to wield decisive force).”339 These motivators reflect the three fields of 
constructivism, institutionalism, and realism described by Michael Doyle.340  The motivators 
map to the three schools of international relations in the following way: “beliefs are the focus of 
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constructivism, money is the focus of liberal institutionalism, and force is the focus of 
realism.”341  Demchak argued that coercion works best in diminishing confidence, by 
transforming the ease of actions, irrespective of local culture, to find and frustrate the malicious 
actor.  Her argument is helpful in examining how strategic options influence decisions to attack 
based on beliefs (legitimacy), money (need) and ability (confidence). 
 
Major General William Chambers, the U.S. Air Force Assistant Chief of Staff for 
Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, proclaimed the necessity to retain classic 
deterrence methodologies and integrate newer behavioural approaches outside a rational state-
based actor construct.342 Adam Lowther, an Air Force research professor, aptly noted “today’s 
diversity of challenges increases the complexity of formulating successful deterrence strategies.”  
Therefore Lowther suggested states “develop coherent and comprehensive approaches that are 
applicable to the global security environment” and that “deliberately employ all instruments of 
power,”343 consistent with the bearing of this work.  Senior defence analyst Michael Johnson and 
RAND program director Terrence Kelly emphasize tailored approaches to deter principal threats 
to national security, seizing upon basic tenets such as to deny objectives or impose costs, which 
provides a useful paradigm for exploring an alternative strategy in this work. They suggest 
deterring aggression by China in multiple domains with a defensive approach capable of limiting 
ability to attack.344  A RAND study by Abram Shulsky examines the particular requirements for 
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deterrence of China while reaching a different conclusion that the best means is by diplomatic 
action,345 which validates a different approach also examined in the work.   
 
Cyber Deterrence 
 
In the leading book on cyber deterrence, Martin Libicki applied the concept and 
components of deterrence in the context of strategic and operational cyberwar.  Libicki 
masterfully examined what makes deterrence in cyberspace different in terms of attribution, 
signaling, thresholds, and escalation, which contributes to views on retaliation in this work.346  
Esteemed scholar Patrick Morgan believed for cyber attacks,  the limits on deterrence based on 
retaliation, the largest being credibility to demonstrate will, must be compensated for by 
deterrence supplied by defense, which is the reverse of the U.S. situation during the Cold War.347  
Furthermore, Will Goodman, a defense advisor to Senator Patrick Leahy, explained that the 
credibility of a deterrent declaration is defined by capability, intent and incontestability. He 
proclaimed “states must maintain effective denial measures and threaten credible penalties,”348 
which lends credence to efforts for denial in this work. Given cumulative challenges of attack 
detection, precise attribution and credible retaliation, expert views by Dimitri Alperovitch from 
the cyber security firm McAfee, are appropriate for thinking of how to establish a cyberspace 
deterrence strategy.  After arguing that “attacks on confidentially cannot be subject to deterrence 
in the current international framework,” Alperovitch put forth a strategy that can “enhance 
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national security against devastating cyber attacks through a credible declaratory retaliation 
capability that establishes red lines that may trigger a counter strike against all identifiable 
responsible parties,”349 part of the basis for active defense in this work.  
 
Jeffrey Cooper, a vice president for technology at Science Applications International 
Corporation, recognized the calculus of deterrence is a function of decision makers evaluating, 
within a matrix of values and expectations, possible gain versus loss for opportunities filled with 
consequences and uncertainties. Thus Cooper introduced a cooperation, competition and conflict 
framework for cyber deterrence that sees actors driven by and pursuing self-interest,350 a relevant 
component of entanglement in this work.  Franklin Kramer, distinguished fellow for the Brent 
Scowcroft Center, and Melanie Teplinsky, adjunct professional lecturer at American University’s 
Washington College of Law, proposed development of a tailored deterrence approach to reduce 
adversarial cyber intrusions. Their unique approach emphasized raising costs of, and reducing 
benefits from, cyber attacks, to include use of cyber sanctions, mandatory standards for 
protection and resilience, international agreements, and certified active defense,351 that are 
analogous to elements of the four strategic options in this work.  Lieutenant Colonel Corinda 
Rujillo, U.S. Air Force provided similar options for cyber deterrence that comprise strengthening 
defense (security and resilience), pursing partnerships, and advancing policy and legislative 
solutions, which are highly realist and U.S.-led.352 Kamal Jabbour, a senior scientist for 
information assurance, and Paul Ratazzi, a principal engineer for cyber assurance, suggested a 
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new strategy for securing cyberspace must employ new technical solutions based on warfighting 
concepts found in other domains, like the notion of offensive and defensive operations occurring 
simultaneously and in concert,353 which are useful ideas for the application of active cyber 
defense in this work.  
 
 In order to better understand how defensive and offensive systems relate and interact in 
warfighting concepts in other domains for the translation of the simultaneous operations model 
to the cyber domain, national security expert Leon Sloss proposed looking at the strategic 
perspective of ballistic missile defense.  Sloss then examined how ballistic missile defense does 
or does not play a role in deterrence strategies.354  Although ballistic missile defense has 
demonstrated limited tactical success, Schulyer Forester, the Brent Scowcroft Professor of 
National Security Studies at the U.S. Air Force Academy, remarked that active defenses confront 
the tyranny of an offense dominant environment in the global commons (maritime, air, space and 
cyberspace domains). As an alternative, Forester presented deterrence by entanglement as a way 
to entrench potential adversaries in a network that would not attack because of shared 
interests,355 the basis for the third strategic concept in this work. Other scholars evaluate the 
usefulness of the “commons” analogy for resolving issues nations face in regard to cyber 
security, and for guiding regulatory frameworks for cyberspace, such as those envisioned in the 
theory of entanglement suggested by Forester.356  Vincent Manzo, a research analyst at the 
National Defense University, postulated that the United States may seek to deter attacks in 
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cyberspace by threatening proportionate cross-domain responses, which adversaries could 
perceive as clearer and more credible.357  
 
 In maturing the concept of cyberspace as an operational domain, General Larry Welch, U.S. 
Air Force, former president of the Institute of Defense Analysis, treated “cyber as a place, not a 
mission,” in, from, and through which “military operations create intended effects.”358  Parallel 
to this view, Lieutenant Colonel Lincoln Bonner, of the U.S. Air Force, defined “cyber power” as 
the ability to “exploit cyberspace to create advantages and influence events.”359  This ability to 
“create intended effects” and “influence events” through cyber power relates closely to the 
central premise of cyber deterrence - altering an adversary’s behavior.360  Thus David Betz, 
senior lecturer at King’s College, and Tim Stevens, an associate at King’s College, posit four 
distinct forms of cyber power.  The first form uses direct coercion to modify the behavior or 
conditions of existence of another actor; the second involves the indirect control of an actor 
through the mediation of an institution; the third works to maintain structures to permit or 
constrain actors; and the fourth uses social discourses to constrain or facilitate social actions.361  
Joseph Nye, a renowned American political scientist, considered three aspects of relational 
power in the cyber domain which each use hard and/or soft power in or through cyberspace to 
obtain preferred outcomes.  The first aspect uses an ability to make others “do something 
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contrary to their initial preferences,” the second aspect uses agenda setting that “precludes the 
choices of another by exclusion of their strategies,” and the third aspect shapes “another’s initial 
preferences so that some strategies are not even considered.”362 The Betz and Nye forms of cyber 
power are helpful in thinking of how to influence uncooperative state actors to abide by 
international norms established by international institutions contrary to their preferences.  Stuart 
Starr, a distinguished research fellow at the National Defense University, went further to advance 
the theory of cyber power in regard to the development of strategy.  He recommended 
assessments of military risk in relying so heavily on cyberspace and analyses of other levers of 
power (political, diplomatic and economic),363 which are useful views on coercive means for 
altering an adversary’s behavior.  
 
Retaliation in a Cybered Conflict  
 
This form of deterrence is based on credible threats of retaliation that impose 
unacceptable costs for hostile acts in cyberspace.  An assortment of books and articles outline 
political and legal issues in determining circumstances and thresholds for retaliation in cybered 
conflict.  Professor Michael Schmitt, the Chairman of the Stockton Center for the Study of 
International Law at the United States Naval War College, examined in a NATO CCD COE 
2012 conference proceeding the meaning of the term attack in international law in a cyber 
operations context, both in the conduct of jus ad bellum (governs when a state may resort to 
force) and jus in bello (governs how operations may be conducted during armed conflict).364  
More than a decade before in his seminal paper, Schmitt provided six criteria for evaluating 
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cyber attacks as a use of armed force, specifically in severity, immediacy, directness, 
invasiveness, measurability, and presumptive legitimacy.365  Building upon these criteria, 
Schmitt chaired, an international group of experts, to produce two versions of the Tallinn 
Manual, as the authoritarian view on international law applicable to cyber operations, the latest 
version containing one hundred and fifty-four rules governing such operations. The Manual 2.0 
addresses topics such as sovereignty, jurisdiction, international responsibility, the use of force, 
the conduct of hostilities, and neutrality.366   
 
Conversely a study by Keir Giles, the director of the Conflict Studies Research Centre, 
with Andrew Monaghan, a Research Fellow at Chatham House found “a range of foreign states 
use definitions for cyber conflict that are entirely different,” which extends to different concepts 
of what constitutes hostile cyber activity and even a state of war, such as a shifting boundary 
between war and peace.367 This finding complicates use of a consistent threshold to respond to 
cyber attacks in this thesis since an adversary “could be operating according to an entirely 
different understanding of international law.”368   Commander Ramberto Torruella, U.S. Navy 
offered how to determine what constitutes a hostile act using a variety of legal frameworks 
(instrument-, effects-, and target-based plus kinetic equivalency) combined with the Schmitt 
criteria.369  Colonel Jonathan Rice, of the U.S. Air Force also proposed cyber attack guidance 
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based on foundational elements of context, spectrum, focus, and circumstances.370 For a decision 
to respond to hostile cyber acts in kind, Major Steven Smart applied joint targeting principles 
according to the Law of War to military operations in cyberspace, to include differentiating 
between offensive and defensive cyber targeting.371  The latter is most helpful, since Smart 
identified five key areas that complicate cyber targeting, specifically “positive identification of 
the target; location of the target; attribution of attack; capability/target pairing; and assessment of 
potential collateral damage.” A premier example of the application of the Law of War that 
centers on the core principles of distinction and proportionality is contained in a report by John 
Richardson, the President of JMR Portfolio Intelligence, Inc. on the Stuxnet worm attack upon 
Iranian nuclear facilities.372   
 
An analysis by Herbert Lin, a senior research scholar at Stanford University and his 
associates provided a foundation for understanding the basic characteristics, technologies and 
principles of a cyber attack, and what U.S. policy goals these actions might serve, is helpful 
because it integrates technical capacity with policy experience, which is the aim of this thesis.373 
Other articles address in detail what constitutes a cyber weapon and their ethical usage.  Thomas 
Rid, now moved to John Hopkins University, and Peter McBurney, a Professor in the Agents and 
Intelligent Systems Group at King’s College define and group cyber weapons along a spectrum 
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ranging from malicious software to autonomous smart bombs.374 While authors Gregory Rattray, 
of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) and Numbers, and Jason 
Healey categorize “offensive cyber capabilities across a range of potential scenarios to help 
further the dialogue on cyber deterrence,”375 and this is useful for this work because it separates 
below-legal threshold campaigns from more overt military operations. Maren Leed, a senior 
advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies examined policy considerations, 
technical feasibility and intelligence concerns in the use of offensive cyber tools.376  On ethical 
deliberations, Neil Rowe, a Professor of Computer Science at the Naval Postgraduate School 
discussed the unreliability of cyberweapons and the problems of damage assessment, counter 
attacks and collateral damage, arguing that cyberweapons “can create serious harms like any 
weapon.”377  A NATO organized ethics workshop tackled the applicability of traditional Just 
War Theory along Law of War criteria to military cyber operations378 and of other theories of the 
morality of war, citing instances of cyber warfare in more slippery moral terrain, such as 
intrusion into information systems or placing inactive malware to eventually cause harm, 
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meaning some methods for retaliation reviewed in this work might be ethically or/and legally 
questionable.379  
 
Several articles explore escalatory issues that relate to decisions to retaliate in response to 
a hostile act in cyberspace.  Martin Libicki cited that cyber attacks carried out in the name of 
deterrence may be considered “after-the-fact retaliation to convince the attacker to stop attacking, 
and deter it from contemplating further mischief.”380  Accordingly Herbert Lin’s work examined 
how to deter escalation (chain reactions), terminate conflict (cease fire agreements), and prevent 
kinetic escalation (off-limit targets) which is difficult in practice.381  Another article by Irving 
Lachow, a Portfolio Manager for International Cyber at the MITRE Corporation and his 
associates identified the important precept that unlike kinetic actions that can generally be 
identified and measured, the failure to detect intentions, moves, and origins in cyberspace could 
lead to overreactions and miscalculations, hence escalation.382 
 
Denial in a Cybered Context 
 
This form of deterrence is based on capability that ensures denial of an adversary’s 
objectives in cyberspace.  Although limited academic material on the topic of protective 
measures is available since cyber security solutions are usually promulgated in industry releases, 
Emin Caliskan, a Computer Scientist, and Raimo Peterson, Chief of Research & Development, 
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both at the NATO CCD COE, have explained the main technical methods and techniques for 
cyber defense, with some coverage of security applications and devices, such as firewalls, 
detection and prevention systems, and honeypots (a computing resource whose purpose is to be 
accessed in an unauthorized way in order to collect information about the attack and the 
attacker.)383  Richard Andres, a Professor at the U.S. National War College highlighted the 
dynamics in cyber defense as an element of cyber deterrence and the reasons the traditional 
defense model is failing under cyber threats.384  Relatedly, David Aucsmith, Chief Scientist at 
the Applied Physics Lab of the University of Washington laid out in his article on cyber defense 
a fundamental factor in a computer system is their complexity that guarantees vulnerabilities and 
the lack of a systemic way to find all of them.385  
 
According to cyber security professionals Jason Andreas and Steve Winterfeld “one of 
the more important principles of a successful defensive strategy is defense-in-depth,” which 
“proposes a layered approach to security.”386  In this case defenses would be at the network, host, 
application, and data levels, in addition physical security and user awareness training are 
integrated into layers of security.387  In regard to sample defenses, Robert Koch gave a useful 
overview of intrusion detection and data leakage prevention systems to investigate their 
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shortcomings while recommending architecture for next generation systems.388 According to a 
report on Strategic Cyber Intelligence, in addition to tactical level intelligence to help understand 
a network attack, a great need exists at a higher level to better understand the goals, objectives 
and inter-relationships associated with these tactical attacks.  This knowledge will lead to risk-
informed decision making on investments in defensive measures relevant to the threat and better 
choices across deterrence options.389 
 
Larry Clinton, the president of the Internet Security Alliance, a civil society group, wrote 
about value of public-private partnerships in promoting cyber threat information sharing, in 
particular the sharing of classified and sensitive information by the government with the private 
sector to defend its systems and deny benefit of an attack.390  Several other articles address 
sharing of cyber threat and also system vulnerability information between the public and private 
sectors.  This practice could warn either about likely attacks or specific problems in software 
which would help defenders harden systems.  Sharing of information should not include personal 
or sensitive details, just sources of threats or vulnerabilities in coding.391  Therefore in the United 
States a number of impediments for sharing exist, starting with a narrow legislative focus since 
the 9/11 attacks on counterterrorism and agency over-classification of relevant data.  The recent 
Presidential Executive Order 13636, titled Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, takes 
steps to improve information dissemination, with an emphasis on producing unclassified reports 
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or granting security clearances when a report cannot be declassified but is crucial to the defense 
of critical infrastructure.392  The Senate Intelligence Committee passed the Cybersecurity 
Information Act (CISA) of 2014 however it could be improved with reasonable clearer privacy 
protections and more protection from regulatory use.393  
 
Entanglement in a Cybered World 
 
This form of deterrence is based on cooperation on mutual interests that encourages 
responsible behavior (and thus restrains malicious behavior) in cyberspace.  Cooperation at the 
hemispheric, regional or global level is relevant to deterrence because it is often seen as the 
surrogate indicator of conflict reduction by entanglement.  For example, Brian Bow, the director 
of the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies and an Associate Professor at Dalhousie University 
stated that apprehensions about cybersecurity serve as a political lever for progress between the 
United States, Canada and Mexico on coordinated national policies for critical infrastructure 
security and resilience.394  Thomas Renard, a senior research fellow at Egmont-Royal Institute 
for International Relations assessed the extent and limits of cooperation between the European 
Union and its strategic partners on cyber security, to include achieving cyber resilience and 
cooperating with like-minded international stakeholders to make the internet safe and stable.  
Renard reviewed cooperation on the exchange of information and best practices, strengthening 
multilateral instruments and shaping internet governance.395  Joseph Nye, a Distinguished 
Service Professor at Harvard University took a global view on internet governance, using regime 
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theory to describe loosely coupled norms and institutions in a mapped regime complex. Nye 
contended this loose coupling among issues permits cooperation among actors in some areas, 
like economic prosperity, while they disagree in others, such as in human rights and content 
control.396  
 
Joseph Nye separated norms from entanglement in describing complex mechanisms to 
prevent harm in cyberspace, evening calling norms a fourth major means of deterrence.  
Although Nye readily admitted that normative considerations “can deter actions by imposing 
reputational costs that can damage an actor’s soft power beyond the value gained for a given 
attack.”  Since reputation is “something highly valuable to lose,” potential costs in this regard 
may contribute to self-restraint, which Nye labeled an element of entanglement that “may result 
from rational calculations of interest.”397 Hence normative considerations encourage restraint, or 
in effect serve to implement entanglement. A report by the United Nations Secretary General 
recognizes that the application of norms derived from existing international law relevant to 
information and communication technologies is essential to reduce risks to international 
security.398  An understanding of the general principles of international law and their application 
to cyberspace is necessary to evaluate the efficacy of norms.  Katharina Ziolkowski, a legal 
advisor to the German Armed Forces, stated that although “cyber specific international custom is 
absent and contractual regulation is scarce,” the “competing freedoms of the coexisting 
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sovereign States are guided (and de-conflicted) by general principles of international law.”399  
Kristen Eichensher, a visiting Assistant Professor at the UCLA School of Law, addressed 
pressing state-to-state issues in regulation of cyberspace, starting with the presumption that 
existing legal regimes for the high seas and outer space establish a baseline for the assessment of 
cyber governance.  She argued for multi-stakeholder governance in cyberspace and governance 
through norms (and not by treaties), which can serve as instruments for cooperation among 
actors in deterrence by entanglement.400  
 
Other authors also discount the use of treaties for cyber governance as a form of arms 
control relevant to deterrence and de-escalation of cybered conflict is contested among experts.  
Paul Meyer, a Canadian Foreign Service Officer explained policy-makers can draw upon past 
arms control models to accommodate the specific challenges of cyberspace, in particular 
examples for prevention and for regulation.  However, Meyer concluded that arms control efforts 
for cyberspace are premature due to problems of attribution, transparency, and verification, but 
some aspects, like confidence building measures have merit.401  Neil Rowe and his associates 
argue however, that recent technology provides some tools for cyber weapons control and 
therefore international cyber arms agreements could provide for forensics and usage monitoring, 
while encouraging more responsible cyber weapons use by stipulating attribution and 
reversibility.402 Louise Arimatsu, in the International Law Program at Chatham House, finds that, 
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although chances for a cyber arms control treaty cannot be dismissed, reasoning from historical 
experience is a poor guide; for contrary to kinetic weapons; cyber weapons are relatively 
inexpensive, widely accessible, easily concealable, and impossible to destroy all copies.403  
 
Michael Schmitt discussed in a Tallinn paper the two sources of international law – 
treaties and custom – and explained the different challenges cyberspace poses to their formation, 
identification and application.  He deduced that the conclusion of new treaties or the 
crystallisation of new customary law norms to govern cyber activities is doubtful, and instead, 
the application and interpretative evolution of existing international law is the most likely near-
term prospect.404  Other authors are more hopeful for success in international norms, such as 
Panayotis Yannakogeorgos, the Dean of the Air Force Cyber College and Adam Lowther, an Air 
Force research professor, who write that “nation-states should be held culpable for the malicious 
actions and other cyber threats originating in or transiting information systems within their 
borders, or owned by registered corporate entities therein,” under clear and accepted norms of 
responsible state behavior in cyberspace.405  Their work assumes attribution problems can be 
resolved with “not only technical methods, but also legal/policy solutions as well.”406  
 
This work assumes the right of a cyber Westphalia in which nations will be choosing 
deterrence options for themselves.   David Betz and Tim Stevens consider the notion of 
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Westphalia (as a right of internal decision-making) in their interpretations of cyberspace and 
sovereignty, in addition to domestic (entails authority and control); interdependence (control 
flows across territorial boundaries); and also international legal (recognition of state authority).  
They detect these forms of sovereignty interact with each other and are subject to compromise.407 
Brigid Grauman, an independent Brussels-based journalist presented judgements by experts, 
such as Vytautas Butrimas, Lithuania’s Cyber Security adviser at the Ministry of Defense that 
“we need an international agreement that makes every country responsible for its sovereign 
cyber-space” and by U.S. Lawyer Stewart Baker that “an international treaty is a waste of 
time.”408 Jason Healey, a senior research scholar at Columbia University and a Senior Fellow at 
the Atlantic Council crossed this chasm in opinions with proposed cyber confidence-building 
measures that increase stability in cyberspace without extensive legal or political action by 
states.409 Legal scholar Katharina Ziolkowski attested to the value of confidence-building 
measures as “a verified instrument of international politics, which aims to prevent the outbreak 
of war or an (international) armed conflict by miscalculation or misperception of the risk,”410 yet 
affirmed their development for cyberspace proves to be difficult because of the specific attributes 
of the internet.   
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Systemic Resilience 
 
The concept of systemic resilience is relevant to the argument in this thesis because the 
development of overarching internal systemic resilience is a way to meet the failings of the 
contemporary deterrence strategies of retaliation, denial and entanglement.  Systemic resilience 
in this work means a defender’s state or network has the capacity of combined social and 
technical systems to proactively recognize, adapt to, absorb, and innovate around disturbances or 
disruptions.411 Numerous books and chapters by esteemed authors illustrate the value of 
resilience in general as a key element of national security strategy.  This value is apparent in an 
edited volume by Louise Comfort, Arjen Boin, and Chris Demchak on the topic of resilience in 
the context of low-chance, high impact events, such as natural disasters, terrorist attacks, 
pandemics or critical infrastructure failures, sometimes called Black Swan events. The authors 
use this forum to inquire into the characteristics, causes, consequences, and measurement of 
resilience, while studying societal capacity to deal with emerging contingencies in terms of 
resilience.412  For why resilience against cyber attacks is important, P.W. Singer, the director of 
the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, and Allan Friedman, the research director 
of the Center for Technology Innovation, both at the Brookings Institution illuminate the need to 
build resilience against shocks (like losing internet access) that have impact on things like 
politics and economics.  They think about resilience in terms of systems and organizations that 
are prepared for attacks and can maintain some functionality while under attack.413  Chris 
Demchak observes that cybered conflict greatly increases the potential for unexpected outcomes 
across the complex critical systems of modern society.  Therefore, a national security resilience 
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strategy is necessary to guide the coordination of society’s cyber resilience with national military 
capabilities,414 and could be relevant to strengthen deterrence, by halting malicious cyber activity 
after an intrusion, and by using tailored disruption capacities to thwart malicious actor 
objectives.     
  
Kamal Jabbour, at the Air Force Institute of Technology, and Sarah Muccio, at the Air 
Force Research Lab write on the challenges of mission assurance, similar to the functional 
continuity aspects of resilience, for national security systems and with a direct relevance to 
discussions of deterrence. They introduce an approach to mapping mission dependence on cyber 
systems and discuss time dependent mission assurance, specified for a finite duration, rather than 
indefinitely.415  Academic treatise for critical infrastructure protection advances these themes 
along practical examples starting with an edited book by Maurizio Martellini, from the 
International Working Group-Landau Network Centro Volta, that proposes methods for security 
and resilience for industrial control systems.416  Joseph Weiss, an industry expert on control 
systems formerly at the Electric Power Research Institute, concentrates on protecting systems 
from malicious threats while maintaining their mission, given their convergence with but also 
differences between information technology systems.417 Other experts at the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security respond to industrial control system vulnerabilities with suggestions for 
                                                          
414 Chris Demchak, “Cybered Conflict, Cyber Power, and Security Resilience as Strategy,” 
Cyberspace and National Security, (Georgetown University Press, 2012): 121-136.  
415 Kamal Jabbour and Sarah Muccio, “On Mission Assurance,” Conflict and Cooperation in 
Cyberspace: The Challenge to National Security, (Taylor & Francis Group, July 2013): 107-126. 
416 Maurizio Martellini, Cyber Security: Deterrence and IT Protection for Critical Infrastructure, 
(Springer, October 2013). 
417 Joseph Weiss, Protecting Industrial Control Systems from Electronic Threats, (New York, 
NY: Momentum Press, 2010). 
110 
 
defense-in-depth strategies that create an aggregated security posture which isolates and protects 
critical assets.418 
 
Robert Jervis asserts in his book that many systems are contingent on strategies that 
“produce aggregate behavior that is complex and ordered, although not necessarily predictable 
and stable.”419  He stated that everything in a system will not remain constant and a change at 
one point will have wide ranging and multiple effects.  Therefore based on his premise that in a 
system the whole is different from, not greater than, the sum of the parts, Jervis examines 
effects, often delayed and indirect, that occur from interactions of the parts, with the belief that 
since systems are designed to cope with adversity, the breakage of one point rarely destroys 
them.420 Jervis cites how Robert Gilpin in his most important realist text addresses the vital role 
that feedback, both positive and negative, plays in most systems, especially in the system 
structure of world politics when confronted by stimuli.421 Jervis in particular contributes to an 
argument to strengthen deterrence through systemic resilience because the vast majority of large-
scale socio-economic-technical systems from electrical grids to manufacturing supply chains 
have become vulnerable to nasty surprises in cyberspace and if a surprise can cascade over 
enough nodes, the wide ranging and multiple effects will become a systemic event.422   
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Complexity Theory and Socio-Technical Systems Literature 
 
Chris Demchak argued that not only systemic resilience, but also disruption capacities in 
large-scale socio-technical-economic systems are key components of relative cyber power, and 
therefore are used as conceptual elements in this work.  Demchak observed that cybered coercers 
use deception and opaqueness in campaigns against these complex systems designed, used and 
maintained by humans. Therefore national cyber power needs to be both resilient to unskilled 
bad actors assaulting society and able to disrupt organized hackers employed by states or 
transnational organizations. Since cybered coercion is theoretically a struggle between whole 
systems, the understanding of cumulative effects across the wide range of actors and complex 
systems requires reframing along systemic terms.423 Professor Alicia Juarrero said complex 
systems are grouped into interlinked levels of organization determined by the functional task of 
interest. In her article she proclaimed that “complexity is a systemic property.”  According to 
Juarrero, complexity is the order that results from the connectivity and interaction among 
multiple agents,424 which helps to understand the systemic nature of complex systems that are at 
risk from cyber attack.   
 
Edward Smith, an executive strategist at the Boeing Company, labeled military 
organizations and government agencies as multi-tiered living systems that have a recognizable 
order, where simultaneous interactions with multiple actors occur on many different levels. In a 
full length study, he examined complexity in the context of effects-based approaches to 
operations. Here Smith viewed complexity as “a continually changing array of interdependent 
variables in which the chain of causes and effects between action and outcome will seldom if 
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ever be the same.”425  Furthermore, Professors William Rouse and Nicoleta Serban at the 
Georgia Institute of Technology explained how understanding change in complex systems 
requires understanding the fundamental nature of causality.  They argued the difficulty in 
determining causes of system states increases with the complexity of the system.426 David 
Berteau and his fellow authors saw complexity as a result of non-linear, unpredictable interaction 
of elements combined in new ways. Their paper provided ways to measure or access success in 
managing complex programs, while cultivating flexibility and resiliency in the organization, 
integral to defending against cyber attacks.427     
 
Professor John Holland at the University of Michigan also saw complexity as a web of 
interactions between objects with interconnected parts. He contended each complex system 
exhibits a distinctive property called emergence which is roughly described by the common 
phrase “the action of the whole is more than the sum of the actions of the parts.”  His short book 
looks at ways in which systems exhibit emergent properties.  Holland split the field of 
complexity studies into two subfields that study emergence: complex physical systems and 
complex adaptive systems.428  Doctor Mitchell Waldrop, a writer and correspondent for Science 
magazine, discussed this adaptive phenomenon in his classic book on complexity.  He observed 
the richness of independent agents “interacting with each other in a great many ways” allows 
“the system as a whole to undergo spontaneous self-organization.”429  Furthermore he argued 
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these “self-organizing systems are adaptive in that they don’t just passively respond to events,” 
but actively “try to turn whatever happens to their advantage.”430  Waldrop concluded that 
“complex, self-organizing, adaptive systems [possess] a kind of dynamism that makes them 
qualitatively different from merely complicated static objects.”431  
 
A comprehensive approach is one way for stakeholders to deal with the inherent 
complexity in socio-economic-technical systems.  A key test for this work is whether each of the 
deterrent options is comprehensive enough for an emerging cybered world.  The comprehensive 
approach seeks “to apply a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments in a concerted effort 
that takes into account their respective strengths and mandates.”432 The pivotal study of the 
approach reveals from operational experience that coherence could only be achieved if 
processes, planning and objectives are harmonized across all instruments and agencies.433  
Fundamentals of the comprehensive approach include interdependence, cooperation, 
prioritization, nesting of imperatives with objectives, flexibility of sequencing and timing, and 
measurements of progress.434  Accordingly, essential elements for implementation of the 
approach are proactive coordination mechanisms, shared understanding, outcome-based thinking 
and collaborative working guidelines.  While many of the fundamentals and elements are 
reflected in some manner in the four strategic options in this work, yet their absence signifies 
insufficiency in the contemporary deterrence strategies.  
 
                                                          
430 Ibid. 
431 Ibid, 11-12. 
432 Brooke Smith-Windsor, “Hasten Slowly: NATO’s Effects Based and Comprehensive 
Approach to Operations,” NATO Defence College, Research Paper No. 38, Rome, 2008. 
433 United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, “The Comprehensive Approach,” joint discussion note 
4/05 (Shrivenham: Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, 2006), 1-4 to 1-7. 
434 United States Institute of Peace, “Fundamentals of a Comprehensive Approach,” in Guiding 
Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction, (Washington, DC: United States Institute of 
Peace Press, 2009): 5-30 to 5-32. 
114 
 
Part of the reason for lack of coherence in practice, according to Phillipp Rotmann, a 
fellow at the Global Public Policy Institute in Berlin, is that obstacles to an effective 
comprehensive approach include institutional and political fragmentation of mandates, conflicts 
between organizational and professional cultures, and political-strategic differences.435  Two 
edited volumes best examine how the comprehensive approach can be translated and applied for 
different situations, conditions and players, to include in an emerging cybered world.  In the first, 
Kristina Rintakoski and Mikko Autti, editors for the Crisis Management Initiative, state the 
comprehensive approach is a way of thinking or a method rather than a mechanical process.  
They argue it is all about developing mechanisms and cultures of understanding, sharing and 
collaboration.436  Therefore the comprehensive approach enhances organizational interaction to 
deal with inherent complexity.  Michael Hallet and Oke Thorngren, on the staff of NATO’s 
Supreme Allied Command Transformation, state the approach aims for congruence of purpose. It 
enables the development of new means of influencing (seducing some, coercing others) actors to 
shape the environment.  Most importantly, this influence can be exerted in preventing conflict, 
not only responding to it, to include in the cyber domain under the guise of cyber deterrence.437 
 
Active Cyber Defense 
 
In this work, Active Cyber Defense is posited as a more comprehensive and thereby 
useful deterrent option for nations mired in cybered conflict.  It’s defined here as the real-time 
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detection, analysis and mitigation of network security breaches combined with the aggressive use 
of legal countermeasures beyond network and state territorial boundaries.438  The newness of the 
concept and of the environment in which it is emerging makes a literature review more 
challenging than the previous discussions of terms such as denial, entanglement or norms.  
Nonetheless a growing field of works deals with the concept directly or relatedly.  Some are 
more explicit and advanced than others but all offer some aspect of Active Cyber Defense 
relevant to this argument.  Professor Jay Kesan and his research assistant Carol Hayes at the 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign in a workshop proceeding in 2010 identified the 
concept as a controversial option that returns fire at hackers in order to prevent further 
disruption.  They claim a combination of intrusion detection systems and traceback technology 
provides the source of the attacks for counterstrikes.  Although already a practice in the IT 
industry to some extent, the authors question if counterstriking should be regulated and 
standardized.439  For in reality, Herbert Lin, a senior research scholar at Stanford University 
argued the private sector has only two ways that are incontrovertibly legal under current law, 
either to take defensive measures within its organizational boundaries or seek the assistance of 
law enforcement.  Lin characterized any offensive operations chosen by the private sector for 
defensive purposes as “self-help,” which if condoned by US policy might serve as a deterrent 
against the cyber threat.440   
 
In 2013, Irving Lachow, a Portfolio Manager for International Cyber at the MITRE 
Corporation took a broader view on the topic in describing the term active cyber defense as “a 
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range of proactive actions that engage the adversary before and during a cyber incident.”441  
These actions enable detection and forensics, deception and attack termination.  However he 
argued any use of active cyber defense techniques must not violate the primary law that applies 
in such situations, the U.S. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984.442  A way to comply with 
this law described by Martin Stytz, the Collegiate Professor for Cybersecurity at the University 
of Maryland, and Sheila Banks, the president of Calculated Insight is to “erect an ever-varying 
maze of tactical cyber defenses based on virtual machines, each with a different combination of 
properties and operational characteristics that serve to complicate the tactical cyber-attackers’ 
challenge.”443  In essence the tactical cyber defenses that operate inside the network to remain 
inside the law are “based upon an active, dynamic layered cyber defense-in-depth” architecture.  
Attorney James Farwell and Rafal Rohozinski, a principal of the SecDev Group observed in 
2012 that the military’s notion of active cyber defense was unformed.444 This assertion remained 
true until finally in 2014, the Director of Operations at U.S. Cyber Command described passive 
and active defense activities by the military in the concept of defensive cyberspace operations.445   
    
Although there is a growing number of trade, military, and other articles related to the 
concept, currently only one book exists with the title Active Cyber Defense, an edited volume 
that captures the proceedings of an international conference held in Tallinn, Estonia by the 
NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in 2014.  In the volume, Robert Dewar, 
a researcher in the Politics Department at the University of Glasgow suggested a concept 
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definition based on characteristics identified in academic and policy literature, where active 
cyber defense is predicated upon proactive measures not only to detect, analyze, and mitigate 
breaches in real time, but also upon aggressive countermeasures outside the victim network, 
which directly informs the definition used in this work.446  In hearing a rising chorus of voices in 
favor of external countermeasures, Oona Hathaway, the Gerard C. and Bernice Latrobe Smith 
Professor of International Law at the Yale Law School outlined both legal and policy concerns in 
her chapter, primarily drawn on the correlation between “hack back” to a “use of force.”447  In 
contrast, Jason Rivera, U.S. Army posted at the Georgetown School of Foreign Service, and 
Forrest Hare, U.S. Air Force at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies,  
spun the book’s focus to internally based cyber threat countermeasures that proactively engage 
threatening actions independent of a requirement to achieve attribution.  They contend effective 
internal countermeasures will deter malicious actors by affecting their cost/benefit calculus.448  
NikosVirvilis and Oscar Serrano, both at the NATO Communications and Information Agency, 
and Bart Vanautgaerden, a consultant for NATO Office of Security, InfoSec, at NATO 
Headquarters, concur with the use of internal countermeasure in their chapter by proposing the 
use of multiple deception techniques, like honey tokens or social network avatars, at stages of the 
attack phase to protect the resources of an organization.449 
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A number of recent studies and reports by academics and researchers have examined, 
suggested or neglected the use of active cyber defense.  The most prominent report is aptly titled 
Into the Gray Zone sponsored by the Center for Cyber & Homeland Security at the George 
Washington University.  The most useful aspect of this Project Report is the depiction of the 
“spectrum of proactive cybersecurity measures that fall between traditional passive defense and 
offense.”450  Their definition and evaluation of active defense techniques informed the range of 
countermeasures listed in this work and their applicability to types of malicious actors in various 
scenarios.   While those countermeasures act outside the network, Liam Nevill and Zoe Hawkins, 
from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, affirm the value of automated technologies that act 
within one’s own defense to “interdict, isolate or remove threat vectors.”451  Furthermore, the 
Center for Long-Term Cybersecurity at UC Berkley released Policy Ideas for a New Presidency 
that included “norm development in the active defense space.” Although considered risky, the 
Center tacitly promoted private active defense as “a limited freedom, for a cabined window of 
time,” made “in coordination with the government,”452 to increase capabilities to respond to 
cyber attacks.  Paul Rosenzweig and associates at the Heritage Foundation reached the same 
conclusion in saying “the U.S. should expressly allow active defenses that annoy adversaries 
while allowing only certified actors to engage in attribution-level active defenses,”453 which 
endorsed the proposed application of tailored disruption capacities in this work.   Finally, the 
Defense Science Board report, co-chaired by James Miller and James Gosler, both senior fellows 
at the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory focused primarily on tailored 
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deterrence campaigns for the “most likely” and the “most dangerous” types of cyber attacks.  
However, their definition of cyber attack included only effects on availability and/or integrity, of 
mostly weapon and affiliated military systems, omitting confidentially, the third element of the 
standard security triad for information systems.  Although the authors concluded “it is clear that 
a more proactive and systematic approach to U.S. cyber deterrence is urgently needed,” the 
report neglected to even consider active cyber defense, only mentioning vague “innovative 
technologies aimed at breakthrough improvements in cyber security.” Except for discussions on 
the development of a playbook of scalable response options, the report is not very applicable for 
this work.454   
 
Review Summary 
  
Adequate sources exist to articulate in detail the underlying logic of the thesis. Primary 
literature is sufficient to describe the typology of malicious actors, attack methods and their 
motivations for exploiting their inherent advantages in the cyber substrate. Current reference 
material is available to explore how cyber acts through complex system’s surprise to result in 
nationally significant socio-tech-economic system (STES) consequences. Secondary literature is 
suitable to describe the role of deterrence in national strategic choices to address the burdens and 
cost of these consequences. Ample academic treatises exists, except for active cyber defense 
itself, to provide the foundation for the comparison and weighing of deterrence implementation 
options, to include the strategic option of active cyber defense.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
Global Cybered Conflict  
 
An attack in cyberspace is defined as “any kind of malicious activity that attempts to 
collect, disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information system resources or the information 
itself.”455  Malicious activity includes the theft or exploitation of data; disruption or denial of 
access or service; and destructive action including corruption, manipulation, alteration of data 
and damage to systems. The array of actors conducting malicious activity is vast and varied in 
their motivations. They usually desire to achieve some form of reputation, satisfaction, monetary 
gain, national pride or advantage.  Their actual decision to act is based on meeting the actor’s 
sense of legitimacy, need, and confidence related to the act itself.456  Actors use malicious code 
to steal data, tarnish reputations, disrupt services, or sabotage systems.  They operate with no 
discernible legal or ethical restraints.457 The targets for their attacks are not just private 
companies, but also military installations, government offices, energy supply and transportation 
control facilities, financial and telecommunications systems, and other critical infrastructure 
nodes, i.e., the critical functions of a nation as a system.   
 
Cyber attacks are increasing in scale and severity of impact, while the cyber networks, 
systems and services that support military, commercial and social activities remain vulnerable to 
theft, espionage, disruption and destruction.  The Director of National Intelligence foresees an 
ongoing series of cyber attacks from a variety of sources “will impose cumulative costs on US 
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economic competitiveness and national security.”458 An Institute survey found in 2014 that the 
most costly attacks for large organizations in all industry sectors were by web-based attacks, 
denial of services, malicious insiders, and malicious code, to include Structured Query Language 
(SQL) injection.  The average time to contain a cyber attack was 31 days, during which business 
disruption accounted for 38 percent of total external costs.459  Another Industry survey of over 
800 IT security decision makers and practitioners across North America and Europe, of those 
who knew or admitted to it, revealed 71 percent of their networks were breached in 2014, again a 
nearly 10 percent increase from the previous year.  Phishing/spear-phishing, malware, and zero-
day attacks were perceived as the greatest risk for responding organizations.460  
 
The tactical imbalance of power impedes the fundamental premise of contemporary 
deterrence strategies, which is convincing the attacker that costs outweigh benefits. The 
Commander, US Cyber Command has admitted “despite your best efforts, you must prepare and 
assume that you will be penetrated.”461 This undeniable truth is a direct result of the gap between 
an organization’s ability to defend itself and the adversaries’ ability to circumvent those 
defenses.462  The adversary has considerable resources and expertise at their disposal to conduct 
attacks, while victim organizations often have limited resources and budgets to launch an 
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adequate defense.  It is an unfair and asymmetric fight, because offense is easier and cheaper.463 
This chapter will present why cyber attacks matter to states if they happen and how bad it can get 
if defenders cannot deter malicious actors. It will start by examining the relative ease by which 
all levels of malicious actors’ access information systems through various types of attack 
methods.  These actors operate from distant locations without any real risks or repercussions. 
They can with impunity freely choose “the scale, proximity, and precision” of their attacks.464  
Using examples of actual cyber incidents, the chapter will delineate the wide range of malicious 
actors, and their methods and motivations in their campaigns of malicious activity. It will end on 
the need to deter malicious actors from causing significant consequences though cyber attacks on 
complex socio-technical-economic systems. 
 
Attack Methods  
 
The asymmetric nature of the cyber threat that undermines contemporary deterrence 
strategies demands an understanding of how exactly and easily a malicious actor can access 
equipment, computers or systems.  Malicious actors use various methods, termed ‘cyber attack 
vectors’ by industry professionals, to access microprocessor controlled equipment, computers or 
systems in order to deliver a hostile payload or a malicious outcome. 465  The attack vector 
creates a path to exploit a software or code vulnerability that compromises the equipment, 
computer or system for the installation of malicious code, also known as malware.  Malicious 
code is “software or firmware intended to perform an unauthorized process that will have 
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adverse impact on the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of an information system.”466  
Common forms of malware include worms (that spread freely), viruses (that activate upon 
execution), and Trojans (that allow remote control of the infected system).  Ransomware is a 
type of malware that inflects computers and restricts user access to systems or data unless a 
ransom is paid.467  Most malicious code attempts to evade detection, by various means such as 
the use of polymorphism to automatically change its code whenever it is downloaded, allowing 
the malware to escape traditional signature-based antivirus sensors.   
 
The term vulnerability implies a weakness in a system or in a piece of software, 
commonly called a software “bug.”  Software exploits are used to take advantage of these flaws 
or misconfigurations in operating systems and applications. They can be found in exploit kits 
available for purchase on hacking forums, the most active in 2015 is entitled Angler.  The 
average price for exploit kits is $800-$1500 a month.468 The kits include software exploits for 
known vulnerabilities in end user technologies such as Internet Explorer, Adobe Flash and 
Oracle Java.  Over 80 percent of the vulnerabilities in exploit kits were published in the past two 
years.  The speed with which exploit kit developers deploy new exploits takes advantage of the 
gap in time between initial vulnerability disclosure and the implementation of software patches 
at an organization. 469 Yet vulnerability scanning data reveals that 21 percent of client 
vulnerabilities found in every industry sector are more than three years old, meaning the 
organization does not patch it and it is open for exploitation.470  The exploit kit scans victim 
systems to find those open or zero-day vulnerabilities, identifies effective exploits for those 
vulnerabilities, exploits the target system vulnerability, and drops into the system the attacker’s 
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payload of malware.471 Exploit kits continue to evolve at a much faster pace than the people 
defending and using the systems can respond.472  
 
The most common attack vectors to exploit vulnerabilities and spread malicious code are 
‘spear phishing’ by sending an email to a specific person in the hope they will run a malicious 
attachment or click a malicious link, or by so called ‘drive by download’ which occurs when 
visiting a compromised web page.473  These personalized attacks are difficult to prevent because 
they capitalize on human behaviors474 such as trust, compassion, or curiosity.475  More so, human 
behavioral trends and advanced technique trends are the reason that if targeted by an advanced 
attacker, a breach is inevitable.  The following sections will examine the most successful attack 
methods by which malicious actors deliver a hostile payload or harmful outcome.  
 
Spear Phishing 
 
Social Engineering.  It is almost certain that in a ‘spear phishing’ campaign, some 
member of an organization will click upon a malicious attachment or link.  The security firm 
FireEye-Mandiant analyzed over eight million results of sanctioned phishing tests in 2015 to find 
that 30 percent of phishing messages were opened by the target and about 12 percent went on to 
click on the attachment or link.476  The reason is because phishing attacks have evolved from 
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mass emails with blatantly phony messages to lower volume and highly targeted emails that 
appear more legitimate.  The spear phishing attack process usually starts by hackers gathering 
intelligence on targets from social networking websites; then they compromise a legitimate 
domain familiar to the target to gain access to a reputable email address; from which they send a 
socially engineered email to the target recipient.  A large percentage of recipients act on the email 
by clicking on a malicious attachment or an embedded URL (web address) that links to a 
legitimate but compromised website that downloads exploits and malware.477  Cyber criminals 
send messages that appear to come from a company’s domain, leaving customers vulnerable to 
phishing attacks.  For the healthcare, banking, and payments industry, malicious emails trick 
people into sharing sensitive information with hackers, leading to identity theft, while eroding 
customer trust.478   
 
Spear phishing lures unsuspecting people to act or provide information via seemingly 
trustworthy electronic communications.  In some cases victims are asked to input their login 
credentials and they comply on what are fake sites. Arguably one of most notable examples of 
phishing success is seen in the Operation Aurora attacks in 2010 on Google, Adobe and over 30 
other U.S. corporations.  Hackers used a high level of target profiling and social engineering to 
employ fake but personalized emails to trick employees and ultimately download malware which 
exploited a zero-day vulnerability (also not yet patched) in Internet Explorer.479  Today’s spear 
phishing attacks are more sophisticated in content, and even more effective. For instance, the 
technique was used to penetrate the unclassified networks of both the White House in 2014480 
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and the U.S. Joint Staff in 2015.481  Also today, the volume of attack attempts are astonishingly 
high, as the number of phishing emails reached 6.3 million in the first quarter of 2016, with 93 
percent containing ransomware.482   
 
Watering hole  
 
Web-Based Attack.  Watering hole attacks have advantages over spear phishing, such as 
the ability to bypass email filtering security technologies.483 These web-based attacks occur when 
malicious actors infect a legitimate website with malware by SQL injection attack or some other 
means for the purpose of targeting visitors of that site.  In a watering hole attack, the individual 
target does not need to be socially engineered into acting; instead all that is required is for a 
website of interest to a target group to be compromised and the attacker to wait like a predatory 
tiger for its prey.  State sponsored hackers use watering hole attacks alongside other methods to 
compromise large groups within the same industry; like an attack on the IHS.com website which 
is the parent of Jane’s Information Group and other sources of military, intelligence, or political 
analysis, by the Chinese state-sponsored group known as “FlowerLady.”  When users visited the 
compromised site, a PlugX file was downloaded onto the victim’s machine and within 10 
seconds this Remote Access Trojan received commands and sent data to an attacker controlled 
domain. Although users can be trained to detect spear phishing, there is no way for the user to 
recognize a compromised and legitimate popular website.484 
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Exploits of zero-day vulnerabilities are occasionally deployed in watering hole attacks, 
such as the incident of a newly uncovered flaw in Internet Explorer served up through the U.S. 
Veterans of Foreign War’s website.485 In a similar incident, two zero-day vulnerabilities, this time 
in Adobe Flash and Internet Explorer, were leveraged in a watering hole attack on the Forbes 
website. The Chinese hacking group Codoso infected the ‘Thought of the Day’ widget with the 
intent to perform ‘drive by download’ attacks.486  For days only certain visitors who clicked on 
the widget were redirected to another site where their computers could be infected with malware.  
The attack targeted only companies within the defense industry and financial services industries 
despite the broad audience of the Forbes site.487  Although attackers must compromise a 
legitimate website in this attack vector, surprisingly scans of public websites have found that 16 
percent are vulnerable enough to allow attackers to access and alter website content, signifying 
watering hole attacks are not going away.488  
 
Point-of-Sale  
 
RAM Scraping.  Headlines of breaches at several large retailers through Point-of -Sale 
(POS) intrusions highlight the use of low cost malware available on criminal forums to achieve 
disproportionate financial gains. This vector begins with the compromise of a POS device 
(terminals where customers swipe a payment card at a checkout counter) that is open to the 
Internet and protected with weak or default passwords, by issuing likely credentials (called Brute 
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force) to access the device.489 Or the vendor using the POS is compromised by an email or web 
attack lure. Then RAM (Remote Access Memory) scrapper malware is installed which captures 
payment card data while processed in memory before it is encrypted for storage or transmission. 
The data is written to a text file which is later sent to an offsite server. 490  This credit or debit 
card data is usually offered for sale on the Dark Web.491 Often discovery of the payment card 
breach does not occur until the criminals are noticed to be using the data for fraud and other 
illicit purposes by law enforcement or fraud detection entities. Payment card track data is more 
valued in the criminal marketplace than just names, numbers, dates and codes because it can be 
used to manufacture counterfeit credit cards.492   
 
In the POS breach at U.S. based retailer Target in late 2013 actors were able to steal data 
for as many as 70 million credit card and debit card accounts.493  Within weeks of the breach, 
underground markets were flooded with stolen account information, selling in batches of one 
million cards and going from $20 to more than $100 per card.494  The malware that infected POS 
devices was a hybrid of Kaptoxa and Reedum, both derived from the BlackPOS code sold on 
cybercrime forums.  The BlackPOS malware is small in size, designed to bypass firewall 
software and costs only $2,300.495  The malware continuously scanned the memory of infected 
devices for patterns that looked like payment card numbers and logged them to a file that was 
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transferred to an internal site at regular intervals until exfiltrated to external servers.  In 2015 
headline making remote payment card breaches shifted from large retailers to hotel chains.496   
Twenty hotels including Marriott, Hyatt, Le Meridien, Sheraton, Westin and the Intercontinental 
chains, reported payment card data hacks by POS malware from December 2015 to June 2016.497  
Although in early 2017, the fast food restaurant chain Arby’s suffered a point-of-sale breach at 
up to 1,110 stores affecting 355,000 cards.498  
 
Web Application  
 
SQL Injection.  Web application attacks typically target an organization’s internet facing 
applications.  A 2014 survey by the Ponemon Institute showed “42 percent of all data breaches 
are due, at least in part, to SQL injection.”499  This vector allows attackers to exploit a web 
application vulnerability in order to access or change data.  This means they type computer code 
in the fields of a web form input box, instead of something like a last name or credit card 
number.  The technique takes advantage of applications that do not correctly validate requests 
before passing them to back-end databases.500  The SQL commands can dupe the database 
system into running code that outputs sensitive information, like intellectual property or 
customer accounts.  The SQL code can also allow the attacker to steal the site’s administrator 
password, manipulate data enabling for example the defacement of the website, or compromise 
the site to host malware for ‘drive by download’ by visitors. The risk of SQL injection is 
compounded by automated tools that detect and exploit Web application vulnerabilities, such as 
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the open source tool Sqlmap or the Iranian built tool Havij.501 Comprehensive features make 
Havij stand out from other tools, such as capabilities to bypass security products, like Web 
Application Firewalls or Intrusion Detection Systems.502  
 
The Ponemon Institute study in 2014 also revealed that 65 percent of the organizations 
surveyed experienced a SQL injection attack in the last 12 months.503  Famous breaches by SQL 
injection include at Heartland Payment Systems, Sony, Nokia, and Adobe.504  The Navy Marine 
Corps Intranet network, consisting of 800,000 users at 2,500 locations, was also deeply 
penetrated by SQL injection in 2013.  Hackers entered through a Navy website available to the 
public and found their way to unprotected databases.505  Even the NASDAQ Stock Exchange fell 
victim to an SQL injection in a global hacking operation. One hacker identified a vulnerability in 
a password-reminder page of the NASDAQ website, crafted a text string that injected SQL 
programming code and obtained encrypted login credentials.506 While never penetrating the main 
servers supporting trading operations, the hacking ring eventually had enough information to 
perform network or systems administrator functions on the servers.507   
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Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)  
 
DDoS Methods. Distributed Denial of Service attacks are popular because of access to 
high performance virtual machines, massive botnets, and service offerings.  Assailants can 
perform the attacks with a high probability of success and a low probability of getting caught.  
DDoS attacks typically flood a target server with thousands of communication requests 
originating from multiple compromised machines known as a botnet.  DDoS assaults serve a 
variety of purposes, such as to make social or political statements or take down or interrupt 
government or commercial sites in cybered conflict.  DDoS attacks are also used as a part of 
multi-vector blended attacks or as a distraction mechanism.  For example, during a large barrage 
on a victim’s server, an attacker can conduct an SQL injection, hoping the noise covers the hack 
attempt.508  Or in a hack on financial services institution accounts, a DDoS attack can flood the 
bank’s network and keep the IT department busy while criminals transfer funds and cover their 
tracks.509  For instance, in the Dyre Wolf malware campaign, a cybercrime gang based in Eastern 
Europe distracted banks with DDoS attacks that shut down websites to draw attention away from 
wire transfers to their offshore accounts.510 
 
There are two types of DDoS attacks, either a network centric attack that uses up 
bandwidth or application layer attack which overloads a service.511  In a volumetric attack 
targeting the network and transport layers,512 large amounts of data packets and other traffic 
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consume all of the network and server’s available resources.  These attacks cause traffic 
congestion and service disruption for legitimate users trying to gain access.  Volumetric attacks 
are getting larger, more sophisticated and lasting for longer durations.  Many of the large scale 
DDoS attacks, of nearly 400 Gbps, use reflection and amplification techniques through the 
Network Time Protocol (NTP) or Domain Name System (DNS).513 Another example of an attack 
at the network layer is “Slowloris” that slowly delivers request headers, forcing the web server to 
keep connections open, without ever completing the requests. Whereas in an application layer 
attack, a web application vulnerability or feature is exploited when attacks that mimic legitimate 
user traffic overwhelm a server or database powering the application.514  An illustration of an 
application database attack is “Abuse of Functions” where blasting bad password requests locks 
out legitimate users because of a restricted number of failed logins.515  
   
Malicious Actors and their Motivation 
 
A complex, rising audience exists that needs to be deterred, ranging from non-state 
actors, such as Anonymous, to increasingly aggressive largescale state actors.  As of late 2016, 
more than 30 nation states, many hostile to Western values, are developing offensive cyber 
attack capabilities. The rampant proliferation of cyber capabilities will allow standoff and remote 
operations, especially in the initial phases of military operations in conflict.  Cyber attacks 
against information networks and critical infrastructure can bypass traditional defenses, disrupt 
command and control, and undermine political will.  Most concerning are state adversaries with 
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sophisticated capabilities that could be prone to conduct preemptive attack and rapid 
escalation.516  Non-state actors will exploit advanced technologies for nefarious purposes.   
For example, hacker groups will use cyber operations to advance their political or social cause 
while criminal organizations will use persistent capabilities for theft or extortion. Furthermore 
terrorist groups will use Internet-based technology to incite fear and facilitate operations.     
 
A plethora of cyber incidents reveal that malicious actors employ attack vectors in a 
systematic, coordinated fashion in an attempt to achieve their objectives. Criminal organizations 
and terrorist groups are mostly bad actors with average to good skills, while nation states and 
hacker groups, are considered to be wicked actors that have exquisite skills, high threat enduring 
motivations, and the ability to organize to create deep harm.  The globally unfettered structure of 
the cyber substrate offers asymmetric advantages in the scale, proximity, and precision of actor 
attacks.  Actors can scale their attack organization from five to 5,000 other internet users, can 
operate at any proximity to their targets from five to 5,000 miles away, and can target with any 
level of precision from one entity, five individuals, or entire systems in most cases.517 A 
clandestine black market provides malicious actors with powerful and easy-to-use sets of tools 
and services for all manner of theft, exploitation, disruption and destruction, in some cases with 
little or no technical skills required.518  
 
Malicious actors have in house attack capabilities or can contract with hackers for hire.  
An example of an illicit Web site that traffics tools and talent is Darkode, a sophisticated English 
language Internet forum.  Darkode offers exploit kits, botnets, ransomware programs and zero 
                                                          
516 The Honorable James R. Clapper, et al., “Foreign Cyber Threats to the United States,” Joint 
Statement for the Record to the Senate Armed Services Committee, 5 January 2017: 4. 
517 Chris C. Demchak, “Resilience and Cyberspace: Recognizing the Challenges of a Global 
Socio-Cyber Infrastructure (GSCI),” Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and 
Practice, July 12, 2012: 263-265. 
518 Cyveillance, “Intelligence for Security,” White Paper, January 2015: 4. 
134 
 
day attack tools.519  Even though Darkode was shut down by the FBI, in less than two weeks the 
forum was rebuilt with new security measures.520  Bulletproof hosting services (BPHS) shield 
these sorts of malicious sites that sell or trade malware, security exploits, and also stolen 
personal and financial data. BPHS protect malicious sites by appearing as a legitimate service 
provider to avoid suspicion and by residing in countries with lax law enforcement jurisdiction if 
exposed.521 These illicit, inherent and intrinsic advantages allow actors to operate with little risk 
of repercussion. To better understand the challenges in influencing malicious actor decisions to 
benefit from these advantages, the following section will investigate their motivation for 
employing doctrine and capabilities in actual cyber incidents. 
 
Nation States  
 
North Korea. According to a report by HP Security Research, Leader Kim Jong Un has 
“referred to cyber warfare capabilities as a ‘magic weapon’ in conjunction with nuclear weapons 
and missiles.”522 He has poured resources into the next generation of the weapons of warfare - 
skills in hacking and computer science.523 Consequently the South Korean Defense Ministry has 
reported that North Korea has a 6,000 member Cyber Army.524  Several of the Cyber Army 
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divisions have been ordered to secure critical data on weapons development from nuclear armed 
states, particularly in nuclear warhead miniaturization and ballistic missile technology.525  One of 
the Units, 121, of the General Bureau of Reconnaissance is suspected in particular by U.S. 
investigators of being behind the attack on Sony Pictures and by South Korea for staging a series 
of disruptive attacks in Seoul.526 For North Korea, cyber warfare is considered to be the modern 
chapter of asymmetrical warfare, intended to offset aging and declining conventional 
capabilities.527  For instance in June 2016, North Korean hackers stole wing designs for the F-15, 
a U.S. fighter jet, from a South Korean company, in a campaign that exfiltrated more than 40,000 
documents related to the defense industry.528  Cyber warfare capabilities are an important asset 
for North Korea in “the face of its perceived enemies, the U.S. and South Korea” who are both 
“heavily dependent upon technological infrastructure for social, economic and political 
stability.”529   
 
North Korea’s cyber activity appears to follow a distinct pattern, either around the time of 
U.S. – South Korean joint military exercises, correlated with a significant date, or in response to 
political events.  For instance, following the UN emergency meeting condemning the North 
Korean underground nuclear test in May 2009 and subsequent South Korean joining of the 
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Proliferation Security Initiative, called an act of war by the North, a wave of attacks struck South 
Korean and U.S. government entities, coinciding with the 4th of July, the U.S. Independence Day. 
The distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks saturated target websites, like the White House, 
Defense Department and New York Stock Exchange in the United States and the presidential 
Blue House, Defense Ministry and National Assembly in South Korea, with access requests for 
several hours.530  In March 2011, after U.S. testimony on undeclared North Korean uranium 
enrichment facilities, almost 30 South Korean media, financial, and critical infrastructure targets 
suffered a DDoS and disk-wiping malware attack.531  Next, the third example of this pattern, 
occurred in March 2013, after U.S. and South Korea began their annual joint military exercise 
near the North Korean Peninsula, with cyber attacks upon the South Korean Shinhan Bank and 
NongHyup Bank, and television media outlets, YTN, MBC, and KBS. The organizations were 
crippled as data was lost and machines were unable to reboot.532 The pattern continued at the 
start of similar military drills in March 2016, when South Korea’s National Intelligence Service 
accused Pyongyang of attempting hacks into government websites and smartphones.533  
 
The North Korean pattern of behavior indicates state sponsored cyber actors launch 
attacks in response to a political trigger perceived to be a threat to the regime. The nation’s 
official political ideology of juche, which emphasizes maintaining self-reliance and displaying 
one’s strength, provides context for the regime’s motivations.  Juche places “the survival of the 
regime as its primary goal, and any perceived threat to the regime may be targeted.” 534  The 
regime fears losing control of the populace to outside cultural and political influence, as shown 
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in its reaction to the film “The Interview” that portrayed their leader as sadistic.    A statement by 
a spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs called the comedy film “an act of war that we 
will never tolerate” and vowed “a decisive and merciless countermeasure” if “the United States 
administration tacitly approves or supports the release of this film.”535 Obviously the attack upon 
Sony Pictures five months later should not have come as a surprise.  The leaders of the North 
Korean regime appear committed to demonstrate the illusion of a powerful entity through 
destructive and coercive cyber attacks at no matter what cost of irresponsible behavior.536  
 
Iran.  Similar to North Korea, cyber doctrine in Iran relies heavily on asymmetrical 
warfare tactics.  However in contrast to the use of military units by North Korea, Iran leverages 
hacker crews as a force multiplier to make up for the lack of military capability.537  In light of 
Iran’s long track record of employing proxies for terrorist acts, it is not inconceivable that Iran 
would use proxy groups for cyber attacks against its adversaries.538  Several pro-Iran hacker 
groups share common traits in they view Western entities and Israel as enemies, are heavily 
influenced by Islamic principles, make their exploits public, and associate with one another. The 
most renowned vigilante groups are the Iranian Cyber Army, the Islamic Cyber Resistance 
Group, and the Ashiyane Digital Security Team who has apparent ties to Iran’s premier Sharif 
University.    
 
Iranian hacker crews are used in reaction to political events. For example in August 2012, 
when the European Union decided to boycott Iranian oil exports, the Iranian activist group 
                                                          
535 Choe Sang-Hun, “North Korea Warns U.S. Over Film Mocking Its Leader: Kim Jong-un 
Declares ‘War’ on ‘The Interview,’” The New York Times, June 25, 2014. 
536 Sung Kim, “The North Korean Threat: Nuclear, Missiles and Cyber,” Testimony before the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC, January 13, 2015.  
537 HP Security Research, “Islamic Republic of Iran,” HP Security Briefing Episode 11, February 
2014. 
538 Frank J. Cilluffo, “The Iranian Cyber Threat to the United States,” Statement before the 
House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, April 26, 2012: 4.  
138 
 
Cutting Sword of Justice took credit for attacking Saudi Aramco Oil Company with the Shamoon 
malware. Analysts suspect Iran may have commissioned the attack to exert influence after the 
Kingdom’s oil minister pledged to boost production to compensate for the sanctions.539  Then in 
September, a hacker group called Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Cyber Fighters took credit for denial of 
service attacks on six major American banks. Al-Qassam announced the attacks on Pastebin, 
criticizing Israel and the United States and citing the film Innocence of Muslims that mocks the 
Prophet Muhammad as motivation for the attacks.  The group’s Operation Ababil caused Internet 
blackouts and delays in online banking.540  Three months later, the group Parastoo, linked to an 
Iranian Special Forces unit, hacked the computer servers of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency involved in the contentious inspections of Iranian facilities.  Parastoo then published 
stolen sensitive diagrams, satellite photos, and other documents to expose and discredit the 
Agency.541 
 
Similar to North Korea’s cyber strategy but different again from their use of military 
units, Iranian hacker crews are also being used to position the nation to impact critical 
infrastructure on a global scale.  An advanced malware campaign named Operation Cleaver 
waged against an array of targets indicates Iranian motivations to extract sensitive materials and 
establish beachheads for sabotage.  The name Cleaver is a string of code found several times in 
custom software used in the attacks.  An Iranian team dubbed Tarh Andishan has compromised 
more than 50 victims in 16 countries in the operation.  Networks and systems have been targeted 
in critical industries, like energy, utilities, airlines and transportation, and companies, such as 
aerospace and telecommunications.  For attribution, an IP (Internet Protocol) address in Iran was 
found to be used by one of the primary attackers to conduct SQL injections, control backdoors, 
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and exflitrate information.  Also, domains used in the campaign were registered in Iran and the 
infrastructure was hosted by an Iranian provider.542  The state-sponsored campaign’s objectives 
may be to use sensitive data taken from critical infrastructure companies to damage control 
systems.  As the only nation to actually suffer a catastrophic cyber attack, namely Stuxnet 
blamed on the U.S. and Israel, Iran may have the will to intentionally conduct this sort of cyber 
mayhem, or the capability to inadvertently do so as well.543                                                                     
 
China. The Chinese government’s engagement in cyber espionage for commercial 
advantage was exposed in May 2014, when the U.S. Justice Department charged five People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) officers with hacking into five U.S. companies to steal trade secrets.544 
This type of espionage under dispute threatens business interests in key industries, especially if 
the Chinese government provides state-owned enterprises with extracted information to improve 
their competitive edge, cut research and development timetables, and reduce cost.545  The PLA 
officers in the indictment work for Unit 61398, also known as APT1 (an advanced persistent 
threat group), which has penetrated the networks of at least 141 organizations in 15 countries.546 
Another global campaign run by another APT group from China that appears to steal information 
beneficial to Chinese companies is named NetTraveler.547  This group doesn’t use zero-day 
attacks but instead exploits two well-known vulnerabilities in Microsoft Office. Their attacks 
start with spear phishing emails using attachments rigged with the Office exploits. Their malware 
infected more than 350 victims in 40 countries, allowing theft of more than 22 gigabytes of 
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data.548  The domains of interest the group hunted were space exploration, nanotechnology, 
energy production, nuclear power, lasers, medicine and communications.549  These sorts of 
attacks lead the Director of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency to warn that America’s 
technological edge over China is at risk.550     
 
Compared to espionage in peacetime, Chinese military doctrine in wartime calls for 
computer network operations to “disrupt and damage the networks” of an adversary’s 
infrastructure facilities, such as power and telecommunications systems.551  The finding of an 
intrusion in a honeypot resembling the industrial control system of a water plant in the United 
States, attributed to Unit 61398 in July 2013, indicates ongoing intelligence collection on critical 
infrastructure.552 Chinese military analysts have also established that logistics and power 
projection are likely weak points in modern warfare.553 The cases described by U.S. Senate 
investigators of China breaking into computer networks of private transportation companies 
working for the U.S. military appear to be an attempt to prepare the digital battlefield for a 
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potential conflict.554  Chinese intrusions into the networks of US defense contractors and 
industries threaten military operations, equipment and readiness. In May 2013, the Washington 
Post described a classified report by the Defense Science Board, which lists more than 24 US 
weapon systems accessed by Chinese intruders, to include the Aegis ballistic missile defense 
system, the F/A-18 tactical fighter jet, the V-22 Osprey vertical takeoff aircraft and the multi-
mission Littoral Combat Ship.555  After Chinese hackers infiltrated Lockheed Martin’s network, 
it is no wonder the new Chinese J-31 jet aircraft strikingly resembles the low observable features 
of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter under production by the United States and its allies.556   
 
Ongoing cyber operations by China mirror “its leadership’s priorities of economic 
growth, domestic political stability and military preparedness” according to the U.S. Director of 
National Intelligence.557  Ensuring the obtainment of these priorities through cyber activity 
supports the expansion of comprehensive national power which perpetuates Chinese Communist 
Party rule.558 Maintaining economic growth involves industrial cyber espionage of U.S. and 
other foreign targets; domestic stability occurs through information control and propaganda; and 
preparing for military scenarios consists of military modernization and computer network 
operations.  The actions of Chinese hackers appear consistent with these efforts to increase 
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national power and prestige.559  Likewise foreign policy and military developments in the past 
few years show that cyber operations are a high priority for the Chinese government.  China’s 
most recent Defense White Paper noted that cyberspace is a “new domain of national security 
and area of strategic competition.”560 Therefore in the foreseeable future, Chinese behavior in 
cyberspace may not change in intentions unless major shifts occur in regional politics or 
incentives change the calculus of risk.561  
 
  Russia. Although China is the object of U.S. allegations of cyber spying, the U.S. 
Director of National Intelligence said “I worry a lot more about the Russians.”562  This avowal is 
partly because of the Russian government’s ability to covertly team with business and criminal 
entities to generate cyber capabilities that threaten perceived opponents.  Clues of this nexus 
emerged in April 2007 in the DDoS attack on Estonia during riots over the movement of a Soviet 
World War II memorial from the city center and in Georgia in August 2008 during armed 
conflict with the Russian Federation over South Ossetia.  The assault against the Web pages of 
Estonian government ministries, financial institutions, and media outlets came from a botnet 
associated with a Russian cybercrime group operating from St. Petersburg, with links to the 
Russian Business Network.563 The command and control servers used to issue attack commands 
on Georgian websites, after Russian ground troops engaged Georgian forces, were registered 
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through a bulletproof hosting service provider in Russia and the domains were hosted by a 
business front for cybercrime activities.564  In both of these incidents, Russian-language Internet 
forums posted instructions, malware and targets for patriotic hackers to participate in the 
campaign.565  Although in the 2014 Crimea incursion, Russian did not use the same playbook.  
First off the Nashi youth organization that participated in attacks in both Estonia and Georgia is 
no more, and second regarding forums recruiting volunteers, many Russian hackers support an 
independent Ukraine.566  Instead, Russia relied on the nationalist hacking group CyberBerkut to 
run a disinformation campaign to stir unrest.567  Throughout 2015, in the continued state conflict, 
CyberBerkut conducted DDoS attacks against multiple German and Ukrainian government 
websites and nationalist Ukrainian rivals.568  
 
   Russian actors have engaged in challenging international norms in cyberspace.569  In the 
area of intelligence collection, the government has benefited from a campaign by a group known 
as APT28, or Fancy Bear.570  This group, unlike Chinese actors, does not appear to conduct 
intellectual property theft for economic gain, but collects information on defense and geopolitical 
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issues.  FireEye reported in 2014 that APT28 has been engaged in espionage against targets in 
the Caucasus, Eastern Europe, and European security organizations.  It uses spear phishing to 
target its victims with emails that mention specific topics or lures relevant to recipients, written 
in local languages.  The group also registers domains that mimic those of legitimate news, 
politics or other websites of topics relevant to particular targets, from which to down load 
malware and gain backdoor system access for reconnaissance, monitoring and theft.  APT28 
attempts to obfuscate code,571 implement counter-analysis techniques and encrypt stolen 
information during exfiltration.572  Researchers made a connection to the Russian government 
because the malware was written during working hours in Russia’s major cities, on computers 
with Russian language settings, and for targets aligned with Russian interests.573  Apparently 
Fancy Bear continues to seek information on political matters for Russian intelligence, since the 
malware obfuscation techniques discovered in the Democratic National Committee hack in April 
2016 have been attributed to the group.574  The APT28 exposure of Russia’s cyber espionage 
operations is not the first, as another spear phishing campaign known as Red October was 
unveiled in 2012 targeting diplomatic entities mainly in Eastern Europe and Central Asia.575  
 
   Although discovery of cyber espionage is disturbing enough, Russia appears to be 
preparing for computer network attacks against Western critical infrastructure. At least one 
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government sponsored APT group, named Energetic Bear, alternatively known as Dragonfly, has 
infected industrial control systems of energy related companies.576  Dragonfly began targeting 
US and European energy gird operators, electricity generation firms, and petroleum pipeline 
operators in early 2013 with three infection tactics.  The earliest method was by spear phishing 
emails to selected executives containing a malicious PDF attachment, then the watering hole 
compromise of energy industry and control system related websites, and finally the infection of 
legitimate software packages available for download by three different Industrial Control System 
equipment providers.  Dragonfly uses both custom built and underground market available 
malware to access and control compromised computers.577  The group has not only provided its 
state sponsor with persistent access for spying, but also with sabotage capabilities that could 
cause disruption to energy supplies in the event of cybered conflict. 
    
  United States. After revelation that the United States pierced the networks of the Chinese 
telecommunications company Huawei to conduct surveillance,578 a Huawei senior executive in 
the United States said “The irony is that exactly what they are doing to us is what they have 
always charged that the Chinese are doing through us.”579 This assertion prompted President 
Obama to tell Chinese President Xi at a meeting in The Hague that the United States, unlike 
China, does not use its technological powers to steal corporate data and give the data to its own 
companies, instead, its spying is solely for national security priorities.580  Three other discoveries 
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support this spying contention based on the alleged implication of the United States to the 
Stuxnet intrusion upon Iranian nuclear enrichment facilities.581 The first is the data mining Flame 
virus that shares portions of its code with the Stuxnet malware, for instance, exploiting 
vulnerabilities in the same printing routine. Flame was found to have infiltrated thousands of 
computers in Iran and the adjacent areas in 2012.  The virus copied keyboard entries, sifted 
through emails and text messages, captured screen shots, and recorded microphone sounds.582  
Although Iranian leaders claimed the massive data loss caused by Flame to be tantamount to an 
attack, in defense of United States position on allowable surveillance if guilty, Flame should only 
be considered an act of digital espionage, not defined or prohibited in international law.583   
 
  Circumstantial evidence also associates the United States with the Gauss virus found in 
2012 on some 2,500 computers, largely in Lebanon.584  A notable security firm said they were 
confident the Gauss virus was written by the same programmers who created Flame, by 
extension linked to Stuxnet, because of significant similarities in code and architecture, to 
include C++ computer language and encryption methods.585  The Gauss virus, so-called because 
of this name in its code, acquired logins for email as well as instant messaging, social accounts, 
and financial transactions.  In this case the targeting of banking customers was likely American 
cyber espionage against the Syrian regime and the Hezbollah organization.586  The last revelation 
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is the Duqu virus infiltration, which is named for files used by its key logger to store collected 
data such as DQx.tmp.587  Duqu was detected in 2011 to be mining data from Hungarian and 
Iranian computers. Commonalities in the drivers suggest the Duqu and Stuxnet programs were 
created by the same platform and that early versions of Duqu gathered intelligence for the 
Stuxnet operation.588   
  Although deductive reasoning suggests that the four computer viruses which surfaced in 
the Middle East in three years were state-sponsored because they share a common architectural 
platform, it is possible the code was made available underground and repurposed or reused by 
other actors.   That possibility is refuted by Kaspersky researchers in an analysis and comparison 
of code for advanced hacking tools stolen from the National Security Agency in August 2016,589 
to malware code used by the Equation Group that Ars Technica has attributed to both Stuxnet 
and Flame.  The fact the code is functionally identical and shares specific traits demonstrates that 
Equation Group had clear connections to the National Security Agency.590  The hard reality that 
the four cyber incidents are affiliated with the United States actually lends credence to the White 
House press secretary’s declaration that U.S. “intelligence programs serve a specific national 
security mission.”591 
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Hacker Groups 
 
SEA. The Syrian Electronic Army (SEA) supports a state government in a nebulous 
arrangement.  Based in Syria since 2011, with accomplices in Germany,592 they have hacked and 
defaced over 40 sites to voice political sentiments in support of the Assad regime.  They gain 
access to blogging or social media accounts and use that medium to spread propaganda.  SEA 
tactics include setting up fake Facebook and YouTube sites to collect login credentials and 
compromising websites with the automated SQL Injection exploit tool Havij.593 In one 
defacement, SEA sent phishing emails to employees containing a link to a website that mimicked 
a news agency’s external email login page.  After gaining compromised accounts, the SEA 
targeted email distribution lists to obtain credentials of users with access to the company’s 
Content Management System, from which SEA could deface news articles.  The SEA also gained 
access to a marketing email account to reset the agency’s Twitter password and send 
unauthorized Tweets.594  One of their most famous attacks was the takeover of the Associated 
Press Twitter account via phishing in April 2013 and subsequent Tweet of a message that a bomb 
exploded in the White House injuring President Obama which temporarily plunged the Dow.595  
One Syrian hacker claims the state pays the Syrian Electronic Army to work for them.596   
 
For Hire. A clearer example of a hacker group for hire, but in this case for the theft of 
research information and military secrets, is the Appin Security Group in India.  This group of 
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talented hackers is suspected of targeting organizations in Pakistan, China, Norway and the 
United States.597  The attackers leveraged already-patched vulnerabilities in products like 
Microsoft Word and Oracle’s Java and did not use malware that employs techniques to evade 
detection, such as obfuscation or encryption, indicating they saw no need to implement advanced 
techniques because simple ways worked.598  On the other hand, an APT group named Hidden 
Lynx is a professional team with more advanced capabilities that appears to offer the Chinese 
government a “hackers for hire” operation, since much of their attack infrastructure and tools 
originate in China.  Since 2011, this APT has used primarily watering hole and spear phishing 
attacks to target hundreds of commercial and government organizations worldwide in concurrent 
campaigns.  The most heavily sought industry has been financial services, particularly 
investment banks and asset management agencies to gain competitive information, and also the 
defense industry in pursuit of confidential information.599  
 
Anonymous.  This hacker group is a self-proclaimed Internet movement with a 
decentralized structure that “operates on ideas rather than directives.”600  Their collective 
motivation to express dissent over perceived injustices was first revealed in Operation Payback 
in 2010. When PayPal, Visa and MasterCard stopped processing payments to WikiLeaks, which 
publishes leaked documents on its website, Anonymous called the actions an affront to Internet 
freedom and retaliated with DDoS attacks.601  Average citizens, mostly from the United States, 
participated in a campaign to disable corporate websites, after downloading over 40,000 copies 
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of software designed to flood websites.602 However Anonymous organizers realized the volunteer 
pool was insufficient and engaged two botnet masters to use their private collections of 75,000 
and 50,000 compromised computers to create more damaging effects.603  The subsequent arrest 
of 14 individuals alleged to have participated in the attacks on PayPal’s website brought a stern 
warning from FBI director Steve Chabinsky that “We want to send a message that chaos on the 
Internet is unacceptable.”604 In response, the global hacking collective stated “Your threats to 
arrest us are meaningless to us as you cannot arrest an idea.”605 
 
In a further affirmation of how hard it is to deter all actors and activities in cyberspace, 
Anonymous has claimed to have “NO leader” and that “nothing is official” but to be everywhere 
“helping to give voices to the voiceless.”606  With very few barriers to expression, an example of 
an Anonymous effort to influence an entity can be found in Operation Pharisee in 2011.  The 
collective conducted a 25 day online assault upon the Vatican to disrupt a visit by Pope Benedict 
XVI to Madrid as part of World Youth Day 2011.607  The attack started with skilled hackers 
conducting reconnaissance of the Vatican website, looking for Web application vulnerabilities 
with freely available tools, including the Iranian-built automated SQL injection scanner named 
Hajiv. When no vulnerabilities were found to exploit, Anonymous turned to laypeople to conduct 
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DDoS attacks, either by downloading software or by going to custom built websites, even with 
mobile device browsers.608  The targets of Anonymous protests have continued to diversify to 
include Israeli websites in 2013 after their airstrikes in Gaza609 and Islamic State supporters after 
the 2015 terror attacks in Paris.610  In 2016, the hacker group even took on Republican 
Presidential frontrunner Donald Trump for his stance on Muslim immigrants, exposing his 
personal information on Pastebin.611  
 
Criminal Organizations 
 
The merge in criminal tactics and tools with state sponsored or state hired APT groups 
complicates analysis of actor objectives when interpreting technical behavior for the purposes of 
deterrence.  For instance according to one U.S. official, differentiating between Russian criminal 
hackers and government hackers is difficult because they use cyber surveillance tools created by 
each other.  The U.S. still has not figured out whether criminals or government hackers 
infiltrated a classified military system in 2008 because both employ the same cyber tool used in 
the incident.612  Tactical overlap between malicious actor types exists in the use of spear phishing 
and interactive social engineering, the contacting of victims through popular social network data, 
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in addition to the use of publicly available toolkits and the creation of custom built malware.613  
Also, both actor types have found the attacking of a primary target through a secondary or 
tertiary service provider is one of the easiest avenues of compromise,614 adding further systemic 
complexity to efforts in deterrence.  For example, Eastern European hackers that stole 40 million 
credit card numbers from the retail giant Target creatively used a third party to get into the 
Target Corporation network to install their malware.  The breach begun with an email phishing 
attack sent to employees at a heating, ventilation and air conditioning firm that did business with 
the nationwide retailer. The criminals broke in and stole credentials Target had issued to the firm 
for electronic billing, contract submission and project management to eventually access the 
corporate network that housed the card payment system.615  
 
Whether based in Russia, China, Africa, the United States or anywhere else on the globe, 
organized criminal syndicates, armed with innovative technologies and techniques, outwit 
stalwart cyber defenses.  Criminals move fast to exploit flaws as evidenced in a data breach at 
Home Depot.  Senior executives at the Hardware giant assembled a task force in the weeks after 
the data theft at Target Corporation to draw up a plan to avoid becoming a victim of a similar 
attack.  Although by the time Home Depot signed a contract to install new technology to fully 
encrypt payment card data, hackers had already cracked their payment system.616  In September 
2014, the company announced that criminals had used custom-built malware to put payment card 
information at risk for approximately 56 million payment cards.  The company also released 
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initial estimates for the cost of the breach in staffing and services at $62 million.617  Turns out 
similar to the Target breach, the hackers used a vendor’s stolen log-on credentials to penetrate 
Home Depot’s computer network and install malware on self-checkout registers.  The use of 
stolen credentials from third parties is a continuing trend that has expanded to use of credentials 
from compromised outsourced IT service providers.  Criminals can leverage the elevated 
privileges of the IT administrators to move throughout the victim’s networks undetected.618  By 
starting an attack inside the network, criminals bypass perimeter cyber defenses. The financial 
barrier for criminals to conduct cyber attacks continues to drop as underground forums offer 
sophisticated hacking and malware packages, including security software checking services for 
malware detection, at low costs, making extra problems for deterrence.619  
 
Terrorist Groups 
 
The U.S. Director of National Intelligence has told Congress that cyber attacks from 
groups like Anonymous pose a greater threat than terrorism.620 Politically motivated cyber 
attacks come from a range of actors, to include extremists, but in reality only one terrorist 
organization,621 namely the Islamic State, has exploited the internet for campaign gains and 
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conducted low-level cyber attacks to attract the attention of the media.  The Islamic State 
declared in June 2014 the establishment of an “Islamic Caliphate,” extending from “Aleppo to 
Diyala,” while calling on all Muslims to pledge allegiance to the Islamic State and denunciating 
Western society.622  The Islamic State uses cruel acts of terrorism to create hate propaganda. 
Videos of militants humiliating or killing captured soldiers posted on social-media websites 
intimidate opposition.623  Near-real time footage of victorious militants hoisting their black flags 
and patrolling newly conquered towns vanquishes foes through fear.624 While displays of 
battlefield actions and military parades on YouTube and Twitter draw new recruits and funding, 
as Facebook requests garner private donations.625 Theatrically produced videos of beheadings or 
executions by the terror group are intended to incite horror, change policy, or demand ransom,626 
or even worst indoctrinate child soldiers, like one of five young boys shooting five Kurdish 
prisoners in 2016, all before the physical demise of the Caliphate from coalition victories.627  
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The Islamic State initially established a “Cyber Caliphate,” with the aim of using jihadist 
developed encryption software to mount catastrophic hacking attacks on America and the 
West.628  In January 2015, sympathizers of the Islamic State took control of the U.S. Central 
Command Twitter accounts, changing the profile photo to a black-and-white image of a fighter 
wearing a Keffiyeh, or scarf and posting at the top of the page “CyberCaliphate” and “i love you 
isis.”629  The hackers also posted tweets with phone numbers of officers, unclassified military 
scenarios, and threats against military members. Using the Command YouTube account, hackers 
also posted two videos, of attacks on U.S. troops and of fighters wielding weapons.  Although 
the Pentagon labeled this incident as little more “than a cyberprank,” a senior congressman 
called the intrusion a cyberattack and “severely disturbing.”630  The terrorist affiliate’s cyber 
capabilities appear rudimentary, as they might have simply guessed at weak account passwords, 
but continued recruitment of experienced hackers, like their British born founder since 
identified,631 will eventually yield cyber-enabled means to inflict destruction on infrastructure.  
  
Systemic Consequences  
 
Admiral Michael Rogers, the commander of U.S. Cyber Command stated “we expect 
state and unaffiliated cyber actors to become bolder and seek more capable means to affect us 
and our allies.”632  The Islamic State terrorist organization aims to affirm that statement with 
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video threats of an all-out cyber crusade against the United States and Europe.  Rogers worries 
that cyber could give the terrorist group offensive capabilities to wage attacks, by using the 
Internet as “a vehicle to inflict pain against the United States and others.”633  Likewise, Rogers 
believes China, along with one or two other countries, already has cyber capabilities that could 
shut down the electric grid in parts of the United States.634 These statements of potential 
malevolent cyber activity point to increasing risk to socio-technical-economic systems making 
deterrence both more crucial and harder than ever.   
 
Leadership at the U.S. National Protection and Programs Directorate assert that 
“malicious actors, including those at nation-state level, are motivated by a variety of reasons that 
include espionage, political and ideological beliefs, and financial gain.”635  For the Russian 
group, APT28, their motivations appear to be expanding from just espionage, pertaining to 
defense and geopolitical issues that would be useful to a government, to financial gain, according 
to an industry report that uncovered plans by the threat group to attack international financial 
institutions.  Most likely APT28 would use a spear-phishing campaign, their attack vector of 
choice, with well-crafted emails containing either a malicious file or web hyperlink to what 
recipients believe is an actual, but compromised, website.636  
 
The seriousness of cyber attacks is rising, causing significant harm to security and 
damage to the economies of major Western nations.  Official government assessments parallel 
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industry threat predictions about the looming security concerns.  Small nation states, like North 
Korea or Iran, are conducting cybered conflict by launching crippling distributed denial of 
service attacks or using malware to wipe computer master boot records.  Long-term players, like 
China or Russia, are already using better methods to remain hidden on victim’s networks.  
Similarly, sophisticated cyber criminals, like those from Eastern Europe, are adopting an 
advanced persistent threat approach to collect personal intelligence, looking and acting more like 
nation-state cyber espionage actors.637 Even more troubling, renowned security expert Eugene 
Kaspersky, has stated he is “really afraid some terrorist group will pay cyber criminals to 
develop and deploy [devastating] weapons on their behalf.”638  Finally politically motivated 
attacks will continue as hacker groups like Anonymous take advantage of showcase events on 
the world stage to promote their malevolent ideas.639  The collective judgement is that attacks 
and campaigns will only grow in frequency and sophistication, as malicious actors develop and 
use new “cyber attack vectors” in multiple stage attacks640 to exploit vulnerabilities all across the 
socio-technical-economic systems of defending nations to illegally or coercively obtain for 
political, economic or military advantages.  Deterrence is preferable to kinetic war as the losses 
through cyberspace grow.  The difficulty is that current theories and tools of deterrence are over 
challenged by the magnitude of the near term. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
Theoretical Foundations and History of Deterrence 
 
The concept of deterrence is often the cornerstone of national security strategy in dealing 
with powerful and emerging threats.  The national security strategy itself can signal resolve and 
readiness to deter potential adversaries.641  That includes the deterrence of adversaries as way to 
secure national interests.642  This chapter explores how the theories of strategy and deterrence 
underpin the creation of contemporary strategic deterrence options or an alternative option most 
likely to influence the behavior of malicious actors in cyberspace.  It starts by describing how 
great thinkers have theorized about the role of deterrence in national strategy.  It then uses 
national strategic choices made in three historical periods to illustrate the role that deterrence 
plays with respect to strategies, as a subset, a backup, an element of one or another choice.  
Specifically, the chapter examines three distinct uses of deterrence as strategy tools to reduce 
conflict: the use of coercive diplomacy and preemption before World War II, escalation 
dominance and countervailing strategy during the Cold War, and superiority in cyberspace and 
other domains or functional models in an era of Rising Cyber Power.  In each of the three 
historical periods, the chapter explores how theories of deterrence found in these periods apply 
or not in the formulation and implementation of strategic cyber deterrence options.  Finally in 
recognition of the intrinsic complexity found in various socio-economic-technical systems, the 
chapter concludes with an explanation of why a comprehensive approach enhances 
organizational interaction for the deterrence of malicious actors in cyberspace.   
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Theories of Strategy and Deterrence  
 
Strategy can be defined as the “direction and use made of means by chosen ways in order 
to achieve desired ends.”643  Strategy is subordinate to the more inclusive subject of security and 
in turn security is regarded as a field of politics. Thus at the level of national strategy, the 
functional means consist of any and all among the vital assets of a designated security 
community used for the purposes of policy as decided by politics.  Another more specific view 
of national strategy is the use of “political, economic, and psychological powers of a nation, 
together with its armed forces, during peace and war, to secure a nation’s objectives.”644  Here 
the distinction between the theory and practice of strategy is both objective and subjective.  In 
practice the strategist must always balance political ends with available means, arranged in 
appropriate ways.  However strategy is complicated in its many aspects and causes and effects 
are intrinsically difficult to separate.  Ends, ways, and means have to be unarguably different in 
meaning from each other as they are interdependent.  Yet in principle, the simple relationship of 
ends, ways, and means in a Trinitarian formula serves as a proven construct for managing the 
complexity, confusion, and chaos of disordered behaviors and events.645   
 
Strategy can also be thought of as the link between political aims and the use of force, or 
its threat.  Therefore another suitable version of strategy is the pursuit of political aims by the use 
or possession of military means. This link between policy at the highest level and the use of 
military force as its tools is postulated by Clausewitz in his narrow definition of strategy merely 
as ‘the use of engagements for the object of war,’ where war is ‘an act of force to compel our 
enemy to do our will.’  His seminal writings reason that the aim in war is the imposition of one’s 
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will upon the enemy, and to see all strategy as the pursuit of that aim, while taking into 
consideration the interaction of one’s own side with the enemy.646 According to this reasoning, a 
succinct and normative application of the Trinitarian formula for describing strategy would be 
“the art of the dialectics of wills that use force to resolve their conflict.”647  For in various forms 
of conflict, the use or threat of force for the purposes of policy has to overcome, or at least 
diminish, resistance manifested by human will.648  Political will is usually based on the 
advancement and survival of national interests.  As a manifestation of political will, strategic 
deterrence options convince adversaries not to take actions that threaten national interests.  
 
Deterrence can be defined as “to prevent from action by fear of consequences.”649 
Deterrence aims to convince adversaries not to take actions that threaten “vital interests by 
means of decisive influence over their decision making.”650  Decisive influence is achieved by 
“credibly threatening to deny benefits and/ or impose costs while ensuring restraint by 
convincing the actor that restraint will result in an acceptable outcome.”651  For deterrence to 
alter behavior, it must instill a belief in an adversary that a threat of retaliation actually exists, the 
intended action cannot succeed, or the costs outweigh the benefits of acting.  Therefore effective 
deterrence requires capability (possess the means to influence behavior), credibility (that 
proposed actions may actually be employed), and communication (sending the intended message 
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to the desired audience).652  Prevailing capability must be coupled with appropriate credibility 
and communication.  If a state has all the capability required to response, but lacks the will to 
launch a credible reprisal or the reputation that it would, deterrence fails.  Even if a state has the 
capability and credibility (will and reputation) to respond effectively, it must communicate its 
position.  For unless others receive the message clearly, they will not fully understand the 
probable repercussions of potential actions and deterrence will breakdown.  Finally, if credible 
capability is obtained, but credibility erodes, a greater response may be required to reintroduce 
the belief in an adversary that malicious actions will not be tolerated by the state.653  In this work, 
strategy is defined as “direction and use made of means by chosen ways in order to achieve 
desired ends,”654 and deterrence is defined as “to prevent from action by fear of 
consequences,”655 and relates to strategy as the use of “means of decisive influence over 
[adversary] decision-making.”656 Contemporary deterrence strategies involve ways to credibly 
threaten to impose costs (retaliation), to credibly threaten to deny benefits (denial) and to 
encourage adversary restraint (entanglement).657 
 
The Role of Deterrence 
 
The great thinkers of our time have theorized about the purpose and role of deterrence in 
national security strategy.  Patrick Morgan accurately observed that deterrence has been the 
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focus of “one of the more elaborate attempts at rigorous theory in the social sciences.”658  Thus 
deterrence theory, according to Robert Jervis, is “probably the most influential school of thought 
in the American study of international relations.”659  Although Morgan offered that deterrence is 
“an old practice in international politics and other areas of behavior.”660 Lawrence Freedman 
concurred that deterrence is concerned with “deliberate attempts to manipulate the behaviour of 
others through conditional threats.”661  In line with this view, Morgan stated the essence of 
deterrence is that “one party prevents another from doing something the first party does not want 
by threatening to harm the other party seriously if it does.”662  With the advent of nuclear 
weapons, Bernard Brodie staked out deterrence as the dominant concept of nuclear strategy.  He 
realized “thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars.  From 
now on its chief purpose must be to avert them.”663  For Brodie, the imperative question was 
“how to regulate the new weapons so as to minimize both the chances of their use and the levels 
of devastation that would result if they were used,”664 which conveyed the need for ways that 
threaten to impose costs for, and deny benefit of, an attack.  In questioning whether forces would 
tend toward first-strike capabilities, Brodie stated that if “neither side can hope to eliminate the 
retaliatory power of the other,” then restraint “becomes prudence,”665 which spoke to the need 
for a way to persuade an actor that restraint will result in an acceptable outcome. 
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Patrick Morgan reiterated that considerable speculation exists about the utility of 
deterrence since the end of the Cold War.  After all, the theory and strategy were “conceived with 
individual governments as targets, not a collective actor.”666  The United States or the West “now 
has to confront opponents not easily deterred,” to include fanatical movements, terrorists and 
rogue states.  Morgan pointed out the “fear is that these opponents will be difficult to understand, 
inclined to be uncompromising, likely to take high risks and pay a high price in pursuit of their 
goals.”667   Lawrence Freedman asserted that since the Cold War “involved a bipolar relationship 
[it] allowed for deductive theorizing.”668  For multiple audiences, the situation is not stark and 
simple. Nevertheless, Ned Lebow argued “the theory and practice of deterrence cannot be 
separated from the Cold War, and the ways in which deterrence was conceived and practiced by 
the superpowers.”669 He contended the “superpowers sought to intimidate the other” through 
exaggerated claims or demonstrations on strategic capability.670  Lebow explained intimidation 
through threat-based strategies is risky since they can provoke instead of prevent behavior, 
because restraint will be interpreted as weakness. In looking at an equation for threat-based 
strategies, Lebow stated that theorists have emphasized the ability to inflict punishment and all 
but ignored the ability to absorb cost.671 Freedman opined that first principles determine whether 
“deterrence as a strategic option can be rescued from its cold war use and abuse.”672  He stated 
that “deterrence is a coercive strategy,” which involves “the purposive use of overt threats of 
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force to influence another’s strategic choices.”673 Whereas a controlling strategy restricts choices, 
by defending territory and a consensual strategy adjusts choices, with another without force. 
 
To prevent unacceptable action, Patrick Morgan stated that a government “may issue a 
threat to attack or impose some other punishment.”674 His precept frames the strategic option of 
deterrence by retaliation, where threats of harm are woven into foreign policy.  Morgan pointed 
out that deterrence is “one aspect of what is called coercive diplomacy in which a government 
uses force or threats to get what is wants.”675  Lawrence Freedman went on to say deterrence “is 
a sub-set of the study of coercion, which can also include threats designed to compel action from 
others.”676  With deterrence the objective is inaction, primarily obtained through the threat of 
retaliation.   Freedman states “deterrence becomes a matter of strategy when A makes a direct 
attempt to influence B’s behavior through warning about the consequences of certain acts that B 
might be contemplating.”677  Although for that warning, Thomas Schelling noted that “one must 
threaten that he will act, not that he may act, if the threat fails.”678  To say one may act, leaves the 
opponent guessing whether one will punish or pass.  Also to say one may act, gives the 
threatener a clear choice to act or abstain. However, Schelling argued “the final decision is not 
altogether under the threatener’s control.”679  The uncertain element is aptly termed “the threat 
that leaves something to chance.”  Chance can be for example a product of an accident, false 
alarm, mechanical failure, somebody’s panic, madness or mischief.  Schelling further explained 
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that the decision to respond might be made in a sequence of decisions, some deliberate along a 
“graduated series of trips wires, each attached to a chance mechanism, with the daily probability 
of detonation increased as the enemy moves from wire to wire.”680 
In line with using a threat of retaliation prior to an enemy’s aggressive move to deter it, 
Glenn Snyder stated that essentially deterrence “means discouraging the enemy from taking 
military action by posing for him a prospect of cost and risk outweighing his prospective 
gain.”681  Snyder distinguished the role of deterrence in contrast to defense, which “means 
reducing our own prospective costs and risks in the event deterrence fails.”682 Therefore 
deterrence works on intentions, whereas defense reduces capability to damage, which includes 
the capability for denial.  In this regard, the defense resists the enemy’s onslaught in order to 
minimize losses.  Patrick Morgan remarked that “putting up a strong defense” prevents someone 
from attacking you because the other side decides not to attack.683  Hence the potential for denial 
of benefit from the attack influences a rational decision to attack, in effect enacting the strategic 
option of deterrence by denial.  Yet Robert Jervis asked the difficult question of “how rational do 
men have to be for deterrence theory to apply?” and surprisingly answered “much less than total 
rationality is needed for the main lines of the theory to be valid.” 684  Jervis went on to say 
“rationality may be neither necessary nor sufficient for deterrence” and explained while 
irrationality could produce emotional impulsiveness to launch an attack; it could also lead to 
passive acquiescence, where on the contrary, rationality could lead to belligerence.685  In a 
situation where the attacker and defender are neatly separated, Paul Kecskemeti pointed out 
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“only the attacker, not the defender, can always settle for the status quo, thereby avoiding the 
risks and costs of attack by abstaining.”686 
 
Glenn Snyder also suggested “the broad scope of the concept of deterrence” is not limited 
to military factors given “its fundamental affinity to the idea of political power.”687 Joe Nye 
advanced this suggestion by identifying the political mechanism of entanglement and norms as 
means of dissuasion.  Nye specified that entanglement refers to “the existence of various 
interdependences that make a successful attack simultaneously impose serious costs on the 
attacker as well as the victim.”688  Since benefits exist in the status quo and its continuation, the 
contention is the potential adversary may not attack, because it also has something valuable to 
lose.  Nye also asserted that entanglement by deterrence is sometimes called “self-deterrence,” in 
reference to an argument by Robert Jervis that “because actors can perceive things that are not 
there, they can be deterred by figments of their imagination – self-deterrence if you will.”689  
However in not dismissing the importance of the strategic option of deterrence by entanglement, 
Nye countered that “perceptions that costs will exceed benefits may be accurate, and self-
restraint may result from rational calculations of interest.”690   Furthermore, according to Nye, 
“normative considerations can deter actions by imposing reputational costs that can damage an 
actor’s soft power beyond the value gained from an attack.”691   Patrick Morgan appeared to 
concur in saying “if norms of behavior are internalized, then behavior is self-directed,” however, 
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he noted only when “fear of the consequences of violating certain norms” is internalized “is 
deterrence at work.”692  Accordingly, Lawrence Freedman questioned whether “certain norms – 
such as non-aggression - can be upheld without forms of collective enforcement.”693 
 
Robert Jervis affirmed that “in the most elemental sense, deterrence depends on 
perceptions” and therefore “unless statesmen understand the ways in which their opposite 
numbers see the world, their deterrence policies are likely to misfire.”694 Jervis postulated that 
for deterrence to work, an actor has to be convinced “that the expected value of a certain action 
is outweighed by the expected punishment.”695  That value, or risk, calculation resides ultimately 
in the “eye of the beholder” – that is, “of the party being – it is hoped – deterred.”696 Therefore a 
key requirement for successful deterrence is viewing it “through the eyes of the adversary, and 
not one’s own, including removing a Western perception of rationality from the risk 
calculation.”697  An adversary’s intentions are too often viewed by decision makers from 
perceptual biases and organizational interests, rather than credible signals.698  Thomas Schelling 
said deterrence is “aimed at the rational calculator in full control of his faculties and his 
forces.”699  Furthermore, “the operation of the deterrence principle,” according to Max Lerner, 
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“depends upon an almost flawless rationality on both sides.”700  Although an understanding of 
what is the “rational value-maximizing mode of behavior of adversaries”701 requires perceptions 
of risk from “the eye of the beholder.”  A conception in line with the conclusion by Schelling 
that each opponent’s “best choice of action depends on what he expects the other to do.”702  
Therefore, according to Lawrence Freedman, deterrence can be a state of mind, where “in all 
cases it is about setting boundaries for actions and establishing the risks associated with the 
crossing of those boundaries.”703  
 
Deterrence in Pre-World War II Conditions of Conflict 
  
The political uses of force for deterrence dominated the eras before WWII, and the means 
were as varied and pervasive as the relations of states.  In principle, any instrument of military 
power that can inflict damage upon an adversary may also affect his conduct, even if force is 
never used.  The necessary condition for this effect is that the parties concerned perceive that the 
capabilities will be or are actually deployed, thus allowing those capabilities to affect their 
decisions.  In peacetime the most versatile and extensive means for a deterrent influence was by 
sea power.  Inherent mobility, tactical flexibility, and wide geographic reach render sea power 
particularly useful as an instrument of foreign policy.  Land based forces, either ground or air, 
can be used to encourage friends or coerce enemies, but with more constraints and risks.  Naval 
forces, by virtue of their perceived capabilities, their role as a symbol of national power, and 
their manifestation of political will provide formidable military options.704  In theory, “deterrence 
is a coercive strategy” that involves “the purposive use of overt threats of force to influence 
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another’s strategic choices.”705 In the absence of hostilities, such as before World War II in 
Europe and Latin America, the indirect threat or use of limited naval force by the United 
Kingdom, Italy, Germany and the United States served as a form of coercive diplomacy.  At the 
onset of hostilities, such as before World War II in the Pacific, the use of naval forces by Japan 
served as a means of preemption, after a failure of deterrence by the opposing forces prompted 
the Japanese to act quickly in the belief they were about to be attacked anyway.   
 
Coercive Diplomacy 
 
 The strategy of coercion “includes deterrent as well as compellent intentions.”706  The 
deterrent component prevents undesirable actions by instilling a fear of consequences into a 
targeted actor.  Yet the deterrent threat only changes the consequences if the act in question is 
taken.  Whereas the compellent component offers the actor positive reinforcement for taking 
actions he otherwise would not.  Compellence usually involves initiating an action that can cease 
but only if the opponent responds.707  The general intent of coercive diplomacy “is to back a 
demand on an adversary with a threat of punishment for noncompliance.”708 This strategy was 
seen more than a century ago in the form of gunboat diplomacy, considered to be the threat of or 
use of “limited naval force, otherwise than as an act of war, in order to secure advantage or avert 
loss, either in the furtherance of an international dispute or else against foreign nationals within 
the territory or the jurisdiction of their own state.”709  Gunboat diplomacy can be by definitive, 
purposeful, or expressive force, which varies in the use of deterrent or compellent elements.710  
An example of definitive force occurred in February 1940, months before Germany invaded 
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France, when the German naval auxiliary Altmark, suspected of carrying British prisoners, 
gained shelter in the territorial waters of neutral Norway.  The HMS Cossack with five other 
combatants intercepted the auxiliary under escort by Norwegian torpedo boats.  Captain Vian of 
the Cossack was under direct orders from Winston Churchill to liberate the prisoners and if fired 
upon, to defend himself using no more force than is necessary.  He was also told to suggest to the 
Norwegians “that honor is served by submitting to superior force.”711  Upon informing the 
torpedo boat commander of his intent to proceed with or without consent, Captain Vian boarded 
the Altmark and steamed out of the fjord with 299 British subjects, after in effect issuing a 
deterrent threat to the Norwegians if they acted.  For in a deterrent threat “the objective is often 
communicated by the very preparations that make the threat credible.”712  
  
 Compellent threats “tend to communicate only the general direction of compliance.”713 
An example of their use in purposeful force was the landing of Italian troops on the Greek island 
of Corfu in August 1923, after Italian demands for financial and symbolic reparations for the 
massacre of their Military Mission in Greek territory.714  While “the distinction between 
deterrence and compellence is not necessary sharp,” the “main difference is the time pressure” 
and usually compellence is “associated with ultimatums,”715 as seen in British policy advances in 
Latin America through gunboat diplomacy. For example in Argentina in 1875, when under 
pressure from British bankers, railway and ship owners to safeguard property during civil unrest, 
the British sailed a gunboat up the River Parana to threaten the port of Rosario to force a reverse 
liquidation of a British bank.716  Likewise the United States used gunboat diplomacy by 
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purposeful force in Latin America in the years before World War II.  For instance, the presence of 
400 U.S. Marines embarked on the USS Pennsylvania persuaded Panama in 1921 to conform to a 
U.S. decision regarding her border dispute with Costa Rica.717  The United States also employed 
warships for expressive force to emphasize attitudes or to lend credibility to unconvincing 
statements.  For example in 1936 President Roosevelt arrived at Buenos Aires in Argentina in the 
Cruiser Indianapolis escorted by the USS Chester to attend the first session of the Inter-
American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace amidst U.S. reluctance to accept Argentinian 
doctrine prohibiting interference in other countries.718  Expressive force can be a key to 
diplomatic success, as proclaimed by American Diplomat George Kennan that “you have no idea 
how much it contributes to the general politeness and pleasantness of diplomacy when you have 
a quiet little force in the background.”719    
  
Preemption and Prevention 
 
The failure of deterrence efforts can make the strategy of preemption an attractive choice. 
An enemy belief that “we are about to attack anyway, not after he does but possibly before, 
merely raises his incentive to do what we wanted to deter and to do it more quickly.”720 The 
enemy “may attack in order to reduce its losses, even if it loses more than it gains.”721  
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Preemption is defined as the anticipatory use of force in the face of an imminent attack.722  For 
centuries international law has “recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before they can 
lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of 
attack.”723  Provided the action taken, “at a point in time when the opportunity arises to eliminate 
the threat,” is in proportion to the threat, and avoids excessive force.724  Usually at this point a 
decision for war has been taken by the aggressor.  The strategy of prevention differs both in its 
timing and motivation.  While the preemptor has no choice than to conduct a first strike in a 
rapid manner, the preventer choses to launch military action because of fears for the future 
should it fail to act now.  Preventive action for choice takes the form of a raid, not an invasion 
and occupation.   Both strategies are about self-defense.  The main difference is that in 
prevention, the proposition exists that the preventer is able to detect and to anticipate a deadly 
menace, or at least predict an intolerable major negative power shift.  To preempt is “to act on 
the basis of certain, absolutely contemporary knowledge,” while in contrast, to prevent is “to 
bereft of temporal discipline.”725  The Japanese in the first half of the twentieth century enacted 
both precepts, first at Port Arthur and second at Pearl Harbor. 
 
In 1904, Russia was confident that its great prestige would deter Japan from going to war.  
The Japanese strike on the Russian Pacific fleet stationed at Port Arthur on the Chinese coast 
initiated the two year Russo – Japanese War.  The cause of war on the Asian mainland was a 
matter of prevention of an emerging threat to national security.  Russian aggression to challenge 
Japan’s vital interests in Korea and home islands threatened its national existence.  The answer 
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on how to engage this formidable foe was the strategy of preemption.  Japan needed to preclude 
the Russian naval forces from interfering with the transfer of its army to the Korean peninsula.  
Although the damaged Russian ships at Port Arthur were repaired, the fleet would never 
successfully emerge.726  Nevertheless, the war continued as the Russians committed additional 
resources to the fight.  Russia’s Second Fleet passed through the straits of Korea to engage the 
Japanese Navy near the island of Tsushima in May 1905.  After two days of battle, the Japanese 
warships captured or destroyed thirty-one Russian ships.727 Preemption at Port Arthur had 
contributed to success at Tsushima by ensuring a clash of equal numbers, and to the peace that 
followed, which gave Japan control over Korea and thereby security from invasion.    
 
In 1941 the United States “sought to stop Japan without a war, but ended up provoking 
war.”728 The Japanese attack on the American fleet at Pearl Harbor resulted in the U.S. 
declaration of war against Japan.729  The cause of the preemptive raid was the threatened 
economic destruction of Japan by the United States.  American attempts to deter Japanese 
expansion into the Southwestern Pacific through deployment of the U.S. Fleet to Pearl Harbor, 
economic sanctions that deprived Japan of 80 percent of its oil requirements, and dispatch of B-
17 bombers to the Philippines all failed due to Japanese pride.  America insisted that Japan leave 
conquered Indochina and China as a condition for restoration of trade, essentially abandoning its 
empire and submitting to the economic domination of the United States.730  Given the scope of 
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Japan’s imperial ambitions and alliance with Nazi Germany, Japanese leaders in September 1941 
believed that war was inevitable, and prepared to attack in advance.731  The longer Japan took to 
start a preventive war with the United States, the less its chance of success, given the oil embargo 
and declining military power.  Japan needed to seize the Dutch East Indies to obtain a substitute 
for American oil.  The naval strike on Pearl Harbor was to be just a flanking raid, not an 
occupation, in support of the conquest of Malaya, Singapore, the Indies, and the Philippines.  
However, Japan knew it stood to lose more than it gained, signaled by a prediction by Admiral 
Yamamoto that “It is obvious that a Japanese-American war will become a protracted one.”732  
Tokyo’s grand strategy was to fight the United States to a stalemate in an island-by-island battle 
and extract a political settlement that would preserve imperial interests.  The strategy of 
preemption was meant to just buy time to construct a defense zone for negotiations.733    
 
Cyber Deterrence Implications 
 
The strategy of coercive diplomacy employed in Europe and Latin America in the 
examples above depended on the threat of or use of limited force through deterrent as well as 
compellent intentions.  Coercive diplomacy is a “political-diplomatic strategy that aims to 
influence an adversary’s will or incentive structure.”734 The strategy shows determination so an 
adversary under pressure concludes it must make concessions.  The key contrast with classical 
diplomacy is that coercion, although limited, is not merely a remote contingency.  The prospects 
for “successful coercive diplomacy depend on the costs of noncompliance that can be imposed 
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on the target state.”735  Costs can be imposed by economic sanctions as well as by military force. 
Economic sanctions are an increasingly prominent tool of statecraft.  They are the threat by a 
government to disrupt economic exchange with the target state, unless the target acquiesces to an 
articulated demand.  If the target complies, the sanctions are not imposed.736  Although emerging, 
cyber power has yet to exert anywhere near the same level of political influence of sea power.  
For unlike naval forces, cyber capabilities do yet not reflect a symbol of national power and the 
manifestation of political will.  To both deter and coerce an adversary in the absence of 
hostilities, an additional instrument of power besides cyber, like economic sanctions, should be 
considered in any strategy of coercive diplomacy.   
 
The strategy of preemption, for preventative reasons, as seen in the Japanese attacks on 
Port Arthur and on Pearl Harbor, is difficult to implement in the cyber realm.  The use of 
preemption depends on detecting moves early and averting attacks by moving first, the 
equivalent of a first-strike.  The challenge of situational awareness in cyberspace hinders the 
understanding of adversary origins and intentions.  Therefore a preemption strategy in 
cyberspace is susceptible to misattribution and overreactions or miscalculations.737  However, 
international law does allow any nation to defend itself from threats, and the United States has 
perhaps applied that concept to conduct preventive, and prepare for preemptive, cyber related 
actions, to control dangers in its external security environment.  The Stuxnet worm attack on 
Iranian nuclear facilities to destroy uranium enrichment centrifuges, although never 
acknowledged by the United States, could be considered a preventive cyber attack to forestall a 
nuclear attack.  Furthermore, the United States created a plan for a cyberattack on Iran in case 
diplomatic efforts to constrain its nuclear program failed and Iran struck back at the United 
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States and allies in the region.  American personnel placed “electronic implants in Iranian 
computer networks to prepare the battlefield” for preemptive strikes on Iranian air defenses, 
communications systems and power grid.738  A secret legal review of America’s use of cyber 
weapons concluded that the President has “the broad power to order a preemptive strike if the 
United States detects credible evidence of a major digital attack looming from abroad.”739  The 
preemptive strike would attack adversary computer networks by injecting them with destructive 
code. Yet officials have not revealed what exactly that threshold would be in order to sustain 
ambiguity in an adversary’s mind, inducing an element of deterrence, the threat of retaliation.  
 
Cold War Choices 
 
In January 1954, Secretary of State Dulles announced that the United States intended in 
the future to deter aggression by depending “primarily upon a capacity to retaliate, instantly, by 
means and at places of our choosing.”740 The policy became known as massive retaliation and 
was interpreted as a threat to devastate Soviet economic and political centers in response to any 
aggression, no matter how limited.  Meanwhile the Soviet Union was mounting a substantial 
threat against America’s Allies, and it was not to be long before the continental United States 
was at risk from Soviet aircraft.  Thus the adoption of this concept made the United States more 
reliant on the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons, and ultimately its credibility would depend on 
taking nuclear risks on its allies’ behalf.  With the Soviet Union in the lead on the development 
of intercontinental ballistic missiles, U.S. analysts introduced the concepts of first and second 
strike, the ability to absorb a first strike and inflict a devastating retaliation.  The requirement for 
the second strike force was to be survivable. The placement of intercontinental missile forces in 
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reinforced-concrete underground silos and also on nuclear-powered submarines by both sides 
eventually resulted in a condition of stability based on invulnerable retaliatory forces.741 
Although a global stalemate for nuclear war was attained, a pressing problem the United States 
still faced was how to extend nuclear deterrence over far away allies in a technically credible 
manner. 
 
Ultimately for the United States, national strategy is about the expansion of American 
interests and the security of the American people.  Yet in the Cold War, the perceived need to 
protect the European periphery against the Soviet Union drove the design and execution of an 
American strategy of onshore containment.  For this strategy the United States had ample 
geopolitical and economic resources to extend protection over allies and friends confronting 
Soviet land power.  However, since both the Soviet and NATO governments regarded nuclear 
weapons as useable weapons of war, the United States was left with no choice but to assume 
nuclear weapons were instruments of policy capable of functioning as means in the Trinitarian 
formula.  Therefore the United States elevated nuclear weapons to a dominant position in 
national strategy.  This decision was consistent with the American way of war that called for 
maximum violence for quick results.742 The American policy to use nuclear weapons in a 
strategy of Soviet containment remained firm throughout the nearly thirty years of the Cold War, 
however, the strategic concepts or ways for their use changed as advances were made and 
realized in the destructive potential of the weapons or means of the policy.   
 
Escalation Dominance 
  
The strategy of escalation outlines promised responses to deter adversaries.  During the 
Cold War, escalation was the basic concept around which attempts to develop a credible nuclear 
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strategy evolved. A ladder of escalation conceptualizes how activities in a given scenario 
maintain dominance at any particular level of escalation. Clearly set guidelines at ladder rungs 
integrate reactions and deterrence with policy decisions.  Although since crossing of the nuclear 
threshold would produce unpredictable results, the most useful escalation dominance would start 
at the conventional level in a concept of flexible response. In 1961, the American government 
began to posit that a major nuclear war might not, and need not, be a simple contest in 
destructive fury. Secretary of Defense McNamara gave a speech in June 1962 on the idea that 
deterrence might operate even in wartime, where belligerents might out of self-interest limit the 
destructive nature of nuclear war.  Each might feel that the destruction of enemy people and 
cities, as called for in massive retaliation, would serve no decisive military purpose but that a 
continued threat to destroy them might serve a purpose. McNamara said the United States has 
come to the conclusion that in general war “the destruction of the enemy’s military forces, not of 
his civilian population” would give the opponent the “strongest imaginable incentive to refrain 
from striking our own cities.”743 
 
Less than six months after McNamara’s expression of this conclusion, President Kennedy 
solemnly stated that any nuclear missile launched from Cuba on the United States would require 
a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union.744 Leading up to that point in time, the Soviet 
Union had faced a widening window of vulnerability with the buildup of American strategic 
nuclear forces.  For the Soviets, reducing the threat of a U.S. first strike would take several years. 
However the Soviets did possess a surplus of shorter range missiles that could not reach the 
United States from Soviet bases but could if based in Cuba.  Faced with few options, the Soviets 
decided to move existing weapons to Cuba from which they could reach American targets.  The 
United States discovery of Soviet ballistic weapons in Cuba in October 1962 instigated the 
thirteen day Cuban missile crisis. After previous deterrent threats to the Soviet government that 
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offensive weapons in Cuba would not be tolerated, the United States made the choice to respond 
with a compellant threat, specifically a naval blockade, called quarantine, coupled with a demand 
for withdrawal of the missiles. This form of value-maximizing escalation ended the crisis, with 
the Soviet removal of the missiles.745  Fortunately the crisis did not escalate across a threshold 
that had been previously accepted by both sides. 
 
With an acceptance of the growing American position to not use an automatic nuclear 
response to conventional Soviet aggression, NATO adopted in 1967 the concept of flexible 
response.  In this strategic concept, attempts would be made to respond to conventional 
aggression by the Soviets with conventional means. If that failed NATO would move to tactical 
nuclear weapons, and if necessary, the final recourse would be the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal.  
This progression effectively adhered to use of an escalation latter.746  NATO appeared to be 
aiming for escalation dominance by deliberate progression.  In 1974, the concept of escalation 
dominance emerged again in an announcement by Secretary of Defense Schlesinger that a range 
of nuclear options would reduce dependence on threats of assured destruction.  Schlesinger made 
clear it was neither feasible nor desirable to develop a true first strike capability but in major 
conflict nuclear weapons would impede enemy advance and warn against continued 
aggression.747 In a scenario of assured destruction a condition of stability is balanced if neither 
opponent in acting first gains the advantage of obliterating the other’s ability to lash back.  This 
stalemate guarantees deterrence since no rational actor could dare to choose a course of action 
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equivalent to national suicide.  This deduction assumes rational behavior generated by a 
conscious calculation of advantages based on an explicit value system.748  
 
Countervailing Strategy 
 
The danger in a strategy of escalation lies in its predictability.  If an aggressor knows the 
steps of the ladder, then they can test the rules and assess resolve to climb the ladder.  In 1980, 
US President Carter unveiled a countervailing strategy, by signing Presidential Directive 59 that 
brought it into force.  The strategy implied should the Soviet Union move up the escalation 
ladder, the United States would be able to respond effectively to exchanges at each level. PD-59 
sought a nuclear force posture that guaranteed a “high degree of flexibility, enduring 
survivability, and adequate performance in the face of enemy actions.” The strategy emphasized 
that “if deterrence fails initially, we must be capable of fighting successfully so that the 
adversary would not achieve his war aims and would suffer costs that are unacceptable, or in any 
event greater than his gains, from having initiated an attack.”749 To make this feasible, PD-59 
described targeting categories appropriate to implement a countervailing strategy that put the 
weight of the initial response on military and control targets.  The rapid planning targets 
described in PD-59 covered nuclear forces, command and control, stationary and mobile forces, 
and industrial facilities that support the military, while pre-planned strike options according to 
PD-59 remained for attacks on the political control system or general industrial capacity.   
 
A key component of PD-59 was to “use high-tech intelligence to find nuclear weapons 
targets” on the battlefield, strike those targets, and then assess the damage.750  A “look-shoot-
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look” capability would allow the president and his advisers to improvise targeting during the 
war.751  This flexible targeting system was supposed to provide an adequate deterrent, along with 
rigid pre-planned strategic options.752  Drafters of PD-59 believed they could control escalation 
of a rational actor making rational choices during a nuclear war, but gave up “victory” as an aim.  
Likewise, Soviet leadership did not think neither side could win a nuclear war.753  PD-59 sought 
to create the forces and codify the will to retaliate, but to actually deter, the Soviet leadership had 
to be convinced the Americans would do so. U.S. Defense Secretary Brown publicly discussed 
the major precepts of the countervailing strategy during the SALT arms control hearings in 1970 
and at a NATO Nuclear Planning Group in early 1980.  The policy of PD-59 was dubbed the 
countervailing strategy because its fundamental feature is the proposition that deterrence over the 
full range of nuclear contingencies requires the United States to have forces and plans for their 
use that convince the Soviets that no plausible outcome of aggression would represent victory.754 
 
Nonetheless by 1985 Soviet debate reached a consensus that nuclear war is so farfetched 
and dangerous that it has become an instrument of policy only in theory, and thus an instrument 
of policy that cannot be used.  That year Marshal Ogarkov, the Soviet Chief of the General Staff, 
published a revised description of the modern theater operation, in which military action is 
conducted without resorting to nuclear weapons.  In his book, Ogarkov wrote of a new U.S. 
capability to wage a protracted conventional war through the concept of Air-Land Battle. This 
development inspired a new revolution in Soviet military affairs that involved changes in Soviet 
doctrine generated by emerging technologies.  The Soviets saw the need for precision 
conventional means with the same ranges as those of nuclear weapons. By 1986 they were 
fielding long-range cruise missiles such as the SS-NX-24 to pose a non-nuclear threat to U.S. 
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and Eurasian airfields and nuclear weapons.755  Meanwhile the United States pursed their so 
called revolution in military affairs, developing communications, precision weapons, and 
intelligence systems for increased reach and awareness for deep Air-Land Battle engagements.756 
These revolutions persisted on both sides through the end of the Cold War in 1991.  
 
Cyber Deterrence Implications 
 
Theories of deterrence provided the basis for the American strategy of containment of the 
Soviet Union in the Cold War.  The United States extended deterrence through the threat of 
nuclear use on behalf of its allies, in insisting that an attack on the territory of NATO may invoke 
a U.S. nuclear retaliatory strike plus physical capabilities.  The United States eventually 
developed an invulnerable retaliatory capability in its strategic triad of intercontinental ballistic 
missiles in hardened silos, submarine launched ballistic missiles, and dispersed strategic 
bombers.  There was really no defense against nuclear weapons delivery by these platforms, 
either by ballistic missile defense or by air defense, although admittedly bombers were the most 
vulnerable part of the triad.  And even if defenses were available and robust, the damage that 
could be inflicted by surviving missiles or bombers would be viewed as an unacceptable loss. 
Therefore the Cold War deterrence framework relied heavily on the threat of punishment by 
punitive destruction.757  Here offensive retaliation is not only costly to the aggressor, but also 
makes a first strike unsuccessful in its objective.  This results in a denial of victory, or more 
precisely the denial of success by the attacker in achievement of military and political objectives.  
Therefore, deterrence by denial, in contrast to deterrence by punishment, stresses the role of 
                                                          
755 Mary C. FitzGerald, “Marshal Ogarkov and the new Revolution in Soviet Military Affairs,” 
Research Memorandum, Center for Naval Analyses, January 1987: 1-25. 
756 William A. Owens, “The Once and Future Revolution in Military Affairs,” Joint Force 
Quarterly, Summer 2002: 55-61.  
757 Schuyler Forester, “Theoretical Foundations: Deterrence in the Nuclear Age,” in American 
Defense Policy, Schuyler Foerster and Edward Wright, eds., 6th ed. (Baltimore, MD: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1990): 42-51. 
183 
 
defense to limit the damage the defender will suffer.  Damage limitation enables survival, denies 
attacker success, and enables retaliatory strikes to terminate the conflict on the defender’s terms.  
 
After the Cold War ended, U.S. government officials exhibited continued confidence in 
the nuclear deterrence framework based on the assumption that unified national actors would 
make decisions regarding the use of nuclear weapons in a reasonable and predictable fashion.  
However for a wider variety of malicious actors, confident predictions about deterrence should 
be viewed with skepticism because of the human element in deterrence, where a leader must 
agree to be deterred.  Desperate or determined leaders that are intent on their selected course can 
be obvious or resistant to the promises or threats of their foes.  Even the rationality of an 
opponent’s decision making does not guarantee they will be receptive to strategies of deterrence, 
including very severe threats.  As noted earlier, the rational decision maker choses a course of 
action that is calculated to be most suitable for achieving their preferred goal based on available 
information.  Rationality does not mean the decision maker’s goals and values are considered to 
be reasonable by others.  Therefore rational decision making can underpin behavior deemed by 
observers to be insensible, shocking or even criminal. For example, rational leaders with radical 
ideological views may pursue goals that are sensible to them, but through behavior that appears 
unreasonable to observers based on their own moral set of values and standards.758  
 
The Cold War deterrence framework was developed and practiced based on a particular 
context, not only a limited number of rational national actors, but also their capacity to deliver 
nuclear weapons. To assume that nuclear deterrence must fit well enough the circumstances for 
other attempts to deter in the twenty-first century would be a gross and avoidable error.759  
Nuclear deterrence is about one specific and highly lethal type of physical weapon.  The 
capability of the weapon to produce destructive effects is clear and demonstrated. Yet the 
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success of nuclear deterrence relies on the weapon itself, which by design restricts usage.760  The 
use of the weapon would be a rare occurrence and attribution for any attack, at least by ballistic 
missile or strategic bomber, is most certainly assured.  Therefore the theory of nuclear deterrence 
relies primarily on retaliation or punishment for use of this particular type of weapon, in the form 
of nuclear counter strikes.  All other efforts today to create a deterrent effect center on denial of 
access, by restricting the proliferation of information and materials to produce the weapons, or 
on norms, in the form of international agreements that limit the purchase and use of nuclear 
technologies, or by active defense, entitled more succinctly as ballistic missile defense. 
 
Prominent defense officials have summed up the prevailing view that “traditional Cold 
War deterrence models of assured retaliation do not apply to cyberspace.”761 Their reasoning 
stems primarily from the difficulty in obtaining timely and accurate attribution of actions in 
cyberspace.  Especially since the complexities associated with cyber attacks are compounded by 
the use of compromised servers and uncooperative countries.762  Without attribution that 
connects the action to an individual or state actor with confidence and verifiability, policy-
makers are constrained in making decisions on offensive retaliation.763 Also, unlike nuclear 
attacks that produce only destructive effect, cyber attacks are being used for disruption or 
espionage, which causes challenges for policy makers in determining whether the action rises to 
the level of an armed attack that justifies retaliation. In the Cold War, the possession of nuclear 
weapons meant it was possible to deter by threating horrific retaliation “without maintaining any 
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serious defenses.”764  In the cyber era, threatening harm on the attacker can also “be inflicted by 
a stout defense,” either by “frustrating the attack or making it too costly.”765  This form of denial, 
of benefit, convinces the “opponent to reject undertaking even a seriously prepared attack.”766  
Therefore for cyberspace, effective deterrence rests not only upon ensuring the capability to 
respond to hostile acts, but also upon the security of networks and systems.767   
 
Rising Cyber Power 
 
Over the past four decades, through the advancement of information and communication 
technology, the Internet have evolved into a global medium for collaboration and interaction 
between computers and individuals.  Through the physical and digital manifestation of this 
medium, cyberspace has become a primary conduit for transactions vital to every facet of 
modern life and security.  While society has benefited from connectivity and interoperability, 
technological advancements in cyberspace have provided means for the U.S. military, its allies, 
and partner nations to sustain advantage over adversaries.  Although unfettered access to 
cyberspace also provides malicious actors the avenue to compromise the integrity of critical 
infrastructure in direct or indirect ways.  Most critical infrastructure that empowers national 
economies, like financial systems, the power grid, and health systems, runs on networks 
connected to the Internet.  Concern resides over what a set of systematic cyber attacks might do.  
For example, in thinking of real-life examples, such as an air traffic control system going down 
and disrupting flights, or blackouts that plunge cities into darkness.768  Therefore a paradox exists 
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within cyberspace, as while technological advancements have enhanced the prosperity and 
security of nations, the same advancements have led to increased vulnerabilities and dependence 
on cyberspace, for both society and the military.  
 
This paradox has contributed to the rise of cyber power, broadly defined as the ability to 
“exploit cyberspace to create advantages and influence events.”769  As applied for these 
outcomes, many definitions of cyber power “emphasize how cyberspace can be used to fulfil the 
ends of strategy.”770  Accordingly cyber power can be considered as the “process of converting 
information into strategic effect.”771  This view considers the instrumentality of cyber power but 
neglects to discuss the process of using that power in the face of a willful and determined 
adversary.  A more explicit definition of cyber power is “the national ability to disrupt [the] 
obscured bad actor somewhere in the digital globe, whether nonstate or state, in proportion to its 
motivations/ capabilities to attack with violent effects and yet be resilient against exposed or 
enhanced nasty surprises across all critical nationally sustaining systems.”772  This definition 
recognizes that cyber power is employed as a strategic instrument against a malicious actor that 
is attempting to use cyberspace for their own ends.  The obtainment of stated effects, through 
systemic resilience and disruption capacities, can be part of an overall national strategy.  The 
attraction of cyber power as a strategic instrument lies in the ability for global reach with a 
certain degree of desired anonymity.  This characteristic can be useful in peace, conflict or war.   
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Just as a state actor can create strategic effects against globally distributed targets through 
cyber power, so can malicious actors outside a state’s immediate jurisdiction, “exercise power 
against the wishes of a state with little or no chance of being traced or interdicted by the state.”773  
The reduction in time and space through instantaneous interactions increases the number of 
malicious actors that were previously constrained by temporal or physical separations.774  Thus 
the domain is “marked by power diffusion,”775 where large countries will share the domain with 
new actors and have trouble controlling their borders in the domain.   Those new actors are vast, 
diverse, sometimes anonymous, and operate with an advantage in the offense over the defense.  
States and other actors will attempt to exercise cyber power to obtain preferred outcomes either 
within cyberspace or in other domains outside cyberspace.  Both will use hard power through 
coercion and payment or use soft power through agenda framing, attraction or persuasion.776 
Forms of hard power can include denial of service attacks and insertion of malware to steal data 
within cyberspace or cyber attacks on industrial control systems that physically reside outside 
cyberspace.  Examples of soft power would be setting standards for the security of software used 
in cyberspace or an online propaganda campaign to influence citizens outside of cyberspace.  
The diffusion of power complicates the development of state strategy to counter non-state actors 
with new found capacity to exercise both hard and soft power in cyberspace.  
 
Strategy brings together lines of effort to manage challenges in the strategic environment.  
A pervasive property of the environment is complexity, which rises when a state faces a greater 
number of threats, a more diverse set of security actors, and a more interdependent and 
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networked environment.777  Decision makers face uncertainty in the identity and capabilities of 
the threats and actors operating in the environment.  A number of strategic choices exist to 
respond to uncertainty, a byproduct of complexity. One of these choices is the proactive strategy 
of shaping, where the “expectations and behaviors of others can be shaped through the power of 
ideas or superior capabilities.”778  Shaping embraces a wide range of options, to include the use 
of cyber power, to alter the strategic environment so that serious challenges do not emerge.  The 
concept of ‘Shape’ is referred to as Phase Zero of the notional six-phase model of joint and 
multinational operations described in U.S. joint doctrine.  This doctrine presents military 
operations leading to “war” as a natural progression of activities, from shaping, deterring, seizing 
initiative, dominating, stabilizing to enabling civil authority.  The intent of ‘Deter’ in Phase One 
is to deter undesirable actor activities by demonstrating capabilities and resolve.779  
 
In the military context, cyber power “is equivalent to military power in the physical 
domains,”780 which are air, land, maritime, and outer space.  Cyber power is enacted through 
cyberspace operations, which employ cyberspace capabilities “to achieve objectives in or 
through cyberspace.”781  A cyberspace capability is “a device, computer program, or technique 
designed to create an effect in or through cyberspace.”782  Cyberspace operations are conducted 
and synchronized across the range of military operations.  The concept of cyberspace superiority 
is achieved when the degree of dominance in cyberspace by one force “permits the secure, 
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reliable conduct of operations by that force, and its related land, air, maritime, and space forces 
at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by an adversary.”783  As seen in recent 
incidents, cyberspace operations serve as a component of warfare.  Militaries can use cyber 
operations to disrupt command and control, delay force deployments, sever logistic pipelines, 
degrade weapons performance and produce political or psychological effects.  Most cyber 
attacks will not produce destructive effects similar to kinetic weapons, but can disrupt data and 
services, damage networks and computers, and maybe destroy machinery.784 
 
 Other Domain or Functional Models 
 
Cyberspace is often described as a global commons.  Likeminded nations have labeled 
the global commons as shared spaces – cyber, space, air and oceans - which exist outside 
exclusive sovereign jurisdictions.785  Access to these shared spaces is at risk due to increased 
competition and provocative behaviors.  Therefore the United States and its allies are promoting 
rules for responsible behavior in shared spaces while creating capabilities to assure access.786 
While the U.S. military has removed cyberspace as one of the global commons in their concepts 
of operation,787 the analogy at the strategic level has proven useful for resolving issues nations 
face in regard to domain security, and for guiding regulatory frameworks, such as those 
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envisioned in the theory of entanglement.788  Deterrence by entanglement is a way to entrench 
potential adversaries in a shared network they would not attack because of mutual interests and 
unintended consequences.789 For example, an attack on the commercial satellite infrastructure in 
outer space that facilitates military communications would have huge consequences on the 
wealth of globalized economies.  Besides economic entanglement, nations also share a degree of 
technological entanglement (and potential economic loss) in space, like in applications of Global 
Positioning Systems (GPS) data.790  Mechanisms to promote responsible behavior in space, like 
confidence building measures, can be adapted for cyberspace, due to similarities in the unique 
characteristics of the domains, such as the difficulty in attribution of attacks.791   
 
Warfighting concepts found in other domains suggest a new strategy for securing 
cyberspace resides in technical combinations of offensive and defensive operations occurring 
simultaneously and in concert.792  An operational perspective for countering air and missile 
threats indicates the relationship between offensive and defensive systems.793  To confront the 
tyranny of the offense dominated environment of air and missile threats, offensive counterair 
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operations prevent the launch of threats, while defensive counterair operations use active and 
passive measures to defeat threats attempting to penetrate through friendly airspace.  Active 
measures include defensive weapons in an integrated defense-in-depth system.  Passive measures 
include deception, dispersion, reconstitution, detection and warning systems, and protective 
construction.794  An example of a defensive weapon is the Patriot surface-to-air missile system, 
which uses a radar system and interceptor missile to detect and shoot down hostile aircraft and 
missiles.  The concept definition can be adapted to the cyber domain, where active cyber defense 
is taken to be direct defensive action taken to destroy, nullify, or reduce the effectiveness of 
cyber threats, while passive cyber defense is about all other measures to minimize their 
effectiveness.795   These definitions allow the examination of various active and passive 
measures to see how they act or interact, simultaneously or in concert, against hostile cyber 
threats. 
 
Cyber Deterrence Implications 
 
In an era of Rising Cyber Power, a tailored deterrence approach can serve as a vital part 
of a cyber security strategy designed to prevent and reduce adversarial intrusions. One such 
approach recommended by notable academics emphasizes raising costs of, and reducing benefits 
from, cyber attacks, to include use of economic sanctions, mandatory standards for protection 
and resilience, international agreements, and active defense.796  The U.S. government’s approach 
on its cyber security strategy focuses on four key elements. The first to improve defenses to 
manage risk more effectively; the second to improve the ability to disrupt, respond to, and 
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recover from cyber attacks; the third to enhance international cooperation to hold bad actors 
accountable; and the fourth to make cyberspace intrinsically more secure by building more 
resilient networks.797  Effective resilience measures can convince malicious actors of the futility 
of commencing cyber attacks on networks. Therefore the U.S. Defense Department has 
incorporated the necessity to strengthen the overall resilience of their systems in its new cyber 
strategy. 
 
The U.S. Defense strategy adds resilience as a factor in effective deterrence.  Resilience 
is deemed necessary to withstand a potential attack if it penetrates defenses. The Defense 
Department intends to invest in resilient systems so they may continue “operations in the face of 
disruptive or destructive cyberattacks.”798  The DOD realizes it cannot foster resilience in 
organizations that fall outside its authority. Therefore for resilience measures to “succeed as a 
factor in effective deterrence,” other agencies must work with critical infrastructure and key 
resource owners to develop resilient systems.799 The vast majority of large-scale socio-economic-
technical systems from electrical grids to manufacturing supply chains have become vulnerable 
to nasty surprises in cyberspace.  The increasing complexity of these systems challenges efforts 
to increase resilience.  Complexity rises as “the number, differentiation, and interdependence” of 
elements and nodes rises.800  Therefore if a “surprise can cascade over enough nodes,” it 
becomes a systemic event.801  The challenge in accommodating surprise is to gain sufficient 
knowledge of threats and vulnerabilities.  A proven mechanism is necessary to self-organize 
disparate organizations in their efforts to generate resilience. 
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Comprehensive Approach Applications 
 
The comprehensive approach is a proven mechanism for coordinating efforts to respond 
to security challenges. Absent a precise definition, the phrase “mobilizing the resources of an 
entire society to succeed in modern missions” encapsulates the meaning.802  The model builds on 
a whole-of-government approach, to include the additional capabilities of allies and partners, 
non-governmental and private voluntary organizations, international organizations, and the 
private sector.803 Intended to enhance organizational interaction, the comprehensive approach or 
whole-of-nation response is a way of thinking or a method, instead of a mechanical process.804  
Although reaching consensus on the objectives of the approach can be elusive, any discussion 
requires identifying the underlying apparatus of this approach, which is cooperation among 
actors when feasible, and integration of capabilities when possible. Although acknowledging the 
complexities and challenges, employing a comprehensive approach may lessen distrust and 
hesitancy among the participants, boosting the number of organizations willing to accept 
responsibilities in modern missions. 
 
The fundamentals of a comprehensive approach include interdependence in political, 
security, economic, and social systems; cooperation by constant communication, dialogue and 
negotiation; prioritization of multiple competing demands; nesting of short-term objectives into 
longer term goals; flexibility in sequenced or phased actions; and measurements of progress in 
                                                          
802 James G. Stavridis, “The Comprehensive Approach in Afghanistan,” PRISM, 2 no. 2, March, 
2011: 65-76. 
803 Stephan J. Hadley and William J. Perry, The QDR in Perspective: Meeting America’s 
National Security Needs in the 21st Century, (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, July 29, 
2010): 31-32. 
804 Kristina Rintakoski and Mikko Autti, Trends, Challenges and Possibilities for Cooperation in 
Crisis Prevention and Management, (Helsinki, Finland:  Crisis Management Initiative, June 17, 
2008), 1-34. 
194 
 
translating goals into outcomes.805  Just as important as understanding the fundamentals are the 
unified principles for planning and conducting operations with all relevant actors in an 
increasingly complex environment.806 The four unified principles of the approach identified by 
the United Nations are: first, a shared vision of strategic objectives, and second, congruence of 
purpose, through unity of effort by all parties, not of command by a single governing body.807  In 
this context, congruence is defined as agreeing or coinciding as a state of compatibility.  Third, 
some level of coordination with all relevant actors that enhance effectiveness.  Fourth, successful 
use of the comprehensive approach requires mutual awareness and deliberate consideration of 
the charters, interests, limitations, and perspectives of stakeholders.  With a comprehensive 
approach, organizations are tasked to do things they do best.  Proper application could yield 
efficiencies in allocating resources and reducing duplication of effort. The principles are not a 
panacea for all problems seen in a multidimensional environment, but even modest gains in 
facilitating cooperative interaction justify the effort.   
 
The comprehensive approach uses cooperative interaction to advance the common 
interests of organizations.  To be useful in deterring cyber attacks, the approach needs to 
overcome a clash of self-interests that prevent cooperation, where one party tries to sustain 
economic or military advantage.  For instance the private sector is reluctant to share cyber threat 
data with the government because it does not believe the latter can protect the confidentiality of 
an attacked company, which may devalue stocks or compromise proprietary information to the 
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advantage of competitors, and protect personally identifiable information (PII) which might be 
found in stolen data.808  A state might not agree to cooperative action if binding rules constrain 
their preferred method of competition in cyberspace. Critical to gaining consensus for the 
comprehensive approach is the multilateral characteristic of diffuse reciprocity, whereby parties 
recognize their self-interests will be satisfied over the long term.  Examination of models and 
precedents in other domains could identify principles and mechanisms that foster greater 
cooperation and transparency.  Winston Beauchamp, the deputy undersecretary of the Air Force 
for space touts how space operators have the “equivalent of maritime rules of the sea about 
encounters and how to deal with them.”809  Many of the provisions of the emerging International 
Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities can be translated for cyberspace, such as to avoid 
harmful interference with outer space activities, to prevent outer space from becoming an arena 
of conflict, and to reinforce international norms for responsible behavior in outer space.810   
 
The comprehensive approach does not apply only to operations by friendly entities, for 
example a hybrid threat can “avail themselves of a comprehensive range of methods and 
weapons to accomplish their objectives – a comprehensive approach to goal obtainment.”811 
Therefore to rapidly adapt to new threats, the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff states 
that “success will increasingly depend on how well our military instrument can support the other 
instruments of power and enable our network of allies and partners.”812  His comment openly 
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acknowledges the role of the military in a contribution to a comprehensive approach for security. 
The term for the military component is “full spectrum operations,” explained in doctrine as the 
“range of operations forces conduct in war and military operations other than war.”813 For 
preparation and response to cyber attacks, the Joint Staff proclaims success is dependent upon 
unity of effort enabled by collaboration among partners, to include the private sector.814  This 
claim is consistent with an affirmation by the NATO Enhanced Cyber Defense Policy that 
‘strong partnerships play a key role in addressing cyber threats and risks.” 815 NATO 
consequently intends to engage actively on cyber issues with relevant partner nations and 
international organizations plus intensify cooperation with industry.  Private sector expertise and 
innovations are seen as crucial by NATO to achieve the objectives of the Enhanced Cyber 
Defense Policy.  One of these is the strategic deterrence of cyber attacks.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
Deterrence by Retaliation 
 
The strategy of deterrence by retaliation is based upon the credibility of a threat to 
impose overwhelming costs for hostile acts, including in cyberspace.  Nations reserve the right to 
respond by all necessary means, often in kind, to an attack on their interests where they are 
able.816  Since deterrence is partially a function of perception, the strategic option of retaliation 
works by convincing a potential adversary that it will suffer unacceptable costs if it acts in an 
undesirable manner.817   Deterrence by retaliation seeks to change the cost-benefit calculations of 
a malicious actor by proving that a response by the victim to an attack will occur at or in a 
chosen time, manner, and place.  This influence occurs through not only the clear articulation of 
declaratory policy to use all necessary means in response, but also the overt display of effective 
response capabilities.  The threat of or use of all necessary means and the potential for harm 
deters an actor from carrying out a course of action to attack, but only if the costs are viewed to 
outweigh the benefits.  Thus successful deterrence requires not only the capabilities to harm the 
malicious actor, but also the communication of will to launch a reprisal coupled with the credible 
reputation to actually do so.  Furthermore, the initiator of retaliation must have the resolve to 
accept any harm or pain that may be caused by a reprisal act in response to the original deterrent 
act.818 
 
Yet in today’s threat environment, cyber attacks seriously challenge the strategic option 
of deterrence by retaliation.  Senator John McCain stoutly claimed that “our adversaries view our 
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response to malicious cyber activity as timid and ineffectual,” since we have not proven that the 
“consequences of continued cyberattacks against us outweigh the benefit.”819  Not only has 
retaliation failed because of choses to apply it poorly, it is not suited for cyberspace and cannot 
be effective. To date few malicious actors responsible for significant cyber attacks on critical 
infrastructure have faced criminal justice. The five members of the Chinese Military indicted in 
May 2014 on charges of computer fraud, damaging a computer, and aggravated identify theft are 
“no closer to seeing the inside of a federal courtroom” while “China’s campaign of economic 
espionage against U.S. firms continues.”820  U.S. authorities did file charges ranging from 
securities fraud to money laundering on criminals in cases bearing some link to the massive 
cyber-attack on JP Morgan Chase Bank in 2014.821  Yet it took eighteen months before 
prosecutors publicly and directly linked the suspects to the hack.822  When asked do we need to 
go on the offensive in ways that we have not before, Admiral Michael Rogers, the head of the 
National Security Agency, responded “I think clearly we have got to change the current dynamic.  
To date, most nation states, most groups, most individuals, have come to the conclusion that 
there is little price to pay for the actions they’re taken.”823  Uttering that the U.S. is at a tipping 
point, Admiral Rogers openly inquires, “how can we increase our capacity on the offensive side 
here to get to that point of deterrence.”  
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Lawmakers in the United States have voiced frustration with the lack of an effective 
deterrent strategy for cyber attacks.824  U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work told a 
congressional committee that a key objective of his Department’s cyber strategy “is to develop 
cyber options to hold an aggressor at risk in cyberspace if required.”  Although Secretary Work 
admitted, that “in many instances non-cyber capabilities may provide a more appropriate or 
effective response.”825  Therefore the range of means to directly impose costs for hostile acts in 
cyberspace span military cyber operations, diplomatic engagements, law enforcement measures, 
economic sanctions, and even the use of kinetic capabilities.  These means are reviewed for what 
is necessary to change an actor’s perception. Or simply which means will work best to convince 
a malicious actor, whether from a nation state, hacker group, criminal organization or terrorist 
group, that the costs of conducting an attack outweigh any potential benefits.  This chapter starts 
with an illustrative case that depicts an example of a justified and proportionate response by the 
United States government to a destructive and vindictive cyber attack by a nation state.  It then 
examines the circumstances and concerns for employing the range of necessary means and to 
what extent will the threat of or use of them, often in kind, achieve deterrence by retaliation in 
response to hostile acts in cyberspace.  
 
Illustrative Case of Muted Response  
 
Deterrence by retaliation fails in principle in cybered conflict.  The 2014 threat landscape 
saw an increasing frequency of cyber attacks, underscored by theft of data at retailers such as 
Target Corp., hardware store Home Depot Inc., luxury goods Neiman Marcus Group, craft chain 
Michaels Cos., and grocer Supervalu Inc,826 and at banks like JP Morgan Chase.  The most 
                                                          
824 Joe Gould, “Constructing a Cyber Superpower,” Focus US Cyber Command, Defense News, 
June 29, 2015.  
825 Robert O. Work, Deputy Secretary of Defense, “Cybersecurity Risks to DoD Networks and 
Infrastructure,” Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, September 29, 2015.  
826 Rachel Feintzeig, Clint Boulton and Joann S. Lublin, “Fears Spread of Sony-Style Hack,” The 
Wall Street Journal, December 7, 2014.  
201 
 
sensational act was the destructive and coercive cyber attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment.  
The attack was “a game changer because it wasn’t about profit,” but “a dictator trying to impose 
censorship and prevent the exercise of free expression.”827 On November 24, 2014, images of a 
neon red skull appeared on computer screens at the entertainment giant Sony. An accompanying 
message by a group called ‘#GOP,’ standing for Guardians of Peace, threaten to release data 
secrets if undisclosed demands were not met. Sony initially downplayed the intimidating 
promise, still bruised from an attack months prior that forced their PlayStation network 
offline.828  However, along with the vivid warning expressed to Sony Pictures employees, 
hackers launched a so called ‘wiper’ attack deleting files and disabling computers. They used 
malicious software similar to the virus seen in attacks on South Korean banks and media outlets 
the previous year in a campaign dubbed Dark Seoul.829  Soon after, sensitive personal 
information regarding thousands of employees of Sony Pictures and confidential emails by 
executives were leaked online, along with five new or unreleased films.  
 
On December 16, 2014, Guardians of Peace posted on the Pastebin web site another 
threat that people who see Sony’s movie “The Interview” would suffer a “bitter fate.”830  The 
comedy portrays the leader of North Korea as a sadistically irrational tyrant. This menacing 
promise prompted Sony Pictures to cancel the Christmas release of the movie at the largest 
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multiplex theater chains in North America.831  President Obama criticized the decision by Sony 
to cancel the release of the “Interview” as a bad precedent and stated “we will respond 
proportionately and we will respond in a place and time and manner we choose.”832 The FBI 
concluded the North Korean government is responsible for the incident at Sony Pictures based in 
part on analysis of data deletion malware similarities in lines of code and encryption algorithms 
previously developed by North Korean actors and the discovery that several Internet Protocol 
(IP) addresses used were associated with known North Korea infrastructure.833  Although the 
evidence appeared circumstantial, technical malware analysis confirms the attack was not the 
work of suspected insiders or hacktivist.834  
 
The FBI observed “the destructive nature of this attack, coupled with its coercive nature, 
sets it apart,” as North Korea’s actions were intended “to inflict significant harm on a U.S. 
business and suppress the right of American citizens to express themselves.”835  Yet even with 
confidence in attribution, U.S. policymakers did not have “an established menu of proportionate 
response options” for this low-intensity cyber attack.836  Any military retaliation would be out of 
proportion and would risk escalation, no trade exists for sanctions, and any legal action in 
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indictments would be pointless.837  Nevertheless the United States did respond in a limited way, 
potentially covertly and definitely overtly. Perhaps a coincidence, soon after the President’s 
pronouncement, the Internet in North Korea, available only to the elite, the military and the 
propaganda apparatus, went dark for nearly ten hours.838  Days later, under an Executive Order 
signed by President Obama, the Treasury Department imposed financial measures on three North 
Korean organizations and ten officials. The legislative basis for the sanctions for “destructive, 
coercive cyber-related actions” was violation of four United Nations Security Council 
Resolutions and commission of serious human rights abuses.839 The targets of the sanctions were 
the Reconnaissance General Bureau, which probably orchestrated the cyber operation, the Korea 
Mining Development Trading Corporation, their main arms dealer, and the Korean Tangun 
Trading Corporation, responsible for defense research and development, plus individuals 
operating out of Russia, Iran, Syria, China and Namiba with suspected connections to the North 
Korean government.840   
 
The Sony attack was sophisticated enough that a prominent security company felt Sony 
could not have been fully prepared.841   North Korean used “spear phishing” attacks in early 
September to steal “credentials” of a Sony systems administrator, which allowed the hackers to 
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roam freely inside Sony’s systems.842 Hackers spent two months collecting passwords and 
mapping the network before activating a virus named Destover that wiped data and crashed the 
system in a 10 minute time bomb. Available on the black market, Destover also functions as a 
back door to an affected network, allowing remote access without detection of intruders.843  
Destover contains configuration files created on systems using Korean language.  Not only did 
analysis of Destover used by #GOP and the virus used in the Dark Seoul attack by the Whois 
Team reveal similarities in techniques and code, but also comparisons exist in the computer 
screen images used by the claimed perpetrators in warnings, threats and original skeletal 
artwork.844  The cyber defenses at Sony had failed and the U.S. government resorted to 
retaliation against a nation state through an instrument of power, namely economic sanctions 
intended to inflict some new financial pain, particularly in exports of military goods and services. 
 
Military Response Options  
    
 The United States chose not to use a military response, at least an overt one, to impose 
costs on North Korea in the Sony incident despite attribution by the FBI.  The options for a 
military response include using cyber or kinetic capabilities.  The attack on Sony, although cited 
by Admiral Rogers as an attack on critical infrastructure in U.S. territory,845 did not cross the 
threshold for the use of forceful military means in retaliation.  According to Michael Schmitt, 
“Pursuant to Article 51 of the UN Charter and customary international law, if the malicious 
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cyber operation attack against Sony had constituted a ‘use of force’ rising to the level of an 
‘armed attack,’ the United States would have been entitled to respond forcefully, whether by 
kinetic or cyber means.”846 The attack against Sony involved the release of sensitive information 
and the destruction of data.  Although disruptive and costly, the effects were not at the level of an 
armed attack.  Likewise the attack, although severe, would probably not be characterized as a use 
of force by the international community.  However, the cyber attack against Sony, since 
attributed to the State of North Korea, was a violation of U.S. sovereignty.  As such, under the 
law of State responsibility, the attack amounted to an “internationally wrongful act.” The 
commission of an internationally wrongful act entitles an injured State to engage in 
countermeasures in order to persuade the responsible State to return to a state of lawfulness.847  
For which the United States might have done covertly, by crippling the Internet in North Korea 
for a brief period of time.  
 
 In the Sony case, the United States did make a determination on attribution one month 
after the attack.  Attribution plays a key role in signaling, or proving, that a response by the 
victim to an attack will occur.  Yet tracing cyber attacks back to their origin is difficult.  
Attackers evade detection by using hijacked systems as proxies or by changing [spoofing] the 
source field of IP data packets.848  Attackers can also modify [spoof] the Media Access Control 
address of network devices to mask identify or poison a Domain Name System server to redirect 
users to a malicious website.849  Technical attribution seeks to identify IP ownership or domain 
registration, but other indicators can help to attribute attacks, such as tradecraft tools, code styles, 
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resource language, and time zone information such as malware build time or command and 
control check in times.850  “Attribution is not impossible, it’s just hard,” according to General 
Michael Hayden, former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and “good attribution does 
not include up to the point of beyond all reasonable doubt,” rather “this is about enabling 
governments to act in the face of continued doubt.”851  That entails acting without meeting some 
sort of judicial standard to protect national interest, and if necessary by military means.  If a 
decision to maintain credibility by military means is made, then a plethora of considerations 
follow in this section for use of cyber or kinetic weapons in a proportional and justified response.   
 
Response Thresholds 
 
The threshold for use of military means in response to a cyber attack by a nation state is 
imprecise. Difficulties in reaching international consensus on what qualifies as the “use of force” 
rising to a level of an “an armed attack” in cyberspace impedes the application of international 
law to cyber operations, which are defined as “the employment of cyber capabilities where the 
primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace.”852  The lack of a common 
understanding on these terms and conditions also restricts the ability to deter cyber attacks.  In 
the Charter of the United Nations, Article 2 calls on all Members to “refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence 
of any state.”853  The most serious and dangerous form of the use of force is aggression.  Acts 
that qualify as aggression include invasion, blockade, bombardment, and other attacks by armed 
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forces of a state on the land, sea or air forces of another state.854  The Russian occupation of 
Crimea qualified as aggression, since Russia exercised territorial control without the consent of 
the Ukrainian Government.  However an act qualifying as a use of force need not be undertaken 
by state armed forces.  For example an act would qualify if undertaken by state intelligence 
agencies or by a private contractor whose conduct is attributable to the state.  Cyber operations 
may “in certain circumstances constitute a use of force within the meaning of Article 2 (4) of the 
UN Charter,” if they cause effects that, if caused by traditional physical means, would be clearly 
regarded as a use of force.855  For example, the United States would categorize cyber operations 
as a use of force if they: 1) “trigger a nuclear plant meltdown;” 2) “open a dam above a 
populated area, causing destruction;” or 3) “disable air traffic control services resulting in 
airplane crashes.”856   
 
The term “use of force” is not to be equated with the term “armed attack.”  Not every use 
of force rises to the level of an armed attack.  Likewise the choice of means of attack is 
immaterial to the determination.  For example, the Tallinn Manual 2.0 states “it is universally 
accepted that chemical, biological, and radiological attacks of the requisite scale and effects to 
constitute armed attacks trigger the right of self-defense.”857 Under identical reasoning, Rule 71 
states that “whether a cyber operation constitutes an armed attack depends on its scale and 
effects.”  The parameters for scale and effects are “unsettled beyond the criteria they need to be 
grave.”  The International Group of Experts that wrote the Tallinn Manual 2.0 agreed that “a 
cyber operation that seriously injures or kills a number of persons or that causes damage to, or 
destruction of, property would satisfy the scale and effects requirement.” They also agreed that 
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“acts of cyber intelligence gathering and cyber theft, as well as cyber operations that involve 
brief or periodic interruption of non-essential cyber services do not qualify as armed attacks.”858  
The United States view is similar on cyber operations that resemble traditional signal intelligence 
activities, in considering cyber intrusions to collect data for national security purposes as within 
the realm of international law.859  
 
Resort to Force 
 
The body of international law entitled jus ad bellum governs a state’s resort to military 
force, including through cyber operations, as an instrument of its national policy.  Certain criteria 
for jus ad bellum have been drawn from principles as part of Just War Tradition.860  The 
principles start with a competent authority to order war for a just cause, such as self-defense. 
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations demarcates “the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations.”861  
Traditionally, Article 51 has been characterized as applicable to armed attacks undertaken by one 
nation state against another, but recent practice establishes a right of self-defense in the face of 
armed attacks by non-state actors, such as terrorist or rebel groups.862 Not all states accept the 
United Nations strict criteria on armed attack.  For instance “the United States has long taken the 
position that the inherent right of self-defense potentially applies against any illegal use of 
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force.”863  Regardless of viewpoint, to constitute legitimate self-defense, the defending state’s 
use of force must be necessary and proportionate, which limits the application of retaliation in 
cyber conflict because of constraints on the use of overwhelming force.  
 
Necessity requires that “a use of force, including cyber operations that amount to a use of 
force, be needed to successfully repel an imminent armed attack or defeat one that is 
underway.”864   For example if passive cyber defenses like firewalls are “adequate to reliably and 
completely thwart a cyber armed attack, other measures, whether cyber or kinetic, at the level of 
a use of force are impermissible.”865 Likewise, other non-forceful measures, such as diplomacy, 
economic sanctions or law enforcement must be insufficient to address the situation.  
Proportionality addresses “how much force,” including through cyber operations, “is permissible 
once force is deemed necessary;” the measures taken in self-defense must be proportionate in 
“scale, scope, duration and intensity” to the nature of the threat being addressed.866  There is no 
requirement for the measures taken to be of that which constituted an armed attack, for instance 
“a cyber use of force may be resorted to in response to a kinetic armed attack, and vice versa.”867  
For illustration the insertion of a logic bomb would qualify as “an imminent armed attack if the 
specified conditions for activation are likely to occur.”868  In the case of an ongoing pattern or 
campaign of cyber operations, proportionality can be assessed by what use of force is judiciously 
necessary to discourage future armed attacks or the threat thereof.   
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Justification for a resort to force for NATO resides in Article 5 of the North Atlantic 
Treaty, where “the Parties agree that an armed attack against one of more of them in Europe or 
North America shall be considered an attack against them all.”869  Consequently “they agree that, 
if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective 
self-defense... will assist the Party or Parties so attacked.”870  This principle named collective 
defense binds members together, committing them to protect each other.  Article 5 was invoked 
for the first time in its history after the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States. The North 
Atlantic Council Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit in Wales in 2014 affirmed “that cyber 
defense is part of the NATO’s core task of collective defense.”871  Rule 74 of the Tallinn Manual 
2.0 reiterates that “collective defense against a cyber operation amounting to an armed attack 
may only be exercised at the request of the victim state and within the scope of the request.”872 
That State may, for instance, limit assistance to non-kinetic measures, consistent with NATO’s 
emphasis on defense.   
 
At the 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw, the Heads of State and Government reaffirmed 
“NATO’s defensive mandate,” and recognized “cyberspace as a domain of operations in which 
NATO must defend itself as effectively as it does in the air, on land, and at sea.”873  This 
declaration is intended to maintain freedom of action and support broader deterrence and 
defense, through integration of cyber defense into operations and missions.  Even more so in 
following the principle of restraint, the Heads affirmed their “commitment to act in accordance 
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with international law, including the UN Charter, international humanitarian law, and human 
rights law, as applicable.”874 The strengthening of cyber defensive capabilities will include the 
latest cutting edge technologies.  Overall the Communique stays in line with NATO’s Enhanced 
Policy on Cyber Defense, but any follow-on discussions or decisions on offensive capabilities 
will be important, since the lack of a well-articulated offensive cyber capability does affect 
NATO’s ability to deter or defend against cyber attacks, although national capabilities are at 
different levels of maturity.875   To that extent, the Polish think tank Kosciuszko Institute is 
already calling for NATO development of offensive cyber capabilities.876  
 
In Armed Conflict 
 
The body of international law entitled jus in bello regulates how hostilities may be 
conducted in cases of declared war or any armed conflict and protects those affected by them. 
Practically the term armed conflict has replaced the notion of war as an international legal 
concept.  Rule 80 of the Tallinn Manual 2.0 states that “cyber operations executed in the context 
of an armed conflict are subject to the law of armed conflict.”877  This rule applies in both 
international (between two or more states countries) and non-international (between a state and 
an organized armed group) situations of armed conflict.  For the first situation, the law of armed 
conflict did govern cyber operations that occurred during the armed conflict between Russia and 
Georgia in 2008 because they were undertaken in furtherance of that conflict.878 For the latter 
situation, the International Committee of the Red Cross has characterized the protracted 
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hostilities in eastern Ukraine as a non-international armed conflict between the government of 
Ukraine and separatists from the cities of Donetsk and Luhansk.  Although there is widespread 
belief that Moscow supports the separatists, Russia would have to actively participate or exercise 
overall control for the situation to be considered an international armed conflict.879  By contrast, 
even though Estonia in 2007 was the target of persistent cyber operations targeting civilian 
infrastructure, the law of armed conflict did not apply because the situation did not rise to the 
level of armed conflict.880  
 
Regardless of the situation, it is the policy of the U.S. Department of Defense that 
members will comply with the law of war during all armed conflicts, however such conflicts are 
characterized, and in all other military operations.881  Under jus in bello the law of war is also 
known as the law of armed conflict and international humanitarian law.  According to the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, the means and methods of warfare which resort to 
cyber technology are subject to international humanitarian law.882  Therefore the customary and 
fundamental principles of the law of war, specifically military necessity, distinction, 
proportionality, and humanity apply to the conduct of cyber operations.883  The aforementioned 
law of war principles “work as interdependent and reinforcing parts of a coherent system.”884  
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Military necessity “justifies the use of all measures needed to defeat the enemy as quickly and 
efficiently as possible.”885 Distinction requires Parties to the conflict at all times to distinguish 
between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military 
objectives, and accordingly direct operations only against military objectives. Humanity, the 
prohibition of the causing of unnecessary suffering, forbids actions unnecessary to accomplish a 
legitimate military objective.  Proportionality requires that justified actions not be unreasonable 
or excessive.  This principle obliges persons to refrain from attacking where the expected harm 
incidental to attacks outweighs the military advantage anticipated to be gained.886   
 
Cyber Capability Employment 
 
Any examination of targeting for the employment of cyber capabilities starts with the 
principle of distinction which restricts operations against civilians and civilian objects that do not 
qualify as military objectives.  Usually military attacks will only be directed at military targets.  
By their “nature, location, purpose, or use,” military targets are those objects “whose total or 
partial destruction, capture, or neutralization” offers a direct and concrete military advantage.887   
For example, a command and control facility and cyber infrastructure for military tasks would 
qualify.  Aside from military equipment, objects can qualify by the use criterion, like air traffic 
control or global positioning systems that serve both civilian and military systems, irrespective of 
the extent of civilian reliance on them.888  Persons directly participating in hostilities qualify, 
such as those conducting a denial of service operation or building a botnet for enemy use. 
Otherwise it is only legal to conduct cyber operations against civilians and civilian objects so 
long as they are not harmed or injured.  In this case, relevant factors that suggest a cyber 
operation is allowed are whether it causes only reversible or temporary effects, such as defacing 
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a government webpage, a minor disruption of internet services, brief interference with 
communications, and dissemination of propaganda.889  
 
The principle of distinction also prohibits use of indiscriminate means.  Cyber weapons 
are indiscriminate if incapable of distinguishing between combatants and civilians or civilian 
objects and military objectives.  A destructive computer virus that spreads and destroys 
“uncontrollably within civilian internet systems would be prohibited as an inherently 
indiscriminate weapon.”890 Consider for example malware introduced into a military system that 
spreads randomly into civilian networks, or malware placed on a website open to civilians and 
combatants, or innocuous email attachments sent to combatant’s private account that could be 
forwarded to civilians.891  Even for legal weapons, the risk of cascading and collateral effects is a 
pervasive feature of weaponry.  Due to policy concerns, rules of engagement may limit cyber 
operations to those “that result in no or low levels of collateral effects.”892  Even if a proposed 
cyber operation is permissible after a collateral effects analysis, it must “also be permissible 
under a law of war proportionality analysis.”893 The principle of proportionality prohibits a cyber 
operation which may be expected to “cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, 
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof,” that would be excessive in relation to the 
anticipated concrete and direct military advantage.894  An example would be a cyber attack on the 
dual-use global positioning system, which although a lawful target, would most likely cause 
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harm, for instance, to merchant vessels and civil aircraft, potentially excessive to military 
advantage.895  
 
To avoid law of war prohibitions expect advanced cyber weapons used by states in armed 
conflict to exploit particular vulnerabilities in specific, closed systems.  Take for instance the 
Stuxnet operation found in June 2010 to be infecting the Bushehr and Natanz nuclear facilities in 
Iran.896  In light of the damage caused to nearly 1000 Iranian centrifuges,897 some of the 
International Group of Experts that wrote the Tallinn Manual held the view that the Stuxnet 
operations reached the armed attack threshold.898  Stuxnet “has been called a cyber weapon,” 
according to the senior vice president of Integrity Global Security, because “the intent was to 
cause physical damage and maybe to kill people.”899  The malware was most likely delivered 
into the closed nuclear systems by an infected USB drive.900  It exploited a total of four 
unpatched Microsoft vulnerabilities, of which two had yet to be disclosed or zero days.901 
Stuxnet was written to target specific frequency converter drives used to control the speed of a 
device. The malware does not sabotage any frequency converter, just drives made by the 
particular company Siemens, that run at high speeds, between 807Hz and 1210Hz like those used 
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for uranium enrichment.902 Accordingly, the malicious code adhered to the principles of 
distinction and proportionality because it targeted converters operating at unique speeds.  
Although the facilities may have been used for civilian purposes, they were reasonably assumed 
to have a military role and not merely a remote possibility, and therefore were legitimate 
targets.903 The Stuxnet malware did demonstrate the risk of unintentional or unanticipated 
migration into civilian systems by escaping the Iranian nuclear enrichment plants.  The malware 
was found on 100,000 infected hosts in more than 25 countries where it can be re-engineered.904  
 
Kinetic Capability Choices 
  
As evidenced through alleged involvement in the Stuxnet operation, United States policy 
is to conduct offensive cyber operations in a manner consistent with the policy principles and 
legal regimes for kinetic capabilities, including the law of armed conflict.905  In some cases, the 
use of kinetic options in other domains strengthens legitimacy and credibility to respond to 
malicious cyber activity.  For example when overmatched online by the Islamic State 
propaganda machine, the United States turned to lethal force against this terrorist group in an 
attempt to stop an avalanche of videos and statements.  U.S. airstrikes in military operations 
against the Islamic State have terminated several high level media division operatives, including 
Junaid Hussain, a British born computer expert.906  Hussain was killed by a drone strike while he 
was in a car in Raqqa, Syria.  Hussain was viewed by U.S. officials as a top terrorist threat 
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because he would post names, addresses and photos of U.S. troops on his Twitter feed and 
suggest followers find and kill the person.  He also developed a Remote Access Trojan to hack 
into computers and was training other Islamic State members in how to use hacker techniques.907  
In the case of Hussain, his affiliation with the terrorist group Islamic State made him a member 
of an organized armed group, which made him a legitimate target in an armed conflict.908  
 
Other Response Options  
 
 Lisa Monaco, the former Assistant to the U.S. President for Homeland Security and 
Counterterrorism, contended that “meeting cyber threats requires a whole-of-government 
approach that uses all the appropriate tools available.”909  The approach relies on unity of effort 
within the Federal Government and close coordination between public and private sectors to 
achieve optimal results based on shared interests.910  Appropriate tools include global diplomacy, 
law enforcement expertise, economic clout, and when necessary military capability.  Monaco 
stressed that those who would harm the United States should know that they can be found and 
will be held to account.  A RAND Corporation study agrees with the intrinsic value of the first 
tool of global diplomacy in reaching the conclusion that the best means for deterring, for 
instance, Chinese behavior is by diplomatic action.911  However holding a pragmatic nation state 
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actor like China to account for activity it conducts or allows inside its borders requires not just 
global diplomacy, but also coercive diplomacy, which combines techniques of deterrence and 
compellence to elicit desired actions.912  The law enforcement component of deterrence by 
retaliation attempts to prevent undesirable actions by instilling a fear of punishment into a 
targeted actor.  Yet for actors outside state borders, the deterrent threat only works if there is 
interstate cooperation. For an uncooperative state, the element of compellence offers positive 
reinforcement for taking actions it otherwise would not take.  To compel responsible state 
behavior, economic sanctions initiate harmful actions that can cease, but only if the 
uncooperative state responds favorably by ceasing its malicious activity or by cooperating in the 
punishment of malicious actors inside its territory.    
 
Law Enforcement 
 
State cooperation between law enforcement agencies is essential to hold malicious actors 
accountable for their crimes in cyberspace. The Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, the first 
such international treaty, outlines the widest possible means of cooperation to investigate crimes 
involving “computer systems and data, or for the collection of evidence in electronic form of a 
criminal offence.”913 Over 35 nations, largely in Europe, in addition to Canada, Japan, South 
Africa, and the United States have acceded to the treaty, and many others are in various stages of 
ratifying it.  The Convention provides arrangements “to stem cross border crimes while 
recognizing divergent interpretations of national sovereignty.”914  At the 10th anniversary 
meeting of the Council of Europe on adoption of the Convention, the Secretary General declared 
that “the treaty still represents the only accepted international text on how to protect against and 
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control online crime while at the same time respecting human rights.”915  Since then the 
European Union and the Council of Europe initiated a three year joint project entitled Global 
Action on Cybercrime (GLACY) aimed at supporting countries worldwide in the implementation 
of the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime. GLACY held international conferences, courses, 
and workshops “to enable criminal justice authorities to engage in international cooperation on 
cybercrime and electronic evidence on the basis of the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime.”  
Results of the events were expected to garner progress in the areas of harmonization of 
legislation, judicial training, law enforcement capacities, international cooperation, and 
information sharing.916 
 
Cooperation between State law enforcement agencies has resulted in arrest or extradition 
of criminals, terrorists and hackers operating in cyberspace. For example, in New York in July 
2015, three Estonian men were sentenced to over three years in prison for their involvement in 
an Internet scheme that infected more than 4 million computers in over 100 countries.  The U.S. 
District Judge said he wanted it to be known that those who breach the security of computers on 
a large scale will “face very substantial risks.”  The men were arrested in Estonia and served time 
in Estonia prisons before extraditions to the United States.917  In another case in October 2015, 
Malaysian police detained Ardit Ferizi, a citizen of Kosovo, on a U.S. provisional arrest warrant. 
The U.S. Justice Department accused him of stealing the personal data of U.S. service members 
and passing it to Islamic State member Junaid Hussain. Ferizi had hacked into a server used by a 
U.S. online retail company and obtained data on about 100,000 people, from which he sent 
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details of 1,351 military and government personnel to the Islamic State.918   Ferizi was extradited 
to the United States and charged with computer hacking, identify theft, and providing material 
support to a terrorist organization.919 In June 2015, Ferizi pleaded guilty.920  In March 2016, the 
U.S Justice Department charged three members of the Syrian Electronic Army that support 
President Assad with computer hacking conspiracies targeting government agencies and media 
companies. Though Dmitri Alperovitch, cofounder of CrowdStrike astutely observed “This is yet 
another law enforcement win that [shows] no one is above the law, but these are not major 
criminals that were posing a threat to the United States.” 921 
 
Economic Sanctions 
 
 A successful example of sanctions changing the behavior of an uncooperative nation state 
was those imposed by the UN Security Council on Iran during 2010-2013 for lack of compliance 
with resolutions to ensure the peaceful nature of its nuclear program.  The sanctions contributed 
to the acceptance by Iran in July 2015 of a comprehensive accord that exchanges constraints on 
its nuclear program for broad sanctions relief.  The UN sanctions had caused Iran’s crude oil 
exports to fall by over a million barrels per day and its economy to shrink by about 10%.922  In 
January 2016, the International Atomic Energy Agency verified that Iran had met its 
commitments as set out in Annex V of the accord, and the United States initiated steps to meet its 
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obligations to lift sanctions.923  Not all nations agreed with the accord, in particular Israeli Prime 
Minister Netanyahu told the U.S. Congress before acceptance that the deal would not block 
Iran’s way to a bomb “but paves its way to a bomb.”924  Israel vowed to act alone if necessary to 
prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, and could decide the deal is so bad that force is 
necessary.  After all, the Israeli Air Force has already taken out nuclear reactors in Iraq and Syria, 
the latter with a cyber attack on air defenses.925  Pro-Israel Lobbies also expressed concern that 
once the deal is done, and Iran becomes a nuclear threshold state, there would be no peaceful 
way to stop Iran from building a nuclear weapon, except to resort to force.926  When asked 
whether the United States failed to use all of its leverage, including a credible threat of force, 
President Obama said “I think that criticism is misguided... we have cut off every pathway for 
Iran to develop a nuclear weapon” and “if we can in fact resolve some of these differences, 
without resort to force, that will be a lot better for us and the people of that region.”927  
 
 The accord reached in Vienna to limit the Iranian nuclear program is the most detailed 
non-proliferation agreement ever devised, but only in years will the world know if it was a 
reasonable bet.928  The White House obviously recognizes the value of combining diplomacy 
with sanctions, and the prospect of both for changing malicious cyber behavior.  In April 2015, 
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President Obama signed an Executive Order to try to deal with the threat of malicious cyber-
enabled activities originating from or directed by persons located outside the United States.  The 
Order blocks all property and interests of persons found to be “harming or otherwise 
significantly compromising the provision of services by, a computer or network of computers 
that support one or more entities in a critical infrastructure sector;” “causing a significant 
disruption to the availability of a computer or network of computers,” including through a 
distributed denial of service attack; and “causing a significant misappropriation of funds or 
economic resources, trade secrets, personal identifiers, or financial information for commercial 
or competitive advantage or private financial gain.”929  It authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury 
to impose sanctions on those individuals and entities that are responsible for cyber-enabled 
activities that threaten “the national security, foreign policy, economic health, or financial 
stability of the United States.”930  By sanctioning these actors, their access to American financial 
systems, companies and territory is restricted, which basically harms their ability to commit 
malicious acts and to profit from them.931  Michael Daniel, special assistant to President Obama, 
said the order will “enable us to have a new way of both deterring and imposing costs on 
malicious cyber actors, wherever they may be and across a range of threats.”932  Although in the 
“absence of satisfying policy options, we risk deploying sanctions that... disadvantage U.S. 
companies... and expose our economy to retribution.”933  
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Necessary Means Utility 
 
 U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter has stated “Adversaries should know that our 
preference for deterrence and our defensive posture don’t diminish our willingness to use cyber 
options if necessary.”934  His communication of a willingness to take cyber enabled action in a 
deterrent posture is apparently backed by capability to do so, although the credibility to evoke 
military retaliation is suspect given few publicly known examples to date.  Doing nothing signals 
to other nation states, other groups, and other actors that malicious behavior is okay and will not 
generate a response.  Congressman Mac Thornberry, chairman of the House Armed Services 
Committee, adamantly stated “We have to figure out how to retaliate against an attack.”935   The 
problem starts with identifying the attacker and ends with the uncertain consequences of 
deploying a cyber weapon if necessary.  Attributing malicious activity in cyberspace to an actor 
with sufficient confidence and verifiability to hold them accountable is difficult.  If attribution is 
certain enough to respond, the effects from escalation in counter attacks could reverberate across 
the Internet.  A stockpile of cyber weapons is simply not good enough to deter malicious actors if 
the threat to use them is not credible enough to act when necessary. 
 
 The challenge is when to decisively act, especially if the circumstances of a cyber attack 
fall close to the threshold for military response.  When does a cyber attack upon critical 
infrastructure, such as civilian financial systems, public utility sectors like power grids, or critical 
defense industries, justify a military counter strike?  The Tallinn Manual says it depends on the 
scale and effects of the attack, yet the precise point at which the extent of death, injury, damage, 
destruction, or suffering qualifies as an armed attack is unclear.  In the United States, the basic 
framework for the military to intervene in protecting non-military networks and take retaliatory 
action would be in the event of significant consequence typically reflecting loss of life. As to 
whether there is a clear threshold that would trigger military intervention, the Deputy 
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Commander of U.S. Cyber Command, Lieutenant General James McLaughlin has said “to be 
honest, it will never be black and white.”936  There is a structure in the government for a request 
to come forward for Cyber Command to take action.  However given the range of domestic and 
international actors from the civilian, commercial, and governmental sectors involved in 
cyberspace, any cyber operation will have to consider complicated issues such as fratricide 
avoidance, role of noncombatants, proportional use of force, and rules of engagement.937  
 
Even still an argument exists that the need for an appropriate response in real time to a 
cyber attack on critical infrastructure requires explicit policies to be in place.938  Therefore 
Senator Mike Rounds has introduced legislation that would “require the executive branch to 
define which of these actions constitute a cyber act of war, which would allow our military to be 
better able to respond to cyber-attacks.”939 Although with the threshold defined to reach a 
decision for the military to return fire, can collateral damage be avoided if the intrusions were 
launched through thousands of hijacked computers in third-country or target nation sites?  The 
containment of effects to the intended target set within a highly networked, potentially globally 
interconnected system is more difficult than against closed systems that may be only accessed 
locally.  If effects cannot be meaningfully limited, controlled, or known, any cyber attack in 
retaliation, no matter how discretely intended, could have massive unintended consequences and 
pose significant political risk.940   The inability to predict collateral damage and uncertainty over 
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political effect requires caution.941   Especially since unintentional results could lead to 
escalation, which is an unplanned rise in the scope or intensity of a conflict, or cascade effects.  
Escalation is an interactive concept in which action by one party triggers a response.  Inadvertent 
escalation occurs when one party takes actions that it does not believe are escalatory, but cross a 
threshold of the other party.  Accidental escalation occurs when an operational action has direct 
effects that are unintended.  Of concern is a chain reaction, in which actions feed off each other 
to raise the conflict to a level not initially contemplated by any party. 942    
 
Once a conflict evolves, termination of cyber activity is not trivial.  With detection and 
attribution so difficult, will it be clear when one side has stopped attacking another?  One should 
consider three termination paths: negotiation, tacit deescalation, and petering out.943  A cease fire 
agreement in cyberspace presumes assurance that all parties are in control and will understand, 
monitor and adhere to the terms of the agreement.  These conditions are strained by conceptual 
differences in terminology and technical limitations in verification.  Each side could cheat by 
shifting from visible disruption to more subtle corruption attacks.  Or they could use third 
parties, like hacker crews or patriotic hackers, outside the agreement to reap unilateral 
advantages from attacks.  In mutual deescalation, formal adjudication of the original issues is not 
necessary, just both sides need to believe that neither would make much headway through further 
cyber attacks.  Unfortunately, in tacit deescalation the same validation problems exist, except are 
worst since there would only be a rough consensus on what was and was not considered a 
violation.  In the third path, hope exists that attacks peter out, if each side concludes that attacks 
are growing difficult to conduct and pointless for the retaliation effort, but hope is never a 
strategy to follow.   
                                                          
941 James Lewis, “Low-level cyberattacks are common but truly damaging ones are rare,” The 
Washington Post, October 9, 2013.  
942 Herbert Lin, “Escalation Dynamics and Conflict Termination in Cyberspace,” Strategic 
Studies Quarterly, Vol. 6, Issue 3 (Fall 2012): 52-63. 
943 Martin C. Libicki, Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar, (Santa Monica, California: RAND 
Corporation, 2009): 135-137. 
226 
 
The use of means for retaliation other than cyber operations alleviates many intrinsic 
concerns.  A prime example of the utility of a law enforcement attempt to impose cost is the 
indictment of three men that allegedly hacked JP Morgan in 2014.  The indictment reveals a 
broad network of criminal activity with computer hacking at its center.944  JP Morgan is actually 
listed as Victim 1 of twelve. The range of illicit activities run by the conspirators included 
Securities Market Manipulation, Unlawful Internet Gambling, Illicit Payment Processing, and an 
Unlawful Bitcoin Exchange.  In the list of Statutory Allegations, the conspirators were charged 
with 23 criminal counts, including Computer Hacking, Wire Fraud, Securities Fraud, all under 
violations of Title 18, United States Code.945  The indictment indicates existing laws are 
sufficient to cover a gambit of malicious cyber activities.  The larger hurdle is finding the 
attribution to bring the criminals to justice in a timely manner to impose costs for their malicious 
behavior.  The time from JP Morgan reporting the hack in the media to the indictments was 
about fifteen months.  Maybe that time line is enough to communicate resolve to prosecute, but 
the charges need to hold in a conviction to produce credibility in legal action.  However even 
filing the charges does signal the threat of retaliation through employment disqualifications and 
travel restrictions.  A high profile Russian hacker found out justice is patient, for after being 
tracked for a decade by the U.S. Secret Service, he was apprehended on vacation in the 
Maldives, extradited and convicted in a federal court in 2016.946 
As for the use of economic sanctions, the Executive Order imposing such on North Korea 
for the Sony attack was the first time the United States cited cyberattacks in sanctioning another 
nation state.947 Yet the sanctions could be of dubious value since they have not worked in 
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changing the isolated regime’s behavior.  Following a nuclear test by Pyongyang in 2013, the 
U.N. Security Council adopted sanctions to tightened financial restrictions on North Korea.  
Despite any pain imposed by these sanctions, North Korea successfully detonated a hydrogen 
bomb in January 2016, although probably still fission on a boasted design.948   Concern resides in 
the international community that North Korea will succeed in the mating a nuclear weapon to an 
accurate missile.949  The Chinese resisted broad new sanctions against Pyongyang following the 
nuclear test,950 but did finally agreed after North Korea launched a long-range rocket in February 
2016.951  Still undeterred by sanctions, Pyongyang kept on launching missiles shortly after, 
starting with a submarine-launched ballistic missile in April 2016952 and two Musudan 
intermediate-range road-mobile missiles in June 2016.953  After the Security Council threatened 
“further significant measures,”954  North Korea promptly responded with its fifth underground 
nuclear test that produced a more powerful explosive yield. 955  Despite calls for new punitive 
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action, years of sanctions show the approach is ineffective.956  For instance a loophole in the 
sanctions allows North Korea to sell coal if the proceeds are used for humanitarian purposes957 
and shipments on coal to China have far exceeded the U.N. Security Council ceiling that China 
helped pass.958 
 
The Chinese Foreign Minister had adamantly stated “sanctions are not an end in 
themselves,” in promoting the need to bring the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula back to 
the track of negotiation.959  In this regard sanctions provide pressure for negotiations, such as in 
the historic Iran nuclear deal, but the pressure of sanctions cannot be relieved or forgone if other 
violations of international order occur.  For example, Iran could have violated a United Nations 
Security Council resolution with its ballistic missile test in October 2015 during fulfillment of 
the nuclear accord.960  Iran tested a long-range missile called the Emad which according to their 
Defense Minister was capable of precise control.961  In response, regardless of the perceived 
good will garnered in the nuclear agreement, the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned nearly a 
dozen Iranian-linked entities for their alleged role in Iran’s ballistic missile program.962  
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Likewise the sanctions relief from the nuclear deal has not relieved tensions in the maritime 
domain, where boats from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps have increasingly harassed 
U.S. military vessels transiting the Straits of Hormuz through dangerous close-in maneuvers.963  
Finally in the cyber domain, Iran is only looking to enhance cyber capabilities for use as a 
tolerated form of behavior,964 just like high speed boat approaches to foreign military ships.  
An Insufficient Deterrence Option 
 The U.S. military is working to become more transparent about offensive planning in 
cyberspace, hoping that communication of such information will deter cyber attacks.  For 
example, public media releases indicate contractors have been asked to compete for a nearly 
half-billion dollar military contract to develop and deploy if necessary lethal cyber weapons.965  
The use of these weapons as an instrument of deterrence also requires transparency in direct 
attribution, so an actor knows any threat of retaliation is credible.966  The executive director of 
U.S. Cyber Command has said they are looking for loud offensive cyber “tools that can be 
definitely traced back to the United States military,” to possibly deter future intrusions.967  At the 
classified level, massive cyber weapon capability could exist to hold an adversary at significant 
risk.  Powerful and authentic espionage tools created by hackers at the National Security Agency, 
to include several exploits and a number of implants, have been mysteriously leaked online.  The 
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software would be used to take over firewalls that are used “in the largest and most critical 
commercial, educational and government agencies around the world.”968  Therefore malicious 
actors should not take the lack of a cyber response as a lack of capability or an unwillingness to 
use it if deemed necessary.   
 
 The United States has used cyber operations against the terrorist group Islamic State, 
breaking into computers of fighters to implant malware that mines for intelligence and blocking 
their use of encrypted communications.969 Yet, despite an ongoing process to build and 
demonstrate a cyber deterrent, according to Admiral Rogers, foreign countries and criminal 
hackers still believe there is “little price to pay” for breaching the U.S. government or U.S. 
companies.970  Therefore without risk of punishment, cyber attacks continue unabated against 
federal agencies971 and civilian companies.972  Malicious actors appear to have developed a 
greater tolerance for risk and plan their attacks to avoid triggering credible military deterrent 
responses, staying below the implicit thresholds of “use of force” or “armed attack.”  
Nevertheless the experience of sanctions and indictments do show there are viable alternatives to 
the threat and use of military force, especially for cyber espionage and crime.973 
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 Despite the dropping of “cyber bombs” on the Islamic State, according to former Deputy 
Secretary Work,974 loose groups of supportive hackers have joined forces to create a mega 
hacking unit named the United Cyber Caliphate to run defacement and doxing campaigns.975  To 
dox is to “search for and publish private or identifying information about (a particular individual) 
on the internet, typically with malicious intent.”976  Contrary to this development, it turns out that 
legal action to indict five PLA officers in May 2014 did have an effect in China.  In the months 
that followed the indictment, the Chinese military quietly begin to dismantle their economic 
espionage campaign apparatus.  It initially appeared legal measures by the United States had 
altered the behavior of portions of the Chinese government, but in reality, the mission was just 
shifted to the Ministry of State Security.  This Ministry is better suited anyway for economic 
espionage, with elite contract hackers that can better hide telltale digital trails, and with direct 
channels to state-owned enterprises.977  Already active and productive, the Ministry is most 
likely behind the intrusions into Anthem Health Service in 2014978 and the U.S. Office of 
Personnel Management in 2015.979  If law enforcement is not sufficient, that leaves economic 
sanctions, which require a threshold of attribution lower than beyond reasonable doubt for legal 
action.  Yet not just the threat of them is enough but actual imposition in a demonstration of 
credibility, to create a real effect on nation state sponsored cyber activity.  The United States did 
not hesitate to impose sanctions on North Korea for the Sony attack.  However the Executive 
                                                          
974 Amber Corrin, “U.S. goes to cyber war with ISIS,” C4ISR &Networks, April 14, 2016. 
975 Catalin Cimpanu, “ISIS Hackers Join Forces to Create Mega Hacking Unit,” Softpedia, April 
25, 2016.  
976 Oxford Living Dictionaries: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/dox; accessed on 
July 1, 2017.  
977 Ellen Nakashima, “Following U.S. Indictments, China shifts commercial hacking away from 
military to civilian agency,” The Washington Post, November 30, 2015. 
978 Michael A. Riley and Jordan Robertson, “Chinese State-Sponsored Hackers Suspected in 
Anthem Attack,” Bloomberg News, February 5, 2015.  
979 Kirstin Finklea, “Cyber Intrusion into U.S. Office of Personnel Management: In Brief,” 
Congressional Research Service, CRS Report R44111, July 17, 2015. 
232 
 
Order, while expansive in legal breath, was weak in implementation, targeting three 
organizations already on the U.S. sanctions list and ten individuals not directly involved in cyber 
warfare.980   
 
Overall today malicious actors are left guessing if costs can or will be imposed upon 
them for malicious cyber activities.  The possession of capabilities and communication of 
consequences is not quite consistent.  President-elect Donald Trump told a veterans group in 
October 2016, “As a deterrent against attacks on our critical resources, the United States must 
possess – and has to – the unquestioned capacity to launch crippling cyber counterattacks.” 
Furthermore “America’s dominance in the arena must be unquestioned.  Today, it’s totally 
questioned. People don’t even know if we have the capability that we are supposed to have.”981  
Although for retaliation by military means, maybe it is alright to keep adversaries like nation 
states and terrorist groups guessing on capability.  For under the “idea of a threat that leaves 
something to chance,”982 they will be kept guessing on what the punishment will be, not whether 
there will be punishment. In talking about advanced technologies, Deputy Secretary Work stated 
“We will reveal to deter and conceal for war-fighting advantage.  I want our competitors to 
wonder what’s behind the black curtain.”983   
 
Well-respected reporter David Sanger countered Secretary Work in saying “we are facing 
a shroud of secrecy, which is undermining the deterrent effect.”984 America could have a secret 
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arsenal of the most powerful cyber weapons on Earth.  Their development would be for use as a 
component of any future military campaign. How and when these capabilities will be used 
outside armed conflict is uncertain.  Congressman Jim Himes, ranking member of the House 
Intelligence subcommittee on Cybersecurity, asked “What is the legitimate retaliation for an act 
of war?” and sums up the current predicament well in stating “In place of norms and definitions 
you’ve just got a series of endless question marks. That’s a dangerous world because uncertainty 
in this world equals risk.”985  So it appears today, for at least the United States, in accordance 
with the principle of necessity, all peaceful alternatives must be exhausted before a resort to 
force.986  This staunch policy most likely means attackers will continue to believe there is “little 
price to pay” for their malicious activity, and the strategy of deterrence by retaliation will remain 
an insufficient strategic cyber deterrence option.  In sum, the shortcomings of deterrence by 
retaliation if used in cybered conflict have unconvincing means, limited real effects, and 
questionable resolve. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
Deterrence by Denial 
 
The strategy of deterrence by denial of benefit from undesired activity seeks to convince 
any malicious actor that their undesired behavior will fail to achieve their desired outcome or 
simpler still, seeks to deny their success. The U.S. Defense Department Chief Information 
Officer tacitly endorsed this strategy in stating “one of the best ways to reduce the cyber threat is 
to make it harder and more costly for adversaries to initiate attacks.”987  He opines that 
innovative security measures along with strategic security planning and training could make 
launching attacks on Departmental resources time-consuming and futile.  Since deterrence is 
partially a function of perception, the strategic option of denial works in the mind of the 
adversary by decreasing the likelihood that an intended attack will succeed.  Deterrence by 
denial focuses on increasing capabilities to defend networks and systems from cyber attack by 
any actor, no matter whether that actor is a nation state, hacker group, criminal organization, or 
terrorist group.  In their 2015 Cyber Strategy, the U.S. Defense Department recognizes the 
importance of working with other departments, agencies, international allies and partners, and 
also the private sector to strengthen deterrence by denial through improved cyber security.988  In 
doing so, the development and implementation of effective protective measures deny any 
potential attacker the benefit of succeeding.  
 
However in the current threat landscape, cyber attacks seriously challenge the strategic 
option of deterrence by denial.   The incidents seen today range from basic criminal schemes to 
massive denial of service attacks to sophisticated (and sometimes destructive) intrusions into 
critical infrastructure networks and systems.  Most of the headlines focus on data breeches in 
government and across the spectrum of industries, and rightfully so, as the number of identities 
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that have been exposed through these breaches over the past three years alone surpasses one 
billion.989  The economic impact can be immediate with the theft of money or long term with the 
loss of intellectual property.  The success of malicious actors in cyberspace is partly due to the 
weakest link in defense, the behavior of users combined with the effectiveness of social 
engineering methods, such as reconnaissance based spear phishing which can lead to exploit 
execution or compromised passwords. The latter can be leveraged in second generation activity, 
such as in recent government breaches in the United States where illegally obtained valid 
credentials were acquired by social engineering methods.990  Once the actor gets inside the 
organization, only 31 percent of victims discover the breach by internal means and for the rest 
alerts can come months later after stolen property is found in the wild.991  Although encouraging 
news comes from a 2015 report by the Online Trust Alliance that contends 90 percent of recent 
breaches could have been prevented if organizations had implemented the most basic cyber 
security best practices.992   
 
Protective measures to reduce risk and enhance security include the promulgation of 
security strategies, the implementation of security controls, and the sharing of cyber threat 
information.  The strategy of deterrence by denial seeks to change the cost-benefit calculations of 
a malicious actor by credibly signaling, or proving, that an attack will fail.993  Security strategies 
articulate proven models for the identification and deployment of defensive capabilities, such as 
security controls or best practices. The use of cyber security frameworks result in the selection of 
risk-informed investments in these security controls and associated security solution products, 
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which are ideally enhanced by shared cyber threat information.  Preferably these security 
controls and solutions are deployed to block, detect, and interrupt the actor at the various phases 
of the cyber kill chain.  Through risk management, the strategic selection and positioning of 
credible capabilities along the attack process offers the fluid form of deterrence aptly named 
denial of benefit.  This chapter starts with an illustrative case that depicts the unfortunate failure 
of deterrence by denial of benefit, or of success.  It then examines an assortment of promising 
protective measures and by what degree through risk management they improve the security of 
networks and systems to deny malicious actors the benefit of attack. 
 
Illustrative Case of Security Vulnerabilities  
 
In June 2015, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) revealed that based on 
incident detection and forensic investigation that a cyber intrusion affecting information 
technology systems and data may have compromised the personnel information of approximately 
4 million former and current federal employees.994  A month later, OPM reported a separate 
incident targeting databases housing background investigation records of 21.5 million 
individuals.995  According to US-CERT, the first hack of OPM systems occurred in July 2012.  
The attacker stole manuals and IT architecture information.  That breach was halted by OPM 
after almost two years and reported to Congress.996  Then in May 2014, a second, most likely 
related, attacker established a foothold in the OPM network and moved to the security clearance 
database, which exposed Standard Form 86 data entries where applicants list contacts and 
relatives, mental illness, drug and alcohol abuse, past arrests, bankruptcies and more.  That 
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security data revealed the identities of almost everyone who has gotten a United States security 
clearance.997  The second attacker then moved laterally to breach systems maintained at a 
Department of Interior shared data center in October 2014, which resulted in the loss of files for 
every federal employee, every federal retiree, and up to one million former federal employees.  
The hackers stole military records and veterans’ status information, address, birth date, pay 
history, insurance and pension information, and age, gender and race data.998  Then in March 
2015, the second attacker stole the fingerprint data of 5.6 million federal employees. Collectively 
the personnel records provide a foreign government with the ability to blackmail or impersonate 
federal employees to gain access to classified information or computer networks.  
 
Finally in April 2015, OPM reported to US-CERT an unknown Secure Sockets Layer 
(SSL) certificate beaconing to an unknown site and deployed first Cylance V and later Cylance 
Protect security solutions which identified malware used by the second attacker. A week later, a 
product demo by CyTech Services of a network forensics software package also found malware 
embedded on the network.999 Further forensics indicated the second attacker stole access 
credentials from the contractor KeyPoint and used those credentials to break into OPM 
systems.1000 This finding makes sense for according to an inspector general report outsiders 
entering the OPM system were not subjected to multifactor authentication, where for example a 
code would be sent to a cellphone to be entered before giving a user access to a system. A host of 
deficiencies left OPM open to attack, for instance it did not have an inventory of all computer 
servers and devices with access to its network nor did it regularly scan for vulnerabilities in the 
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system.1001 Consequently in the first attack, it is possible that OPM was breached through an 
unpatched vulnerability. Overall OPM suffered from an antiquated cybersecurity infrastructure, 
abysmal security practices, and ill-equipped personnel. If OPM had implemented proper IT 
governance practices, used encryption and assigned least privilege user access, the organization 
could have pushed the attacker closer to a threshold where the cost of resources outweighed the 
benefit of the data.1002  
 
The Director of National Intelligence said Chinese hackers are the leading suspect in the 
OPM intrusion. To which a spokesman for the Chinese Embassy in Washington responded “we 
hope relevant parties of the U.S. side can stop making unfounded and hypothetical accusations, 
and work constructively with China to address cybersecurity issues.”1003 Even though forensic 
evidence leaves little doubt that China was responsible, the Obama administration chose not to 
make any official assertion about attribution due to concern over exposing details of the United 
States “own espionage and cyber capabilities” and ongoing diplomatic engagements.1004 Even 
more so, the response to penetrations targeting government held data have been restrained, in 
part because such breaches are regarded as within traditional parameters of espionage.  Seen as 
fair game, the former head of the Central Intelligence Agency said “This is espionage” and “I 
don’t blame the Chinese for this at all. If I [as head of the National Security Agency] could have 
done it, I would have done it in a heartbeat.”1005  Instead, President Obama vowed to bolster 
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cyber defenses to deny benefit of attack, saying the United States has old computer systems with 
“significant vulnerabilities” and needs to be “much more aggressive” in stepping up defenses.1006  
 
 Cyber warfare author Jeffrey Carr agreed that the way to fix the administration’s 
cybersecurity problem is not to retaliate against a foreign government since digital espionage is 
the new normal. Carr believes that “deterrence is possible” but “doesn’t come from force or 
trying to instill fear,” instead from “enabling security protocols that make sensitive or valuable 
data so hard to steal that the effort isn’t worth the effort.”1007  That means a complete overhaul of 
how the government employs protective measures, ferreting out weaknesses in security and 
correcting them, or building new security by-design at greater costs.  No one should have been 
surprised by the OPM hacks.  The inspector general audit in 2014 had found serious flaws in the 
network and the way it was managed. OPM is a monolithic agency run by politically appointed 
leaders who lack the expertise to make informed decisions on protective measures. Leadership 
needs to understand and appreciate cyber risk so they can authorize their IT security department 
to develop and deploy defenses against cyber threats.1008  At OPM, the director eventually 
resigned after political pressure from Congress during the fall out investigation.1009  In retrospect, 
the national security consequences of a successful hack at OPM should not have been a surprise. 
The signs were all there for it to happen, as it had the vulnerabilities, no security focused 
leadership, and a capable and motivated malicious actor that was not convinced their attacks 
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would fail.1010  After a House Committee investigation, Representative Jason Chaffetz noted 
“with some basic hygiene, some good tools, an awareness and some talent, they [OPM] really 
could have prevented this.”1011 
 
Security Strategies  
  
The lessons of the OPM hack can be applied in a range of protective measures that 
attempt to reduce cyber risk.  These start with the development of cyber security strategies for 
the placement of defensive capabilities.  Traditionally organizations focus their defenses at the 
perimeter of the network in the belief that this strategy makes it difficult for an attacker to 
penetrate systems. Typical passive defenses at the perimeter, like Anti-Virus software, which 
detect known malware signatures, and Blacklists, which blocks known malicious websites, have 
become less effective as the volume and complexity of threats increases.1012  Once the perimeter 
is breached, as often occurs, the attackers have free reign within the network. In a test by the 
security industry firm FireEye, network and email appliances were placed among 1,216 
organizations in 63 countries across more than 20 industries from October 2013 to March 2014.  
Analysis of the data generated from the trial deployments of the appliances revealed that 97 
percent of the organizations had been breached and more than 75 percent of the organizations 
had active command-and-control communications between their internal systems and outside 
servers, meaning that the attackers had control of the breached systems and were exfiltrating data 
from them.1013 To compensate for the failure of one layer of the system, like at the perimeter, 
organizations use a multi-layer security strategy aptly named defense-in-depth.  
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Defense-in-depth strategies emphasize multiple, overlapping, and mutually supportive 
defenses, such as security controls or best practices, to guard against single-point failures in any 
specific technology or protection method.  Security controls are synonymous with safeguards 
and countermeasures, which may include security features, management constraints, personnel 
security, and security of physical structures, areas, and devices.1014  A defense-in-depth strategy 
also accentuates the continual deployment of defenses to protect multiple threat points, including 
network, endpoint, web, and email security.1015 In designing a multi-layered security 
infrastructure, numerous security controls and best practices can be implemented by an 
organization. One way to consider implementing controls is by using preventive and detective 
categories at the data, application, host, network, and physical layers.  The security industry firm 
Tripwire offers here some of the main controls and where to consider for implementation:1016  
 
Preventive Security Controls 
 Encryption (Data layer) = encrypt sensitive information whether at rest or in transit. 
 User Access Control (Data, Host layers) = access rights reflect level users require. 
 Software Patching (Application layer) = update with latest software patch releases. 
 Malware Detection (Host layer) = install software to identify and prevent malware. 
 System Hardening (Application, Host, Network layers) = remove default user 
accounts and passwords, remove unnecessary services, and adjust permissions. 
 Network Access Control (Network layer) = isolate sensitive systems from main 
network into secure segments with strict access rules. 
 Security Awareness Training (Physical layer) = train users to recognize threats. 
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 Policies/Procedures (Physical layer) = publish user roles and penalties if ignored. 
 
Detective Security Controls 
 File Integrity Monitoring (Data, Application, Host Layers) = regularly monitor for 
replacements of or changes to critical system files.  
 Vulnerability Management (Application, Host, Network layers) = regular testing to 
identify vulnerabilities in software, configurations or processes.  
 Change Control (Application, Host, Network layers) = actively monitoring for 
unauthorized changes on key systems. 
 Incident Alerting (Host, Network Layers) = Identify suspicious activity and be alerted 
to it by intrusion detection/prevention systems. 
 Log Monitoring (Data, Application, Host, Network layers) = monitor log files for 
unusual entries or certain security events.  
 Security Configuration Management (Network Layer) = secure new systems or 
applications that are added to the infrastructure.  
 
It should be obvious there is no one solution in an increasingly sophisticated and complex 
threat landscape.  The security strategy of defense-in-depth offers a multi-layered security 
approach in which a combination of integrated technologies attempt to provide protection and 
detection against known, unknown and advanced malware and threats.1017  Defense-in-depth is 
widely accepted by industry and the military as a way to enhance cyber defensive capabilities 
through layered sensors and countermeasures.1018  For example the U.S. Navy has released new 
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cyber standards that specifically require a defense-in-depth approach.1019  Ideally these defenses 
are configured by leveraging industry security products informed by cyber threat intelligence.   
 
Cyber Threat Intelligence 
 
To effectively defend against cyber attacks an organization needs access to synthesized 
information about specific threats to specific targets.  The fused product called cyber threat 
intelligence consists of threat information on malicious actor tactics, techniques, and procedures 
plus suggested actions to counter an attack and also threat indicators that an attack is imminent, 
is underway or that compromise may have already occurred. Cyber threat intelligence provides 
the ability to recognize and act upon this information or indicators, of attack and compromise, in 
a timely manner.  Indicators of attack represent early warning signs, such as code execution, 
persistence, command and control, or lateral movement.  Indicators of compromise show the 
presence of malware, signatures, exploits, vulnerabilities, or IP addresses.1020  To be effective 
cyber threat intelligence exhibits the characteristics of timely: delivered rapidly to provide 
opportunity for the recipient to anticipate the threat and prepare a suitable response; relevant: 
applicable to recipient operating environment to address likely threats; and actionable: identifies 
actions the recipient can take to counter the threat.   
 
For security teams trying to implement and manage security controls to thwart cyber 
attacks, threat intelligence can make a difference in risk management. The addition of threat 
intelligence in a security program can provide information and indicators to prioritize and adjust 
security controls to stop the latest attacks.1021  For example a Fortune 100 financial services 
organization that faces 250,000 threats a day recently incorporated a threat intelligence platform 
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to aggregate threat data and integrate existing security tools.1022  In a 2016 institute survey of 
Information Technology security practitioners in the United States involved in endpoint security 
in a variety of organizations, 77 percent say they have added or plan to adopt a threat intelligence 
component.1023  However an organization needs not only access to timely, relevant, and 
actionable cyber threat intelligence but also the ability to act on that intelligence.  Security 
vendors gather information about active threats and use that information to inform their industry 
security products. Many security solution products have been optimized to integrate or 
incorporate threat intelligence data feeds.  For example the IBM X-Force research team develops 
threat intelligence and countermeasure technologies for IBM products.  
 
The IBM X-Force team monitors global threats around the clock to understand the latest 
vulnerabilities and exploit techniques. They use fully automated web crawlers to inspect millions 
of web sites every day to build a URL reputation data base.  They also leverage intelligence to 
categorize IP addresses into threat categories, including malware hosts, spam sources, dynamic 
IPs, anonymous proxies, botnet command and control servers, and scanning IPs, with reputation 
scores that assist in traffic blocking decisions. In addition, the team categorizes web applications 
by threat origination and tracks security vulnerabilities.  Other organizations can leverage the 
latest X-Force research through the IBM X-Force Exchange, launched in 2015 to share evidence 
and discoveries.1024  Or organizations can view on-demand webcasts by the threat research team 
on topics such as trends and findings in volume of attacks, affected industries, prevalent types of 
attacks, and the key factors enabling them.1025  Products within the IBM Security portfolio have 
been optimized to integrate or incorporate X-Force capabilities, such as the IBM Security 
Network Intrusion Prevention System uses X-Force feeds for URL filtering, IP source blocking, 
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application action control, and virtual patch shielding of observed vulnerabilities.1026  It is no 
surprise that in a 2015 SANS institute survey of organizations, 54 percent of them use intrusion 
monitoring platforms to accept and consolidate cyber threat intelligence feeds. 1027  The challenge 
for deterrence by denial is the percent of organizations that do not use these feeds.  
 
Cyber Kill Chain  
 
Layering controls informed by cyber threat intelligence provide reinforcing protections 
that attempt to halt attacks in progress.  Yet before an organization can hope to thwart its 
adversaries and convince them that their efforts are futile, the organization must understand the 
adversary’s attack methods.  One of the most popular models of the methods used in the cyber 
attack process is the “intrusion kill chain” first popularized in a 2011 paper by Lockheed Martin 
researchers.1028  A kill chain is a systematic process to target and engage an adversary to create a 
desired outcome.  The integrated, end-to-end process is described as a “chain” because any one 
interuption will break the entire process. The intrusion or simply cyber kill chain is identified in 
seven phases, specifically consisting of reconnaissance, weaponization, delivery, exploitation, 
installation, command and control, and actions on objectives.  The phases describe the sequence 
of activities used by malicious actors, with specific tools and techniques within each phase, to 
obtain essential objectives required to proceed to the next phase in a cyber attack.1029  Definitions 
for the kill chain phases are stated as:  
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Cyber Kill Chain 
1. Reconnaissance = harvesting email addresses, social relationships, and information 
on specific technologies.  
2. Weaponization = coupling an exploit with a Remote Access Trojan into a deliverable 
payload.  
3. Delivery = transmission of the weapon to the victim via email, web, usb, or mobile 
device.   
4. Exploitation = of application or operating system vulnerability or an operating system 
feature to execute code.  
5. Installation = of malware on the asset to maintain persistence.  
6. Command and Control = for remote manipulation of victim’s system. 
7. Action on Objectives = intruders use hands on access inside the target environment to 
accomplish their goal. 1030  
   
The cyber kill chain becomes a model for defense when defenders align defensive 
capabilities, such as security controls or best practices, to the specific processes that a malicious 
actor undertakes to target and engage the victim’s system.  A defensive actions matrix can be 
constructed to identify and inject solutions and procedures that can impact an attacker’s progress 
at various phases of the kill chain.  For example, the use of Software Patching denies the 
Exploitation phase and Malware Detection products stop the Installation phase.  Security firms 
will analyze real world attacks and offer suggestions on where their industry products or 
practices could detect, deny, disrupt, or contain an attack at each phase of the cyber kill chain.  
For example, Dell SecureWorks has examined the 2013 attack on Target Corporation to provide 
recommendations for securing Point-of-Sale (POS) systems.  The Dell suggestions are similar to 
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the preventive and detective security controls listed above, but also include an assortment of 
solutions and procedures at the particular kill chain phase stated as:   
 
Defensive Actions Matrix (2013 Target Breach) 
 Database Security (Reconnaissance) = manage and audit database accounts. 
 Threat Intelligence (Weaponization) = leverage external and internal sources to gain 
visibility into specific types of attacks and indicators to detect these attacks.  
 Application Whitelisting (Delivery) = limit sets of software that can be run on 
system. 
 Endpoint Malware Protection (Exploitation) = antivirus and host intrusion prevention 
system identify and block malicious malware. 
 Two-factor Authentication (Installation) = reduce effectiveness of password stealing 
and cracking attempts. 
 Network Intrusion Detection System (Command and Control) = identify traffic 
patterns matching scanning, malware C2 communication and data exfiltration.  
 Data Loss Prevention (Actions on Objective) = use information tagging, packet 
inspection, and network monitoring to identify movement of sensitive data. 1031  
 
However the trouble with using a patchwork of legacy solutions, called “best of breed” 
from multiple vendors, is they take manual intervention once a breach occurs.  The use of point 
products also makes it difficult to coordinate and share intelligence among various devices.  For 
example, if a sandbox device, which isolates and runs suspicious code, detects an unknown 
threat, it might not automatically share indicators with an Intrusion Prevention System, which 
detects malware. Therefore prominent leaders in the cyber security industry recommend use of 
their integrated and automated products to act across the cyber kill chain. For example, Palo Alto 
Networks presents its Next-Generation Security Platform as a multi-layered defense solution that 
integrates next-generation firewalls, cloud-based threat intelligence and advanced endpoint 
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protection.  The Next-Generation platform inspects all network traffic and offers many security 
features designed to prevent and detect at every phase of the cyber kill chain wherever the 
organization's data may reside: in the cloud, on premise, in the network and on the endpoint.1032  
The WildFire intelligence cloud, a custom-built evasion-resistant virtual environment that uses 
hundreds of behavioral characteristics, static indicators and machine learning, inspects all files 
passing through the platform in order to prevent and detect known and unknown malware and 
exploits.1033  The Palo Alto Networks platform integrates the process of prevention and detection 
down the kill chain so that network defenders do not have to do it themselves. It does that by 
establishing a system-of-systems that communicate with each other within the platform and 
integrates a host of third party tools behind the scenes in an effort to reduce the workload of all 
network defenders.1034 
 
Solutions like the Palo Alto Networks Platform attempt to deny the benefit of an attack.  
In a cyber intrusion the real benefit to the attacker is the exfiltration of data at last stage in the 
kill chain. Critics of the cyber kill chain philosophy argue that too much emphasis is on the early 
stages which take relatively little time, whereas the final steps by the attacker can take 
months.1035 In support of that notion, Black Hat 2016 attendees were told the popular cyber kill 
chain “doesn’t focus enough on what to do after adversaries break into networks successfully, 
which they inevitable will do.”1036 Another prevalent counter point is the list of attack vectors is 
longer than those covered by the chain model, like the insider threat.  Admittedly the kill chain is 
more suited to preventing intrusion and a highly determined and skilled attacker will find a way 
into the system.  Therefore focusing on detecting ongoing attacks in the final stages of Command 
and Control and also Actions on Objectives is imperative before the damage is done.  This 
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requires detective security controls that automatically detect and analyze subtle changes in user 
and computer behavior, like File Integrity Monitoring, Change Control and Log Monitoring.  
 
Security Controls 
 
 Guidance for the identification and application of protective measures in the form of 
security controls are contained in a variety of security frameworks. Security controls are 
safeguards or countermeasure “prescribed for an information system to protect the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the system and its information.”1037  Security 
controls can be found in the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special 
Publication 800-53.  In many cases the controls identify industry best practices, also informally 
promulgated by leading security firms in annual reports.  For example, Symantec Corporation 
publishes Best Practice Guidelines for Businesses and for Consumers.  In the first category 
suggestions include use encryption to protect sensitive data, implement a removable media 
policy, be aggressive in updating and patching, enforce an effective password policy, and restrict 
email attachments.  For the latter, recommendations include think before you click, guard your 
personal data, protect yourself and update regularly. In reviewing a number of good external best 
practice guidelines, Symantec specifically endorses the Critical Security Controls maintained by 
the Center for Internet Security and also the Cybersecurity Framework produced by NIST.1038  
 
Critical Security Controls 
 
The Critical Security Controls (CSC) is a framework that offers safeguards for computer 
security based on the combined knowledge of actual attacks and effective defenses.1039  Twenty 
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sets of safeguards are suggested to detect, prevent, and mitigate damage from the most common 
attacks.  The goal of the CSCs is to protect critical assets and information by strengthening an 
organization’s defensive posture through continuous, automated protection and monitoring of 
information technology infrastructure. Thus the controls attempt to deny benefit of attack by 
monitoring networks and systems, detecting attack attempts, identifying compromised machines, 
and interrupting infiltration.  An organization implements, automates, and measures the 
effectiveness of each CSC through the application of sub-Controls that are categorized as either 
“Foundational” or “Advanced” as an aid to prioritization and planning.1040  The CSCs also 
identify applicable commercial tools to detect, track, control, prevent, and correct weaknesses or 
misuse at threat points.1041 Suggested security tools listed by control range from Network Access 
Control, Vulnerability Assessment, Application Whitelisting, and Intrusion Prevention Systems 
to Web Application Firewalls, Patch Management, Data Loss Prevention and Encryption.1042  
Many security solution firms map their products against the CSCs to illustrate how their features 
and capabilities meet safeguard requirements.1043  
 
The first four CSCs (#1-4) alone are seen as especially very valuable by organizations 
such as the National Security Agency that rates them ‘very high’ in mitigation capability and 
‘high’ in technical maturity.  They directly address risk management, starting with Device (#1) 
and Software (#2) Inventory, Secure Configurations (#3), and Continuous Vulnerability 
Assessment and Remediation (#4), across a large number of systems in an enterprise.  An 
organization could reduce the impact of cyber threats on the confidentiality, integrity and 
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availability of information through proper project planning, resource allocation and prioritization 
based on CSCs #1-4.  This assertion can be affirmed in analyzing data breaches of four major 
U.S. technology firms, namely Twitter, Facebook, Apple and Microsoft, in February 2013 
resulting from vulnerabilities in the Java application.  In each situation the attacker following the 
pattern of the intrusion kill chain; discovering software weakness (reconnaissance), writing 
exploit code (weaponization), posting the code on a “watering hole” website (delivery), luring 
victims to the site (exploitation), downloading attack code (installation), compromising the 
victim’s computers (command & control), and getting what they wanted (actions on objective).  
CSCs #1-4 could have prevented attack success at various points of the kill chain, through 
baseline device control, application version updating, forbidding code execution from untrusted 
websites, noting configuration changes, and scanning systems for vulnerable applications in 
outdated versions of Java.1044         
 
  Application of best practices like patch management, contained in CSC #4 for 
Continuous Vulnerability Assessment and Remediation, can only prevent attacks if used, as 
evidenced in the compromise of computers in the NetTraveler cyber espionage campaign.  The 
malware infected more than 350 victims in 40 countries from 2005 through 2013.1045 
NetTraveler exploits two well-known vulnerabilities in Microsoft office, a Windows Common 
Controls bug (CVE-2012-0158) and flaws in MS Word (CVE-2010-3333), both patched for 
these errors years ago.  All the victims had to do was patch their systems to prevent exploitation.  
Instead, the advanced persistent threat group using NetTraveler stole more than 22 gigabytes of 
data from their victims.1046  Likewise, application of the best practice of removable media policy 
implementation, contained in CSC#8 for Malware Defenses, could have prevented an attack like 
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Stuxnet, where the virus was delivered by thumb drives used by contractors working at the 
Iranian nuclear enrichment facility. The Critical Security Controls were crafted to answer the 
question: “Where should I start to improve my cyber defenses?”1047  Their implementation in 
order could deny attack benefit as they prioritize and focus on a small number of actionable 
controls with a high potential payoff.  The first five alone provide effective defense against 80 
percent of attacks.1048 The 2016 NTT Group provides further guidance for practical application 
of security controls to the cyber kill chain.1049 The challenge for deterrence by denial is the 
number of organizations that do not use the controls.  
 
Cybersecurity Framework 
 
In 2013, President Obama declared that the cyber threat to critical infrastructure 
represents one of the most serious challenges to national security.  Therefore to enhance the 
security and resilience of National infrastructure, he signed Executive Order 13636 for 
“Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity.” The Order directs the development of a 
“Cybersecurity Framework” to reduce cyber risks to critical infrastructure.  A Framework can 
provide direction, focus and guidance to not just reduce risk, but also reduce downtime.1050 The 
Order mandates that the Framework shall include a set of standards and procedures that align 
policy, business, and technological ways to address cyber risks.  To help identify, assess, and 
manage cyber risk, the Framework is intended to provide a prioritized, performance-based, and 
cost-effective approach, including information security measures and controls. It will provide 
technology neutral guidance so users benefit from a competitive market for products and 
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services.1051 The inaugural Cybersecurity Framework was released one year later in February 
2014 by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).  It is constructed around a 
Framework Core containing a set of cybersecurity activities, desired outcomes, and applicable 
references that are common across critical infrastructure sectors. The Core consists of five 
concurrent and continuous functions: Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, and Recover. The 
Framework incorporates international voluntary consensus standards and industry best practices 
to accomplish activities under the functions. The Critical Security Controls are part of the 
Framework’s informative references.1052   
 
Leading companies attest that the Framework has enhanced their ability to set security 
priorities, develop capital and operational expenditure budgets and deploy security solutions.1053  
Their endorsement stems from use of the Framework Profile “characterized as the alignment of 
standards and practices to the Framework Core in a particular implementation scenario.”1054  The 
Profile enables organizations to establish a roadmap that is aligned with business objectives, 
regulatory requirements, and risk management priorities. An organization first creates an “as is” 
Current Profile by reviewing all the Categories and Subcategories in the Core, and after 
assessing emerging cyber threats, develops a “to be” Target Profile.  The organization then 
compares the Current and Target Profile to determine gaps in Security Controls. Next after a 
cost/benefit analysis of risk tolerance and available resources, they develop and implement an 
Action Plan to fix gaps.1055  The risk tolerance is based on an acceptable level of risk for 
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acquisition of products and delivery of services.  The former Deputy Homeland Security 
Secretary, Alejandro Mayorkas, has touted the Framework as a document that has lifted cyber 
security awareness in private companies.  In remarks at the Billington International 
Cybersecurity Summit, he implored a roomful of global experts to use it as a model for their 
home governments.1056  
 
Information Sharing  
 
Organizations in the same critical infrastructure or industry sector often face malicious 
actors that use common tactics, techniques and procedures that target the same types of systems 
and information.  One organization’s detection of a cyber attack can become another’s 
prevention.  When cyber threat information and indicators are exchanged within sharing 
communities, recipient organizations are able to deploy effective countermeasures that block or 
detect similar intrusions.  For example an organization can use shared knowledge of indicators to 
disrupt the cyber kill chain.  Through identifying indicators and determining where in the chain 
these indicators occur, defensive strategies and techniques can be applied within the kill chain 
process. For instance, security controls or solutions can be deployed to disrupt a malicious actor 
before achieving exploit phase execution. If the actor has already reached the installation phase, 
then the organization’s defensive strategy shifts to detect actor presence on the network or 
system and craft an effective response.  At each phase of the kill chain, shared threat information 
or indicators help to anticipate actor behavior and deploy defenses. Thus, by the sharing of cyber 
threat information and indicators, an organization benefits from the collective experience, 
resources, and capabilities of its peers.1057  
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Threat Intelligence Sources 
 
Information alone does not equal intelligence. Intelligence is gained when context is 
applied to information – giving it meaning and operational significance.1058 In a survey of over 
378 organizations, 57 percent of respondents say the cyber intelligence currently available to 
their organization is often too stale to enable them to grasp the strategies, motivations, tactics, 
and location of attackers.1059  Many lack current intelligence in the form of reports on latest 
hacker techniques or indicators of compromise that can spot and mitigate threats.  So where does 
current threat intelligence come from?  Sources of threat intelligence are found in a variety of 
places both internal and external to an organization.  Internally an organization can create a 
threat intelligence program using their IDS/IPS, SIEM and AV products and investing in a team 
of researchers and analysts to process and correlate collected data.  This team can review local 
data logs for malware, incident data, or IP addresses; perform forensic analysis on infected hard 
drives looking for attack patterns; and analyze login attempts or swipe access into server 
rooms.1060  Since internally performing analysis on this magnitude of data is no small task, 
organizations can subscribe to external threat intelligence services provided by security 
vendors.1061  An organization can also take a third option to participate in a sector or an industry 
specific sharing community and leverage CERT and central government warnings and threat 
sharing.  
 
In the threat intelligence service option, some commercial providers provide data feeds in 
standard file formats that can be used in a variety of security platforms from different 
manufacturers.  While other vendors offer levels of service that build upon one another, with the 
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base service being a data feed subscription that requires the use of proprietary security 
appliances, such as FireEye Threat Intelligence.  The basic option enhances the value of FireEye 
Threat Prevention platforms by providing ongoing updates of technical indicators.  The most 
advanced FireEye Intelligence capability provides dossiers on advanced threat groups as well as 
profiles of targeted industries.1062 In some cases, a third party security provider will use external 
feeds to support automated actions, like Hexis Cyber Solutions did in their HawkEye G 
integrated active cyber defense platform.  Key criteria exist for evaluating which threat 
intelligence service providers are the best fit for an organization’s needs.  Evaluation points to 
use in research and comparison include for data feeds – what is the number, focus, format, and 
source; for equipment – what type, existing or proprietary, can accept the feeds; for alerts/reports 
– are there real time alerts and industry-specific reports; for price – are subscriptions tiered based 
on number of users; and for service support – is it timely 24/7/365 telephone access to engineers?  
The cost of data feed subscriptions is in the range of $1,500 to $10,000 per month depending on 
number of feeds.1063  
 
Sharing Arrangements 
 
Threat information and indicator sharing can and should be an important element in 
efforts to ensure defenders stay ahead of the threat.  In a sharing community arrangement, an 
enterprise can join, for instance, an Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC) to improve 
the quantity and quality of available threat information.  The concept of the ISAC was introduced 
and promulgated pursuant to Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-63 signed on May 22, 1998.  
In PDD-63 the federal government asked each critical infrastructure sector to establish sector 
specific information sharing organizations to share information about threats and vulnerabilities 
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within each sector.1064  For example the Financial Services (FS) ISAC is a 501(c) 6 nonprofit 
self-funded organization which has grown to more than 5000 members from various commercial 
banks, credit unions, brokerage firms, insurance companies, payment centers and trade 
associations.  FS-ISAC sharing activities include the delivery of timely, relevant and actionable 
cyber and physical email alerts, and also “an anonymous online submission capability to 
facilitate member sharing of threat, vulnerability and incident information.”1065  The National 
Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center coordinates with the ISACs for the 
federal government on the sharing of information related to cybersecurity risks and incidents. 
 
Substantial barriers to optimal sharing of cyber threat information by private sector 
entities exist. Their concerns reside in legal liability, antitrust violations, potential misuse, and 
risks of disclosure, especially of trade secrets and other proprietary information. They often 
“complain that the federal government does not share its information,” in particular classified 
information and there is “little reciprocity or other incentives” for them “to share with 
government.”1066 Legislative proposals try to address these common concerns.  In 2015 a total of 
six bills were introduced and reviewed in the U.S. Congress with varying provisions aimed at 
facilitating sharing of information among private-sector entities and providing protections from 
liability that might arise from sharing.1067  Finally on December 18, 2015, President Obama 
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signed the Cybersecurity Act of 2015 over the objections of civil liberties groups.1068 Title 1 of 
the Act gives antitrust exemptions and liability immunity to companies that send the government 
cyber threat indicators or defensive measures.  The Act states that data will be gathered in a 
manner that removes “personal information of a specific individual or information that identifies 
a specific individual not directly related to a cybersecurity threat.”1069  Still industry concerns 
linger over the bill, mostly on trusting the government on the use or security of the data.1070  For 
the government to truly facilitate private sector sharing, it must not just implement privacy 
safeguards, but also establish viable controls on use, define limitations on liability, and create a 
value proposition, in regard to cost and risk, or fail to address industry interests and needs.1071  
 
Risk Management  
 
 Despite ever-improving defenses, the vast array of attack methods will hold networks and 
systems at risk for years to come. According to the former Director of National Intelligence, “the 
cyber threat cannot be eliminated; rather, cyber risk must be managed.”1072  The Director is 
concerned that some private sector entities do not account for foreign cyber threats or the 
systemic interdependencies between critical infrastructure sectors in their risk calculus.  Through 
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the process of risk management, leaders consider risk to national interests from malicious actors 
using cyberspace to their advantage.  Risk is defined as “a measure of the extent to which an 
entity is threatened by a potential circumstance or event, and typically a function of ...adverse 
impacts... and the likelihood of occurrence.”1073  Risk management is a comprehensive process 
that requires organizations to “frame risk, assess risk, respond to risk, and monitor risk.”1074  The 
first component of frame risk or establish a risk context requires an organization to identify 
assumptions, constraints, tolerance, and priorities or tradeoffs.  The purpose of the assess risk 
component is to identify threats to the organization, internal and external vulnerabilities, the 
harm that may occur from threats and vulnerabilities in the form of consequences or impacts, and 
the likelihood that harm will occur.1075  The purpose of the third component of risk response is to 
develop, evaluate, determine and implement courses of action for responding to risk.  The fourth 
component addresses how organizations monitor risk over time.  
 
 An important factor in deterrence by denial is determining risk tolerance in the risk frame 
component.  Risk tolerance is “the level of risk or degree of uncertainty that is acceptable to 
organizations.”1076  Risk tolerant organizations may worry about threats experienced by peer 
organizations and not try to defeat all actors and attack vectors.  Whereas less tolerant 
organizations worry about all threats that are theoretically possible across their attack surface.  In 
regard to risk response, less tolerant organizations most likely prefer mature safeguards and 
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countermeasures that have a proven track record.  Such organizations may decide to employ 
multiple safeguards and countermeasures from multiple sources or vendors in a “best of breed” 
defensive actions matrix.  Hence risk tolerance plays a significant role in security solution 
investment strategies.  The strategic investments required to address the risk from high volume 
bad actors, like volunteer hacktivists or less-skill nation states, are different than the investments 
needed to address the risk from wicked actors, like advanced persistent threat groups.  To 
address less sophisticated threats, organizations can invest in proven security controls to address 
known vulnerabilities, whereas for advanced persistent threats, organizations will have to invest 
in cutting edge technologies over the course of several years.  
 
Risk based decisions manage the potential impact of threats on the confidentiality, 
integrity, or availability of information that is being processed, stored, or transmitted by 
information systems. More risk tolerant organizations may concentrate on making investments 
that provide mission or business gains at the expense of malicious actors gaining benefit from 
compromising information systems.  The massive breaches at Yahoo in 2013 and 2014 affecting 
1.5 billion user accounts are an example of “a consistent lack of interest in security”1077 given “a 
low priority to defense against hacker threat.”1078  On the contrary, less tolerant organizations 
will attempt to deny all benefit of cyber attack, even at the expense of achieving some mission or 
business goals.  For organizations that handle critical or sensitive information the emphasis is on 
preventing unauthorized disclosure or the loss of confidentiality. In contrast for organizations 
where the nature of operations or business depends on their functionality, the emphasis will be 
on maintaining the availability of information while protecting its integrity.  Risk response 
“identifies, evaluates, decides on, and implements appropriate courses of action to accept, avoid, 
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mitigate, share or transfer risk.”1079  Courses of action for risk response are evaluated in terms of 
impact on organization mission or business needs and functions.  To avoid risk, an organization 
might eliminate networked connections and employ an “air gap” between two domains. Risk 
mitigation can include use of security controls informed by threat intelligence, and of 
organizational policies, like restricting mobile device or removable media usage.  
 
Risk sharing or transfer is the shifting of risk liability and responsibility to another 
organization.1080   An example of risk sharing would be the purchasing of commercial vendor 
services to protect against volumetric DDoS attacks.  In this arrangement, inbound malicious 
traffic is shifted to commercial servers that can accommodate high bandwidth packet requests. 
For example, the Akamai network defeats attacks measured in tens, or even hundreds, of Gbps. 
The Akamai Kona Site Defender deflects DDoS traffic targeted at the network layer.  It defines 
and enforces IP whitelists and blacklists to protect the website.  Defender also incorporates a 
highly scalable Web Application Firewall to absorb DDoS traffic target at the application layer, 
such as HTTP floods that issue erroneous requests. Over 210,000 edge servers distributed around 
the world are used to compare application requests to known attack profiles.1081  The Kona Rule 
set protects against recent threats, such by Low Orbit Ion Cannon, used by Anonymous, or the 
Havij SQL injection tool, used by Iranian hacker groups.1082  The Akamai cloud-based network, 
used on any given day for 80 percent of U.S. government web traffic, provides another layer of 
defense-in-depth protection.1083  
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An example of risk transfer is the purchase of cyber security insurance. Brokers and 
underwriters generally consider how companies manage cyber risk when assessing qualifications 
for coverage.  They pay particular attention to company adoption, implementation, and 
enforcement of cyber security practices and procedures.1084 If qualified the various elements of a 
protection policy can include “liability for a security or privacy breach... costs of notifying 
customers of a breach... losses from business interruption... costs for restoring or replacing lost or 
damaged data... liability for directors or officer of a company targeted by an attack... and costs 
associated with settling cyber extortion threats.”1085  Given an ongoing lack of actuarial data, this 
wide range of factors in writing policies can result in insurance coverage that does not 
adequately address actual risk, particularly for reputation damage and security remediation 
associated with large breaches experienced today.  For instance the cost related to the theft of 56 
million sets of credit and debit card data at Home Depot in 2014 is expected to reach into the 
billions, with only $100 million covered by insurance.1086  
 
Protective Measure Utility 
 
Organizational risk tolerance dictates the selection of risk response courses of action.  
Protective measures to reduce risk, which include the promulgation of security strategies, the 
implementation of security controls, and the sharing of cyber threat information, deny to some 
extent the benefit of attack.  However organizations need to have resources and processes in 
place to implement these protective measures if they are to improve the security of their 
networks and systems.  The data breaches at the Office of Personnel Management illustrate the 
result of blatant neglect of security strategies.  Subsequent recognition of systemic failures at 
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other U.S. government agencies spurred White House declaration of a “30-day Cybersecurity 
Sprint” to shore up protective measures. As part of the effort, the Federal Chief Information 
Officer instructed Federal agencies to patch critical vulnerabilities without delay, accelerate 
implementation of multi-factor authentication, tighten policies for privileged users, and 
immediately deploy indicators provided by the Department of Homeland Security regarding 
malicious actor techniques, tactics, and procedures.1087  The last mandate reiterates that 
organizations need to know their attackers and the techniques they use to exfiltrate valuable data 
or conduct denial of service attacks.  Federal respondents to an industry survey agree in principle 
that using threat intelligence is essential to a strong security posture, but nearly a third report 
their organizations are not able to collect and use it effectively.1088  
 
To change the cost-benefit calculations of attackers, security leaders need to think like 
attackers in the implementation of security controls.1089  The Critical Security Controls (CSCs) 
are built on the guiding principle that “offense informs defense,” which means knowledge of 
actual attacks provide the foundation to build practical defenses.  In constructing the CSCs, top 
experts combined their knowledge of actual cyber attacks and created a consensus list of the 
most effective techniques to stop them. The CSCs are not limited to blocking compromises, but 
also can detect, prevent or disrupt attacker’s follow-on actions. It is no wonder the Critical 
Security Controls figure prominently in the NIST produced “Cybersecurity Framework.”  The 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce believes the Framework is a success. Critical infrastructure sectors 
and important industry elements are keenly aware of, supportive of, or using the framework or 
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similar risk management tools.1090 The former Senior Director for cybersecurity at the White 
House says that support for the framework has “exceeded expectations.”1091  Still greater 
resources are required to grow awareness of the framework and risk based solutions so decisions 
on investments are made based on risk tolerance for adversary behavior.  In a survey of nearly 
two thousand IT security practitioners in 42 countries, 46 percent say their budgets have 
increased, to on average $9.14 million annually.1092  However since the cost of a Remote Access 
Trojan (RAT Malware) on the underground hacker market ranges from only $5-$10 and an entire 
Angler Exploit Kit goes for $100-$1351093 it appears that attackers are winning the cost ratio 
battle.  
 
The creating of sufficient defense capacities through implementation of security controls 
in an “offensive informs defense” model requires defenders to learn from each other faster than 
attackers learn from each other. When considered collectively, the twenty individual ISACs 
provide shared cyber threat information through systemic outreach and connectivity to 
approximately 85 percent of U.S. critical infrastructure.1094 However if private sector recipients 
find this information to be of little benefit, they are less likely to participate in sharing 
communities.  Cyber threat information needs to be actionable in that it identifies or evokes a 
response useful for mitigating risk.  Shared information may not be useful if it is delayed or 
provided without context or in the wrong format.  It needs to be relevant for use in appropriate 
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security controls and associated security products to break the cyber kill chain.  The usefulness 
of shared information rests on the nature of threat itself.  For example for malware signatures to 
be useful, there has to be enough time for the signatures to be collected, shared, and inserted into 
defensive systems of potential future victims before they are attacked.  This assumes an attack 
group will generate a consistent set of signatures that recur in multiple attacks, which likelihood 
is reduced by polymorphic malware, combined with shifting IP addresses.  Many times attack 
groups evolve to use a new set of exploits and attack vectors with brand new signatures.1095   
 
An Insufficient Deterrence Option 
 
Evidence indicates deterrence by denial is not a sufficient strategy to convince malicious 
actors not to conduct cyber attacks.  Current security mechanisms and practices are simply 
inadequate to achieve deterrence and likely will always be.  U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense 
Robert Work told a congressional committee that “Cyber intrusions and attacks have increased 
dramatically over the last decade, exposing sensitive personal and business information, 
disrupting government and business activity, and imposing significant costs to the U.S. 
economy.”1096 Although great strides have been made in Department of Defense cyber security 
through “the layering of our defenses,” so that only about “0.001 percent” of millions of attacks 
per day are successful,1097 highly publicized data breaches at Sony Pictures, JP Morgan Chase, 
Anthem Health Service, and the Office of Personnel Management expose a failure of cyber 
defenses at civilian companies and government agencies of all sizes.  In a 2014 survey of U.S. 
companies, nearly half experienced a data breach involving the theft of more than 1,000 records, 
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up more than 10 percent from the previous year.1098  Part of the problem is the utility of 
protective measures, primarily security strategies, security controls, and information sharing, is 
diminished by sophisticated attacks that are advanced, targeted, stealthy and persistent.  Cyber 
attacks today unfold in multiple coordinated stages across the cyber kill chain, with calculated 
steps to get in, establish a foothold, surveil the victim’s network and steal data.  Malicious actors 
use a variety of stealthy tactics to evade detection and maintain control of compromised systems.  
 
In response deterrence by denial counts on a defense-in-depth strategy that proposes the 
layering of multiple technologies combined with best practices, where in theory each layer 
blocks a different aspect of multi-pronged cyber attacks.  For example, at the Delivery phase, 
device control blocks infected USB devices; at the Exploitation phase, patch and configuration 
management fixes known vulnerabilities; and at the Installation phase, application control stops 
unapproved executables.1099  These defenses are intended to impose cost on the attacker by 
shutting off their attack vectors. For instance, issue of emergency patches for zero-day 
vulnerabilities in Flash Player closed off exploitation by the China-based threat group APT31100 
and by a Russian APT group in Operation Pawn Storm, a spear phishing campaign against 
political targets in NATO and the United States.1101 Yet this threat will most likely reconstitute 
as APT3 has a history of introducing new browser-based, zero day exploits, and the Pawn Storm 
group has been actively introducing new infrastructure and strategies for eight years.1102   
Consequently, in their yearly observation of cyber attack trends, the security firm Mandiant 
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reaffirms the need for a defense-in-depth strategy in stating that “it is more critical to focus on all 
aspects of your security posture (people, processes and technologies) than ever before.”1103  
 
In the wake of the OPM hacks, in October 2015, the White House's Office of 
Management and Budget released their Cybersecurity Strategy and Implementation Plan (CSIP), 
which builds off the 30-day Cybersecurity Sprint.  The CSIP directs actions to “improve 
capabilities for identifying and detecting vulnerabilities and threats, enhance protections of assets 
and information, and further develop robust response and recovery capabilities.”1104 The CSIP 
emphasizes “the need for a defense-in-depth approach that relies on the layering of people, 
processes, technologies and operations.”1105 Suggestions in CSIP include to improve security 
practices and controls around agency high value assets, implement tools to identify risks to 
systems and networks, advance information sharing on critical vulnerabilities and threats, and 
acquire innovative commercially available cyber security products and services.1106  While the 
initiatives in the Cybersecurity Strategy and Implementation Plan appear promising, 
Representative Jason Chaffetz reminded Federal Chief Information Officers, in a Letter from the 
Chairman of the House Committee investigation of the OPM data breach, that “a single 
vulnerability is all a sophisticated actor needs to steal information, identities, and profoundly 
damage our national security.”1107   
 
Consequently it is no surprise that forensic evidence indicates malicious actors are not 
convinced defenses will deny their success. For instance, the Fortinet Cyber Threat Assessment 
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Program recorded over 185 million threat events in the period from April 1 to June 30, 2016, 
meaning many of the events succeeded in getting past traditional security defenses onto the 
internal network where Fortinet assessment devices were located.1108 Furthermore, Verizon 
reports that in 60 percent of cyber incidents, attackers are able to compromise an organization 
within minutes, while their detection takes months.1109 These statistics mean threat groups can 
bypass conventional defenses at will and wander unimpeded to obtain their objectives on the 
target. The hard reality that attackers can compromise an organization quickly and persist 
undetected for long durations indicates that the strategy of deterrence by denial will remain an 
insufficient strategic cyber deterrence option.  In sum, then, the shortcomings of deterrence by 
denial if applied to cybered conflict are in adversary ingenuity, defensive asymmetry, and 
undervalued risk tolerance.  
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CHAPTER VI 
 
Deterrence by Entanglement 
 
The strategy of deterrence by entanglement presumes strengthening state cooperation on 
mutual interests encourages restraint to avoid incurring unintended consequences and 
antagonizing third parties.  Nations share political, economic, commercial, and strategic 
interdependence in cyberspace as well as some degree of vulnerability.  Soft power theorist 
Joseph Nye claims that “entanglement refers to the existence of various independencies that 
make a successful attack simultaneously impose serious costs on the attacker, as well as the 
victim.”1110  Deterrence by entanglement encourages responsible state behavior by raising the 
perceived value of maintaining and not endangering the returns from government to government 
cooperation.  The strategy uses a range of cooperative measures to restrain state behavior in 
conducting, endorsing or allowing malicious cyber activity by itself, or its authorities, or by 
hacker groups, criminal organizations, and terrorist groups originating from territory under their 
jurisdiction.  Since deterrence is partially a function of perception, the strategic option of 
entanglement stems from a state actor’s belief that the costs outweigh the benefits of acting in an 
irresponsible manner.  Deterrence by entanglement seeks to change the cost-benefit calculations 
of a state actor by communicating the ramifications of their irresponsible behavior.  For a 
deterrence strategy to be successful, the deterrer has to maintain not just the capability, will, and 
knowledge to restrict behavior as necessary, but also the credible reputation to do so.1111  
Therefore effective signaling of clear expectations is fundamental to the achievement of 
meaningful cooperation between states. Otherwise an uncooperative state will not believe the 
deterrer will not tolerate infractions and therefore not participate in cooperative measures to 
secure cyberspace for the good of all parties.  
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However in today’s global environment, a clash of competing state interests seriously 
impairs the strategic option of deterrence by entanglement.  For instance the United States is a 
strong proponent of a free and open Internet as shown in ongoing trade negotiations and 
decisions on net neutrality.  But some nations, such as China and Russia, are pursuing a different 
vision.  Theirs is “predicated on absolute government control of the Internet” and anti-access 
policies that restrict “publishing and distributing online content.”1112  In addition state-sponsored 
cyber theft and cyber espionage indicate differing views exist on the protection and use of 
intellectual property, partially based on a cultural divide.  The use of state-sponsored or privately 
contracted APTs allows for plausible deniability of state involvement in a cyber attack.  While 
the state feints anonymity, the operators themselves are not put at personal risk in any way.  The 
situation is quite simple; if states do not share and adhere to the same underlying objectives and 
values then state cooperation to reduce risks and enhance security is futile.   Yearning to counter 
that hurdle, the United Nations Government Group of Experts 2013 report contends that “further 
progress in cooperation at the international level will require actions to promote a peaceful, 
secure, resilient, and open Information and Communication Technologies environment.”1113  
 
For space deterrence, notable scholars have suggested a layered approach that considers 
entanglement based on interdependence and international norms as distinct elements.1114  
However in practical application, norms are a mechanism to implement the strategy of 
entanglement.  Norms, rules and principles of responsible state behavior, along with confidence-
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building and capacity-building measures form the range of cooperative measures that attempt to 
enhance international peace and security.  However unlike binding treaty agreements that are 
essential to sustaining international order, adherence to and participation in cooperative measures 
remains voluntary.  Therefore despite diplomatic overtures for increased involvement in 
cooperative measures, state cooperation for responsible behavior in cyberspace remains elusive.  
If countries behaved responsibly and cooperated the magnitude of the cyber problem would 
diminish.  Likeminded nations need to “persuade or compel those countries who take action 
against us in cyberspace to stop.”1115  Or be incentivized to rein in non-state actors conducting 
proscribed activities.1116  In some cases in order to elicit desired actions from uncooperative 
states, coercive diplomacy, which combines techniques of deterrence and compellence, is 
necessary. Unlike the former that waits for the attacker to act before fulfilling a threat, the latter 
involves initiating an overt action that can become harmless only if the opponent complies.1117  
This chapter starts with an illustrative case that depicts the use of coercive diplomacy by the 
United States government to reach an unprecedented cyber arms agreement with China.  Then 
after assessing legal principles for establishing responsible state behavior in cyberspace, the 
chapter examines the range of cooperative measures and to what level they restrain state 
behavior in conducting, endorsing or allowing malicious cyber activity originating in their 
territory.  
 
Illustrative Case of Coercive Diplomacy 
 
Ahead of his first official state visit to the United States in September 2015, Chinese 
President Xi Jinping stated in a written transcript that “The Chinese government does not engage 
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in theft of commercial secrets in any form, not does it encourage or support Chinese companies 
to engage in such practices in any way.”1118  Contrary to this pronouncement, U.S. officials have 
repeatedly alleged state-sponsored Chinese hackers have stolen sensitive corporate data.  For 
example, in May 2014, the U.S. Attorney General accused a group of five Chinese hackers 
affiliated with Unit 61398 of the People’s Liberation Army of carrying out a hacking campaign 
against American businesses to include U.S. Steel and Westinghouse Electric.  Nevertheless 
nearly a year and a half after that 48 page indictment, cybersecurity experts said China has only 
altered the methods used by its hackers and that its campaign against U.S. firms remains 
active.1119  This difference in state position prompted U.S. officials to suggest they would use the 
state visit to confront China on the matter.  In recognizing that the United States and China have 
boosted cooperation in many areas, the U.S. National Security Advisor said President Obama 
“would make clear that China must change its practices in other, more sensitive areas, 
particularly state sponsored, cyber-enabled economic espionage.”  In seeking this change, the 
Advisor stated the United States would continue to “urge China to join us in promoting 
responsible norms of state behavior in cyberspace.”1120  
  
Just a day before the arrival of President Xi in Washington, the Office of Personnel 
Management revealed hackers who stole security dossiers from the agency also got the 
fingerprints of 5.6 million federal employees.  Although the administration has never publicly 
blamed China for the theft of the personnel files, American intelligence agencies have attributed 
the hack to China.  Although stealing government records from another country is a common 
part of espionage, the episode intensified pressure on Mr. Obama to act on the more serious theft 
of corporate data.  Weeks prior to the visit, his administration developed a package of economic 
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sanctions, considered to be “an increasingly important tool is our coercive diplomacy toolkit,”1121 
for use against Chinese companies and individuals who benefit from the cyber-enabled theft of 
U.S. trade secrets by the government.1122  The sanctions would be the first use of an Executive 
Order signed by President Obama in April 2015 that established the authority to freeze financial 
and property assets of individuals and entities overseas who engage in not only destructive 
attacks on critical infrastructure but also commercial espionage for competitive advantage in 
cyberspace.1123  The intent or threat of the sanctions, along with indictments, is to impose costs 
for malicious cyber-enabled activities.  
 
  Nonetheless the Obama administration held off on imposing the sanctions in hopes of 
resolving this issue with Mr. Xi during the state visit.1124  Turns out for weeks before the state 
visit the United States and China had conducted negotiations with urgency hoping for a cyber 
arms agreement for the Presidents to sign.  A high level Communist Party envoy came to 
Washington to meet with the National Security Advisor and Director of the FBI.  The result of 
deliberations appeared initially to be a bilateral agreement that would be a generic embrace of 
the code of conduct adopted by the Government Group of Experts at the United Nations in 
July.1125  Yet on the last day of the state visit,  the White House released only a Fact Sheet that 
stated the two Presidents agreed to work together to manage differences and deepen cooperation 
in a number of areas, to include cybersecurity.  The two countries agree that “neither country’s 
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government will conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property, 
including trade secrets or other confidential business information, with the intent of providing 
competitive advantages to companies or commercial sectors.”1126  Later President Obama said he 
told Mr. Xi “The question now is...are words followed by actions?” and indicated the United 
State “will apply [sanctions] and whatever tools to go after cybercriminals either retrospectively 
or prospectively.”1127 
 
U.S. Congressional reaction to the cyber deal was guarded.  “I remain skeptical that 
China will deliver on this promise,” said Representative Adam Schiff, “But if curbing cyber theft 
is a journey of a thousand miles, perhaps China has taken a first step.”1128  Although it was 
unclear how the agreement would be enforced, it could reflect an inflection point, according to 
Dmitri Alperovitch, cofounder of CrowdStrike a prominent cyber security company, where the 
Chinese “are now obligated to respond to evidence presented by the United States.”1129  
Consequently only three weeks later China fulfilled that obligation with the arrest of a number of 
hackers at the request of the U.S. government showing it was serious about punishing 
hackers.1130  However the unprecedented move by China could have been more a reaction to 
threats of economic sanctions. For despite the pledge by China’s president, according to a 
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CrowdStrike report,1131  hackers linked to the Chinese government attempted to gain access to 
U.S. tech and pharmaceutical companies in the same three weeks since President Xi left 
Washington.  One year after the deal, according to a FireEye report, the number of network 
compromises by China-based hacking groups appears to have dropped.  Yet “absence of 
evidence is not the same thing as evidence of absence” as China may just be more stealthy and 
sophisticated in their attacks, signifying a failure of the much heralded agreement to achieve 
deterrence by entanglement.1132  
 
Norms of Responsible State Behavior  
 
A central premise for responsible state behavior in cyberspace is that global 
interdependence requires it.  Critical components of modern life such as food, water, health, 
finance, energy, manufacturing, and transportation are entrenched with Information and 
Communications Technologies.  For society in every state, the security of the online 
infrastructure in these sectors is important.  Yet as new cyber-related vulnerabilities are 
discovered the risk of systemic disruption increases in parallel with rising connectivity.  
Accordingly a Chatham House report recognizes that dependencies in cyber-enabled critical 
infrastructure “spread across national boundaries and become global.”1133 This newfound global 
interdependence challenges state sovereignty (defined by the Oxford dictionaries as “the 
authority of a state to govern itself”) for maintaining security and prosperity in cyberspace.  It 
also questions the limits of responsible state behavior in not endangering the same for other 
nations by conducting, endorsing or allowing malicious cyber activity originating from their 
territory.  Rightfully so, the U.S. National Security Strategy eloquently states in 2015 that the 
                                                          
1131 Ellen Nakashima, “China still trying to hack U.S. firms despite Xi’s vow to refrain, analysts 
say,” The Washington Post, 19 October, 2015.  
1132 Adam Segal, “The U.S.-China Cyber Espionage Deal One Year Later,” Net Politics, 
September 28, 2016.  
1133 Dave Clemente, “Cyber Security and Global Interdependence: What is Critical?” Chatham 
House, February 2013: v-x.  
276 
 
“increasing interdependence of the global economy and rapid pace of technological change” are 
linking governments in unprecedented ways, while creating “shared vulnerabilities, as 
interconnected systems and sectors are susceptible” to the threats of malicious cyber 
activities.1134  For example, according to Joseph Nye, in a scenario that envisages a Chinese 
attack on the U.S. power grid that results in costs on the U.S. economy, the economic 
interdependence of the two countries would mean costly damage to China as well.1135  This 
phenomenon should hypothetically incentivize and enable new forms of cooperation based on 
mutual interests.  
 
 The bilateral agreement between China and the United States represents a form of 
cooperation for responsible state behavior in cyberspace.  Any effort to further codify norms, 
rules, and principles of responsible behavior by states starts with an understanding of how 
international law is applicable to cyberspace.   International law is made by states and comes 
from various sources, to include treaties and conventions, that are legally binding documents 
among states; customary international law, which is created by consensus of states over a long 
period of time; general principles of law, that are recognized among civilization; and the writing 
and teaching of scholars.1136  In particular, general principles can be of contractual nature (in 
good faith) and procedural character (for advisory opinions) or of common heritage of mankind 
(for common spaces) or sustainable development (for the environment). In regard to international 
peace and security, a common core of general principles consist of: the sovereign equality of 
states, including the right to self-preservation, independence, jurisdiction, non-intervention, and 
duty not to harm the rights of other states; the maintenance of international peace and security, 
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including the obligation to refrain from threat or use of force and peaceful settlement of disputes; 
and duty to international cooperation in solving international relations.1137  These principles 
serve as a “normative source of law, which governs situations not regulated by formulated 
norms.”  They can also serve as a “guide or framework for interpretation of conventional and 
customary international law.”  And they can serve as the “basis for the development of new 
rights and obligations.”1138  Most importantly, the aforementioned core of principles pertaining to 
international peace and security apply in some manner in cyberspace.    
 
 The topic of sovereignty opens the Tallinn Manual 2.0 in Rule 1, in delineating “The 
principle of State sovereignty applies in cyberspace.”1139  Therefore a State is “free to adopt any 
measure it considers necessary or appropriate with regard to cyber infrastructure, persons 
engaged in cyber activities, or cyber activities themselves within its territory,” unless prevented 
by international law, such as those for international human rights.1140  At the same time, 
sovereignty entails “a duty to protect within the territory, the rights of other states, in particular 
their right to integrity and inviolability in peace and in war.”1141  Based on the principle of 
territoriality, “states are able to legislate with regard to activities and to prosecute offences 
committed on their territory.”1142  Typical examples of offenses that are likely to be considered a 
violation of state territory or integrity include cyber-enabled political influence, economic 
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espionage, crime, terrorism, and sabotage.  However there is no clear consensus in the 
international community on whether acts that cause no physical damage qualify as a violation. 
Hence it is “imperative to examine to what extent states are obliged to control and regulate 
cyberspace within the reach of their sovereign powers, in order to avoid being responsible”1143 
for these offenses, caused by acts which originate from their territory, by the state itself, or its 
authorities, or by private parties under its jurisdiction.   
 
The duty to protect the rights of other states invokes the obligation of states to take 
preventive measures in cases where the state has actual as well as constructive or presumptive 
knowledge.  A state may have detected a cyber-enabled activity; it may be told by the victim 
state; or it can be presumed to know about the activity.  The prevention principle obliges states to 
conduct a risk assessment and tell other states of risk of harm.  This obligation in effect requires 
the State to notice malicious cyber activity, create investigative cyber capabilities to identify the 
source, and establish an organizational and legal framework to enable the prevention or 
discontinuation of such activity originating on the state’s territory.1144  In addition, states are also 
responsible for their “internationally wrongful acts” to those whom they have injured.  Such acts 
are composed of a both a breach of an international obligation and attribution of the act to the 
responsible state.1145  The conduct of “state organs”’ of government, such as military, 
intelligence, and security agencies,1146 or a person or group of persons “acting on the instructions 
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of, or under the direction or control of, that state in carrying out the conduct,”1147 is attributable 
to the state.  With regard to the wrongfulness thereof, an example is cyber operations that violate 
the prohibition on the use of force.  Those cyber operations which cause injury or death of 
persons, or damage or destruction of property violate the prohibition, as resident in customary 
law, and codified in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.1148  The latter was affirmed to be applicable 
to state conduct in cyberspace by the Group of Twenty (G-20) at their 2015 Summit in 
Turkey.1149  
 
 International law principles echo the basic values of international society that are 
intrinsic to international order.  The United States considers a rules-based international order that 
promotes peace, security and opportunity to be an enduring national interest.1150  For cyberspace, 
one prevailing scholarly view is that international order is inevitable due to the dynamics of 
power and competition, particularly competition over issues of sovereignty.  Inevitability is 
deduced from the reality that states are always negotiating over the framework of competition.   
Therefore as “the international system moves from a unipolar format to a multipolar one, great 
powers will have no choice” but to cooperate, to “soften the harsh effects of multipolarity and 
oligopolistic competition.”1151  A counter view is that while correct increased competition may 
create incentives for cooperation on rules for cyberspace, the history of norm evolution for other 
emerging-technology weapons, such as chemical and biological weapons, strategic bombing 
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platforms, and nuclear weapons, indicates otherwise.  In each of these historic cases, the primary 
reason for developing norms was the “perception among powerful or relevant states that such 
norms are in their national self-interest.”1152  The counter view contends that an analysis of the 
cyber doctrines of China, Russia, and the United States for certain categories, indicates that their 
calculations of self-interest might not converge in favor of robust constraining cyber norms,1153 
signifying another intractable impediment to achievement of deterrence by entanglement.  
 
Formal Binding Obligations 
 
The start point for reaching concurrence between countries on rules or norms, and also 
confidence-building and capacity-building measures, is the recognition that a cyber treaty for 
international peace and security is simply not possible and therefore other means are necessary to 
achieve peace and security.  According to cyber expert James Lewis, there is no real alternative 
to using these forms of cooperative measures as “legally binding commitments have serious 
drawbacks.” 1154  Uncooperative states will most likely just ignore treaties regarding 
cybersecurity, as they face definitional, compatibility, compliance and verification problems in 
implementation.  The first issue for an arms control type treaty is what defines a cyber weapon.  
One cyber security industry insight into common characteristics of a cyber weapon includes both 
an attacker with “intimate knowledge of the workings of the targeted system” and a special “code 
that can bypass protective cybersecurity technology.”1155  However those characteristics are also 
common to penetration tests, described in the Center for Internet Security Critical Security 
Control 20 as to test the strength of an organization’s defenses “by simulating the objectives and 
                                                          
1152 Brian M. Mazanec, “Why International Order in Cyberspace Is Not Inevitable,” Strategic 
Studies Quarterly, Vol. 9, Issue 2 (Summer 2015): 78-84. 
1153 Ibid. 85-95. 
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actions of an attacker.”1156  A more precise version of the definition is found in Rule 103 of the 
Tallinn Manual 2.0, where cyber weapons are considered to be “cyber means of warfare that are 
used, designed, or intended to be used to cause injury to, or death of, persons or damage to, or 
destruction of, objects.”1157  Even Thomas Rid agreed that cyber weapons are “instruments of 
harm” where computer code causes these same effects.1158  Although without pervasive 
consensus on the definition of a cyber weapon,1159 there is no basis for cyber arms control 
treaties.  
 
Past arms control arrangements between states such as the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1970, the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty of 1992, the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996, and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 offer 
policy makers extensive experience in governing armaments and their deployment or use.1160  
However the technical properties of cyber weapons are not compatible with the rationale used in 
these arms control treaties.  For example unlike nuclear weapons affordable only to states, 
malware is easy to use and relatively inexpensive.  And unlike other kinetic weapons, malware 
can be reproduced and distributed at minimal cost.  In addition, the rapid pace of development of 
malware makes any listing of prohibited weapons impossible.  Even if prohibitions were 
possible, dual use software, like that for intelligence collection can be repurposed for malicious 
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action.1161  The success of the aforesaid arms control treaties has been dependent on compliance 
and verification regimes.  Yet no state would likely agree to verification measures which would 
require the scanning of their computers and devices, including those in classified systems.1162  
Therefore rather than ban cyber weapons, some scholars contend that binding agreements should 
stipulate acceptable types, which adhere to attributability and reversibility.  For the first quality, a 
responsible country would make their attacks clear in origin, by using digital signatures in attack 
code.  And for the second, nations would use attack methods that are repairable.1163  Even though 
this approach seems to just encourage the use of cyber arms, while under some form of control.   
 
All complications aside, China and Russia did sign in May 2015 a bilateral agreement 
dubbed a “nonaggression pact” for cyberspace that demonstrated their values diverge from 
Western society.  The treaty broadly defines cyber threats to include the transmission of 
information that could endanger “societal-political and social-economic systems,” seemingly 
counter to the free flow of information, and calls for the creation of “a multilateral, democratic 
and transparent management system” for the Internet, implying a predominant state voice in 
governance versus a multi-stakeholder model.  Besides detailing pledges of cooperation, such as 
in international legal norms and on joint scientific projects, one particular provision in the treaty 
pledges the parties to refrain from “computer attacks” against each other.  Specifically Article 4 
provides that “Each Party has an equal right to the protection of the information resources of 
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their state against misuse and unsanctioned interference.”1164  Still the language is vague and 
could be interpreted differently, highlighting the difficulty of implementing the precise provision, 
the essence of the treaty.  Efforts to limit the cyber arms race are confronted by a nations desire 
to maintain advantage in the domain for their own benefit.  One public analysis of intrinsic 
challenges simply concludes that “cybersecurity treaties may be nice, but it’s really every 
country for itself.”1165  Undoubtedly any hope for that assertion to be false resides in cooperative 
measures found in the strategy of deterrence by entanglement.    
 
Cooperative Measure Selection 
 
A broad range of cooperative measures attempts to restrain state activity, or state 
sponsored or endorsed activity, of a malicious manner in cyberspace.  International forum 
discussions indicate that cyber related norms of behavior are the best means to guide state 
behavior in cyberspace.  The main objectives for agreeing on norms appear to be “increased 
predictability, trust and stability in the use of ICTs, hopefully steering states clear of possible 
conflict due to misunderstandings.”1166  State acceptance of a prescribed norm can constrain and 
regulate their behavior, under the pretense that other states will sanction violations of the 
norm.1167  The incentive for states to adopt norms stems from a common interest in sustaining 
cyberspace, in particular the Internet, for the benefit of all states.  Therefore the United Nations 
has taken the lead on the development of norms for responsible behavior by states in cyberspace.  
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Another cooperative measure choice resides in voluntary politically binding confidence-building 
measures (CBM) designed to prevent the outbreak of conflict.  The Organization for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has made progress in advancing cyber-related CBMs.  Finally, 
the last category of cooperative measures is contained in capacity-building measures. They are 
intended to help secure ICTs and their use.  
 
Norms, Rules and Principles  
 
A norm can be defined as a “standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given 
identity.”1168  Voluntary, and hence non-binding, norms of responsible state behavior are 
intended to reduce risks to international peace and security.  They reflect international 
community expectations and standards for responsible state behavior.  Normative regimes are 
beginning to influence the development of state policy embodied in their national cyber 
strategies and the position on related matters of intergovernmental bodies such as the United 
Nations.1169 Although some state views and initiatives regarding norms, rules and principles 
substantially differs from international congruence based on their own interpretations of 
international order.  For instance from China’s perspective, international order reflects the 
relative balance of power and resides currently in the interest of hegemons, which makes it 
inconsistent and unfair.  China would favor an international order that contributes to the 
maintenance of national sovereignty and political systems.  Their foundational principles for 
international order specify “equality of the sovereign nations, non-interference in each other’s 
internal affairs, and peaceful coexistence of different political systems.”1170  
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Therefore China teamed with Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in September 2011 to 
submit to the United Nations their version of an international code of conduct for information 
security.  Their letter recognizes that a “global culture of cybersecurity” needs to be implemented 
pursuant to a previous General Assembly resolution.”1171  The letter highlights “the importance 
of the security, continuity and stability of the Internet” and reaffirms “that policy authority for 
Internet-related public issues is the sovereign right of States.”1172  One purpose of the proposed 
code of conduct is to promote responsible behaviors of states in information space.  Although 
adherence is voluntary, each state subscribing would pledge: to comply with universal norms 
governing “sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of all States;” not to use 
information and communication technologies “to carry out hostile activities or acts of 
aggression;” and to reaffirm the rights of “States to protect... their information space and critical 
infrastructure from threats, disturbances, attack and sabotage.”1173  The draft code of conduct 
submission was revised in January 2015 to add that each State subscribing would also pledge: 
not to use information and communication technologies “to interfere in the internal affairs of 
other States” and not to “undermine States’ right to independent control of information and 
communication technology goods and services,”1174 in effect advocating government control of 
the Internet.  
 
The code of conduct submission by China, Russia and most of the Central Asian States is 
not the only regionally endorsed proposal.  In June 2014, the Member States of the African 
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Union released a Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection.  It establishes a 
normative framework that aims to strengthen existing legislations on Information and 
Communication Technologies.  The provisions of the Convention are not to be interpreted in a 
way that is not consistent with the principles of international law, to include customary law.  
Actions that collect, process, transmit, store or use personal data by the state or a person are 
subject to the Convention.1175  Each Member State is supposed to develop and adopt a national 
cyber security policy that acknowledges the significance of Critical Information Infrastructure. 
Suggested strategies to implement this policy include international cooperation, especially on the 
exchange of information on cyber threats and vulnerabilities, and legislative reform.  For the 
latter, by mandating that each state shall take legislative or regulatory measures to make attempts 
to gain unauthorized access, remain fraudulently, hinder functioning, enter data deceptively, or 
damage data in a computer system a criminal offense.1176  The Convention establishes a de facto 
baseline for norms of expected behavior by Member States, which also applies to individuals in 
their territory.  Although critics of the Convention say serious concerns exist over its human 
rights implications, particularly provisions that restrict fee speech, limit freedom of association, 
and broaden judicial powers.1177   
 
Also, eight months before the 2011 code of conduct submission, the UN General 
Assembly adopted a resolution, sponsored by the United States and Russia that notes “the 
dissemination and use of information technologies and means affect the interests of the entire 
international community” and expresses “concern that these technologies and means can 
potentially be used for purposes that are inconsistent with the objectives of maintaining 
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international stability and security.”1178  Consequently the resolution requests the Secretary 
General to establish another Group of Governmental Experts, with an equitable geographical 
composition, to “study existing and potential threats in the sphere of information security and 
possible cooperative measures to address them.”1179  In 2013, the subsequent Group, comprised 
of representatives from China, Russia, the United States and twelve other nations, reached 
consensus on their report.  They agreed that international law, and the Charter of the United 
Nations, is applicable and essential to promoting a peaceful ICT environment.  Hence in regard 
to specific recommendations on norms, rule and principles of responsible state behavior, the 
2013 Group of Governmental Experts concluded that:  
 
a. States must meet their international obligations regarding internationally wrongful 
acts attributable to them. 
b. States must not use proxies to commit internationally wrongful acts. 
c. States should seek to ensure that their territories are not used by non-State actors for 
unlawful use of ICTs.1180 
 
These particular norms codify Group determination that the principles that flow from sovereignty 
apply to state conduct and jurisdiction over ICT-related activities or infrastructure respectively.   
 
While regional and organizational initiatives advance, the broader international 
community has not sat idle on discussing norms for responsible behavior in cyberspace.  As of 
2017, a total of four Global Conferences on Cyberspace have been held with representatives 
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from governments, private sector and civil society.   The first in London in November 2011, 
called the London process, asked this succinct question under the topic of international security: 
“How do we develop and apply appropriate principles of behavior?”1181  In response all delegates 
agreed that immediate steps should be to create shared understanding and agree on common 
approaches.  Some delegates noted the draft Code of Conduct being circulated at the United 
Nations.  None wanted to expend effort on legally-binding international agreements.  By the next 
iteration in Budapest in October 2012, very little progress had been made, and if anything, 
various actors dug in on their resistive positions.  The Chinese indicated their preference for a 
cyberspace arms control treaty and the Russians rejected the Budapest Convention on 
Cybercrime because it serves their national interest.1182 Although in a progressive manner, the 
United Kingdom asked for consensus on rules of the road and the Republic of Korea urged 
exploration on norms of behavior to avoid conflict between states.1183  Real progress on areas of 
common ground was made at the Seoul Conference in October 2013, and reflected in the Seoul 
Framework for and Commitment to Open and Secure Cyberspace.   The document identified 
elements for an open and secure cyberspace to include under the category of international 
security many verbatim conclusions from the 2013 UN Group of Government Experts report.1184  
The fourth Global Conference held in The Hague in April 2015, sought to build on the Seoul 
Framework.  The Hague Conference “reaffirmed the applicability of existing international law to 
State behavior in cyberspace, as well as its commitment to exploring the development of 
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voluntary, non-legally-binding norms for responsible State behavior in cyberspace during 
peacetime.”1185   
 
Three months later, in July 2015, the Group of Governmental Experts released another 
report that distinctly expanded the discussion of norms.  In the Foreword, the Secretary-General 
pronounced that “All States have a stake in making cyberspace more secure.”1186  Thus to better 
represent the international community in this quest, the 2015 Group was enlarged to 20 States.  
Their comprehensive exchange of views on norms, rules and principles of responsible State 
behavior resulted in consensus on the following additional recommendations: 
 
a. A State should not conduct or knowingly support ICT activity contrary to its 
obligations under international law that intentionally damages critical infrastructure.  
b. States should take appropriate measures to protect their critical infrastructure from 
ICT threats. 
c. States should respond to appropriate requests for assistance by another state whose 
critical infrastructure is subject to malicious ICT acts. 
d. States should not conduct or knowingly support activity to the harm the information 
systems of the authorized emergency response teams.1187  
 
These particular norms could be considered a breakthrough for U.S. diplomats pushing for an 
alternative to formal treaties.  By delineating norms regarding critical infrastructure, the United 
States and other states reached “a consensus on the appropriate boundaries for state activities in 
                                                          
1185 Bert Koenders, “Global Conference on Cyberspace 2015: Chair’s Statement,” The Hague, 
April 16-17, 2015.  
1186 United Nations General Assembly, “Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the 
Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security,” 
A/70/174, 22 July 2015: 4. 
1187 Ibid. 8.  
290 
 
cyberspace in order to avoid wide-spread, potentially devastating, damage in cyberspace.”1188  
Although in the spirit of concession, the United States did not reach consensus on their proposal 
to spell out the implications of the 2013 Group’s agreement “that international law applies to 
cyberspace just as it does on land or at sea.”1189  A bloc of nations rebuffed the proposal to 
prevent their interpretation of an attempt to establish U.S. hegemony in cyberspace. 
 
 Not just states have “a stake in making cyberspace more secure,” so do international 
corporations.  More representative of the multi-stakeholder model is the Microsoft Corporation 
version of proposed Cyber Security Norms to limit potential conflict in cyberspace.  The premise 
of their norms is that governments which are investing in offensive cyber capabilities have a 
responsibility to guide their use.  Therefore norms can better define what type of government 
behavior is unacceptable so that incidents do not escalate to conflict.  In order to be effective, 
Microsoft believes norms also have to drive behavior change that is observable.  Their proposed 
norms are meant to reduce the possibility that states will use, abuse, or exploit ICT products and 
services as part of offensive operations that result in conflict.  Therefore the six norms proposed 
by Microsoft focus mostly on protecting global trust in technology, per the following abbreviated 
recommendations that states should:    
 
 Not target ICT companies to insert vulnerabilities that undermine public trust. 
 Have a policy for handling product and service vulnerabilities that reflect a mandate to 
report them to vendors rather than to stockpile, buy, sell, or exploit them.  
 Ensure that any developed cyber weapons are limited, precise and not reusable. 
 Commit to nonproliferation activities that pertain to cyber weapons.  
 Limit offensive cyber operations in order to avoid creating mass events.  
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 Assist the private sector to detect, contain, respond and recover from cyber 
incidents.1190  
 
Microsoft recognizes that norms are not an objective by themselves, but can drive demonstrable 
changes in state behavior if implemented, assessed for accountability, and, if appropriate, 
evolved.  Microsoft did just that in forwarding in June 2016 a new three-part organizing model of 
offensive, defensive, and industry norms.  Offensive norms require restraint to not choose actions 
that violate boundaries of responsible state behavior.  Defensive norms are meant to enable risk 
management through improved defenses and incident response.  While the first two categories 
are consistent with the above 2014 list for states, industry norms are new in addressing their role 
in mitigating risks, for example, global ICT providers should not permit backdoors in their 
products, traffic in cyber vulnerabilities, or withhold patches from any party.1191  Scott Charney, 
Corporate Vice President of Microsoft, described the relationship among the categories in stating 
“as governments commit increasing resources into offensive cyber capabilities, the global ICT 
industry must…take active steps to prevent user exploitation” and “raise the bar in our defensive 
capabilities to deter nation-states from targeting technology users.”1192  
 
Confidence-Building Measures  
 
The 2015 Group of Governmental Experts proclaimed that confidence-building measures 
strengthen international peace and security.  In their report, they assert these types of measures 
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“can increase interstate cooperation, transparency, predictability and stability.”1193  Confidence-
building measures are used as an instrument of international politics, in attempts to prevent or 
reduce the risk of conflict by removing sources of mistrust, misunderstanding and miscalculation 
between states. They achieve this result by establishing practical means and processes for crisis 
management.1194  For example, confidence-building measures have been developed and 
suggested for outer space activities to address state-owned threats to their sustainability and 
security.1195  The world’s growing dependence on vulnerable space-based platforms, technologies 
and information is no different than global interdependence in cyberspace.  Likewise neither is 
the risk of conflict from the militarization of outer space and also cyberspace.  The acceleration 
of an arms race in both domains only increases the risk of escalation and conflict.  Confidence-
building measures attempt to reach an adequate level of predictability of state behavior and 
prevent the loss of control over a perilous situation.  
 
In 2013, the United States and the Russian Federation attempted a new field of 
cooperation in confidence-building.  Both parties recognized not only the increasing 
interdependence of the world on Information and Communication Technologies, but also the 
political-military, criminal and terrorist threats to or in the use of them.  Thus in demonstrating 
“commitment to promoting international peace and security,” they completed so called 
“landmark steps designed to strengthen relations, increase transparency, and build confidence” 
between their nations, to include:  
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 A mechanism and arrangements for information sharing between computer 
emergency response teams to better protect critical information systems.  
 Authority to use the direct communications link between Nuclear Risk Reduction 
Centers for this purpose. 
 A link between high-level officials to manage dangerous situations related to security 
threats to or in the use of Information and Communication Technologies.1196  
 
These confidence-building measures are designed to “reduce the possibly that a misunderstood 
cyber incident could create instability or a crisis” between the two nations.1197  Although not as 
formal, the United States and China do pursue a model of risk reduction under the rubric of 
“constructive management of differences.” President Xi Jimping has labeled cooperation in this 
manner to be “of vital importance to the global community.”1198  The model applies not just to 
cyber security, but also to maritime disputes, as urged by the Chinese Chief of General Staff 
Fang Fenghui for the two sides to “manage their differences in a constructive way” in regard to 
South China Sea tensions, which has resulted in protests against U.S. tests of maritime claims 
instead of conflict.1199 
 
On a more global scale, the U.S. Department of State has advanced the development of 
practical cyber confidence-building measures to reduce risk.1200  This has occurred through 
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agreement in the ASEAN Regional Forum in 2015 on a work plan for such, and in the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in 2016 on implementation of an initial set 
of voluntary confidence-building measures, which include: 
 
 Provide national views on threats to and in use of ICTs. 
 Facilitate co-operation among national bodies and exchange information.  
 Hold consultations in order to reduce risks of misperceptions. 
 Share information on measures taken to ensure a secure and reliable Internet. 
 Have in place national legislation to facilitate bilateral co-operation. 
 Share information on their national organization, strategy, policies and programs.1201  
 
The development of confidence-building measures provides tools to manage expectations of 
responsible state behavior in cyberspace.  For example, measures for communication, exchange 
and cooperation during transnational investigations facilitate norms for states to not allow 
malicious activity originating from their territory.1202 
 
Capacity-Building Measures  
 
The 2015 Group of Governmental Experts commented that some states may lack 
sufficient capacity to protect ICTs and prevent a haven for malicious actors.  Consequently they 
endorsed the 2013 Group’s findings that some states may require assistance “in their efforts to 
improve the security of critical ICT infrastructure; develop technical skill and appropriate 
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legislation, strategies and regulatory frameworks to fulfil their responsibilities.”1203  The 2015 
Global Conference on Cyberspace held in The Hague not only reached the same deduction but 
also took action.  The founding partners of the event announced the launch of the Global Forum 
on Cyber Expertise, described as a global platform for cyber capacity-building.  The primary 
objectives of the Global Forum are to share expertise, experience, and best practices on thematic 
cyber issues; identify gaps in global cyber capacity and find solutions; and contribute to efforts 
to build global cyber capacity.1204  The Framework Document for the Global Forum delineates 
that participation is voluntary, and does not impose any legal obligation.  Members are to take on 
new initiatives or enhance and expand existing ones to improve capacity in cyber.1205  In 2016, 
the Global Forum consisted of fifty organizations and states working together on four focus areas 
of strengthening cybersecurity, fighting cybercrime, protecting online data and supporting e-
governance.1206  The Global Forum continues today with over sixty organizations and states 
working together on practical initiatives.  
 
Cooperative Measure Utility 
 
As a leader of the international community, the United States has remained eager to 
pursue cooperative measures to restrain state behavior based not only on mutual interests, but 
also on mutual trust.  After success in collaboration with Russia on ICT security measures, the 
United States elected to pursue comparable confidence-building measures to promote trust and 
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assurance with China.  An exchange on national policies for cyberspace was deemed the 
appropriate measure to head off the chance of fast escalating cyber attacks between the two 
nations.  Therefore prior to the U.S. Defense Secretary visit to Beijing, in April 2014 the Obama 
administration quietly briefed Chinese military leadership on the Pentagon’s emerging doctrine 
for defending against cyber attacks against the United States and for using its cyber technology 
against adversaries, including the Chinese.  The intent was to allay Chinese concerns about plans 
to triple American cyber warriors in new teams for cyber operations, and the hope was to prompt 
the Chinese to give Washington a similar briefing about People’s Liberation Army units believed 
to be behind cyber attacks on government and corporate networks in the United States.1207   
Without any guarantee of reciprocation, the briefing turned out to be a one way exchange.  
Although the United States hoped for the same openness, under the semblance of mutual 
transparency China gained access to sensitive U.S. defense information while offering very little 
in return.  The reality is that “a collaborative and transparent relationship would run counter to 
the Chinese government priorities.”1208  Ultimately the United States had no choice but to turn to 
other measures, in particular coercive diplomacy to gain cooperation on mutual interests.   
 
The result was President Xi’s pledge during his State visit to Washington in September 
2015 that China would not conduct cyber-enabled economic espionage.  Up to that point, the 
Chinese government had never even acknowledged such activity.  Remarkably at the 2015 
Group of Twenty Summit, President Xi repeated that commitment to the heads of state.  In 
response, the G-20 Leaders “affirmed that international law applies to state conduct in 
cyberspace and committed that all states should abide by norms of responsible state behavior 
in cyberspace.”1209  They also “affirmed that no country should conduct or support cyber-
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enabled theft of intellectual property with the intent of providing competitive advantages to 
companies or commercial sectors.”1210  A month later, China announced the arrest of hackers it 
says breached the OPM database.  However U.S. officials are not sure if the arrests were of the 
guilty parties.1211  FireEye and ISight Partners had attributed the attack to a Chinese state 
sponsored APT group referred to as Deep Panda, also responsible for the Anthem breach.1212  It 
seems hard to believe the Chinese government would give up the Deep Panda operation that 
routinely steals Personally Identifiable Information from U.S. commercial and government 
networks.  A combination of delivered indictments and threatened sanctions may have altered 
malicious Chinese behavior in cyberspace, shown in the OPM arrests. A year after the U.S.-
China Cyber Agreement, although FireEye Chief Technology Officer Grady Summers reported 
the cyber firm is now conducting about 10 investigations of Chinese cyber espionage a month 
compared to a prior average of 35 per month for different corporate clients,1213 according to Brad 
Bussie at STEALTHbits Technologies, “nothing has changed. Attacks and the origin of the 
attacks have simply become harder to detect.”1214      
 
The reality is that fundamental challenges in agreeing on and adhering to norms exists in 
competing views, particularly on use of the Internet.  For instance, the 2015 UN Government 
Group of experts did not accept proposed norms related to intellectual property theft.  For the 
Chinese, as a member of the UN Group, economic espionage in cyberspace is now part of 
normal business practice.  China has no tradition of protecting intellectual property, evidenced 
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1212 The Institute for Critical Infrastructure Technology, “Handing Over the Keys to the Castle,” 
Technical Report, July 2015: 3. 
1213 Joseph Marks, “Obama’s Cyber Legacy: He Did Almost Everything Right and It Still Turned 
Out Wrong,” NEXTGOV, January 17, 2017.  
1214 Doug Olenick, “U.S.-China Cyber Agreement: Flawed, but a step in the right direction,” SC 
Magazine, January 24, 2017. 
298 
 
by more than thirty years of licit and illicit acquisition of western technology.1215  A cultural 
divide exists, where the Chinese believe that intellectual property is to be rightfully copied or 
obtained.  Confucianism holds that imitation is the greatest form of flattery and emphasizes the 
significance of sharing intellectual products with society, even to the extent that it would be 
dishonorable if a scholar makes money by selling his book to others.1216   In addition, 
communism discourages individual property.1217  These fundamental precepts produce the 
prevailing Chinese view that copying is a form of compliment rather than disrespect, and thus 
justly acceptable.1218  This view permeates Chinese thought to the extent that the obtainment of 
intellectual property for imitation is a moral duty.  For illustration, after a Chinese national 
admitted to conspiring to hack into the computer systems of major U.S. defense contractors to 
steal military hardware secrets on Beijing’s behalf,1219 the state-run Global Times said that if he 
had done so, “we are willing to show our gratitude and respect for his service to our country.”1220   
 
On the contrary, the United States recognizes acts of cyber-enabled intellectual property 
theft as unlawful and impermissible.  Assistant Attorney General John Carlin called the 
sentencing of the aforementioned Chinese national as “just punishment” for his role in a 
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conspiracy “to illegally access and steal sensitive U.S. military information.”1221  Therefore to 
establish an environment of common expectations, the United States seeks to consolidate 
regional and international consensus on key cyberspace activities.  Although consensus is 
difficult to achieve when not just values, but basic rights diverge.  For example, the U. S. 
International Strategy for Cyberspace opines that “states should not have to choose between the 
free flow of information and the security of their networks.”  The reason is because the best 
cybersecurity solution tools secure systems “without crippling innovation, suppressing freedom 
of expression or association, or impeding global interoperability.”1222  In contrast, some 
totalitarian states call for national-level filters and firewalls that increase sovereign control over 
Internet access and content.  At the 2015 World Internet Conference, Chinese President Xi called 
for governments to cooperate in regulating Internet use, stepping up attempts to promote 
controls.  The human rights group Amnesty International scorned this assault on Internet 
freedom to make censorship and surveillance the norm everywhere under the guise of security.  
For already in China, the Communist Party tries to prevent Internet users from seeing news 
outlets, the Google search engine, and social media such as Facebook.1223   In November 2016, 
China adopted a controversial cyber security law where elements, such as “criminalizing the use 
of the Internet to damage national unity, would further restrict online freedom.1224    
 
According to Christopher Painter, the U.S. Coordinator for Cyber Issues, the area of 
Internet governance is where authoritarian governments are “pushing to shift from the long-
standing and successful multi-stakeholder model...to an intergovernmental and exclusive system 
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that could fundamentally undermine the future growth and potential of the Internet.”1225  The 
United States counters this movement by working to support and enhance the multi-stakeholder 
model, as evidenced by the Commerce Department announcement in 2014 of intent to transfer its 
stewardship of key Internet domain name functions to the global Internet community.1226  In 
keeping this promise, the United States transferred the Domain Naming System to ICANN (the 
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers) on 1st October 2016, even over the 
objections of several U.S politicians that the transfer increases “the power of foreign 
governments over the internet.”1227  Those objections continued in 2017 when Senator Ted Cruz 
insisted in the appointment of a new National Telecommunications and Information 
Administrator on the assembly of a “panel of experts to investigate options for unwinding” the 
transfer, which Cruz referred to as an “internet giveaway”.1228  Whereas in a show of contrasting 
views on multi-stakeholder governance, China and Russia have advocated for a new global 
cybercrime treaty that controls free speech and undermines human rights, while disregarding the 
long standing Budapest Convention on Cyber Crime from 2001 that has already been ratified by 
46 countries.1229   From the 2015 Global Conference on Cyberspace, the Chair’s Statement 
reiterates the need to ensure that fundamental human rights are protected online.  The Chair also 
notes commitment at the Conference to a multi-stakeholder approach for Internet governance 
that includes “civil society, the technical community, business and governments across the 
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globe.”1230  While the next Global Conference in The Hague called upon all stakeholders to 
strength the evolution of the multi-stakeholder model to achieve a free and open Internet, some 
countries would prefer to stake out borders in cyberspace, in a form of “balkanization of the 
Internet.”1231  
 
An Insufficient Deterrence Option 
 
Part of the problem in achieving cooperation for restraint in cyberspace is that states are 
not going to agree on what they do not know is acceptable; instead they will wait to see what the 
international community will not tolerate.  For instance China operates at a peer level and will do 
what it wants, inside the precise language of what is allowed, based on an assessment of its own 
national interests in any given situation.1232  Take for example the Chinese military buildup in the 
South China Sea on disputed islands.  As President Obama hosted Southeast Asia allies at a 
summit in California in February 2016, China stationed a modern surface-to-air weapons system, 
the HQ-9 on Woody Island in the Paracel chain, controlled by China but claimed by Vietnam 
and Taiwan.1233  Then a month later, China not only deployed anti-ship cruise missiles, the YJ-
62, to the island,1234 but test fired the coastal battery.1235  The placement of these advanced 
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weapons not only challenges U.S. policy to sail anywhere in the world that international law 
allows, but also imposes China’s unilateral resolution on island claims that the United States has 
insisted to be settled through negotiations.  Russia also pushes international law and order to the 
edge, then recasts language to their terms.  Although NATO called the Russian annexation of 
Crimea in March 2014 a violation of international law, Russia defended its actions as the lawful 
protection of the Russian speaking minority in Crimea.  However there were really no 
indications that native Russians were in any danger, and even if so, that pretense could only have 
justified their evacuation, not the occupation of the entire peninsula.  Without an invitation by 
the Ukrainian authorities to intervene in their country, the annexation by Russia was simply an 
illegal violation of the territorial integrity of Ukraine.1236 
 
In addition, States use proxies, groups that act as a substitute for another, to allow for 
‘plausible deniability.’  By the time the Russian Parliament approved the deployment of troops 
into Ukraine, Russian military forces disguised as ‘little green men’ were already present in 
Crimea.  According to President Putin, these armed men were “members of ‘self-defense groups’ 
organized by locals who bought all their uniforms and hardware in a shop.”1237  Likewise in the 
‘Donetsk People’s Republic,’ Russian Special Forces troops reportedly reinforced local 
‘separatists.’1238  This use of ‘volunteers’ allowed the Russian government to deny any 
involvement in Ukraine for months.  Even more so, Russian use of proxies in the conflict in 
Ukraine extended beyond the physical domain into cyberspace.  Here the most prominent proxy 
actors have been hacktivist groups, to include pro-Moscow Anonymous Ukraine and 
CyberBerkut.  Their activities range from DDoS attacks and web defacements to the leaking of 
government files.  While Ukrainian government officials blame the Russian government for 
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indirectly orchestrating these operations, the latter denies accusations that it has any influence 
over the groups.1239  Yet the accusations are consistent with Russian government reliance on 
criminals and hacker groups to hide their attempts to break into computer systems.  Admiral 
Rogers, the head of U.S. Cyber Command, testifies that this relationship “theoretically makes it 
more difficult to go to country X and say we see this activity going on, you are doing it, this is 
unacceptable,” when they have the ability “to say it’s not us, it’s criminal groups.”1240    
 
Ultimately to attribute an attack to states, or to their proxies, to hold them accountable for 
irresponsible behavior is a political decision, which varies depending on the target and nature of 
the attack.  In the OPM hack, even though forensic evidence leaves little doubt that China was 
responsible, the Obama administration chose not to make any official assertion.1241  Likewise in 
hacks into unclassified networks at the State Department and White House, although 
investigators traced the malicious activity to hackers associated with the Russian government, 
U.S. officials refrained from going public with that allegation against Moscow.1242  Like these 
political decisions, norms of responsible behavior are just political agreements, not binding arms 
control treaties, to be enforced by signature parties, or binding laws and rules, that hold parties 
accountable.  At the very best norms can develop into shared daily practice by states and then 
eventually become customary international laws.   Diplomatic statements, press releases, military 
manuals, national court decisions, legal advisor opinions, international tribunal rulings and 
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executive orders “can all serve to develop international law.”1243  Like minded nations must 
actively work together to develop those customary principles if they are eventually to be seen as 
the law in cyberspace.  
 
The capability to create norms of responsible behavior and other forms of cooperative 
measures exists, but to be credible, uncooperative nations have to believe that their interests are 
also at stake.  Admiral Rogers has publicly communicated that point, in saying “To my Chinese 
counterparts, I would remind them, increasingly you are as vulnerable as any other major 
industrialized nation state.  The idea that you can somehow exist outside the broader global cyber 
challenges I don’t think is workable.”1244  Nonetheless strategic advisor Patrick Cronin pointed 
out that “China apparently does not want to buy into a post-World War II international system 
that it did not play a role in creating.”1245  Cronin believes that finding a meaningful partnership 
with China will require some adjustments to the international order.  Then in that new order, 
nations will determine through international relations what is considered to be irresponsible or 
unacceptable behavior.  Take for example espionage, which by its terms violates state 
sovereignty, but since states do it to each other, over time espionage has become part of 
customary international law established by state practice.  The blurry line between cyber-enabled 
espionage and intellectual property theft complicates state interpretation of what are realistic and 
consistent norms for responsible behavior in cyberspace.  For the latter activity, despite claims 
by the United States of massive economic damage, without actual physical damage, there is no 
clear consensus if cyber-enabled economic espionage even qualifies as a violation of territorial 
sovereignty.  Until underlying state objectives and values converge to remove conflicting 
interests regarding cyberspace, the strategy of deterrence by entanglement will remain an 
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insufficient strategic cyber deterrence option.  In sum, then, the shortcomings of deterrence by 
entanglement, and the primary mechanism of norms, if applied to cybered conflict are competing 
state interests, self-serving technical and legal interpretations, and plausible deniability of 
wrongful acts. 
 
 
  
306 
 
 
 
 
Section Three: 
 
 
 
A New Strategic Option  
307 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
Active Cyber Defense 
 
The strategy of active cyber defense is based upon the real-time detection and analysis of 
network security breaches seeks to create a comprehensive, automated and thereby unavoidable 
response to neutralize and reinforce the effects automatically through associated auto trigger of 
legal simultaneous countermeasures inside and beyond network and state territorial 
boundaries.1246  Active cyber defense in the near term combines internal systemic resilience to 
defeat malicious cyber activity after a network intrusion and tailored disruption capacities to 
punish the attacker.  It serves as a comprehensive combination of strategic capabilities available 
now and able to compensate for the shortcomings of denial and retaliation in contemporary 
deterrence approaches while more comprehensive structures combining all three contemporary 
approaches are being evolved.  The strategy encourages adversary restraint by shaping malicious 
actor experiences and thereby perceptions of the costs and benefits of any given cyber attack 
automatically and at scale large enough to handle the multiplicity of malicious actors in 
cyberspace.  Since intrusions may not always be stopped at the perimeter, active cyber defense 
operates at cyber relevant speed before malicious activity can affect networks and systems.1247  
Active cyber defense is different from static activities, which harden networks and systems 
through preventive controls.  Active cyber defense uses reactive activities, which stop or limit 
damage through detective controls and remediation actions, seamlessly automated in a common 
framework of integration.  According to the Defense Information Systems Agency deputy Chief 
Technology Officer, we need “cyber capabilities integrated with each other and automatically 
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defending against things.”1248 That means using not just a defense-in-depth strategy to layer 
various methods of cyber defense, but to include the more flexible tools and capabilities to be 
included in the strategy of active cyber defense.  
 
Admiral Michael Rogers, the head of the National Security Agency, warned the audience 
at the London Stock Exchange that “it is not about if you will be penetrated, but when.”1249  If 
true that cyber defenses cannot block an attack, then organizations have to close the time from 
compromise to discovery before an actor achieves their objectives.  Yet in 2015, the time from 
evidence of compromise to discovery of compromise, or the median time that threat groups are 
present on a network before detection, was 146 days.1250  Active cyber defense seeks to close that 
gap by using synchronized, real-time capabilities not only to discover and detect the breach, but 
also to analyze and mitigate the threat and vulnerabilities.  The difficult question to ask is 
whether these improved defenses are adequate enough to stop malicious actors inside the 
network or if an appropriate response is necessary outside the network to disrupt their activities.  
The use of proportionate countermeasures is allowed to some extent under international or 
customary law but constrained under national law, depending upon the party invoking their 
rights. Therefore the scope or use of active cyber defense depends on authorities to act inside or 
outside of the network.  It is worth noting that while the rights of an injured state to resort to 
countermeasures in response to an internationally wrongful act or omission are explicitly 
articulated by international law, an argument can be made that licensed private companies in the 
United States should have the right to hack back in self-defense or in defense of property.  
Private actor hack back could turn “the tables on the attacker,” thwarting or stopping a crime, or 
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even stealing back what was taken.1251  However, it is not required for a robust active cyber 
defense strategy. 
 
 The promise of active cyber defense is to deny benefits through systemic resilience and 
impose costs through tailored disruption in a rapid, more comprehensive and practical manner 
than what the three contemporary deterrence approaches can currently offer.  Certain aspects of 
the strategy are agnostic to the origins and motivations of the malicious actor unlike 
contemporary deterrence by retaliation.  Specifically active cyber defense capabilities deny actor 
objectives and raise actor costs by obstructing or interfering actively with their progress in the 
cyber kill chain inside the network and thereby signaling failure and likely future failures rapidly 
and directly. Regardless of who is the actor, even state intelligence agencies, their malware or 
techniques are detected, diverted, blocked or terminated.  In recognition that a perfect defense 
against intrusion is impossible, active cyber defense also offers remedies outside the network.   
Either way, inside or outside the network, the strategy seeks to convince malicious actors that it 
is no longer worth making the attack.  The strategic option of active cyber defense possesses the 
three necessary conditions to achieve deterrence, specifically the capability to deliver an 
appropriate cyber response, the communications to signal intentions, and the credibility to not 
tolerate malicious activity.1252  This chapter starts with an illustrative case that depicts the virtues 
of active cyber defense capabilities applied across before, during and after the cyber kill chain is 
initiated.  It then examines the opportunities and issues for use of active cyber defense inside and 
outside the network a new strategy to achieve deterrence within the cyber arena, one that 
critically reinforces and compensates for – rather than replaces – the other three contemporary 
deterrence strategies.      
 
 
                                                          
1251 Melissa Riofrio, “Hacking Back: Digital Revenge is Sweet but Risky,” PC World, May 9, 
2013.  
1252 Emilio Iasiello, “Hacking Back: Not the Right Solution,” Parameters, Vol. 44, No. 3, 
Autumn 2014: 107. 
310 
 
Illustrative Case of Active Cyber Defense Virtues 
 
The massive theft of data at the mega retailers Target Corporation in 2013 and Home 
Depot in 2014 exhibited many similarities.  In both incidents, attackers were able to upload 
malicious software to point-of-sale machines and collect unencrypted credit and debit card data 
for exfiltration.  The Reedum malware, nearly identical to BlackPOS sold on cybercrime forums, 
used in the Target breach,1253 was the basis for the tool used against Home Depot.1254  The initial 
intrusion into the Target system was traced to network credentials stolen from a third party 
refrigeration, heating and air conditioning vendor.1255  Likewise, an investigation revealed that 
criminals used a third-party vendor’s user name and password to enter into Home Depot’s 
network.1256  After authenticated access to the networks, attackers moved laterally to eventually 
compromise the point-of-sale systems at checkout counters. In both high profile breaches, 
personal and financial information of millions of customers was exposed for criminal uses.  This 
exposure was not deterred but could have been prevented by active cyber defense.  Its 
exceptionally rapid and comprehensive detection, verification, and remediation of malicious 
behavior in the cyber kill chain, could have stopped harm or damage before the breach occurred.   
 
Most organizations do not have reliable visibility of malicious activity in their networks.  
The most common approach is to look for indicators of compromise, such as virus signatures.  
This approach tends to produce high amounts of false positives, which can desensitize security 
teams to notifications.  In the Target breach, the FireEye malware intrusion detection system 
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used by the retailer actually detected the data exfiltration malware used in the attack, but 
reportedly the security team ignored the urgent alerts and did not allow the FireEye software to 
delete the malware.1257  They claimed to receive hundreds of alerts each day and had difficulty 
determining which were malicious.1258  This situation portrays a need for an approach that 
accurately and automatically prioritizes alerts. For example the previously described HawkEve G 
advanced threat detection and response platform provides that approach in using a threat feed 
that combines network and host sensors in order to detect and perform correlation on 
sophisticated and emerging threats.  In addition, the platform collects a baseline of historical data 
across the network and hosts to determine anomalous behavior and activities.  The vendor 
adamantly claims that “several months prior to the cyber attacks on Target and Home Depot, the 
HawkEye G threat feed had already blacklisted the source and could have helped both retailers 
detect and prevent these attacks.”1259  This claim supports the notion that the use of behavioral 
analytics with threat intelligence to detect and investigate threats in real time can optimize efforts 
of security teams.  
  
In both the Target and Home Depot breaches, the starting point for detection was well 
inside the cyber kill chain due to attacker use of valid vendor credentials.  Verizon consultants 
hired to probe the Target networks days after the breach found “no controls limiting their access 
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to any system.”1260  Instead they discovered systems and services with either weak or default 
passwords and either outdated or missing security patches. These discoveries meant once inside 
Target’s network, there was nothing to stop the attackers from moving across the cyber kill 
chain, as depicted by phases in the chapter on deterrence by denial (on page 234).  The first 
opportunity for Target to disrupt the breach was at the Delivery phase, by requiring two-factor 
authentication for its vendors which means besides the stolen credentials, a second step is 
included such as a token or phone code or security question. At the Exploitation phase, Target 
could have paid attention to the FireEye software alerts or allowed malware deletion.  At the 
Installation phase, it is suspected that the attacker exploited a default account name in a software 
management system, which Target could have altered.  In the Command and Control phase, the 
method used by the attackers is unclear and Target’s protective options were limited to Firewalls. 
Finally, at the Actions on Objectives phase, Target could have white listed1261 - created listings 
of pre-approved - File Transfer Protocols (FTP), which is “a standard internet protocol for 
transmitting files between computers on the internet,”1262 designated servers for uploading data, 
thereby blocking transmissions to outside servers, at least one found later to be located in Russia.  
Outside the network, Target’s FireEye software did decode the destination of the servers on 
which stolen credit card data was stored for days at a time,1263 opening an opportunity to disrupt 
the files on those servers.  
 
Although the opportunities for breaking the kill chain appear limited in the Target breach, 
an analysis of the actions of the attacker and placement of resources to address capability gaps 
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“raises the costs an adversary must expend to achieve their objectives.”1264  A number of 
technologies and processes can be identified and applied to detect, deny, disrupt or recover at 
each phase of the kill chain.1265  For example the LightCyber Magna platform combines many of 
these technologies and processes across the kill chain for network and endpoint behavioral 
detection.  Magna uses a next generation firewall at the Delivery phase, an intrusion detection 
system at the Exploitation phase, and endpoint detection and response at the Installation phase.  
Magna embraces the industry-wide megatrend toward automated removal of advanced threats. 
For instance one requirement in the trend is the ability to detect data flows, which might include 
outbound traffic from an internal server.1266  Magna profiles the pattern and rate/volume of data 
sent to outside entities by domain and destination.  It detects a change or anomaly in rate/volume 
of data sent.  In the Target breach, the malware sent stolen data to an external FTP server via 
another compromised Target server used to collect the credit and debit card data.  Over a period 
of two weeks, the attackers collected and transmitted 11 GB of stolen information.1267  Not only 
does Magna have the capability to detect anomalously large uploads to external servers via FTP, 
Magna also includes a significant concentration of algorithms designed to detect the internal 
communications/movement of data to/from a compromised server.  Magna almost certainly 
would have alerted on this activity (and the control of the compromised server) before the data 
exfiltration phase, preventing the exposure of customer financial data.   
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Today organizations like Target do not have to rely on manual analysis and adjustments. 
Automated active defense solutions, inside the network, provide distinct advantages over the 
attacker and warrant further consideration as a way to change the cost and benefit paradigm.  
 
Inside Defender’s Network 
 
Although preventive controls have improved, so too have the techniques used by 
malicious actors to penetrate cyber defenses.  They morph, encrypt and disguise existing 
malware so it cannot be detected by signature based defenses; develop custom malware for zero 
day targeted attacks before signature distribution; and create evasive malware that hides from 
sandboxes (virtual test environments) that attempt to capture and evaluate malware intent and 
capabilities.1268  Even if security teams can find an initial threat indicator, it often takes days or 
weeks to trace the attack, analyze the threat, quarantine compromised systems, and implement 
remediation actions.  The longer that process takes, the longer the malicious actor has to achieve 
objectives inside the network.  Active cyber defense compensates for the shortcomings of 
deterrence by denial through reactive capabilities predicated on automated and integrated 
technologies. To break the cyber kill chain, active cyber defense synchronizes “the real-time 
detection, analysis, and mitigation of threats to critical networks and systems.”1269 Active cyber 
defense creates internal systemic resilience, wherein networks and systems can withstand a 
potential attack.  Hence, the U.S. Defense Department has stated its intention to invest in 
resilient systems to continue operations in the face of disruptive or destructive cyber attacks.  
Documented as a form of deterrence, the U.S. Defense Department asserts that “effective 
resilience measures can help convince potential adversaries of the futility of commencing cyber 
attacks.”1270   Furthermore “in order for resilience to succeed as a factor in effective deterrence” 
in organizations that “fall outside its authority,” the Defense Department counts on other 
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government agencies to “work with critical infrastructure owners and operators and the private 
sector to develop resilient and redundant systems” through a comprehensive cyber deterrence 
strategy.1271   
 
Typical Proactive Activities 
 
 Common active cyber defense approaches have achieved resilience by placing emphasis 
on proactive methods to engage or deceive the adversary before or during a cyber incident.  An 
organization might respond to an attack using as many as three active defense concepts: 
detection, deception, and termination.1272  For the first concept, a variety of techniques can detect 
an attack, but the most prominent to attract attackers and look for their patterns of behavior are 
the use of honeypots and sinkholes per below:   
 
Honeypots: are computer systems set up to act as a decoy to lure attackers away from 
assets of real value. They can be isolated or placed inside a production network to detect, deflect 
or study attempts to gain unauthorized access.1273  Honeypots elicit exploitation by attackers by 
the use of real or simulated vulnerabilities or by configuration weakness, like easily guessed 
passwords.1274  Legal issues confound the use of honeypots, in particular concerning privacy 
rights and entrapment accusations. Privacy concerns stem from honeypot recording and 
monitoring of all activity occurring on the device without consent.  Entrapment concerns stem 
from inducement or encouragement of a person to commit a crime.1275  Yet neither privacy nor 
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1274 Anand Sastry, “Honeypots for network security: How to track attackers’ activity,” Tech 
Target, November 16, 2010.  
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entrapment would be considered as a serious legal defense, for after all, the attacker committed 
the intrusion in the first place without authorization. The real issue is that organizations that 
deploy honeypots have to watch for their misuse, for if a malicious actor uses the honeypot as a 
launch point to attack other systems, then the organization could be held liable for any 
damages.1276  
 
 Sinkholes: are a system under the control of a defender used to intercept and receive 
traffic redirected from infected machines, like a botnet.  The can provide intelligence to craft 
appropriate defenses, identify infection targets or geographically locate attackers.1277 
Organizations can set up an internal sinkhole where only traffic bound for an external malicious 
IP from victim machines in the organization is manipulated.  Or they can set up an external 
sinkhole by registering known malicious domains as they expire or if not registered at all. Legal 
issues confound the use of external sinkholes in that victim machines that do not belong to your 
organization are now contacting a server you control, which is a criminal act in most 
jurisdictions. Another issue is that victims have a right to be notified if their machines are 
infected, which requires a reporting mechanism to do so.1278   
 
While honeypots and sinkholes also deceive the attacker, other methods in a deception 
campaign include allowing the attacker “to steal documents that contain false or misleading 
information.”1279  While this method is intended to protect intellectual property or trade secrets, 
there could be harm if the misleading information is accidently leaked to the public and results in 
damage to the organization’s credibility or reputation.  The final concept of termination stops the 
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attack while it is occurring.  In order to prevent information from leaving the network, the idea is 
to sever connections with the infected computer, although that might not work if the attacker has 
already moved laterally in the network.  Each of the three options have merit but as rudimentary 
singular methods they have inherent limitations.  Therefore today’s approach for active cyber 
defense focuses on the advanced automation and integration of multiple services and 
mechanisms to execute detection, verification and remediation in cyber-relevant time.  
 
New Reactive Approaches 
  
 Automation has become a key component of network protection strategies. As stated by 
the Chief Technology Officer at network management and discovery tools developer Solar 
Winds, “automating network security can help to quickly pinpoint a breach, identify the root 
cause and often help to resolve the issue quicker than manually checking every endpoint and 
connection.”1280 A corollary to automation is security event correlation, which can produce 
suitable remediation decisions. Those decisions can also be automated, like to revise user 
authorization privileges, place systems into protected zones, or redirect network flows.  Once 
automated processes replace human operators, networks become more responsive to attacks. 
Humans are being overloaded with data, especially false positive alerts (errors in evaluations) 
from security information and event management (SIEM) systems. Automation systems can 
extract insights from data sets and device logs in real time.  For example, Carbon Black 
technologies automate the continual recording of critical data before the moment of compromise, 
so after a breach is discovered, Carbon Black can highlight activity to better understand the cause 
and scope of the intrusion.1281 
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 The Carbon Black capability to continuously monitor connections and devices while 
correlating logs and data of user activity turns security automation into a reactive tool to deny 
malicious actors the benefit of their attack.  Automation empowers security teams to act more 
quickly and aggressively to stop data breaches before they can threaten an organization.  Today 
security teams lack the speed and agility to respond to a suspected data breach.  Not only do 
teams lack the personnel and tools to identify anomalous behavior across endpoints and the 
network, they are not authorized to actually shut it down.1282  Given the consequences of a data 
breach, organizations can no longer rely on manual procedures.  They have to reduce the time to 
query through data, detect the breach and get to the decision point on remediation.  Automation 
enables 24 hour security operations, with policy changes in remediation decisions if humans are 
or are not in the loop. At the same time, automation allows organizations to reduce manpower 
and save costs, by shifting basic and mundane tasks to machines.  This benefit is important given 
ominous projections of shortfalls of more than 1.5 million information security professionals in the 
global cyber security workforce by 2019.  According to Brett Helm, Chairman and CEO of DB 
Networks, “Intelligent IT security automation through machine learning and behavioral analysis 
is faster, more accurate, and frees up skilled professionals to focus on more critical issues.”1283   
 
 Besides the advantages of automation, the integration of a diverse set of capabilities 
improves an organization’s ability to respond to a cyber attack.  Take for example the integration 
of endpoint detection and response solutions with third party devices or services.  An endpoint is 
an Internet-capable computer hardware device, such as a desktop computer, laptop, smart phone, 
printer or other specialized hardware such as a point-of-sale terminal or smart meter.1284  
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Endpoint detection and response solutions monitor a range of actions on these devices.  For 
example, they track registry entries created, edited and deleted; files created, opened, modified 
and deleted; changes in process tables; and network connections to other systems on the network 
or to unknown servers on the Internet.1285  The advantage of these types of detection and 
response solutions is the ability to find and react to the activities of malware that may have 
evaded preventive controls.  Yet to be effective, the endpoint detection and response solutions 
have to integrate easily with other devices, for example to automatically send unknown files to a 
sand box for analysis, or with other services, for example to get up-to-date threat intelligence 
based on the actor techniques.  Therefore, the actuation of active cyber defense inside the 
network requires combinations of capabilities to collect security data, detect advanced malware, 
apply threat intelligence, conduct forensic analysis, and implement remediation actions.  
  
Single Integrated Platforms 
 
 Active cyber defense strives to provide real-time defense inside the network through 
automation and integration of cyber defense services and capabilities.  These synchronized 
services and capabilities are used to discover and detect a breach, and interdict, isolate or remove 
the threat. The benefits of new active defense solutions include:1286  
 
 Detection of known, unknown, and zero-day threats missed by most anti-virus products.    
 Coupling of enhanced threat intelligence and behavioral analytics on endpoint activity. 
 Integration with the most effective commercial security solutions on the market.  
 Threat response by policy-based automated or machine-guided remediation actions. 
 Integration to SIEM systems, big data analytics, and real-time dashboards.   
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The need for continuous threat detection and response is becoming obvious and a number of 
endpoint security solutions achieve the benefits of automated investigation and removal.  For 
example, one option is HawkEye G, acquired by WatchGuard Technologies,1287 which provides 
automated detection, verification, and remediation capabilities in a single integrated endpoint 
detection and response platform.1288  
 
 HawkEye G received a score of 4.875 out of 5 in testing of ability to identify, block and 
remove threats in an independent evaluation.1289  Hexis has described the ability of the Hawkeye 
G platform to remove advanced threats at machine speed before they can steal data, compromise 
intellectual property or cause process disruption.1290  The platform provides visibility of threat 
actor activity on the endpoint through host and network sensors.  The host sensor uses heuristics 
that analyze files, processes and registry events as they are created, modified, or executed.  175 
different heuristics are calculated individually and then combined to give an initial threat score 
that is enhanced by cloud-based malware verification service. Network sensors utilize deep 
packet inspection technology to detect application usage by threat actors.  The inspection module 
looks for outbound communication from infected endpoints, specifically for command and 
control traffic and downloading of exploits and remote access toolkits.  The HawkEye G threat 
feed that covers malware data, phishing URLs, and controller information, is aggregated from 
multiple sources, to include integrated third party devices such as Palo Alto Networks Wildfire 
and FireEye Network Security.  After the threat is verified and assigned a unified score, a range 
of network and host-based countermeasures are deployed to remediate the threat.  Machine 
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guided actions for the host include to kill an executing process, quarantine a file, remove a 
registry value hijacked by malware, or whitelist a process and for the network include block 
access to controller URLs and divert traffic to/from an external server to a Bot Trap.  
Countermeasures can be executed manually or through automated policies based on multiple 
configurations that consider targets, scores and actions.1291   
 
 Another previously discussed platform is LightCyber Magna, acquired by Palo Alto 
Networks,1292 that combines automated investigation and integrated remediation to reduce 
attacker dwell time and minimize damage.1293  Like Hawkeye G, it was developed in response to 
a current lack of ability to detect active attacks.  The difference is Magna detects attackers 
through the anomalies their activity introduces.  The platform profiles normal user and device 
behavior then uses attack detectors to find behavior that registers as anomalies against those 
profiles.  Magna has hundreds of detectors across all phases of the cyber kill chain, from 
reconnaissance, lateral movement, command & control, and data exfiltration.   Magna embraces 
criticism of the kill chain expressed at Black Hat 2016 that the steps to be addressed should be 
internal, under a presumption of breach.1294  A pertinent example is at the internal reconnaissance 
phase after intrusion, where the attacker is attempting to find out what servers and services are 
accessible or what vulnerabilities are available, Magna uses profiles of patterns of internal 
connections to find attack detectors, such as changes in connections, rates of connections and use 
of ports and protocols.1295  Magna then enhances anomalous process findings with threat 
intelligence and malware analysis.  Upon confirmation of an active attack, Magna provides one-
click remediation through integration with third party security tools.  Supported capabilities 
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include the ability to revoke user credentials or force a password reset with Microsoft Active 
Directory, or quarantine breached endpoints and malicious IPs or URL domains with Palo Alto 
Networks next generation firewall.1296   
 
Outside Victim’s Network  
 
For the state the aggressive use of countermeasures beyond network and state territorial 
boundaries is governed by international law.  Proportionate countermeasures are allowed in 
response to harm originating from a state.1297  In the cyber context, countermeasures represent 
disruption capacities tailored to the circumstances of the harm. For private companies, not acting 
on behalf of the state, a number of legal issues confront the use of these forward deployment 
techniques. However, U.S. common law does admit “certain rights of self-defense and the 
defense of property in preventing the commission of a crime against an individual or a 
corporation.”1298 The defense of property is more limited in range of allowable actions, roughly 
comparable to what is allowed for non-lethal self-defense. For private companies the relevant 
concept will most always be defense of property, although that right does not allow for 
vigilantism.  An argument exists that private companies have no choice but to resort to self-help, 
as the government is doing too little to protect them.1299  Without policy or guidance, victims 
might already be taking self-help actions based on their own judgements and perceptions, which 
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could have substantial consequences.  A Black Hat survey in 2012 found that thirty-six percent 
of attendees when asked “Have you ever engaged in retaliatory hacking?” said either “once” or 
“frequently”.1300  The question of whether private companies should be licensed to act on the 
government’s behalf persists in the face of debilitating cyber attacks.  
 
Permissive Conditions 
 
In the Tallinn Manual 2.0, Rule 20 delineates that “A State may be entitled to take 
countermeasures, whether cyber in nature or not, in response to a breach of an international legal 
obligation that is owed by another State.”1301  The Rule is derived primarily from the Draft 
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, developed by the 
International Law Commission.  Although not a binding treaty, the Draft Articles are 
authoritative and reflect and constitute customary international law, as extensively cited by legal 
bodies for fifteen years and commended to governments by the UN General Assembly.1302  They 
define countermeasures as “measures which would otherwise be contrary to the international 
obligations of [an] injured state vis-à-vis the responsible state if they were not taken by the 
former in response to an internationally wrongful act by the latter in order to procure cessation 
and reparation.”1303  Regarding what constitutes an internationally wrongful act, the responsible 
state would for example have violated a treaty or customary law obligation.  Prominent among 
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treaty obligations is the prohibition on the use of force contained in Article 2 of the Charter of 
the United Nations.1304  Rule 69 of the Tallinn Manual 2.0 affirms that a cyber operation 
“constitutes a use of force when its scale and effects are comparable to non-cyber operations 
rising to the level of a use of force.”1305  Prominent among customary law is the principle of 
sovereignty, which protects cyber infrastructure located on the territory of a state.  Therefore 
cyber operations against that infrastructure that qualifies as a use of force would amount to a 
violation of that state’s sovereignty.  International law experts have taken the position that 
sovereignty can be violated even when no damage or injury results, such as in the case of the 
emplacement of malware or destruction of data.1306  
 
The purpose of countermeasures is to persuade the responsible state to adhere to its legal 
obligations or to remedy existing harms.  They are not allowed for other purposes, such as 
retribution or punishment.  If the target state resumes its obligations of cessation and reparation, 
the measures are to be discontinued.1307  Therefore, a state cannot be motivated by punitive 
considerations to use countermeasures, especially if the other state’s breach of international law 
has ended.  In general, countermeasures are allowed only after the injured state has asked the 
state in question to cease its internationally wrongful act.  However this requirement is not 
absolute if urgent measures without notification are deemed necessary for the injured state to 
“preserve its rights and avoid further injury.”1308  In the cyber context, countermeasures “often 
represent an effective means of self-help by allowing the injured state to take urgent action that 
would otherwise be unavailable to it, such as ‘hacking back,’ to compel the responsible state to 
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cease its internationally wrongful cyber operations.”1309  In their application, countermeasures 
must be “commensurate with the injury suffered, taking into account the gravity of the 
internationally wrongful act.”1310  This can be interpreted as proportionate to the breach of 
obligations.  This restriction is intended to avoid the risk of escalation, where states respond 
interactively with acts of increased scope and duration.  Also, countermeasures must not 
themselves violate the prohibition on the use of force.1311  They should to the extent feasible be 
taken in such a way that permits the resumption of performance of the breached obligations in 
question.  All of this means countermeasures should consist of temporary measures that produce 
as far as possible reversible effects1312 and may only occur during an attack because 
“countermeasures must be suspended when the internationally wrongful act has ceased”1313 – a 
currently nearly impossible requirement for any but the active cyber defense strategic option.   
 
Countermeasures are allowed to be used when the breach of obligation is attributable to 
the responsible state.1314  The clearest case of being attributable is when acts are conducted by 
state organs, like military or intelligence agencies.  Acts committed by persons or entities that are 
empowered to exercise government authority, such as by a private company under contract from 
the state are equally attributable.1315  Additionally, the conduct of a person or group of persons 
shall be considered an act of a state if “acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or 
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control of, that state in carrying out that conduct.”1316  For instance, although the Iranian activist 
group Cutting Sword of Justice immediately took credit for attacking Saudi Aramco Oil 
Company with the Shamoon malware in 2012,1317 eventually the attack and group were 
attributed to the government of Iran by U.S. authorities.1318  However, incidental or peripheral 
association does not qualify as attribution. For instance, the patriotic hacker operations 
conducted against Estonia in 2007 and Georgia in 2008 were not sufficiently determined to be 
under the control of Russia to justify attribution, and therefore the use of countermeasures.  
Likewise, although the hacktivist organization calling itself the Syrian Electronic Army has 
hacked and defaced over 40 sites, mostly global media outlets and notable universities, to voice 
political sentiments in support of the Assad regime since 2011,1319 in the absence of proven 
instructions, direction, or control by Syria, the use of countermeasures is not an available 
response option for the injured state. 
 
The limitation on use of countermeasures to acts by or attributable to states is significant 
since today the majority of harmful cyber operations are conducted by non-state actors.  In 
observation of these constraints, the plea of necessity may offer relief to “states facing harmful 
non-state cyber operations” under certain conditions.1320  A state may invoke necessity as a 
ground for precluding the wrongfulness of an act if it is the “only way for the State to safeguard 
an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril.”1321  An essential interest is “one that is 
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of fundamental and great importance to the State concerned.”1322  The peril is grave “when the 
threat is especially severe.”1323  Examples of when essential interests are gravely and imminently 
threatened would be in cyber operations that debilitate the state’s banking system, ground flights 
nationwide, halt all rail traffic, alter national health records or shut down a large electrical 
grid.1324  In certain cases where the exact nature or origin of a cyber attack is not clear, a state 
may justify cyber measures on the basis of the plea of necessity.  For example in an emergency 
situation, a state could decide to shut off its own cyber infrastructure, as the only way to protect 
itself, even if doing so affects other state’s cyber systems.  In this instance the state’s action is 
“directed against the danger itself, and not directed against another state or aggressor.”1325  
Similarly, if significant cyber operations of unknown origin target its critical infrastructure, the 
Tallinn Manual 2.0 contends that “the plea of necessity could justify a State’s resort to counter-
hacking.”1326  Therefore, the plea of necessity provides a failsafe for a state facing severe cyber 
operations when they cannot be attributed to another state.  For that matter, “factual and legal 
attribution is not a precondition to action,” only that the state “locate the technological source of 
the harmful operation and assess the consequences of its own response.”1327 Therefore the plea 
can be resorted to whether the malicious actor is governmental or private.  
 
Disruption Choices 
 
“Only an injured state may engage in countermeasures” in response to an internationally 
wrongful act, or engage in counter-hacking under the plea of necessity, to disrupt a cyber 
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operation in progress.1328  The more controversial term hack back usually applies when a private 
organization responds with a counterattack. The difference between countermeasures and hack 
back is accessing a computer, network or information systems without authorization. An 
organization may be motivated to hack back against an attacker “to recover or wipe stolen data 
or intellectual property.”1329  An organization may also be motivated to enact revenge by 
“disrupting or damaging the malicious actor’s system” or “degrading their capability to conduct 
future attacks.”1330  The cyber security firm Symbiot has placed methods of hack back into three 
categories: 1) invasive techniques to obtain access and then purse a “strategy of disabling, 
destroying, or seizing control over attacking assets,” 2) symmetric counterstrikes which 
proportionally exploit “vulnerabilities on the attacker’s system,” and 3) asymmetric 
counterstrikes which constitute “retaliation... far in excess of the attack.”1331   
 
Countermeasures and hack back are similar in that an entity, whether a state or a private 
company, returns fire or sends data back at the attacker in some manner to stop the attack.  Thus 
the range of tailored disruption choices for the two is blurred by motivation and authority.  The 
range of countermeasures represents a sliding scale of aggressive actions that may include:  
 
 Allow attackers to steal bogus files or embed beacons that reveal his location1332  
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 Bait files with malware to photograph the malicious actor using his webcam1333 
 Infiltrate malicious actor networks to retrieve, alter or delete stolen data 
 Implant malware to damage or ransomware to lock down actor computers1334 
 Insert logic bombs into files before stolen to damage computers when opened 
 Use Denial of Service attacks to interfere with malicious activity 
 
These methods are usually enabled by a combination of intrusion detection system technology to 
detect the intrusion and advanced traceback technology to ensure accurate targeting of the 
hacker.1335  Primary IP traceback schemes or techniques are link testing, packet marking, ICMP 
(Internet Control Message Protocol) traceback, and log-based traceback.1336  Analysis of logs 
(firewall, router, server and endpoint operating system) that extend from the network to the 
endpoint could reveal and correlate inbound and outbound attack patterns for route 
determination.  Other methods for traceback include use of the Google Alerts function to search 
for stolen files, recognition of actor tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP), and inspection of 
industry threat intelligence.  Some form of the disruptive responses above have been occurring 
for the past decade, by both government agencies and private companies, and software packages 
designed to execute them have been made commercially available to private companies.  
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Employment Options 
 
Private Companies.  Since only an injured state may use countermeasures or counter-
hacking, there is no basis under international law for a private company, such as an Information 
Technology service or security firm, to act on its own initiative in response to malicious cyber 
activity.1337  Private companies conducting methods of hack back would be subject to national 
criminal law for any violations of legal statute and be held criminally liable for unintended 
consequences.  For example in the United States, a company that decides to hack back might 
face criminal and civil liability under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA).1338  
Specifically the CFAA stature 1030(a)(5) prohibits and punishes the following offenses for 
whoever “knowingly causes the transmission of a program, information code, or command, and 
as a result of such conduct, intentionally causes damage without authorization, to a protected 
computer” and “intentionally accesses a protected computer without authorization, and as a 
result of such conduct, recklessly causes damage.”1339  The paragraph establishes “crimes of dual 
intent - the intent to knowingly or intentionally intrude and intent to damage.”1340  Damage is 
defined as “any impairment to the integrity or availability of data, a program, a system, or 
information.”1341 Computer damage is a crime under the paragraph only if it involves a protected 
computer, which includes those used by the government, financial institutions, or in interstate or 
foreign commerce or communications.1342 Under U.S. law, the punishment for a violation of the 
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paragraph (summed up as knowingly causing a transmission that intentionally causes damage) 
depends on the severity of damage or loss, but could be imprisonment for 1 to 20 years, or even 
life, and fines up to $500,000.1343   
 
Arguments do exist to allow a company to exercise its rights to self-defense and defense 
of property. As a general principle, one has the right to defend one’s self and one’s property by 
reasonable force.1344  Hack back could be warranted if traditional law enforcement schemes are 
inadequate in response, which are hampered by the speed by which cyber attacks create damage 
and the multiple jurisdictions with varying laws and procedures often used to stage the attack.  
Other criteria for determining if hack back is an optimal solution include whether the likelihood 
of striking the attacker is higher than innocent third parties and whether damage to the victim 
outweighs potential damage to third parties.1345  Although the CFAA appears to be clear on the 
matter, ambiguities do exist that could allow a company to exercise the principle of self-help.  In 
particular debate exists on the meaning of the term “authorization.” For example even though 
there is no exemption in the CFAA for a private party, “does a hacker nonetheless implicitly 
grant authorization to a hack back when that person infiltrates a victim’s systems and exfiltrates 
digital assets? Is authorization a binary concept, for which permission is or is not granted?”1346  
If authorization is interpreted in a manner desirable to those who would engage in such activities, 
hack back by private companies could serve as a deterrent and supplement law enforcement.  For 
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if a malicious actor knows that a particular company will strike back, they might be inclined to 
not attack the company in the first place.1347  
 
Licensed Privateers. The Tallinn Manual 2.0 specifically states “There is no prohibition 
against injured States turning to a private firm, including foreign companies, to conduct cyber 
countermeasures on their behalf against responsible states.”1348  The injured state would be held 
responsible for the company’s actions on their behalf, although the company would be subject to 
all applicable restrictions and conditions on the use of countermeasures.1349  For overseas firms 
not under the national laws of the injured state, this responsibility prevents denial of culpability 
by the state if undesired consequences occur.  For this reason, a more viable approach to avoid 
liability would be for the state to deputize or license a private company under its own jurisdiction 
to act on its behalf.  Historical precedence for the use of cyber privateers exists for centuries in 
the issue of letters of marque and reprisal for naval privateers, starting as early as 1205 by 
England and as late as 1941 by the United States, for a civilian dirigible to hunt enemy 
submarines.1350  Letters of marque and reprisal are basically “a license authorizing a private 
citizen to engage in reprisals against citizens or vessels of another nation.”1351  They were 
originally used by governments in time of war to grant private parties the authority to operate 
and use armed ships to attack and capture enemy merchant ships.  The letters were written with 
enough specificity to ensure the private party did not surpass the intent of the government.  
Therefore conceptually the letters or licenses could be used by the government to specify the 
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circumstances under which “hack back” may be performed by a private company for the defense 
of property.1352   
 
Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution signed in 1787 states “the Congress shall 
have Power to…grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal.”  The U.S. Congress invoked that power 
during the War of 1812 with Britain.  Later in 1856, the Paris Declaration Respecting Maritime 
Law adopted a solemn Declaration that “Privateering is, and remains, abolished.”1353  
Notwithstanding, letters of marque have been used to counter piracy or to allow for self-defense. 
For instance the British Parliament authorized private ships to attack and capture pirates after the 
Declaration of Paris.  More recently, for all practical matters, armed private companies that 
protect merchant ships off Somalia from piracy serve as a form of naval privateers.  Hence there 
is “at least a colorful argument to be made that the Paris Declaration did not render unlawful the 
issuance of letters of marque for purposes of self-defense in countering piracy.”1354  Furthermore, 
one could compare cyber criminals, hackers, or hacktivist to modern day pirates that roam not 
the seas, but cyberspace, threatening the activities and interests of nation states.1355 From this 
point, a tentative conclusion could be reached “that letters of marque for cyber privateers might, 
likewise, be lawful under international law to counter cyber pirates.”1356   
 
The United States never ratified the Paris Declaration. Whether bound by the Declaration 
or not, if any conclusion through broad interpretation that letters of marque are lawful holds 
ground, undoubtedly private companies will rise to the opportunity.   This assertion is backed by 
the appearance in 2004 of Symbiot Security, Inc., which said its new “Intelligent Security 
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Infrastructure Management Systems not only defends networks but lets them fight back.”1357  
While most of the platform consists of traditional defensive measures, like blocking or deflecting 
malicious traffic, it can also escalate the response and return fire.  The exact extent of aggressive 
measures was not made clear by the company, but executives professed in a position paper that 
based on the lawful military doctrine of necessity and proportionality, the private sector has the 
right to counterstrike hostile intent with the subsequence use of force in self-defense.1358  
Supposedly the controversial platform was deployed on several enterprise, government and 
military networks.  It is not obvious how long Symbiot maintained this stance and product, since 
they were acquired by Chaotic Moon Studios in 2012 for their development over the last decade 
of proven technologies in quantifying network risks, not for their attack response platform.1359  
 
Government Agencies.  In the United States, the Department of Defense, in concert with 
other agencies, is responsible for “defending the U.S. homeland and U.S. interests from attack, 
including attacks that may occur in cyberspace.”1360 Therefore the Department of Defense has 
been given a primary mission to “help defend the nation against cyberattacks from abroad, 
especially if they would cause loss of life, property destruction, or significant foreign policy and 
economic consequences.”1361 In doing so, the DOD conducts Defensive Cyberspace Operations 
(DCO) to “preserve the ability to use friendly cyberspace capabilities and protect data, 
networks...and other designated systems.”1362  DCO may be conducted in response to an attack, 
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exploitation or intrusion on assets that the DOD is directed to defend.  The DCO mission is 
accomplished “using a layered, adaptive, defense-in-depth approach,” with equally supporting 
components for digital and physical protection.  A key characteristic of the DCO approach is the 
“construct of active cyberspace defense.”1363  DCO activities can occur inside the network in the 
form of Internal Defensive Measures (IDM) or can occur outside the network through Response 
Actions (RA).    
 
The ultimate goal of DCO is to “change the current paradigm where the attacker enjoys 
significant advantage.”1364 They strive to accomplish this goal through passive and active 
cyberspace defense activities that outmaneuver an attacker.  DCO provides the capability to 
discover, detect, analyze and mitigate cyber threats. These operations taken for defensive 
purposes involve both DCO subcategories of Internal Defensive Measures and Response 
Actions.   The primary tasks for IDM are hunting on networks for threats that evade security and 
directing authorized internal responses.  RA is “about going after the shooter” with aggressive 
countermeasures to stop the attack in accordance with all legal and policy guidelines for 
operations outside the network.1365  Any cyber operation that equates to the use of force requires 
authority that resides at the Presidential level, which would clash with a comfort level to stay 
inside the network.  
 
Restriction Relief 
 
Countermeasures provide a proportionate response for an injured State in cases where a 
cyber incident falls below the threshold of an armed attack.  Because malicious activity in this 
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category can still have disruptive and threatening effects, States will want to react quickly.1366  
Yet there are various restrictions placed on the taking of countermeasures.  For instance when a 
state is injured by an internationally wrongful act, it may only resort to proportionate 
countermeasures aimed at the responsible state, or persons or entities attributable to the state, 
violating its legal obligations.  Execution of that right can be a problem since it is difficult to 
attribute malicious cyber activity to a particular state or actor with absolute certainty.  Likewise, 
the difficulty in establishing the connection between the state and an actor is a further obstacle in 
the use of countermeasures.  The Commentary in the Articles on State Responsibility, in the 
citing of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, affirms that “in order to attribute an act to the 
state, it is necessary to identify with reasonable certainty the actors and their association with the 
state.”1367  While that association might not be possible, the determination of reasonable certainty 
may be possible regarding the location from where the malicious activity was launched.  Under 
the principle of due diligence, even in situations where the state is not behind the harm to an 
injured state, international law does allow for countermeasures in response to harm from cyber 
operations originating from the state.   
 
In essence the principle of due diligence is based on a state’s legal responsibilities “when 
cyber infrastructure located on its territory is used by another state, or by non-state actors, such 
as hacker groups, individual hacktivists, organized armed groups, or terrorists, to mount the 
operations.”1368 Rule 6 in the Tallinn Manual 2.0 provides that “a State must exercise due 
diligence in not allowing its territory, or territory or cyber infrastructure under its government 
control, to be used for cyber operations that affect the rights of, and produce serious adverse 
consequences for other States.”1369  This Rule expresses “the obligation of states to take 
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measures to ensure their territories are not used to the detriment of other states.”1370 The UN 
Government Group of Experts framed the principle of due diligence in hortatory, rather than 
obligatory terms, in stating that “States should seek to ensure that their territories are not used by 
non-state actors for unlawful use of ICTs.”1371 However if a state is “unwilling to terminate 
harmful cyber operations encompassed by the due diligence principle as opposed to unable to do 
so, the injured state may be entitled to resort to countermeasures based on the territorial state’s 
failure to comply with this Rule [6].”1372  This ruling gives the injured state another option when 
faced with harmful cyber operations conducted by non-state actors.  
 
However the principle of due diligence only indisputably applies to a cyber operation that 
results in ‘serious adverse consequences’ in another country, not one that causes “inconvenience, 
minor disruption, or negligible expense.”1373  Serious adverse consequences could involve 
“interference with the operation of critical infrastructure or a major impact on the economy.”1374  
Additionally, the obligation of due diligence attaches to a state only after the offending cyber 
activity comes to the attention of the state.  If the state does not possess the resources to 
investigate the cyber operations originating from its territory, the victim state may be obligated 
to offer assistance to the responsible state before any forcible countermeasures would be 
justified. If the responsible state accepts the offer of assistance, the injured state may lose the 
right to use countermeasures since the responsible state would have resumed its international 
obligation to ensure its territories are not used to the detriment of other states.  If, however, the 
offer of assistance is rejected and the responsible state still fails to stop a non-state cyber 
operation conducted from its territory, the injured state has the right to take proportionate 
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countermeasures against it.1375  Moreover in response to this breach of due diligence obligation, 
the injured state could launch cyber operations targeting the non-state actors.   This is an 
important allowance given that the high thresholds in invoking the plea of necessity, namely a 
grave threat to an essential interest, limit its utility against non-state actors.  
 
In regard to thresholds, the U.S. – China Economic and Security Review Commission 
asserts that international law has not kept pace with developments in cyber warfare, namely 
cyber espionage where stolen trade secrets are turned over to government-owned companies. 
Clearly malicious activity not in the category of serious adverse consequences or a grave threat 
to an essential interest.  Therefore in June 2015 the Commission held hearings on “the possibility 
of U.S. corporations mounting retaliatory cyber strikes against Chinese companies.” Although 
the Commission noted that today “U.S. companies cannot retaliate or “hack back” without 
violating current U.S. law.”1376 As a result the Commission recommended lawmakers should 
“look at whether U.S. based companies be allowed to ‘hack back’ to recover or wipe stolen 
data.”1377  Scholars at the Atlantic Council propose the development of a tailored deterrence 
approach to reduce adversarial intrusions into U.S. private, commercial, and government 
networks that result in intellectual property theft or destructive effects on critical infrastructure. 
They assert that an important element of tailored deterrence would be “a new legal framework 
authorizing certified private sector cybersecurity providers to take limited, but meaningful steps 
under proper supervision.”1378  The framework would describe requirements for certification and 
prescribe that providers register with the government. To ensure sufficient oversight, 
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transparency, and accountability, the framework would require certified providers to articulate in 
advance and report on certain aggressive activities to law enforcement.  
 
The creation of a new legal framework to use some form of cyber privateers could 
alleviate many of the concerns associated with private company hack back.  At a Cyber Security 
Summit in October 2015, Admiral Rogers stated that “It’s not without historical precedence that 
when a nation lacks capacity, it historically turned to the private sector,” citing America’s 
reliance on privateers before the Navy was established.  Although while not unheard of, Rogers 
quantified he is “very leery” of moving in that direction. “I still believe that the nation state is 
best posed to apply force,” Rogers said, “And I worry about what the implications are if we turn 
that over to the private sector.”1379  Some of those implications could be the intrinsic temptation 
to use resident hack back capability for other than sanctioned actions.  For instance the use of 
hack back for revenge would turn the cyber privateers into nothing more than cyber vigilantes.  
Licensed privateers could prove difficult not only to trust, but also to manage without direct and 
persistent oversight.  As Rogers opined “It’s the Wild West in some ways already – we don’t 
need more gunslingers out in the street.”1380  
 
An Alternative Strategy 
 
 Following his remarks that the “state of security of most companies is worse than ever,” 
Dmitri Alperovitch, the Chief Technological Officer of the security firm CrowdStrike, asked the 
question “whether we should continue trying the same old tactics over and over again expecting 
a different result, or whether the time has come to fundamentally change our security 
strategy.”1381 Alperovitch noted that the U.S. Department of Defense has “proclaimed that it is 
changing its strategy to employ an active cyber defense capability” and “it is time for the private 
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sector to adopt the same strategy which focuses on raising costs and risks to adversaries in an 
attempt to deter their activities.”1382  Alperovitch said that his version of active defense is not 
about hack back, retaliation, or vigilantism, which could be counterproductive, or even illegal. 
Instead he believes an effective active defense strategy should focus on four key elements: real-
time detection, attribution of threat actors, flexibility of response actions, and intelligence 
dissemination.  His remarks were made during the launch of CrowdStrike Falcon, a big data 
active defense platform that embodies these elements. The platform promises to enable 
organizations to move beyond passive defenses by leveraging the kill chain model to obtain real 
time detection of what the attacker is doing and actually taking action against them.1383   
 
 In the CrowdStrike an approach that focuses more on the attacker than the exploit, 
several of the harshest critics of the company argue that  “CrowdStrike will inevitably test legal 
and ethical boundaries in fighting hackers; the implication is that CrowdStrike offers offensive 
capabilities, known as hack back,” which the Chief Executive Officer, Georg Kurtz emphatically 
denied.1384  Thus with stated, suspected or denied capabilities, the CrowdStrike platform 
represents a private sector implementation of active cyber defense in the broadest sense.  Inside 
the network, active cyber defense uses synchronized capabilities to discover the breach, isolate 
the threat and remediate the intrusion in real time.  These capabilities operate inside the cyber 
kill chain to provide internal systemic resilience to withstand an attack.  Outside the network, 
active cyber defense uses tailored disruption capacities to stop an attack.  The conditions for use 
of countermeasures by an injured state against responsible states are well articulated by 
international and customary law.  Delegation by the injured state to private companies to conduct 
cyber countermeasures on their behalf is allowed, but the private sector cannot go it alone under 
the concept of hack back.  Besides lack of legal authority or precedence, the use of hack back 
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brings a plethora of concerns that undermine the credibility of active defense.  Foremost among 
them is the motivation of the organization, misattribution of the attacker, third party collateral 
damage, and potential escalation out of control.  A new novel legal framework proposed by 
Anthony Glosson at the Mercatus Center authorizes active defenses subject to third party liability 
and could temper excessive retribution and reduce societal risk.1385  
 
 The imposition of any new legal framework in the United States for authorized, certified, 
or licensed private company response would communicate the government’s willingness to 
increase capability to deter malicious actors.  While this initiative could work well at the criminal 
level for theft of data, the credibility of such a move is somewhat suspect in convincing state 
based or sponsored actors their attacks will not succeed.  For in a direct contest, “despite the 
bluster of some in the high-tech community, private citizens are no match for the Russian mafia, 
the Russian Federal Security Service, or the People’s Liberation Army in China.”1386 If this 
contest cannot be won by American companies, then the U.S. Government has no choice but to 
step in and U.S. Cyber Command is well positioned with the capability to do so.  The Command 
has designated Cyber Protection Teams to conduct the Internal Defensive Measures mission and 
tasked National Mission Teams with the Response Action mission.1387 In testimony, the Deputy 
Commander of U.S. Cyber Command, Lieutenant General James McLaughlin avowed that the 
Defense Department will defend “the U.S. homeland and interests from attacks of significant 
consequence that may occur in cyberspace.”1388  Public declarations on the use of active cyber 
defense by licensed private companies to defend against cyber attacks below that threshold have 
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the potential to broaden beyond law enforcement “the range of punishments against which 
adversaries would have to calculate.”1389  Through open communication of intentions to deliver a 
credible response outside the network, coupled with emergence of automated capability to stop 
attacks inside the network, active cyber defense is well postured to serve as an alternative 
strategy to achieve deterrence within the cyber arena.    
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Conclusion 
 
For the deterrence of malicious actors in cyberspace, the strategies of retaliation, denial 
and entanglement have made little progress in imposing costs for, denying benefit of, and 
encouraging restraint in malicious activity.  Former FBI Director James Comey said in 2016 that 
“certain actions the federal government is taking to deter cyber threats to the country are 
working, at least in part.”1390 He claimed indictments of Chinese military and Iranian hackers 
“send an important and chilly wind through them,” and he saw “early indications of efforts to 
cooperate” on norms for nation states to not engage in theft for commercial purposes.  However, 
his recognition that “state sponsored cyber attackers are getting more aggressive” and “criminal 
organizations are getting more specialized” amplifies the reality that current strategies are 
insufficient to deter the number and type of actors engaged in cyber attack campaigns.  Michael 
Daniel, the former White House cybersecurity coordinator, said in 2016 that “the cyber threat 
continues to outpace our current efforts.”1391   
 
In response, the Obama administration proposed for 2017 over $19 billion for federal 
cyber security efforts, with nearly $3.1 billion to retire, replace and modernize legacy IT 
systems.1392  In addition the Justice Department asked in 2016 to increase its cyber security 
related funding by 23 percent to improve their capabilities to identify, disrupt, and apprehend 
malicious cyber actors.1393  These cost intensive measures to improve defensive capabilities and 
punish actors arrive as cyber threats become more frequent and more serious, partly because of 
the availability of low cost and effective hacker toolkits. Technically proficient actors are 
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spending just over a thousand dollars for specialized toolkits to execute an attack that could 
impose losses in the many millions of dollars.1394      
 
Asymmetric advantages for the malicious actor continue to shape their perceptions of the 
costs and benefits of a cyber attack.  A reoccurring cyber security industry revelation is that 
“Defenders must block all attacks; to win; attackers need to succeed at only one.”1395  An ever 
expanding list of attack vectors and techniques, such as MITRE describes for lateral 
movement,1396 allows an actor to execute the cyber kill chain with ease, despite attempts to 
install security controls for denial.1397  Many tools and services are available on the open market 
from dark sources and overlap in their common use by nation states, proxies, patriots, 
sympathizers and criminals makes it hard to distinguish the source to impose costs.  Even worst, 
nation state use of all these actors under some form of direction, control or incitement for 
plausible deniability makes concentration on just the nation state for deterrence impractical.  The 
unrelenting motivations of the wide range of malicious actors to achieve political objectives, 
national pride, personal satisfaction or monetary gain exceed international efforts to restrain 
behavior, especially when actors know they can operate with little risk of repercussion.  
Optimism for the future appears bleak, as evident in a defense report that 62 percent of 
respondents expected their organizations to be compromised by a cyber attack in 2016, up from 
only 39 percent two years ago.1398  These statistics indicate that a new way to alter malicious 
actor behavior in cyberspace is necessary.  
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 This final chapter starts with how asymmetric advantages and system vulnerabilities 
create potential for systemic sector consequences from disruptive or destructive cyber attacks.   
Next, in consideration of threats that “exploit the increased complexity and connectivity of 
critical infrastructure systems,”1399 the chapter presents an assessment at the strategic level of the 
impact of contemporary deterrence strategies on attacks (volume of noise across social, technical 
and economic systems), time (in mitigation of systemic security losses), and costs (in order of 
magnitude of gross domestic products).  Given insurmountable gaps in the comprehensiveness of 
contemporary strategies, the chapter then examines whether the strategy of active cyber defense 
as a new approach to fill these gaps has been sufficiently shown to be technically capable and 
legally viable inside and outside the network for use in deterring the wide variety of malicious 
actors.  Next an illustrative case of an alleged Russian multifaceted cyber campaign designed to 
interfere in the 2016 US Presidential Election process1400 depicts why active cyber defense could 
be a strategic option for cyber deterrence.  The chapter finishes with how the empirically 
grounded midrange theory of active cyber defense, comprised of the concepts of systemic 
resilience and disruption capacities, meets the conditions of capability, credibility and 
communication1401 to be selected as an alternative strategy to achieve deterrence within the cyber 
arena, capable of compensating for the shortcomings of the contemporary three deterrence 
strategies.  
 
Systemic Sector Consequences 
 
The globally unconstrained structure of cyberspace offers asymmetric advantages in the 
scale, proximity, and precision of malicious actor attacks.  Attackers can cause a significant and 
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disproportionate amount of damage without large resources or technical sophistication.1402 A 
vibrant underground hacker market provides them with tools and services to increase the scale of 
their cyber attacks.  Countries are becoming aware of “the asymmetric offensive opportunities 
presented by systemic and persistent vulnerabilities in key infrastructure sectors including health 
care, energy, finance, telecommunications, transportation, and water.”1403  Admiral Rogers, head 
of the National Security Agency, said he is watching “nation states, groups within some of that 
infrastructure” for now focused on reconnaissance.1404  An example is the Iranian hacker breach 
of the Bowman Avenue Dam outside of New York City in 2013.  The intrusion was a test by the 
hackers to see what they could access.  They could have controlled the flood gates if not offline 
for maintenance. The breach illustrates that “overseas hackers can easily get into pieces of old 
critical infrastructure running on retro-fitted software that is connected to the Internet.”1405  
Likewise attackers used remote cyber intrusions in the attack on the three power companies in 
Ukraine in 2015.1406  The attackers ran a phishing campaign to get into the corporate network 
and hijack worker credentials.  Eventually they took over control center computers to open 
breakers and take substations offline.  Then the hackers wiped files from operator stations with 
KillDisk malware.1407  Ukraine blamed Russian hackers for the power outage.1408  It appears the 
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attacks were part of a multi-stage campaign against the Ukrainian industrial network, also 
targeting a major mining company and a large railway operator.1409  
  
While the above attacks on water, energy and transportation sector infrastructure a 
disconcerting demonstration, they were not necessarily destructive.  Yet a few confirmed cases 
do exist in which a digital attack caused physical destruction.  The first being a series of attacks 
against the Maroochy Shire Council sewerage control system in Australia in 2000 that caused 
raw sewage spills,1410 and the second being the 2010 Stuxnet attack on Iranian nuclear facilities.  
The third occurred in late 2014 at an unnamed steel mill in Germany. A malicious advanced 
persistent threat actor used a spear phishing email, one of the most common attack vectors, to 
gain access to the mill’s corporate network and then move, most likely through trusted 
connections, into its production network. The final stage of the attack produced “an 
accumulation of breakdowns of individual components of the control system.”1411 As a result, the 
plant was “unable to shut down a blast furnace in a regulated manner” which caused “massive 
damage to the system.”1412  It is “unclear if the attackers intended to cause the physical 
destruction or if that was simply collateral damage.”1413  The incident accentuates that not all 
intrusions into critical infrastructure will be as careful as the Stuxnet worm that destroyed only 
targeted uranium enrichment centrifuges.1414 The German steel mill attack was an isolated, not 
                                                          
1409 Warwick Ashford, “Ukraine cyber attacks extend beyond power companies, says Trend 
Micro,” Computer Weekly, February 12, 2016.  
1410 Marshall Abrams and Joe Weiss, “Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case 
Study– Maroochy Water Services, Australia,” The MITRE Corporation, August 2008.   
1411 Robert M. Lee, Michael J. Assante and Tim Conway, “German Still Mill Cyber Attack,” 
SANS Industrial Control Systems, December 30, 2014: 1-15.  
1412 Kim Zetter, “A cyberattack has caused confirmed physical damage for the second time ever,” 
Wired, January 8, 2015.  
1413 Ibid.  
1414 Ibid.  
348 
 
systemic attack on an industry sector, but still concern resides of the impact of destructive attacks 
on critical infrastructure.   
  
 In the wake of the Ukraine incident, Admiral Rogers said at the 2016 RSA Conference 
that he worries over an infrastructure attack in the United States that causes significant damage.  
He also expressed fear over attacks that would manipulate data for the purpose of crippling 
financial institutions. Rogers asked the audience “What are we going to do as a society when you 
go to your bank account, and the numbers don’t match what you think they should be?” or “What 
do you do if your business does financial transactions, and they don’t reflect what you are 
seeing?”1415  Those dreadful scenarios would cause systemic failure of the financial sector, and 
consequently cascading effects across the economy and society.  Many banks have experienced 
denial of service attacks upon the availability of information, and intrusion attacks upon the 
confidentiality of information, but this new paradigm would affect the integrity of the 
information system.  Disruption or manipulation of stock trading operations would cause a 
systemic global impact, as seen in January 2016 when the Chinese stock market crashed over the 
devaluation of its currency, driving a tumble in the Dow Jones industrial average of nearly 400 
points.1416  
  
 The chief of strategy in the U.S. Defense Strategic Capabilities office remarked that we 
see “cyber being increasingly used as a first strike weapon by peer competitors” and “non-
military assets are increasingly the targets.”1417  Those targets could include nuclear facilities, 
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like in Stuxnet.  A study of twenty nations with significant atomic stockpiles or nuclear power 
plants reveals the lesson of Stuxnet seems lost, as “too many states require virtually no effective 
security measures at nuclear facilities to address the threat posed by hackers.”1418  A similar 
report affirms a paucity of regulatory standards for civil nuclear facilities, coupled with 
insufficient spending on cyber security.1419  Yet regardless of the catastrophic risk of a release of 
ionizing radiation, most of the hype over cyber intrusions has been over the relentless theft of 
personal, corporate or government information.  For example, the German report of a destructive 
cyber incident got lost in the noise of the widely publicized Sony hack in late 2014.  Although 
the method to deliver a hostile payload, like a social engineering attack seen in Sony, can be the 
same for all types of business networks, including those connected to production networks in 
industrial control systems.   
 
Deterrence Strategy Shortfalls 
 
 At the strategic level, the deterrence option of entanglement attempts to reduce the 
volume of noise across social, technical and economic systems through cooperative measures 
that restrain state behavior.  Although the impact of the primary mechanism of norms depends on 
“whether they are implemented faithfully and whether violators are held accountable.”1420  An 
example is the U.S. – China agreement not to conduct or support cyber-enabled theft of 
intellectual property. Here diminishment of state sponsored attacks is a matter of trust, and for 
China in other domains that trust is lacking.  For instance China appears to have built 
“significant point-defense capabilities, in the form of large anti-aircraft guns and probable close-
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in weapons systems (CIWS), at each of its outposts in the Spratly Islands,”1421 despite President 
Xi Jimping’s September 2015 pledge not to militarize the islands in the South China Sea.1422  
After all, the U.S.-China cyber deal was produced through coercive measures in the threat of 
sanctions, which came after criminal indictments of five members of the Chinese military.1423  
Public attribution of attacks is part of a U.S. strategy shift to “name and shame” countries, as the 
FBI did in naming North Korea as responsible for the Sony Pictures attack.1424  Likewise, the 
Obama administration publicly blamed Iran for the 2013 New York dam cyber breach and 
attempted accountability through charges against seven hackers working as contractors for the 
Iranian government.  The indictment brought attention to another uncooperative state actor, to 
include the hacker’s roles in denial of service attacks on U.S. banks starting in 2011.1425  In this 
case Iran is the belligerent actor that test-fired several ballistic missiles in February 2016 despite 
fresh sanctions imposed on their weapon’s program.1426  
 
 The U.S. Senate unanimously approved legislation in December 2016 that reauthorized 
sanctions against Iran’s ballistic missile development and weapons program for the next 
decade.1427  Extension of the sanctions that were not covered by the landmark nuclear agreement 
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indicates a lack of trust in improved behavior by Iran, as hoped for given related sanctions relief.  
In fact Iran’s government has conducted nearly a dozen ballistic-missile tests in the year since 
the deal was implemented.1428  In regard to China, the United States still trusts they will abide by 
the Obama-Xi cyber agreement.  As mentioned previously, the Chinese government did arrest a 
handful of hackers it says were connected to the OPM breach, which could mark the first 
measure of accountability.  Notwithstanding that the identities of the suspects remain unclear.  
U.S. government officials said “they suspected the involvement of the Chinese government, 
particularly the civilian Ministry of State Security.”1429  Whereas FireEye, iSight Partners and 
other firms attribute the OPM attack to a Chinese state sponsored APT group referred to as Deep 
Panda.1430 A major challenge in attribution according to the U.S.-China Economic and Security 
Review Commission is that “distinguishing between the operations of official and other Chinese 
cyber actors is often difficult, as is determining how these groups interact with each other.”1431  
The U.S-China cyber agreement to curb cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property should work 
regardless of what type of actor if the state enforces it.  However more than a year after the 
agreement, the testimony of Director Clapper that “Beijing continues to conduct cyber espionage 
against the U.S. Government, our allies, and U.S. companies,”1432 although at reduced levels, 
signals the continued insufficiency of deterrence by entanglement. 
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 The deterrence option of denial attempts to lessen the time in mitigation of systemic 
security losses through both preventive and detective security controls that deny attack success.  
For instance in the aftermath of the Ukraine power distribution attack, the U.S. Industrial Control 
System – Computer Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT) released an alert that not only 
depicted the attack but also listed mitigation strategies for organizations across all sectors to 
review and employ.  It suggested asset owners take defensive measures by leveraging best 
practices to minimize the risk from similar malicious cyber activity.  Suggested practices 
included use of Multi-Factor Authentication to limit remote access and Application Whitelisting 
to prevent attempted execution of malware.1433  ICS-CERT also recognizes that the increased 
integration of external, business, and control system networks to enhance productivity and 
reduce costs leads to vulnerabilities.  The same protocols and standards that increase 
interoperability in the control systems community are the same technologies that have been 
exploited on the corporate networking domains.  Open system architecture vulnerabilities that 
could migrate to control system domains include network reconnaissance, unauthorized 
intrusions and escalation of privileges.  Therefore multiple countermeasures are needed to 
disseminate risk over layers of protection. 1434  However as asset owners move to implement 
defense-in-depth frameworks, informed by cyber threat intelligence, malicious actors continue to 
penetrate defenses, and the proportion of breaches discovered within days still falls well below 
that of time to compromise, usually in minutes or less.1435  
 
 The confounding question for the 22 million federal employees and others whose 
personally identifiable information was stolen in the OPM breach more than a year ago is “are 
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you safer now?” The acting director, Beth Cobert, “thinks so.”1436  She has outlined a long list of 
actions that OPM has taken to strengthen cybersecurity, including the deployment of two factor 
strong authentication, the limitation of remote access, and the implementation of data loss 
prevention systems, in addition to establishing an agency-wide IT security workforce and 
enhancing cybersecurity awareness training.1437 These actions are all hallmarks of a defense-in-
depth posture based on the primary elements of people, technology and operations.1438  It is true 
these security controls might have even prevented the OPM breach, for example the second 
attacker utilized a single factor network credential stolen from a KeyPoint contractor for the 
“initial vector of infection.”1439  However the office of the agency’s inspector general continues 
to believe that there is “a very high risk that the project will fail to meet its stated objectives of 
delivering a more secure environment at a lower cost.”  Part of the reason for this assessment is 
“potentially wasteful spending” in creating a new security environment before “it was clear that 
it was the best solution.”1440  Security spending on the right solutions is always a challenge, but 
spending will invariably rise as “organizations realize they need to protect against phishing, 
ransomware and the growing variety of threats they face.”1441  However since attackers receive 
“an estimated 1,425 percent return on investment for exploit kit and ransomware schemes 
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($84,100 net revenue for each $5,900 investment),”1442 the cost ratio imbalance forecasts the 
continued insufficiency of deterrence by denial. 
  
 The deterrence option of retaliation attempts to diminish the costs of systemic security 
losses by the credible threat to impose overwhelming costs for hostile acts.  However the global 
economy is bearing the costs from cybercrime and cyberespionage, estimated to be annually 
around $455 billion.  The estimate accounts for the loss of intellectual property and the theft of 
financial assets and sensitive business information, plus additional costs for securing networks 
and recovering from attacks, including reputational damage.  For nations, those costs measured 
in order of magnitude of gross domestic products (GDP) are staggering.  Costs in high-income 
countries are 0.9% of GDP on average.1443  In the United States the loss is 0.64% of GDP which 
for a 2015 GDP figure of $18 trillion equals $115.2 billion a year.  The threat of retaliation 
through use of all necessary means strives to shift costs to the malicious actors.  For instance 
since the raid by Russian authorities in November 2015 of offices used in a financial hacking 
operation, a password stealing software program known as Dyre, responsible for tens of millions 
of dollars in losses at financial institutions including Bank of America and JP Morgan Chase, has 
not been deployed.1444  Criminal prosecutions are intended to change the calculus of costs, yet 
many require slowly evolving international cooperation.1445 In cases where overseas actors are 
unlikely to be held accountable, economic sanctions are an effort to prevent malicious actors 
from reaping rewards for their intrusions.  However the building of a case to use these means 
requires letting federal investigators examine the forensic evidence left by the intruders.  That is 
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futile as companies are wary of cooperating in government investigations for fear of exposure to 
regulatory actions, privacy suits or other civil litigation.1446  
 
 Malicious actors seem to act without impunity as if there is no deterrence strategy in 
place.  Senator Dan Sullivan asked the witness at a recent Congressional Hearing “why the U.S. 
has not hit back against adversaries in a significant manner out of the public eye?”1447 Under 
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Marcel Lettre said “I think you’re getting right at the 
question of what do we mean by a proportional response,” while Director Clapper replied that 
“When we do choose to act, we need to model the rules we want others to follow since our 
actions set precedents.”  Both of their comments cumulatively speak to underlying legal and 
procedural constraints on the imposition of overwhelming costs. Director Clapper went on to say 
“there’s always that issue of counter-retaliate, ergo my brief mention that it’s in my view to 
consider all instruments of national power.”  Yet the apparent lack of a retaliatory response, by 
any instrument of power, against China for the OPM hack has made the United States appear to 
look weak on the world stage.  That look continued in a crisis with China in 2016 over their 
seizure of a U.S. Navy underwater drone in waters near the Philippines.  The day prior, the 
Commander of U.S. Pacific Command, Admiral Harry Harris told diplomats in Sydney that 
“capability times resolve times signaling equals deterrence.”  The host for his speech at the Lowy 
Institute, Director Euan Graham, remarked after the maritime incident that “the weak link is the 
resolve, and the Chinese are testing that.”  The muted U.S. response, outside a demand by the 
Obama administration to return the drone, carries well into other domains.  The embolden act by 
China that fell short of provoking conflict and suffered few consequences, quite similar to the 
OPM hack,  indicates the continued insufficiency of deterrence by retaliation. 
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 The aim of deterrence is to “decisively influence the adversary’s decision making 
calculus.”1448  Thus deterrence is a “state of mind brought about by an adversary’s perception of 
three factors: being denied the expected benefits of his action; having excessive costs imposed 
for taking the action; and that restraint is an acceptable alternative.”1449  The deterrence strategies 
of denial, retaliation and entanglement seek to convince adversaries not to take malicious actions 
by changing their perceptions.1450  They concentrate primarily on means to deny benefits, impose 
costs, or encourage restraint.  An adversary chooses “not to act for fear of failure, risk, or 
consequences.”1451 These strategic options are not mutually exclusive and U.S. doctrine, for 
instance, uses a mixed methodology, especially across diplomatic, legal, economic and military 
dimensions.  The cumulative effect of these strategies is gained from a synchronized and 
coordinated use of all instruments of national power in a comprehensive approach.  Regrettably 
evidence indicates that contemporary deterrence strategies, even if applied together, are 
insufficient to deter the wide range of malicious actors conducting cyber attacks.1452   Critics of 
the U.S. approach to “name and shame” foreign cyber threat actors believe it’s just “yapping in 
the wind.” While nation states stand at the top of the FBI stack of threat actors, followed by 
criminal syndicates, hacktivists, and terrorists, former Director Comey admits that “all cyber 
attackers are becoming more sophisticated.”1453 Therefore without a doubt, an alternative and 
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compensating strategy is necessary that encourages adversary restraint, by shaping perceptions of 
the costs and benefits of a cyber attack in a different way.   
 
A Sufficient Alternative 
 
An alternative strategy of active cyber defense combines internal systemic resilience to 
halt malicious cyber activity after an intrusion with tailored disruption capacities to thwart 
malicious actor objectives and compensate for gaps in – but does not replace – existing 
deterrence strategies.  The question of whether a strategy of active cyber defense is technically 
capable and legally viable to deny benefits through systemic resilience and impose costs through 
tailored disruption was publicly examined in 2013 by the Commission on the Theft of American 
Intellectual Property (IP Commission). Outside the victim’s network, the IP Commission noted 
that “while not permitted under U.S. laws, there are increasing calls for creating a more 
permissive environment for active network defense that allows companies not only to stabilize a 
situation but to take further steps... within an unauthorized network.”1454  Inside the defender’s 
network, the IP Commission recommended that besides vulnerability mitigation measures such 
as firewalls and password protection systems, companies and governments should also “install 
active systems that monitor activity on the network, detect anomalous behavior, and trigger 
intrusion alarms that initiate both network and physical actions immediately.”1455  These 
suggestions tacitly endorse the use of automated active cyber defense type capabilities to provide 
internal systemic resilience through legally acceptable means as long as actions stay inside 
organizational boundaries.   
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Inside the Defender’s Network 
 
Industry solutions are actually getting better in monitoring activity and detecting 
malicious behavior.  The security firm Mandiant reported in 2012 that the median days an 
organization was compromised before the breach was discovered was 416 days. That number 
dropped in their reports, in 2014 to 205 days and then to 146 days in 2015.1456  For companies 
that detected a breach on their own, which is less than 20 percent,1457 the median number was 46 
days compromised before discovery.  This decline in days over the past few years most likely 
indicates the wide spread installation of not just preventive, but also detective security controls 
on organizational systems.  In an 2016 institute survey of Information Technology security 
practitioners in the United States involved in endpoint security in a variety of organizations, 95 
percent said their organizations will evolve toward a more “detect and respond” orientation from 
one that is focused on prevention.1458  Organizations could adopt a single integrated platform, 
like LightCyber Magna considered to be a single real-time detection platform,1459 or they can opt 
to select an endpoint detection and response solution, like one used in Magna, which comprises 
many active cyber defense type capabilities, empowered by actionable cyber threat intelligence.   
 
In cyber incidents, penetration often occurs via endpoints, for instance when malware is 
downloaded from a spear-phishing email to the victim’s desktop or laptop, or through known 
vulnerabilities in older point-of-sale terminals, or by a USB stick used between the home and the 
office.1460  After penetrating an endpoint, the malware establishes command and control for an 
attacker to conduct reconnaissance and lateral movement inside the network.  The identification 
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of actions originating from the compromised endpoint provides an opportunity to break the cyber 
kill chain. This opportunity is the reason for a rise in commercial endpoint detection and 
response solutions.  A worthwhile vendor solution must be able to detect, contain, investigate 
and remediate the incident at the endpoint.  Capable solutions inventory and manage system 
configurations to establish a normal baseline.  Then the same solution monitors configuration 
changes to detect unusual behavior.  Such changes can be in new software or files, the registry, 
account information, user privileges, new processes and open ports or communications 
activity.1461  The solution may contain a process or traffic then investigate through threat 
intelligence exchanges.  Upon confirmation of malicious behavior, the solution remedies the 
situation through routine repairs, software de-installations or further blocks of IP addresses.1462  
Ideally to stop or limit damage, configurations will be automatically compared to indicators of 
compromise for quick detection and remediation actions will be automatically run for real time 
response.    
 
In order to better understand possible indicators of compromise, most endpoint detection 
and response solutions are integrated with multiple independent threat intelligence services and 
feeds.  They will consume these sources constantly and filter information on malware, URL 
domains, email sources, IP addresses, etc. on a massive scale for organizational relevance.1463   
The solutions will then compare configuration changes to relevant indicators of compromise for 
threat detection.  As necessary a suspect change or file will be sent to a third party threat 
intelligence service, like to the cloud-based virtual malware analysis WildFire environment, 
“built for high fidelity hardware emulation” to analyze “suspicious samples as they execute.”1464 
The solution can also use a log event analysis service to identify odd behavior on systems and 
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the time of occurrence, such as by LogRhythm labs which “collect and process all of an 
organization’s log, flow, event and other machine data, as well as endpoint, server and network 
forensic data” to identify activities and automatically prioritize incidents.1465  In this fashion 
cyber threat intelligence “has gone from a niche product to a general-use tool.”1466 
Yet to be valuable for endpoint detection and response solutions, it still has to be accurate, 
relevant and timely for use across each phase of the cyber kill chain.1467  That means a threat 
intelligence platform should also execute automated processes to provide seamless integration 
with endpoint detection and response solutions, such as sending a block action on an 
indicator.1468   
 
The demand for next generation endpoint security solutions is high. In a 2016 survey of 
enterprises across all industries, a whopping 86 percent of respondent organizations report they 
are not satisfied with their current endpoint protection software.1469  In response to this demand, 
a number of capabilities are available starting with Magna and also HawkEye G technologies 
integrated into a new Threat Detection and Response (TDR) platform delivered as part of a Total 
Security Suite.  The WatchGuard FireBox appliance T30 model that delivers the Total Security 
Suite won Gold in the “Best Security Products and Solutions for Medium Enterprises” category 
at the 13th Annual Global Excellence Awards held by Info Security Products Guide.1470  The new 
TDR platform employs a host sensor to detect security events using heuristics and behavioral 
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analytics.1471  Data on these events is then sent to a cloud-based threat intelligence correlation 
and scoring engine to generate a threat score and rank based on severity. Based on score, threats 
can be quickly remediated through one-click response options or through policies that enable 
automated responses including quarantine the file, kill the process or delete the registry value.1472 
 
Other emerging capabilities include the Cb Response platform that visualizes the 
complete kill chain to find the root cause and see lateral movements to accelerate investigations. 
The Carbon Black Platform is the winner of the SANS “Best of 2016 Award” for “Endpoint 
Detection/Response.”1473  Cb Response attempts to stop attacks in progress by isolating infected 
systems, terminating processes and banning hashes (numerical text strings) across an enterprise.  
It also retains historical data for review of any attack.1474  Another new Enterprise type endpoint 
defense solution is contained in an integrated suite for real-time detection, analysis and response. 
The Tripwire Enterprise is the winner of the Bronze award for Endpoint Security Solution 
Innovations in the Information Technology and Security Innovations - Best Product or Service of 
the Year category at the Golden Bridge Awards for 2016.1475   This capability monitors and 
compares files changes in endpoints against baseline configurations, then automatically uploads 
and detonates suspicious files in a sandbox provided by an advanced malware detection system. 
The Lastline advanced malware detection system was deemed to be the most effective in a NSS 
Labs Test.1476  The Enterprise solution also monitors and correlates state changes with system 
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events and application logs.  Upon solution prediction of risk, a security analyst manually 
defends assets through protective controls.1477    
 
Another new capability for Endpoint Protection is claimed to integrate “innovative 
security technologies to protect against all stages of an attack.”1478  Sophos Endpoint received an 
overall Security Effectiveness rating of 94.7% by NSS Labs.1479   Although whitepapers by 
vendors seem to just herald their capabilities, independent testing of endpoint security solutions 
often shows they actually work. For example in a test of HawkEye G for malware installed on a 
protected system, the solution caught the malware trying to contact its botnet handler and 
automatically routed traffic to a Bot Trap.  HawkEye G automatically stopped the process from 
running on the host computer, and then encrypted and quarantined the malicious file for operator 
review.1480 Customers trust these solutions as evidenced by the deployment of the Enterprise 
endpoint defense solution in over a million business-critical systems.  In regard to the legality of 
deployment of endpoint defense solutions, the Cybersecurity Act of 2015 Section 104 stated 
“notwithstanding any other provision of law, a private entity may, for cybersecurity purposes, to 
monitor an information system of such private entity” and “operate a defensive measure that is 
applied to an information system of such private entity in order to protect the rights or property 
of the private entity.”1481   Therefore given the proven qualities of endpoint security solutions 
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available for installation today, for the category of inside the defender’s network, the strategy of 
active cyber defense seems to be both technically capable and legally viable through automated 
and integrated capabilities that act only inside organizational boundaries.   
 
Outside the Victim’s Network 
 
Yet even with promising advances in security solutions, the IP Commission contended 
that the best security systems cannot be depended upon for protection one hundred percent of the 
time against the most highly skilled hackers. Therefore they felt new ways are necessary to 
reverse “the time, opportunity, and resource advantage of the targeted attacker by reducing his 
incentives and raising his costs.”1482  The IP Commission appeared to support ways to identify 
and render inoperable stolen intellectual property through cyber means, such as marking 
electronic files with beacons and writing software that renders files inaccessible to unauthorized 
persons. Yet the IP Commission did not recommend specific revised laws to recover a stolen file 
or to degrade or damage the computer system of a hacker under present circumstances.1483 The 
specific reasons that the IP Commission was not ready to endorse the idea of Congress 
authorizing aggressive cyber actions for the purpose of self-defense, were the dangers of misuse 
of legal hacking authorities and the potential for collateral damage.1484   
 
The primary motivation for the private sector to hack back against an attacker would 
probably be to recover or delete stolen data, intellectual property or trade secrets on an attacker’s 
computers or servers.  Yet private organizations could be enticed to hack back for retaliatory 
reasons to obtain justice for any perceived harm and induced inconvenience, including to disrupt 
or damage the attacker’s systems, and even more so, to degrade their ability to carry out future 
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attacks.1485  Also, the choice to hack back could produce unintended collateral damage to an 
innocent bystander’s system.  Attackers often use compromised home or office computers as 
bots in a botnet for distributed denial of service attacks or to distribute spam in illicit schemes.  
They also route attack traffic through compromised computers without the owner’s knowledge to 
hide their tracks.  For the latter, just imagine for instance the impact of a destructive hack back 
on an emergency service provider, a school, or even worse, a hospital system and the associated 
punitive and civil damages.1486   
 
Despite the apparent risks of hack back, one could argue that private companies will 
aggressively act covertly anyway, partly due to their frustration with government inability to act 
in a timely and effective manner by other means, such as by legal indictments or economic 
sanctions.  In the aforementioned 2016 institute survey of Information Technology security 
practitioners involved in endpoint security, 64 percent said their organizations are pursuing now 
or planning to pursue an offensive security capability, described as to discover who is behind an 
attack and then to counterattack.1487  Furthermore, the Black Hat USA 2016 conference even 
offered a technical course in “Active Defense, Offensive Countermeasures and Hacking Back” to 
learn “how to force an attacker to take more moves to attack your network...to detect them” and 
“how to gain better attribution” and “how to get access to a bad guy’s system.”1488  While the 
Black Hat site claims this could be done legally, the last objective neglects the reality that often 
the source of the attack is a compromised computer of an unwitting third party and any 
aggressive action after unauthorized access could result in undesired collateral damage.   
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The potential for collateral damage to an innocent third party highlights the importance of 
attribution.  However the determination of “absolute attribution can be difficult if not near 
impossible.”1489 Therefore if absolute identification is unrealistic, could a legal framework 
prevent mistakes and consequences from the employment of hack back in case of misattribution?  
One way, suggested by Anthony Glosson, to protect against the dangers of misattribution and 
other associated risks, would be for Congress to accommodate hack back by “adding a qualified 
active defense right to the CFAA.  The right would balance the active defense privilege with 
misattribution concerns by imposing strict liability for harm caused during misdirected active 
defense efforts.”1490  Glosson believes “firms will use active defense tactics only when they have 
an appropriate degree of confidence in the identity of their targets.”1491 Under certain conditions, 
those tactics could include disruptive options to disable an attacker’s system or destructive 
measures to destroy stolen trade secrets.  Even still, a lingering concern if counterattacks were 
somehow made legal is that too many of the techniques would cause severe and irreparable harm 
to not just innocent third parties from misattribution, but also to the attacker’s systems that could 
result in escalation.  If the attacker perceives the hack back as disproportionate to the initial 
attack, it could invite a stronger counterattack against more valuable systems.1492   
 
Taking all considerations into account, the IP Commission determined that only the 
Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense, and Law Enforcement Agencies 
should have the legal authority to use countermeasures against targeted attackers for 
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unauthorized intrusions into national security and critical infrastructure networks.1493   This legal 
authority already exists in international law for state use of countermeasures, as previously 
described in three distinct forms with associated conditions and restrictions: 
  
- Injured State: has the right to resort to proportionate countermeasures against a 
responsible State for an internationally wrongful act to include a violation of a treaty or 
customary law obligation.  
- Plea of Necessity: may be invoked to justify a state’s resort to cyber measures when 
faced with a grave and imminent threat to an essential interest to include in certain cases where 
the exact nature or origin of a cyber attack is not clear.  
- Due Diligence: principle allows a state to resort to countermeasures if a responsible 
state fails to meet its obligation to not allow cyber infrastructure located on its territory to be 
used to mount a cyber operation that results in serious adverse consequences in another country.  
 
The three categories of allowable state responses represent sovereign privileges granted to 
nations.  If the United States or its allies disrespect the law by sanctioning private hack back, 
others will most likely cite use as precedent.  A myriad of complications would follow that 
would weaken efforts to sustain customary law and create international norms. For instance, 
would China or Russia even know that a damaging attack by a private company is not an official 
cyber attack signaling state response?   Also, would Iran or North Korea adopt a similar 
retaliatory policy through use of hacker groups not under state control or direction?1494   
 
The IP Commission determination on authority for only government use of 
countermeasures appears valid given the risks of private sector hack back.  Thus the use of 
tailored disruption capacities is probably best left to government agencies, especially for 
disruptive activities outside victim’s network, such as taking control of remote computers or 
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launching denial of service attacks.  However the difficulty with this determination lies in the 
question of whether the government really has the capacity to defend the private sector? Or even 
the willingness to do so, given the high thresholds for response delineated in international law 
and reiterated in national strategy.  For instance in the United States, the Department of Defense 
mission to defend the nation and its interests applies to “cyberattacks of significant consequence” 
which may include “loss of life, significant damage to property, serious adverse U.S. foreign 
policy consequences, or serious economic impact on the United States.”1495 The magnitude of 
these consequences would not apply to many of the cyber attacks seen today.  Likewise, many of 
the organizations experiencing cyber attacks do not fall into the category of “national security 
and critical infrastructure” delineated by the IP Commission.  If the government were to respond 
to more common incidents for more common organizations, then a new precedence would be set 
below the current threshold of government response.  
 
The Department of Defense Cyber Strategy recognizes that the “private sector owns and 
operates over ninety percent of all the networks and infrastructures of cyberspace and is thus the 
first line of defense.”1496  Not a surprising statement since the talent, tools, and technical capacity 
reside primarily in the private sector.  What is surprising is that the private sector has already 
publicly used hack back with proven success in multiple incidents, as documented by Anthony 
Glosson. In his first example, Google mounted an active defense campaign in response to 
Chinese hacker intrusions into private Gmail accounts in 2009.  Google gained access to a 
computer in Taiwan used by the hackers to see evidence of the attack.   The evidence revealed 
the breaches of the so called Operation Aurora were not only at Google, but also at 33 other 
companies, including Adobe Systems and Northrop Grumman.  Google shared the evidence with 
American intelligence and law enforcement officials and cooperated with them to determine the 
origin of the attack was on the Chinese mainland.1497   In a second instance, Facebook used 
                                                          
1495 U.S. Department of Defense, “The DoD Cyber Strategy,” April 2015: 4-5. 
1496 Ibid.  
1497 David E. Sanger and John Markoff, “After Google’s Stand on China, U.S. Treads Lightly,” 
The New York Times, January 14, 2010.  
368 
 
active defense tactics in response to the compromise of Facebook servers by the “Koobface” 
gang in 2011.  Koobface installed a virus on user devices to draft their computer into a botnet, 
hijack Web searches to deliver clicks to unscrupulous marketers, and trick the user into paying 
for fake antivirus software.1498  Facebook Security performed a technical takedown of the gang’ 
command and control server to exfiltrate evidence and disable it.  Facebook then shared its 
intelligence with the online security community and law enforcement agencies to rid the Web of 
the Koobface virus.1499   
 
For legal use of tailored disruption capacities outside the victim’s network, after taking 
the factors of willingness, capacity, and benefits into account, a better option than relying only 
on the government could be closely regulated use by licensed private companies under limited 
circumstances.  The concept of licensed privateers to augment government capability has a 
strong historical basis in the maritime environment.   By applying this logic to the cyber domain, 
a reasonable contention is that “a limited number of entities certified by the government and 
working with the government could add to the government’s capabilities to address extensive 
cyber intrusions through the application of active defense.”1500  To ordain this contention, revised 
laws might not even be necessary, as a new legal framework could capitalize on clauses in 
existing laws.  Section 1030(f) of the CFAA’s unauthorized access ban “does not prohibit any 
lawfully authorized investigative, protective, or intelligence activity of a law enforcement agency 
of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision of a State, or of an intelligence agency of 
the United States.”1501  In essence, Section 1030(f) is “an explicit exception from the CFAA for 
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law enforcement agencies” which allows them “to undertake normally prohibited 
cyberattacks.”1502  Since there is “no explicit provision exempting private companies from the 
CFAA,” an approach proposed by Zach West is to “deputize U.S. companies under Section 
1030(f).”1503   
 
The Active Cyber Defense Task Force Project Report released in October 2016 agrees 
that “there is a need for government to partner with the private sector in developing and 
implementing a framework for active defense. Such a framework would allow forward-leaning 
and technologically advanced private entities to effectively defend their assets in cyberspace, 
while at the same time ensuring that such actions are embedded in a framework that confirms 
government oversight.”1504  The pertinent question is what delineations or limitations should be 
made for the type of malicious actor and the type of disruptive action to be used against them by 
licensed private companies in various scenarios outside the network?  In consideration of risk, a 
sliding scale of aggressive actions could be applied in “limited circumstances in cooperation with 
or under delegated authority of a national government:”1505  
 
- Nation States: the use of countermeasures against state organs, namely military or 
intelligence agencies has potential to cause escalation. Therefore aggressive actions, such as 
denial of service or damage to their computers should only be undertaken by government 
agencies.  Countermeasures against persons or groups acting on the instructions of, or under the 
direction or control of a State, could be conducted by licensed private companies but limited to 
bogus files or embed beacons, traceback property and delete stolen data.  The Task Force Report 
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argues that retrieval attempts are not likely to succeed because an advanced adversary would 
replicate, hide or back up stolen data.1506  Thus the data should be wiped in route on a third party 
server before local business hours of the adversary.  
  
- Hacker Groups: the use of countermeasures against loosely state affiliated “hackers 
for hire” groups would be to deny their objective of stealing competitive or confidential 
information.  For commercial victims, this activity would most likely fall below the current 
threshold of government response.  Therefore countermeasures could be conducted by licensed 
private companies but mostly limited to bogus files or embed beacons, traceback property and 
delete stolen data per above.  The insertion of logic bombs into files before stolen to damage 
computers when opened is risky but would prevent initial access to files before replication and 
dispersion.  The use of countermeasures against movements like Anonymous would be to halt 
their hacktivist campaign.  The challenge is the difficulty of interfering with tens of thousands of 
enthused citizens using their computers for typical denial of service attacks or worst collateral 
damage to compromised computers in botnets.  Countermeasures against the verified source of 
an intrusion, like by a skilled hacker attempting SQL injection, could be conducted by licensed 
private companies in order to achieve disruptive signaling, to include denial of service or 
implanting malware to damage the hacker’s computer.   
 
- Criminal Organizations: the use of countermeasures against criminal syndicates 
would be to halt the theft of financial assets and sensitive information. For commercial victims, 
this activity would most certainly fall below the current threshold of government response.  
Therefore countermeasures could be conducted by licensed private companies to not just delete 
stolen data but bait files with malware to photograph the actor for evidence for prosecution.  An 
alternative is to implant ransomware to lock down the computer to impose proportionate costs. 
 
- Terrorist Groups: the use of countermeasures against an organized armed group like 
the Islamic State would fall under the category of armed conflict and is best left to the military. 
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Granted the Zach West framework for use of deputized U.S. companies adopted here is slightly 
different than the one suggested in the Task Force Report.  Yet given the proven utility of hack 
back by the private sector, for the category of outside the victim’s network, the strategy of active 
cyber defense could be technically capable and legally viable for use in deterring the wide 
variety of malicious actors.  However only by licensed private companies under the supervision 
and approval of proper authorities, such as by the Department of Justice under CFAA Section 
1030(f) exceptions, in certain authorized scenarios.   
   
Illustrative Case of Deterrence Strategy Failure 
 
The 2016 hack into the Democratic National Committee (DNC) network outlined in the 
Introduction provides an illustrative case for final analysis of the sufficiency of contemporary 
deterrence strategies or the alternative strategy of active cyber defense.  The Obama 
administration hesitated to publicly named Russia as behind the hack into the DNC, and also into 
other Democratic Party accounts as the campaign was revealed to be wider than first thought.1507 
Some prominent figures, such as U.S. House Democratic Leader Nancy Pelosi, bluntly said “It is 
the Russians.”1508  However U.S. intelligence officials said “publicly blaming Russian President 
Vladimir Putin’s intelligence services would bring instant pressure on Washington to divulge its 
evidence, which relies on highly classified sources and methods.”1509  Regardless, the United 
States issued on 7 October a statement of blame,1510 continuing their “name and shame” strategy.  
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Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said it was flattering but a baseless accusation, in not 
seeing “a single fact, a single proof.”1511 
 
The absence of presented evidence in October 2016 of Russian culpability is counter to 
the 2015 UN Group of Governmental Experts report that accusations of “wrongful acts brought 
against states should be substantiated.”1512  As a matter of policy, formulating the right kind of 
response for deterrence in this case is not straightforward. American agencies assembled a menu 
of options for President Obama ranging from exposing President Putin’s financial ties to 
oligarchs to manipulating the computer code used by Russia in designing its cyberweapons.1513 
Some of the options were rejected as ineffective and others as too risky.  For the first, James 
Lewis doubted “using intelligence findings to embarrass Mr. Putin... would be the solution.”1514  
For the latter, to manipulate or even expose Russian hacking tools, which they hold dear, risks 
exposure of American software implants.  For specific sanctions in retaliation, the impact is 
questionable given the limited effect of sanctions levied on Russia for the Crimea incursion.1515 
And the use of offensive cyber means to attack Russian networks would likely induce rapid 
escalation while the U.S. cannot ensure escalation dominance.1516  For deterrence by denial, the 
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DNC announced the creation of a Cybersecurity Advisory Board “composed of distinguished 
experts in the field”1517 to prevent future attacks and other Democratic organizations have been 
“shoring up their cybersecurity defenses,”1518 which might all prove to be hopeless given the 
APT groups ability to easily bypass security defenses if determined to do so.  Whereas they did 
not try very hard in a less aggressive, risk adverse phishing attempt to penetrate the Republican 
National Committee computers at the time of the DNC hack.1519 
 
For the strategy of deterrence by entanglement, the question begs was the DNC intrusion 
really outside international norms of acceptable behavior? 1520 Michael Schmitt said “hacking the 
DNC’s emails is an act of political espionage, which is not a breach of international law.”1521 
Nonetheless, Schmitt said Russia’s apparent attempt to influence the outcome of the election 
“probably violates the international law barring intervention in a state’s internal affairs.”1522  Yet 
what proof besides circumstantial1523 exist that Russia directly gave the material to WikiLeaks or 
that the release was directed by Russia?1524  Even though the U.S. believed President Putin most 
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likely gave broad direction to hack U.S. political institutions, a senior administration official said 
at that time “We don’t have Putin’s fingerprints on anything or a piece of paper that shows he 
signed the order.”1525  The U.S. assessment based on analysis of intelligence, not any evidence, 
depicts how hard it is to achieve attribution to satisfy international law criteria for State 
responsibility.1526  This synopsis of deterrence strategy shortfalls is further exacerbated by 
FireEye saying the two APT groups “wanted experts and policy makers to know that Russia is 
behind it [the DNC hack].”1527  Finally, on 29 December, President Obama imposed sanctions on 
Russian entities,1528 expelled 35 Russian intelligence operatives, and closed two Russian 
recreational compounds in the United States.1529  In addition, a Joint Analysis Report released 
data on malware used by Russian intelligence services.1530 President Putin said Russia wouldn’t 
retaliate and expel U.S. diplomats and even invited their children to a New Year’s celebration at 
the Kremlin, in a public display of restraint aimed to embarrass the Obama administration.1531  
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The reality today is advanced actors continue their operations at a high pace, adapting in 
the open, with little risk of real punishment. The failure of cyber deterrence strategies highlighted 
by the U.S. election hacking episode, despite the past eight years of efforts by the Obama 
administration,1532 leaves open the question of what about the strategy of active cyber defense to 
deny benefits or impose costs?  To get into the DNC network, Crowdstrike suspected the APT 
groups may have targeted employees with “spearphishing” emails,1533 a preferred vector used by 
both Cozy Bear and Fancy Bear to target their victims.1534  The use of this common attack vector 
which has such a high success rate meant penetration was probably inevitable.1535 After which 
Cozy Bear installed the SeaDaddy implant and Fancy Bear installed X-Agent malware for 
automatic or remote execution,1536 placing themselves already at phase five of the cyber kill 
chain. Although the DNC information technology team did notice some unusual network activity 
and reported it in late April, the files were already stolen and the damage done.  Inside the 
network, the groups did have to move across two phases of the kill chain after installation, which 
opens the possibility that active cyber defense capabilities could have stopped the attack before 
action on objectives.  FireEye has seen Cozy Bear on some systems “moving laterally within a 
network. They know that their tool is going to be detected by a system that they’re about to move 
to and they’ll do it anyway because they’re such skilled hackers that they can compromise the 
system and then jump to another system and get what they need before they can be 
                                                          
1532 David Fidler, “President Obama’s Pursuit of Cyber Deterrence Ends in Failure,” Net Politics, 
January 4, 2017.  
1533 Ellen Nakashima, “Russian government hackers penetrated DNC, stole opposition research 
on Trump,” The Washington Post, June 14, 2016. 
1534 FireEye, “APT28: At the Center of the Storm,” Special Report, January 2017: 11. 
1535 Kaspersky, “The Dangers of Phishing: Help Employees Avoid the Lure of Cybercrime,” 
White Paper, 2015: 1-8. 
1536 Dmitri Alperovitch, “Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee,” 
CrowdStrike Blog, June 15, 2016. 
376 
 
quarantined.”1537 Active cyber defense operates at cyber relevant speed,1538 leveling the playing 
field to isolate the threat. 
 
The President of Crowdstrike said the DNC “was not engaged in a fair fight” since 
“you’ve got ordinary citizens who are doing hand-to-hand combat with trained military 
officers.”1539  Yet CrowdStrike, a leading private firm, are not ordinary citizens, but undoubtedly 
experts in the field.  They not only identified the two Russian intelligence-affiliated hacker 
groups in the network, but watched advanced methods to avoid detection, such as changing 
implants, modifying persistence methods, and moving to new command and control channels.1540 
CrowdStrike considers the APT groups to be the best of all the numerous nation state, criminal, 
hacktivist and terrorist groups they encounter.  In the DNC incident, CrowdStrike was in the 
network with them and in the best position to launch countermeasures outside the network.  
If the attackers were already at exfiltration, maybe CrowdStrike could have seen the files sitting 
on an overseas server.  General Michael Hayden said he is “aware of a company that did see its 
data stolen, was able to track where it had gone” and “it is not yet the waking hours during the 
work week of the country in which they believe the source of the attack emanated... and so it’s 
just sitting there on this server in a third country place waiting for the thieves to come grab it and 
bring it home.”1541  Maybe a licensed private company, deputized under existing law, and under 
proper government oversight and supervision, could have traced and deleted the DNC files.  
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Concluding Considerations 
  
 In the summer of 2015 eight top congressional leaders were briefed that Russian hackers 
were attacking the Democratic Party, but not the target because the information was so secret.1542  
A year and a half later, CrowdStrike provided proof through malware analysis that the APT 
group Fancy Bear that struck the Democratic National Committee was a unit of the GRU, 
Russia’s Main Intelligence Directorate.1543 The apparent motivation to affect U.S. public opinion 
appears to have been greater than any perceived risk induced by current deterrence strategies.  
For deterrence is a matter of perception, that “resides ultimately in the eye of the beholder.”1544  
Lieutenant General James McLaughlin has stated that the Defense Department, in a whole-of-
government approach, seeks to “deny the adversary the ability to achieve the objectives of a 
cyber attack, so our adversary will believe any attack will be futile.” Furthermore, the adversary 
must believe “that our ability to respond to an attack will result in unacceptable costs imposed on 
them” through the use of “a variety of mechanisms, including economic sanctions, diplomacy, 
law enforcement, and military action.”1545  Cumulatively these statements describe the desired 
outcomes of the contemporary deterrence strategies of retaliation, denial and entanglement. The 
problem today is malicious actors in cyberspace do not believe that “a threat of retaliation exists, 
the intended action cannot succeed, or the costs outweigh the benefits of acting.”1546  It would be 
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naïve and negligent to think they will not try “again and again.”1547  Another strategy is 
necessary to induce the perception of risk and repercussion into the wide range of malicious 
actors engaging in cyber attacks.   
  
 An alternative strategy of active cyber defense would embrace a combination of internal 
systemic resilience to deny benefits and tailored disruption capacities to impose costs.  Internal 
systemic resilience starts with closing the gap in time from compromise to discovery inside the 
network.  Mandiant claims that its Red Team is able to “obtain access to domain administrator 
credentials within three days of gaining initial access” to a system.1548  The firm argues that once 
credentials are found, it is “only a matter of time before an attacker is able to locate and gain 
access to the desired information.”  They conclude that if the average time to discovery is now at 
146 days, that is at least 143 days too long.1549  In response, active cyber defense can detect, 
verify and remediate activity along the cyber kill chain to withstand the attack.  It does not matter 
if attribution exists to identify exactly who is the actor, only that the attack is stopped before 
harm or damage from the breach occurs, to deny benefit of the attack.   Outside the network, to 
impose costs, maybe the time has come to use tailored disruption capacities that target hackers 
“with some of their own weapons: government-sanctioned malware or ransomware, software that 
locks down a computer without a user’s consent.”1550 
  
 For deterrence to be effective, the strategy must be based on capability (possess means to 
influence behavior), credibility (instilling believability), and communication (of right 
message).1551  The level of skill seen in the DNC hacks is not limited to APT groups, as Kevin 
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Haley, director Symantec Security Response states “Advanced criminal attack groups now echo 
the skill sets of nation-state attackers.”1552 Active cyber defense has the capability to withstand 
an attack by any of these actors through use of numerous heuristics or attack detectors combined 
with automated remediation actions.  Also, the DNC hack represents another use of proxy groups 
for plausible deniability, codified in the “inevitable Kremlin response: Prove It.”1553  Inside the 
network, active cyber defense has the credibility to block the attack before objectives, denying 
the need to “prove it,” or even better, outside the network, to find the files and take discrete 
action.  Finally, the DNC hack that induced unprecedented interference in the electoral process 
of a nation signifies a test by Moscow of the limits of acceptable state behavior in cyberspace.1554 
Signaling, a corollary to communication, is a foreign policy instrument “to change the cost-
benefit calculations of states engaging in or sponsoring” malicious cyber activity.1555  Any 
decision to legally allow companies to engage malicious actors would communicate national 
resolve.  Senator Whitehouse has said that “policymakers should consider allowing companies to 
engage in “active defense” of their networks,” ranging from “tracking the flow of a company’s 
information across networks,” or to hack back where it seems “to make sense in certain, very 
narrow circumstances.”1556  Although the parameters and limitations have yet to be fully 
explored, the empirically grounded midrange theory of active cyber defense, comprised of the 
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concepts of systemic resilience and disruption capacities, potentially meets the conditions of 
capability, credibility and communication to be considered or selected as an alternative strategy 
to achieve deterrence within the cyber arena.    
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APPENDIX 
 
National Strategy Agenda 
 
The general theory of strategy enables a nation to cope with serious challenges to national 
security.  For the United States, the President declares that “significant malicious cyber-enabled 
activities originating from, or directed by persons located, in whole or in substantial part, outside 
the United States continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, 
foreign policy and economy of the United States.”1557  Yet this threat is not unique to the United 
States.  In a 2016 industry survey of medium size organizations representing 10 countries across 
North America, Europe, Asia Pacific, and Latin America, the percentage compromised by at 
least one successful cyber attack in the past twelve months ranged from 63 to 89 percent, with 
more than half between one to five times.1558  For these countries and any other, the principles 
and priorities of a national security strategy can guide the use of power and influence in 
countering the cyber threat.  The strategy can signal resolve and readiness to deter, and if 
necessary to defeat malicious actors that threaten the advancement or survival of national 
interests.  A smart national security strategy relies not only on military power to protect interests 
but draws upon all elements of national strength as means in a comprehensive national security 
agenda.   
 
For the deterrence of malicious actors in cyberspace, evidence has shown that the strategy 
of active cyber defense is technically capable and legally viable, at least to some extent, to enable 
the achievement of the central premise of deterrence; the altering of the behavior of an actor.  
Active cyber defense reinforces both deterrence by denial and deterrence by retaliation.  A 
national strategy agenda for active cyber defense has promise to instill in an actor the belief that 
the intended action cannot succeed and that a threat of retaliation exists. According to Admiral 
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Mike Rogers, Director of the National Security Agency, “We are in a world now where, despite 
your best efforts, you must prepare and assume that you will be penetrated.”1559  His warning to 
the audience at a London Stock Exchange event came shortly after similar comments by 
Jonathan Kidd, the Chief Information Security Officer for the United Kingdom Met Office that 
“You can’t assume you’re not already compromised.”1560  In response, Kidd contends the best 
course of action is to develop a strategy on how to deal with that reality. That strategy is one of 
active cyber defense that embraces a combination of internal systemic resilience to halt 
malicious cyber activity after an intrusion with tailored disruption capacities to thwart malicious 
actor objectives.  Therefore to implement a strategy of active cyber defense, a national strategy 
agenda would be based on the two pillars of resilience to withstand a cyber attack and disruption 
to obstruct the malicious actor.   
 
The first pillar of resilience prepares society for surprise in cyberspace through 
implementation of automated and integrated capabilities that act only inside organizational 
boundaries.  The second pillar of disruption averts malicious actor asymmetries in cyberspace 
through countermeasures performed either by or under the supervision and approval of proper 
authorities.  Since resources for a national strategy agenda will never be limitless, policy 
tradeoffs and hard choices among many competing priorities will have to be made.  In order to 
set the debate for implementation by any country, this appendix begins by delineating how the 
national strategy pillars of resilience and disruption, enabled through a comprehensive approach, 
reside currently in principle in the cyber security strategies of international organizations and 
multiple nations.  The appendix then explores architectures and arrangements in work in the 
United States to strengthen the two pillars for adaptation or use as deemed fit by other nations.  
The appendix finishes with policy recommendations and priority suggestions to guide tradeoffs 
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and choices in action plans that implement a national strategy agenda for active cyber defense 
based on the two pillars of resilience and disruption.     
 
Cyber Security Strategies 
 
A national security strategy addresses the top strategic risks to national interests.  
Enduring national interests typically fall into four categories, namely the security of the nation 
and its citizens; a strong economy that promotes prosperity; respect for universal values; and a 
rules-based international order.  To advance these interests most effectively, leaders pursue a 
national security agenda that allocates resources and prioritizes efforts according to strategic risk.  
For the United States, standing at the top of the list of strategic risks is a catastrophic attack on 
the U.S. homeland or critical infrastructure.  Consequently the present U.S. National Security 
Strategy stresses the importance of “fortifying our critical infrastructure against all hazards, 
especially cyber espionage and attack.”   That objective necessitates working with the owners 
and operators of critical cyber infrastructure across every sector to decrease vulnerabilities and 
increase resilience.1561  In essence, this mandate means using a comprehensive approach which 
brings together all elements of society to make the nation resilient in the face of diverse threats.  
For that reason, Presidential Policy Directive, PPD-21 “advances a national unity of effort to 
strengthen and maintain” not just secure and functioning, but also resilient critical 
infrastructure.1562  The emphasis on unity of effort for the purpose of resilience is also found in 
other cyber security strategies of international organizations and multiple nations.   
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Internal Systemic Resilience 
 
Resilience at the international level is particularly important because digitally 
interconnected infrastructures that span the globe create both dependencies and vulnerabilities.  
The potential impact on society of disruptions to this fragile equilibrium makes interaction 
between the private sector which owns and operates most critical infrastructure and the public 
sector crucial to managing risk.1563  The Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union 
highlights the value of this interaction in a guiding principle that all relevant actors, whether the 
private sector or public authorities, need to recognize shared responsibility to ensure security of 
information and communications technologies.  Accordingly, the European Union made 
“achieving cyber resilience” the first strategic priority for action in their Strategy.1564  To 
promote cyber resilience among members, the European Union Strategy recognizes a substantial 
effort is necessary to enhance private and public capacities and processes to prevent, detect and 
handle cyber security incidents.  Since gaps exist in national capacities, the European Union 
suggests members adopt a national strategy and cooperation plan, with incentives for private 
actors to invest in security solutions and provide reliable data on cyber incidents.1565  
 
A central principle of the National Cyber Security Strategy of the Czech Republic is a 
“comprehensive approach to cyber security based on principles of subsidiarity and 
cooperation.”1566  The nation aims for coordination of activities and enhancement of trust among 
all stakeholders.  Main goals for protection of national critical information infrastructure include: 
to enhance network resistance and integrity, share information in an efficient manner, and 
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increase capacities for active cyber defense and cyber attack countermeasures.  Likewise, the 
Italian National Strategic Framework for Cyberspace Security recognizes that network 
interdependence, asymmetric threats and the pervasive nature of cyberspace calls for a holistic 
approach and synergistic effort of all involved stakeholders. A strategic guideline of the Italian 
Strategy that echoes the tenets of active defense is to “leverage the national capability to analyze, 
prevent, mitigate and effectively react to the multi-dimensional cyber threat.”1567  The National 
Cyber Security Strategy of the United Kingdom specifically calls for Active Cyber Defense as a 
Defend Element in order to implement “security measures to strengthen a network or system to 
make it more robust against attack.”1568  
 
The Estonian Cyber Security Strategy recognizes that civilian and military resources 
must be integrated into a functioning whole to ensure the ability to provide national defense in 
cyberspace.  One of the aims of this Strategy is to “describe methods for ensuring the 
uninterrupted operation and resilience of vital services.”1569 Therefore the information systems 
that are necessary for the operation of vital services are to be managed in a way that provides the 
means to manage risks.  Furthermore, the Estonian Strategy dictates that civil and military 
cooperation must “function adequately in cyberspace with regards to warning, deterrence and 
active defense.”1570  The Cyber Security Strategy of Georgia also aims to set up a system that 
will “facilitate resilience of cyber infrastructure against cyber threats.”1571  It calls for 
cooperation modalities between state agencies that extend to public-private partnerships.  Like 
for Estonia, the Georgian Strategy appeals for a new legislative framework in order to develop 
and implement effective security measures.  
                                                          
1567 Presidency of the Council of Ministers, National Strategic Framework for Cyberspace 
Security, December 2013: 6-20. 
1568 HM Government, National Cyber Security Strategy 2016-2021, 2016: 33. 
1569 Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communication, Cyber Security Strategy 2014-2017, 
2014: 6-8. 
1570 Ibid, 10.  
1571 The Government of Georgia, Cyber Security Strategy of Georgia 2012-2015, 2012: 3-5.  
386 
 
 
In the Pacific, Australia’s Cyber Security Strategy emphasizes the need for government 
and business to collaborate “to strengthen our economy and national security by building greater 
resilience to cyber security threats.”1572  To achieve the goal of strong cyber defenses, the 
government will “co-design national voluntary Cyber Security Guidelines with the private sector 
to specify good practice.”  Furthermore, it will “establish a layered approach for sharing real 
time public-private threat information.”1573  Similarly, the Japanese Cybersecurity Strategy 
recognizes that in order to “counter diversified cyber threats appropriately; the public and private 
sectors must closely collaborate in sharing information on system failures possibility caused by 
cyber attacks.”1574  Therefore the Japanese Government intends to work to build platforms for an 
interactive and advanced information sharing environment.  The Japanese Strategy emphasizes 
the need to limit the information to be shared and conceal informer identities, so they will not 
suffer unreasonable loss or disadvantage.   
 
Tailored Disruption Capacities 
 
The military has a role in protecting national interests in their assigned missions in 
defense of the nation.  For instance in the United States, U.S. Cyber Command teams with 
federal, foreign, and industry partners to help “mitigate, halt, and attribute acts of disruption and 
destruction and campaigns of cyber espionage; dissuade adversaries from malicious behavior; 
and strengthen the resilience of Department of Defense systems to withstand attacks.”1575  These 
functions articulated in the Commander’s Vision and Guidance require building information 
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sharing mechanisms to ensure regular contact with those whom Cyber Command operates and 
fights alongside, both inside and outside the Department of Defense. For instance, Cyber 
Command teams with the National Security Agency to leverage its proven expertise in 
intelligence analysis and information assurance.  When necessary, the Command will “help other 
agencies defend the nation against cyber attacks from abroad, especially if they would cause loss 
of life, property destruction, or significant foreign policy and economic consequences.”1576  And 
when called upon, Cyber Command will “utilize appropriate authorities and policies, especially 
in our role as part of the federal government’s response to attacks on critical infrastructure.”1577   
Besides the United States, a few other nations have developed strategies that embrace broad 
tenets for use of tailored disruption capacities in a comprehensive approach to cyber security.  
 
The Dutch Defense Cyber Command, established in 2014, is a smaller equivalent of the 
U.S. Cyber Command.  It is the central entity in the Netherlands for the development and use of 
offensive capability.1578   The country’s Defense Cyber Strategy delineates that offensive cyber 
capabilities are “aimed at influencing or disabling the actions of an opponent.”1579  Since the 
digital systems of potential opponents are vulnerable, cyberspace can be used for operations 
against that opponent.  The strategy recognizes that a large scale attack against society could 
have enormous impact and therefore the armed forces must be capable of taking action against 
digital threats to society.  The armed forces have a core task to make capabilities available to 
civil authorities on request, and with the proper legal or regulatory basis, measures can be taken 
to improve the security and availability of Dutch cyberspace.  Although in organizing a 
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comprehensive approach in response to large-scale digital disruptions, the strategy recognizes 
that roles, tasks and responsibilities have to be clear.1580  Any use by the military of capabilities 
in cyber operations would fall under the categories of Defensive Cyber Operations for proactive 
detection and termination of intruders and Offensive Counter Operations for preventive 
attacks.1581  
 
In 2015, the Israeli Defense Force decided to establish in two years a Cyber Command to 
lead the military’s operational activities.  Although in Israel, protection of computerized systems 
in the civilian sector has never been put under the protection of the Israeli Defense Force.  The 
reason to limit the military role appears to stem from ethical, ideological and political values.  
Any further analysis on reasons and roles is difficult as Israel has never published an open, 
formal cyber security strategy, exercising political preference to avoid formal binding 
declarations and even using classification to shroud the topic, while they are known to leverage 
support from the private sector.1582   Yet the nation has taken public steps to review national 
cyber policy through commission of their National Cyber Initiative in 2010.  A task force was 
charged with putting Israel among “the top five countries leading the cyber field.”1583  Many of 
their recommendations centered on aspects of Research and Development infrastructure, 
collaboration and products.  The result of subsequent efforts is impressive as “Israel is 
responsible for more exports of cyber-related products and services than all other nations 
combined apart from the United States.”1584  In fact over the past five years, the number of Israeli 
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cyber security companies has doubled to 300.  Given the propensity of former Israeli Defense 
Force members, trained to use cutting edge technologies under tight discipline, to join these 
companies,1585 there is no shortage of talent for external disruption capacities.  
 
Architectures and Arrangements 
 
Active cyber defense focuses on “the integration and automation of many services and 
mechanisms to execute response actions in cyber-relevant time.”1586  The term cyber-relevant 
time ranges from nanoseconds to minutes depending on the location of the malicious actor and 
activity.  The elements of active cyber defense synchronize “the real-time detection, analysis, and 
mitigation of threats to critical networks and systems.”1587  These active activities strive to stop 
or limit damage through the integration and automation of cyber-security solutions.  Sets of 
solutions are deployed “across the interior and at the boundary of a network enterprise.”1588  
They can be unique tools integrated in a single platform or individual solutions, like for endpoint 
detection and response.  In the United States, a collaborative effort between the National Security 
Agency, the Department of Homeland Security and the Johns Hopkins University Applied 
Physics Laboratory has produced the reference architecture for the fundamental concept of 
Integrated Adaptive Cyber Defense (IACD), supported by a cooperative arrangement for 
Automated Indicator Sharing (AIS).  A key principle in the design of active cyber defense is for 
response actions to be automatable and not inherently automatic.  While the intent is for these 
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1586 MJ Herring and KD Willett, “Active Cyber Defense: A Vision for Real-Time Cyber 
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actions to stay inside the network, there are other innovative programs in the United States that 
could lead to military and civilian capacity for disruptive actions outside the network. 
 
Internal Systemic Resilience 
 
Integrated Adaptive Cyber Defense (IACD).   The goal of Integrated Adaptive Cyber 
Defense is to “dramatically change the timeline and effectiveness of cyber defense secure 
integration and automation” to enable faster response times and defensive capabilities.”1589  The 
IACD reference architecture is intended to inform and guide “cyber service providers, network 
owners and product vendors on the capabilities and interfaces that can enable an agile, 
dynamically responsive and resilient cyber infrastructure.”1590  The concept starts with the 
premise that two key issues hamper effective cyber defense.  The first is malicious actor’s ability 
to reuse cyber-attack tools and techniques against multiple targets because similar organizations 
do not share information.  The second is cyber attack response times are too slow to address 
alerts, primarily because existing solutions rely on humans in the loop.  The latter has become 
even more severe because of attacker use of automated tools.  IACD seeks to reverse these trends 
by improving cyber security automation and information sharing and encouraging 
interoperability between commercial tools.  Accordingly the concept relies on three foundational 
capabilities:  
 
 Automation that enables “automated sensing, sense-making, decision-making, and 
courses of action responses” within cyber-relevant time. 
                                                          
1589 IACD Community, “Integrated Adaptive Cyber Defense (IACD) Community Day: October 
3th, 2016,” Email Announcement, September 19, 2016.  
1590 K. Done, et al., “Towards a Capability-Based Architecture for Cyberspace Defense,” 
Concept Paper Approved for Public Release, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. 
National Security Agency Information Assurance Directorate, and the Johns Hopkins University 
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 Information sharing that enables “rapid sharing of indicators, analytics and 
effective courses of action” among organizations. 
 Interoperability that enables “a variety of commercial vendors’ tools to function 
with each other without the need for pairwise, custom interfaces.”1591 
 
The capability-based reference architecture supports a vendor-agnostic plug-and-play operating 
environment to enable organizations to select commercial vendor products that best suit their 
needs.  Ultimately the fundamental objective of IACD is to reduce response time “from months 
to milliseconds.”1592  Therefore the reference architecture centers on the integration of solutions 
that provide the capabilities to accomplish goals that achieve this objective.  To promote 
automation, IACD provides for machine implementation of capabilities to migrate people from 
‘in’ to ‘on’ the loop in cyberspace operations. To promote sharing, IACD provides a robust, 
standards-based sharing capability.  To promote interoperability, IACD enables open-standards-
based capability interfaces for machine-to-machine information exchange.1593   IACD conforms 
to other efforts and environments, such as the NIST Cybersecurity Framework for automation of 
the Detect function, and to the Cyber Kill Chain for preventing any step to disable the attack.  
The architecture describes top-level IACD capabilities and functions, to include:  
 
 Secure orchestration, control and management: of “interactions among the IACD 
capabilities.”  
 Control messaging: through “a standard set of messages for compliant 
components”  
                                                          
1591 Ibid, 2.  
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 Sensor or actuator control and data normalization: for “secure communications of 
data, commands, and status with heterogeneous collections of sensors and 
actuators.” 
 Sense-Making: that “evaluates cyber events and intelligence data” to determine 
whether an alert is necessary. 
 Decision-Making: which “recommends an appropriate response based on 
enterprise policies and risks and impact to the enterprise.” 
 Response Controlling: that “sequences workflows” and “coordinates responses.” 
 Information Sharing: that enables secure communications for “standardized 
exchanges of indicators of compromise” and “recommended courses of 
action.”1594   
 
The IACD activity above intends to increase the cost of an attack by reducing cyber incident 
response time and limiting actor ability to reuse tools and techniques.  The concept has been 
proven feasible through spirals that demonstrate how the integration of commercial products can 
detect malware, generate indicators, initiate and share responses between organizations.1595  
 
Automated Indicator Sharing (AIS).  IACD conforms to the Cybersecurity Act of 2015 by 
enabling and promoting trusted information sharing mechanisms.1596  The Act imposed a 90 day 
deadline for the Department of Homeland Security, in coordination with other Federal entities, to 
“develop and implement a capability and process to commence real time, automated sharing of 
                                                          
1594 Ibid, 6-7. 
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cyber threat indicators and defensive measures.”1597 In response DHS deployed the Automated 
Indicator Sharing system, which provides “the capability for the timely exchange of relevant and 
actionable cyber threat indicators among federal departments and agencies and the private 
sector.”1598 An example of an indicator is a malicious IP address. The goal of the AIS initiative is 
to “commoditize cyber threat indicators” so they are “shared broadly among the public and 
private sector.”1599 The National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center manages 
the system to allow bidirectional sharing with participants, who will not be identified as the 
source of an indicator unless they grant consent.  AIS takes measures to ensure appropriate 
privacy and civil liberties by performing “automated analyses and technical mitigations to delete 
Personally Identifiable Information (PII) that is not directly related to a cyber threat;” 
incorporating “elements of human review on select fields of certain indicators  to ensure 
automated processes are functioning properly;” minimizing “the amount of data” in an indicator 
to “what is directly related to a cyber threat;” retaining only “information needed to address the 
cyber threat;” and ensuring any information collected is “used only for network defense or 
limited law enforcement purposes.”1600 
 
Also, as mandated by the Cybersecurity Act of 2015, the Department of Homeland 
Security released guidance to assist private sector and federal entities share cyber threat 
indicators and defensive measures. DHS published policies and procedures relating to the 
receipt, processing, and dissemination by all federal entities of cyber threat indicators and 
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defensive measures submitted through real-time means and through non-automated means,1601 
along with privacy and civil liberties guidelines for such actions.1602 The Act did specify that 
besides the creation of a real time, automated process between information systems, other 
acceptable means for the sharing of cyber intelligence are through electronic mail or media and 
through an interactive forum on an Internet website.  Therefore, DHS offers electronic 
opportunities to share cyber threat indicators and defensive measures via web form and 
email.   If emailed, DHS requests the following fields:  type (either indicator or defensive 
measure); valid time of incident or knowledge of topic; tactics, techniques, and procedures; and a 
confidence assertion for the value of the indicator (high, medium or low).1603  Former Deputy 
Homeland Security Secretary, Alejandro Mayorkas, remarked at the Billington International 
Cybersecurity Summit, that the information sharing legislation and platform is a collaborative 
effort that “protects not just various parts of the economy, but the entire online environment.”1604 
 
The Automated Indicator Sharing capability leverages STIX (Structured Threat 
Information eXpression) and TAXII (Trusted Automated eXchange of Indicator Information) 
specifications for machine-to-machine communication.  STIX is a structured language and 
TAXII is the preferred mechanism to exchange it.  STIX describes “cyber threat information so it 
can be shared, stored, and [analyzed] in a consistent manner that facilitates automation.”1605   The 
STIX framework conveys the full range of cyber threat data elements to include observables, 
                                                          
1601 Department of Homeland Security and Justice, “Final Procedures Related to the Receipt of 
Cyber Threat Indicators and Defensive Measures by the Federal Government,” June 15, 2016: 3-
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1602 Department of Homeland Security and Justice, “Privacy and Civil Liberties Final Guidelines: 
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indicators, incidents, adversary tactics, techniques and procedures, exploit targets, courses of 
action (contains defensive measures), campaigns, and threat actors.  TAXII standardizes the 
automated exchange of cyber threat information.  TAXII defines “a set of services and message 
exchanges that, when implemented, enable sharing of actionable cyber threat information across 
organization and product/service boundaries.”1606  TAXII uses an XML data format and 
HTTP/HTTPS message protocols.  International in scope and free for public use, STIX and 
TAXII are “community-driven technical specifications designed to enable automated 
information sharing for cybersecurity situational awareness, real-time network defense and 
sophisticated threat analysis.”1607 
 
Tailored Disruption Capacities 
 
Cyber Mission Force (CMF).  In the United States the build of the Cyber Mission Force 
at U.S. Cyber Command underpins the Department of Defense’s primary missions in 
cyberspace.1608  The Department is working to create a total of 133 CMF teams comprised of 
6200 personnel and to achieve their full operational capability by September 2018.  The teams 
are:  
 Cyber National Mission Force teams to defend the nation by seeing adversary 
activity, blocking attacks, and maneuvering to defeat them; 
 Cyber Combat Mission Force teams to conduct military cyber operations in 
support of combatant commands; 
 Cyber Protection Force teams to defend the DoD information networks, protect 
priority missions and prepare cyber forces for combat; and 
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 Cyber Support teams to provide analytic and planning support to National 
Mission and Combat Mission teams.1609 
 
Portions of the Cyber Mission Force are honing their offensive skills in cyber operations against 
the self-proclaimed Islamic State.  Former Defense Secretary Ashton Carter said “the methods 
we’re using are new...and some of them applicable to the other challenges that I described other 
than ISIL,” namely Iran, North Korea, Russia and China.1610  The Cyber National Mission Force 
“plans, directs, and synchronizes full-spectrum cyberspace operations to deter, disrupt, and, if 
necessary, defeat adversary cyber actors to defend the nation.”1611  Defending the nation 
missions include defending the U.S. and its interests against cyberattacks of “significant 
consequence,” defense of the nation’s critical infrastructure when directed by the president or 
secretary of defense; and alignment to the most sophisticated cyber adversaries.  National 
Mission Force teams are tasked with the Defensive Cyber Operations – Response Action mission 
to stop attacks outside the network.  They are “trained to the highest technical standards” and 
“operate in accordance will all legal and policy guidance impacting operations outside friendly 
cyberspace.”1612 
 
The obtainment of a dedicated and talented professional cyber force to conduct both 
offensive and defensive operations is a daunting task for the military given national shortages in 
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manpower with critical technical skills and competitive pay gaps with the private sector.  One 
way to leverage the civilian workforce is through employment of cyber militias. In the United 
States, militias are found in the form of National Guard units.  General Joseph Lengyel, Chief of 
the National Guard Bureau told the audience at the North American International Cyber Summit 
2016 that “the civilian-acquired skills of its members enable the National Guard to make unique 
contributions in the cyber realm.”1613  Thus the National Guard works closely with the combatant 
commands, especially Cyber Command, to fight off cyber incidents.  Lengyel went on to say 
“we practice our capabilities routinely at all levels.”1614  That could include in the fight against 
the Islamic State, per comments on the 262nd Squadron by Defense Secretary Ashton Carter that 
“units like this can also participate in offensive cyber operations...to secure the prompt defeat of 
ISIL.”1615  Carter says use of the National Guard “brings in the high-tech sector in a very direct 
way to the mission of protecting the country.”  The Pentagon is building new facilities while the 
Guard launches 13 new cyber units across the country to have a total of 30 by 2019.1616  
However as the National Guard accelerates the fielding of cyber forces it faces a backlog in 
training which includes basic skills and certifications.1617   
 
U.S. Department of Defense Manual 8570.01 provides guidance for the certification of 
all military and civilian personnel conducting information assurance functions.1618  The 
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certification program establishes a baseline understanding of principles and practices for each 
position, specialty and skill level.  Approved baseline certifications and providers are published 
on the DISA Information Assurance Support Environment website.1619   For example a common 
baseline certification is “Comp TIA Security+” for Information Assurance Technician Level I 
which is obtained by an examination.1620  More advanced certifications include Global 
Information Assurance Certification Security Essentials, Intrusion Analyst and Enterprise 
Defender.1621  One certification for specialist that appears more applicable for outside the 
network is Certified Ethical Hacker offered by the EC-Council.  A Certified Ethical Hacker is “a 
skilled professional who understands and knows how to look for weaknesses and vulnerabilities 
in target systems and uses the same knowledge and tools as a malicious hacker, but in a lawful 
and legitimate manner to assess the security posture of a target system(s).”1622   Courses for the 
range of certifications are available from a number of training providers, but the lead vendor is 
SANS whose website links their courses to the certifications.1623  Of note a new two day course 
offered by SANS is entitled “Active Defense, Offensive Countermeasures and Cyber Deception” 
which includes tools “to annoy attackers, determine who is attacking you, and finally, attack the 
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attackers.”1624  Since contractors supporting information assurance functions also have to comply 
with the certification requirements, private sector personnel could also possess necessary skills 
for tailored disruption.     
 
Defense Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUx).  In May 2015 the Pentagon set up a new 
office in Silicon Valley to harness the creativity of the West Coast technology community.1625  
The Engineer and Navy SEAL that initially manned the Defense Innovation Unit Experimental 
or DIUx for short were picked for their tech sector experience and entrepreneurial mindsets. 
Their goal was to search out commercial dual-use technologies, to include in cyber.1626  Less 
than a year later the U.S. Defense Secretary overhauled the leadership, structure, reporting and 
resources of the office. It had suffered from an overly broad purpose and unrealistic demands.1627  
DIUx 2.0 was launched by the Secretary with new processing power in funds and a new 
operating system of partner style leadership.1628  A third feature was the creation of offices in 
other innovation hubs, starting with Boston and Austin.1629  The result of the reboot was award of 
a total of $36 million in contracts for 12 projects via an acquisition technique named Commercial 
Solutions Opening.  The largest of the awards for $12.7 went to Tanium to build a cyber 
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situational awareness platform to monitor millions of DoD computer endpoints in real-time,1630 
in effect enabling timely detection that could lead to rapid response to harm. 
 
Then Defense Secretary Carter highlighted in his remarks announcing DIUx 2.0 that 
“another way we’re investing in innovation is through people,” by providing “on-ramps and off-
ramps for technical talent to flow between DOD and the tech sector.”1631  An example of this 
ramp is the Defense Digital Service office that brings civilian techies into the Pentagon for a 
project or period of time to do something meaningful, including improving cybersecurity.1632  
One of the very first initiatives of the office in May 2016 was the “Hack the Pentagon” program, 
the first federal “bug bounty.”1633  Hackers were given legal consent to perform specific 
techniques against Defense Department websites and received financial awards for submitting 
vulnerability reports.  HackerOne, a Silicon Valley firm that offers vulnerability disclosure as a 
service assisted in recruiting 1,410 participants that generated 1,189 vulnerability reports over 
three weeks.1634  The program was so successful that a second round was contracted in October 
2016 with HackerOne and also Synack, but this time for more sensitive systems.  A former NSA 
employee said these ethical hackers will “look outside the box to come up with creative attacks 
in the same way an attacker would.”1635  A new Pentagon vulnerability disclosure policy will 
allow hackers to submit information with a high level of anonymity with no restrictions on 
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citizenship.1636 The obtainment of this type of skilled talent through private sector arrangements 
proves that building capacity for external disruption is feasible and legitimate.   
 
Policies and Priorities 
 
Tony Scott, U.S. Federal Chief Information Officer candidly stated in late 2015 “as cyber 
threats become increasingly sophisticated and persistent, so must our actions to tackle them.”1637  
His remarks heralded the release of the Cybersecurity Strategy and Implementation Plan (CSIP) 
for the Federal Government.  The Plan’s second objective is the most pertinent to the strategy of 
active cyber defense, namely: “Timely Detection of and Rapid Response to cyber incidents.”1638 
Accordingly CSIP directs a series of actions to “improve capabilities for identifying and 
detecting vulnerabilities and threats, enhance protections of assets and information, and further 
develop robust response and recovery capabilities to ensure readiness and resilience when 
incidents inevitably occur.”1639  Specific improvements for objective two include examine 
private sector technologies for behavioral-based analytics, implement automated indicator 
sharing, and create incident response best practices to ensure appropriate mitigation in a timely 
manner.  Consistent with these broad themes, a national strategy agenda to implement the 
strategy of active cyber defense based on the pillars of resilience and disruption can be based on 
the following policy recommendations and priority suggestions.  
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Internal Systemic Resilience 
 
Policy: Encourage the adoption of integrated and automated capabilities, informed by cyber 
threat intelligence, that can detect, verify and remediate malicious activity in cyber-relevant time.  
 
Priorities:  
1. Design common open standards for active cyber defense inside the network that are 
applicable across the government as well as for critical infrastructure. 
a. Promulgate a reference architecture that centers on the automation and integration 
of services and mechanisms to reduce response time from months to milliseconds. 
b. Adopt, adapt, or develop common communications mediums, standard interfaces, 
and standard message sets to enable security tool interoperability.    
c. Demonstrate the art-of-the-possible to defenders and influence the marketplace of 
cyber security solutions including endpoint detection and response. 
 
2. Create incentives to adopt common open standards for active cyber defense that can 
enable responsive and resilient critical infrastructure to manage the risk of cyber attack. 
a. Provide relief from regulatory requirements, certifications for government usage, 
or preferences for government contracts or grants. 
b. Reduce cyber insurance premiums based on positive security posture assessments 
of capabilities that prevent financial or data loss, service interruption, legal action, 
system or reputation damage.  
c. Offset world-wide shortage of cybersecurity professionals with automated 
intrusion responses as the number of devices, systems and networks grow at an 
exponential rate.1640  
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3. Develop and implement a capability and process to commence real time, automated 
sharing of cyber threat indicators and defensive measures between private and public entities.  
a. Grant legal protections in the form of antitrust exemptions and liability immunity 
to private entities that send the government indicators or measures.   
b. Create a voluntary system that will encourage private and public entities to share 
indicators or measures while protecting classified information, intelligence 
sources and methods, and privacy and civil liberties.  
c. Issue guidelines for the receipt, processing, and dissemination by the government 
of indicators and measures submitted through real-time and non-automated 
means, to include guidelines concerning privacy and civil liberties. 
d. Leverage proven specifications and mechanisms for machine-to-machine 
transmission of indicators and measures between private and public entities.    
 
Tailored Disruption Capacities 
 
Policy: Allow either state agencies or licensed private companies, whichever is best positioned to 
respond to breaches, to deploy their comparative advantage in securing victim networks. 
 
Priorities:  
1. Create a legal framework that accommodates the use of disruptive countermeasures 
outside the network by properly authorized entities under certain conditions.  
a. Recognize authorized circumstances for the State to employ countermeasures that 
are acceptable under international law, primarily for an injured state, in a plea of 
necessity, or in respond to a lack of due diligence.  
b. Codify if a law enforcement or intelligence agency could deputize private firms to 
act under their authority in pursuing attackers under current provisions (such as 
1030(f) in the CFAA in the United States) in limited circumstances and whether 
those provisions provide immunity for the firm:  
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i. If not, determine if a lack of explicit self-defense provisions in domestic 
law does not preclude the application of common law defense of property 
by licensed private companies.  
ii. Or at a minimum, add a qualified active defense right to domestic law that 
provides licensed private companies with immunity from liability for 
third-party harm if caused during state authorized responses.  
 
2. Create habitual relations with cyber security industry firms and personnel to employ 
cutting edge technologies in detection, verification, and remediation of malicious cyber behavior.  
a. Establish government outreach programs to find, adopt, and harness commercial 
dual-use high tech solutions that enable responses in cyber relevant time.    
b. Employ commercial and public skill sets in crowd sourced solutions to security 
challenges beyond the scope and capability of government agencies such as in 
bug bounty programs.   
c. Engage leading cyber security vendors in the investigation of high profile 
breaches to leverage and position their talent in the cyber kill chain of the most 
sophisticated actors. 
   
3. Identify thresholds and circumstances for either state government or licensed private 
companies acting under their authority to respond outside the network to a cyber attack.1641 
a. Determine if the establishment of clear “red lines” for cyber attacks that warrant a 
response is necessary or if best left undefined to allow for some level of strategic 
ambiguity for political decisions.1642 
b. Delineate what thresholds warrant a military response, such as in defense of the 
nation and its interests against “attacks of significant consequence” defined in the 
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United States as loss of life, significant property damage, serious adverse foreign 
policy consequences, or serious economic impact.1643 
c. Determine if responses to cyber attacks that below the threshold of “significant 
consequences” are more suited for other agencies or licensed private companies 
as the military is “not involved in the majority of major cyber incidents that 
occur.”1644  
 
The above policy recommendations and priority suggestions are by no means exhaustive but 
offer a start point for action plans.  Another source to ponder is the Active Cyber Defense Task 
Force Project Report released in October 2016 that specifies an explicit set of relevant actions for 
government agencies and private sector companies to facilitate the implementation of their 
proposed framework for active defense.1645   Pertinent to consideration of any actions are 
remarks made by the Deputy Commander, U.S. Cyber Command Lieutenant General James 
McLaughlin, regarding their success will be dependent on the ability to acquire “the latest, best 
offensive and defensive tools available” combined with the “quality” and “proficiency” of people 
to use them.1646  A national strategy agenda for active cyber defense based on the two pillars of 
resilience and disruption will bring in the best people and capabilities to achieve deterrence 
within the cyber arena.  
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